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few people envied David Kaczynski. In 1996, he found some old writings by 
his brother Ted that were similar in tone and content to a manifesto submit-
ted to newspapers in 1995 by a feared terrorist, known to law enforcement 
agents as the Unabomber. David was then faced with an agonizing choice 
about whether to disclose his discovery to federal investigators. He ulti-
mately revealed Ted’s name, believing that he had assurances from federal 
authorities that they would not pursue the death penalty against his brother, 
whom David believed to be mentally ill. When Attorney General Janet Reno 
decided, nonetheless, to pursue a capital case, David was devastated.
1
 Later, 
Ted Kaczynski pled guilty to charges that carried a life sentence.
2
 Subsequently, 
David Kaczynski became an anti-death penalty advocate.
3
David Kaczynski is perhaps the best-known example in recent years of a 
family member who provided law enforcement offi  cials with the critical 
information that led to the arrest of a loved one.
4
 Bernie Madoff ’s sons’ recent 
choice to turn in their father for his giant investment fraud is another head-
line-grabbing instance of this confl ict between family loyalty and public 
duties. Unsurprisingly, many family members confronted with a dilemma 
like David Kaczynski’s make an entirely diff erent choice.
Consider the Sheinbein family, for example. In 1997, a high school senior 
named Samuel Sheinbein was charged with murder after police found the 
burned and dismembered body of an acquaintance in the garage of a vacant 
house in Maryland.
5
 But Sheinbein was never brought to trial in Maryland 
because he fl ed to Israel within days of the murder, and Israel subsequently 
refused to extradite him.
6
So how was a seventeen-year-old able to get to Israel so quickly? Prosecutors 
alleged that, after learning that his son was a murder suspect, Samuel’s father, 
Sol Sheinbein, brought Samuel, who was then hiding in New York, his passport, 
some clothing, and a ticket to Israel. Sol also drove his son to the airport,
7
 and, a 
few days later, followed his son to Israel, where he continues to live and work.
8
 
Prosecutors in Maryland subsequently fi led a misdemeanor charge against him 
Introduction
xi
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for obstructing a police investigation. But because of the nature of the charge 
and his status as an Israeli citizen, Sol also could not be extradited.
9
After Samuel Sheinbein pled guilty before an Israeli court and was 
sentenced to twenty-four years in prison,
10
 Sol gave his fi rst interview to an 
Israeli newspaper. In defending his actions, Sol, a practicing lawyer, stated: 
“I did some simple soul-searching and I came to the conclusion that with all 
due respect to the law, I am fi rst of all a father and only after that a citizen.”
11
 
Samuel Sheinbein’s mother, in an earlier statement, claimed, “any parents 
would go and would do what we are doing.”
12
Th e choices David Kaczynski and Sol Sheinbein made arise virtually 
every day in every jurisdiction, where family members have the opportunity 
to facilitate or obstruct enforcement of the criminal law. Indeed, the media 
recently reported stories about fugitives whose family members created 
alibis (including reporting the death of the fugitive) for them;
13
 criminals who 
perpetrated their frauds with the assistance of family members;
14
 and white-
collar criminals whose spouses off ered testimony or other evidence in 
exchange for a reduction of the criminal liability they themselves faced.
15
Th e confl ict between duties as citizens and loyalties as family members has 
long been explored in literature—most prominently in Antigone, Sophocles’ 
play about a young woman’s decision to defy the ruler Creon in favor of 
aff ording her brother Polynices a proper burial. Nonetheless, it is a relatively 
uncharted area in legal scholarship.
16
 Th is is especially so with respect to how 
this classic tension manifests itself within the criminal justice system.
17
∗∗∗∗∗
One goal of this book is to expose how family members and their interests 
intersect with what we often refer to as “the American criminal justice system.”
18
 
For instance, we fi nd that the state does not always impinge upon family mem-
bers in the course of investigating or prosecuting crimes. Indeed, sometimes 
legal institutions and actors defer to the decision of family members to priori-
tize their duties to family over their duties as citizens. Examples of these 
accommodations include evidentiary privileges that enable family members 
to avoid furnishing evidence against their loved ones and exemptions for family 
members from laws prohibiting the harboring of fugitives. We characterize 
these state policies that treat defendants better because of their family status 
as family ties benefi ts—and there are many of them. For several reasons that 
we hope to explore in this book, we generally oppose conferring family ties 
benefi ts in the criminal justice system. Th is is a controversial stance because it 
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might enable our critics to characterize us as “anti-family.” But we think that, 
in many circumstances, there are simply too many normative costs to the 
criminal justice system when it gives special benefi ts to defendants based on 
their family status. 
In contrast to family ties benefi ts, sometimes the state imposes extra bur-
dens on defendants on account of their status as a member of a family.
19
 In 
these situations, but for family status, a person would not be found liable of a 
crime. Examples include vicarious criminal liability imposed on parents for the 
crimes of their children and “omissions liability,” that is, criminal liability 
imposed on family members for failing to rescue their kin from harm. Because 
these laws impose punishment on account of one’s familial status, we call these 
family ties burdens.
We believe that these burdens stand in need of substantial justifi cation. 
Some of these criminal liabilities appear to be attempts to protect the vulner-
able in relationships of voluntary caregiving. We think it is relatively easy to 
protect that interest without resorting to the current laws’ discrimination 
against caregiving arrangements that diff er from the structure of an idealized 
traditional family unit. It is one thing for the law to recognize how citizens 
organize themselves into close circles of aff ection; but it is another for the 
criminal law to take a stance on how citizens ought to organize themselves—
and to discredit and disadvantage those who choose to draw their circles of 
intimacy diff erently.
With an understanding of both family ties benefi ts and burdens, we can 
stand at the crossroads between the family and the criminal justice system 
and see two distinct questions about the facial treatment of familial status, 
each of which has been given spare and insuffi  cient attention until now. First, 
how does the criminal justice system in this country approach the issue of 
family status? Second, how should family status be recognized, if at all, in a 
criminal justice system situated within a liberal democracy committed to 
egalitarian principles of nondiscrimination? 
Because of the diff erent dynamics involved in family ties benefi ts 
and family ties burdens, we largely address them in separate parts of the 
book. Th us, the fi rst half of the book canvasses and analyzes family ties ben-
efi ts; the second half focuses attention upon family ties burdens. Before pro-
viding a quick summary of how the rest of the book will proceed, a few 
clarifi cations are in order.
∗∗∗∗∗
introduction
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Th is book integrates legal analysis, political theory, and public policy. 
Th us, we are not merely describing doctrine but suggesting an analytical 
framework for thinking about the way the criminal justice system grapples 
with questions of family status. We are hopeful that public policy makers, 
lawyers, and legislators will learn from our approach to this diverse set of 
rules within the criminal justice system—and that they will begin to see how 
these seemingly independent laws need to be understood in light of their 
contribution to privileging and punishing family status. Although we realize 
that each benefi t and burden exposed here must ultimately be analyzed on 
its own terms and from within its own context, we think revealing the multi-
farious ways our society goes about privileging and punishing family status 
will contribute to each of those separate inquiries. We cannot analyze each 
benefi t and burden exhaustively; our hope is that developing a normative 
lens through which to view each of these intersections can illuminate the 
policy debates about each of these practices. And, at the very least, the 
descriptive side of our project should show just how pervasive these prac-
tices are within the criminal justice system. 
Many earlier books have studied the economic and cultural eff ects of 
criminal justice policy on families. Some have even considered the impact of 
incarceration on families, focusing on the devastating impact that the 
incarceration of relatives can have on the family members left behind.
20
 One 
study has considered how the corrections system copes with the issues 
related to the reproductive or family-raising aspirations of its off enders.
21
 
And another focuses on the issues related to prisoner reentry into society 
and family life.
22
 Th ere is no doubt that many of the criminal law’s policies 
and practices disadvantage families in many ways—and without attention to 
this sort of disparate impact on families, policy designers risk tearing our 
social fabric at the seams. We agree that this lens is a critically important one 
in evaluating criminal justice policies. Nevertheless, this lens tends to track 
the indirect results of other policies. For example, although lengthy sentences 
for minor drug crimes result in the tragic situation of too many children 
growing up without access to a parent, the primary objective behind drug 
sentencing laws is generally not to separate children and their parents.
Our focus is diff erent and has yet to be suffi  ciently addressed by the 
community of scholars interested in how the criminal law intersects with 
families. Here, we examine the distinctively purposeful practices that con-
sciously target defendants for special privileges or burdens on account of 
their familial status. Scholars have been successful in analyzing the eff ects of 
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certain criminal justice policies and practices on the family. But most schol-
ars have not recognized the panoply of laws expressly drawn to privilege or 
disadvantage persons based on family status alone. Some have addressed 
singular instances of the larger phenomenon we chart, but we are the fi rst to 
off er a synthetic approach. It seems important and necessary to pause and 
think through how and why our laws intentionally target family status and 
how the underlying goals of such a choice might better be served in some 
cases. Th is book clears that ground.  
Although we have chosen here to focus on explicit legislative or judicial 
choices to privilege or burden individuals with family relationships, there are 
no doubt many other ways in which persons enjoy informal benefi ts or bur-
dens; for example, if a police offi  cer makes an on-the-spot decision not to arrest 
a domestic violence off ender precisely because the assault was committed on 
a family member rather than on a stranger; or if a juror refuses to convict in a 
marital rape case because he believes a husband is entitled to his wife’s sexual 
services. Th ese kinds of subterranean choices are weighty and important, but 
our focus here is diff erent. We believe policymakers need to refl ect upon the 
explicit choices they have made, choices that have been insuffi  ciently analyzed 
in a synthetic manner by academics before this project. Once we have a frame-
work for analyzing the explicit family ties benefi ts and burdens, one might be 
able to apply elements of that framework to the unstated and more obscured 
informal benefi ts and burdens. But to develop that framework in the fi rst 
instance, we focus on facial benefi ts and burdens.
∗∗∗∗∗
As mentioned earlier, in the fi rst half of the book we address how the 
criminal justice system “privileges” family status. Th e fi rst chapter provides 
an overview of the multiple sites in which a defendant’s family status is used 
as a basis for extending a benefi t to that person within the criminal justice 
system. We fi rst explore how jurisdictions off er evidentiary privileges and 
other exemptions aff ecting evidence gathering that constrain the state from 
intruding into familial relationships. We then describe the eff orts by some 
states to shield from prosecution family members who harbor fugitives from 
law enforcement offi  cials. Additionally, we survey family ties benefi ts associ-
ated with violence in the family, pretrial release, sentencing, and prison 
administration.
Chapter 2 then takes a normative turn and off ers a framework for assess-
ing family ties benefi ts within the criminal justice system. We assess the 
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costs that they are likely to exact and explore why these benefi ts should gen-
erally be rejected absent a substantial state interest. We begin with an appre-
ciation of the important role families play in securing the conditions for 
human fl ourishing.
23
 We also note the ambivalent relationship the state has 
with the family. On the one hand, the state depends on the family to prepare 
individuals for their role as citizens; on the other hand, the state must com-
pete with the family for the loyalty of individual members. Th at discussion 
serves as a springboard for our critique of family ties benefi ts in the realm of 
criminal justice.
24
Chapter 2 also articulates four distinct normative concerns that may arise 
when extending special accommodations based on a defendant’s family 
status in the criminal justice system. We recognize that not each family ties 
benefi t will implicate all of these concerns. We therefore begin with only a 
pre sumption of caution toward family ties benefi ts, rather than unmitigated 
disapproval. First, the historical context in which the family’s relationship to 
the criminal law has evolved reveals that many family ties benefi ts often 
served (and in some cases, continue to serve) to perpetuate norms of patri-
archy, gender hierarchy, or domestic domination. Our second concern is that 
accommodations to families might impede the realization of criminal justice 
understood as the eff ective and accurate prosecution of the guilty and the 
exoneration of the innocent.
25
 Our third reservation stems from the way that 
family ties preferences can disrupt norms of equality that should otherwise 
prevail in an attractive regime of governance that does not discriminate on 
the basis of morally arbitrary characteristics. On this view, criminal investi-
gations and prosecutions should treat citizens’ interests with equal concern 
and without fear or favor. Th e extension of special privileges to persons 
simply because of their family situation bears an onus of justifi cation, espe-
cially because the policy that extends such privileges will often have a nega-
tive and discriminatory eff ect on those without family ties—some of whom 
never made actual choices to avoid family ties. Fourth, we note that some 
family ties benefi ts can have the unsavory eff ect of incentivizing more crimi-
nal activity—and more successful criminal activity at that. To the extent the 
law eff ectively signals messages to the public, some family ties benefi ts 
encourage family members to keep their criminal enterprises in the family. 
For example, if sentencing policies serve to create a class of persons who are 
immune from incarceration or who receive heavy discounts in their prison 
terms, then those persons will be the most sought after to serve in criminal 
enterprises—or they themselves might seek out criminal activity.
introduction
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We think these four considerations, taken together, suffi  ce to create a pre-
sumption against family ties benefi ts in the criminal justice system. We do 
not make the constitutional claim that family status is a suspect classifi cation 
worthy of strict scrutiny when the criminal justice system discriminatorily 
benefi ts or burdens individuals on the basis of family status. But we do 
believe that, as a policy matter, the government should view the use of family 
status skeptically. Th us, policymakers, whether in the legislature or else-
where, should consider our framework for analyzing family status.
26
 To use 
the language of equal protection analysis without making the constitutional 
claim, the objective of the government should be at least “important” and 
perhaps “compelling,” and the means adopted to pursue that objective should 
be “narrowly tailored” to achieve that objective, looking especially to see 
whether alternative measures might be as eff ective.
In the context of family ties benefi ts, a presumption does not entail elimi-
nating all accommodations of family ties. Instead, we propose that such ben-
efi ts undergo a set of searching inquiries. First, to what extent does the family 
ties benefi t in question contribute to one of the four normative costs often 
associated with family ties benefi ts? Second, assuming the benefi t implicates 
one or more of these concerns, to what extent does the benefi t vindicate a 
substantial state interest that justifi es the use of the benefi t in the criminal 
justice system? Finally, are other less troubling means—means that can be 
crafted in terms that are neutral to family status—available to protect the 
interest underlying the benefi t? To be sure, this kind of scrutiny will not 
resolve all questions: we will inevitably have disputes about the strength of 
competing claims. But it will do some important work in helping us think 
more clearly about the problem before us and, in close cases, will alert us to 
some of the potentially hidden costs of family ties benefi ts.
In Chapter 3, we apply the normative framework developed in Chapter 2 
to assess some of the benefi ts we identify in Chapter 1. We fi nd good reason 
to eliminate or curtail substantially some benefi ts, including evidentiary 
privileges, exemptions from prosecutions, and sentencing discounts in most 
cases. In other instances, where there might be good reasons to extend the 
benefi t, we suggest policies neutral to family status that can be used to 
achieve the underlying goal of facilitating caregiving without encroaching on 
the core values of the criminal justice system—and we demonstrate how 
those policies could work in particular instances. We conclude this initial 
inquiry into family ties benefi ts with some refl ections relevant to future 
theoretical and empirical work in this area and then turn, in the second half 
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of the book, to an analysis of how the criminal justice system punishes per-
sons on account of their familial status through family ties burdens.
Family ties burdens are the special burdens placed on defendants within 
the criminal justice system on account of their familial status. Th us, to paral-
lel the inquiry in the fi rst half of this book, we fi rst ask which of the burdens 
in the criminal justice system imposed on individuals are attributable to 
their familial status and then, second, we ask whether such burdens can be 
justifi ed, and if so, under what conditions?
Chapter 4 surveys particular examples of family ties burdens. We focus on 
eff orts by states to impose criminal liability on individuals for crimes if an 
element of the crime is a defendant’s family status. Examples of these sub-
stantive crimes include parental responsibility laws (based on vicarious and 
strict liability theories of failure to supervise); fi lial responsibility laws (duties 
to support indigent parents); omissions liability (duties to rescue family 
members); bigamy; incest; adultery; and nonpayment of child support.
Once we identify the practices properly characterized as family ties bur-
dens, Chapter 5 presents a normative framework for analyzing whether such 
burdens can be justifi ed. We fi rst address whether and to what degree the 
normative considerations we identifi ed earlier—patriarchal domination, 
inaccuracy, inequality and discrimination, and crime creation—apply to the 
context of family ties burdens. As it turns out, some of these considera-
tions—crime creation and inaccuracy—are generally inapplicable in the 
context of the burdens. In other words, unlike family ties benefi ts, burdens 
rarely trigger concerns that they will create more crime or impede the 
accurate prosecution of the guilty and the exoneration of the innocent. But 
many do seem to raise concerns about gender and discrimination.
We then examine which additional factors may warrant consideration in 
the particular context of family ties burdens. We develop the claim that the 
use of family status to allocate criminal liability causes substantial problems 
for the liberal state, both because it can burden relationships that persons 
have had no autonomy in creating or rejecting and because it risks infringing 
upon citizens’ liberty without suffi  cient justifi cation or narrow tailoring 
between the goal and remedy. As we hope to demonstrate, we think that 
some of these family ties burdens run afoul of principles that should con-
strain the use of the criminal justice system in a liberal democracy.
We emphasize here that many of the family ties burdens we fi nd in the 
law occur in the context of relationships that have a voluntary or “opt-in” 
nature, meaning that the individual who faces the burden imposed by the 
criminal justice system has consensually entered into the relationship of 
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caregiving that serves as a basis of liability. We fi nd that this pattern has 
some normative valence and explain its dimensions, limits, and implications 
for policy design within the criminal justice system.
Specifi cally, we propose that family ties burdens undergo a form of scru-
tiny similar to that which we advocated with respect to family ties benefi ts. 
Our general approach is that a presumption against special burdens based 
on familial status is also warranted. Perhaps unsurprisingly, just as we 
exhibited a tendency to be skeptical toward family ties benefi ts, we are 
also inclined to protect individuals from burdens based on familial status. 
However, because we are sensitive to the caregiving contributions that might 
stand in need of special protection from the state, we believe that at least 
some of the concerns we have about family ties burdens can be addressed by 
redrafting these laws in a manner that avoids a refl exive resort to familial 
status alone and instead focuses on voluntarily assumed obligations of 
caregiving.
Of course, we recognize that an analysis of a family ties burden needs to 
be viewed in its particularized context and that, in some classes of cases, the 
unusual burdens currently placed on family members may be proxies for 
promoting some of the distinctive purposes of the criminal justice system. 
Th us, our presumption against family ties burdens does not entail eliminat-
ing all family ties burdens; instead, we propose that such policies undergo a 
set of searching inquiries.
First, we propose that those seeking to impose a burden ask whether the 
burden falls on persons who had voluntarily assumed some duty of caregiv-
ing. Second, we explore whether the burden impinges on some liberty that 
should be recognized as deserving of protection in a liberal society. Th ird, we 
examine whether the laws can be drafted so as to be narrowly tailored to the 
governmental objectives. Fourth, we look to whether there are non-criminal 
measures that could be equally eff ective in achieving these government 
objectives, assuming these government objectives are suffi  ciently compel-
ling or important to vindicate through law. Last, we examine whether the 
existing family ties burdens contribute to concerns about gender inequality 
and discrimination. As with family ties benefi ts, this scrutiny will not, to be 
sure, resolve all questions; inevitably, disputes about the strength of compet-
ing claims will persist. But, it should do some important work in helping 
clarify the problems under consideration.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we apply this framework to the various issues 
highlighted in Chapter 4. Having identifi ed seven distinctive family ties 
burdens, we demonstrate how our normative framework helps illuminate 
introduction
Dan Markel-FM.indd   xix 2/27/09   12:14:48 AM
xx
analysis of these burdens. We conclude that, in each case, the kind of scru-
tiny we deem appropriate presents at least some challenge to the relevant 
burden. In all but one of the family ties burdens, we are inclined to recom-
mend either full or partial decriminalization. We recognize, however, that 
some might disagree with those conclusions, that some might want better 
empirical evidence to be pursued in order to refi ne our means-testing prong, 
and that some may think some of our conclusions politically unfeasible. 
Th us, our second-best solution in many of those instances is to require the 
state to impose the burden in ways that do not simply embrace a traditional 
conception of the family. Rather, the burdens should be expanded to other 
relationships that involve voluntarily assumed obligations of caregiving. 
Given that the promotion of voluntary relationships of care ultimately is the 
justifi cation for the burdens in the fi rst place, we conclude that nothing else 
justifi es limiting the burdens to the family as such; even the purported ease 
of administration associated with targeting family status in particular does 
not justify laws that impose special burdens triggered by family status 
exclusively. Accordingly, we endorse reorienting the criminal law of family 
ties burdens around a conception of voluntarily assumed obligations of 
caregiving. Th is will mean that at least some family ties burdens can with-
stand scrutiny, but only once they are redrafted so as not to align the 
criminal justice system with any particularly partisan conception of what 
the family is and who belongs to it.
We conclude with a coda, which refl ects on what we hope the book can 
off er to policy makers within the criminal justice system. Th e coda extends 
special attention to domestic violence issues, and serves as an occasion to 
think through some useful ways to tie together insights from both halves of 
the book.
introduction




the goal of these first three chapters is to explore how the American 
criminal justice system privileges a defendant’s family status such that in the 
absence of that defendant’s family status, he would not experience the same 
benefi t.
At the core of this inquiry stand two basic questions: when does, and 
when should, the state use the criminal justice apparatus to treat a defend-
ant’s family status as a basis for positive diff erential treatment? While 
answering these descriptive and normative questions separately, we charac-
terize state policies that use a defendant’s family status to improve his situa-
tion as family ties benefi ts. If we say the state extends a benefi t because of 
family ties, we are using that term to refer to situations in which the state 
extends a privilege to (or forbears requiring something from) a family member 
on account of his being a family member with someone else.
1
Chapter 1 does the descriptive work of spotting these benefi ts. Chapter 2 
builds a normative approach to furnish a way to think synthetically about 
these benefi ts. Chapter 3 analyzes the benefi ts explored in Chapter 1 through 
the normative lens developed in Chapter 2.
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3as we demonstrate in this chapter, there are a number of sites within the 
criminal justice system in which a defendant’s family status is explicitly con-
sidered by judges or legislative or executive policy makers to be a basis for 
relieving or mitigating the extent of one’s criminal liability or, alternatively, to 
ameliorate the conditions of one’s punishment.
• A. Evidentiary Privileges
In 1993, Kenneth Taylor, a New Orleans police offi  cer, brutally beat his girl-
friend over a period of many hours. He beat her with his fi sts, his police fl ash-
light, and his service revolver, and several times put his gun in her mouth and 
threatened to pull the trigger. His girlfriend had to be hospitalized for several 
days to recover from her injuries. Shortly before the defendant’s trial was to 
begin, the victim married the defendant and refused to testify against him, 
asserting a claim of spousal privilege.
1
 
One way in which family ties permeate the trial process is through limita-
tions on the government’s ability to present all relevant evidence. Testimonial 
privileges are widely recognized exceptions to the common law principle 
that “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”
2
 Because the public has 
a compelling interest in the effi  cient and correct administration of its crimi-
nal justice system, even the few privileges recognized by the law are not to be 
“expansively construed,” since they “are in derogation of the search for truth.”
3
 
Nevertheless, the law recognizes a small class of relationships held to be 
inviolable by prosecutors and other litigants, allowing witnesses with 
relevant and probative evidence to claim a privilege not to divulge the 
information they know even though it could be useful in the administration 
• one
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of justice.
4
 In a number of cases, as explained below, the defendant is empow-
ered to block the testimony of a willing family member, usually a spouse.
5
Th e testimonial privileges immediately relevant to our analysis here are 
the spousal privileges and other claims of intrafamilial privilege as applied in 
the criminal justice context. We focus here on the spousal or parent-child 
privilege but the analysis could be applied to other intrafamilial privileges a 
legislature or court might choose to create, such as between brothers and 
sisters, nephews and uncles, and the like.
1. Spousal Privileges
In the common law, there are two categories of spousal privileges, and all 
states and federal courts have adopted one or both of them in some form. 
Th ey are the spousal immunity and the marital-communication privileges. 
Th e spousal immunity (sometimes called the adverse testimony privilege) 
operates in criminal cases and generally protects spouses from testifying as 
witnesses against their spouse-defendants during a valid marriage.
6
 Diff erent 
jurisdictions apply the immunity in diff erent ways: some insist on complete 
disqualifi cation of spouses; some allow a spouse-witness to testify if he or 
she wishes; some allow a spouse-defendant to prevent the spouse-witness 
from giving adverse testimony; and others allow a spouse-defendant to 
consent to adverse spousal testimony.
7
Th e immunity evolved from the old English common law rule of complete 
disqualifi cation, according to which, in the fi rst instance, a wife was not 
allowed to testify against her husband.
8
 Eventually, the disqualifi cation 
rule became gender neutral—and was fi nally abolished in England in 1853.
9
 
Th e United States also recognized a disqualifi cation rule in the federal 
courts until the Supreme Court refi ned the immunity in Funk v. United 
States,
10
 which found spouses competent to testify at one another’s 
trials—particularly for rather than adverse to one another.
Th e US Supreme Court once recognized very broad spousal privileges for 
the federal courts in Hawkins v. United States.
11
 Th ere, the Court held that the 
privilege was a “rule which bars the testimony of one spouse against the 
other unless both consent.”
12
 To justify such a powerful privilege, the Court 
argued that “the law should not force or encourage testimony which might 
alienate husband and wife, or further infl ame existing domestic diff erences.”
13
 
But in Trammel v. United States, the US Supreme Court reversed course and 
concluded as a matter of federal law that “[w]hen one spouse is willing 
4 privilege or punish
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5to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding . . . their relationship is 
almost certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital 
harmony for the privilege to preserve.”
14
 Accordingly, the Court modifi ed 
the spousal immunity in federal courts, allowing it to be waived by the 
spouse-witness. Many states have followed a similar pattern of having once 
allowed the spouse-defendant to prevent the spouse-witness from adversely 
testifying but now “liberalizing” to allow spouse-witnesses to testify if they 
wish—even if the testimony is only to reduce their own potential sentences.
Unlike spousal immunity, the spousal-communication privilege survives 
the dissolution of a marriage and prevents a spouse from divulging any kind 
of confi dential communication in a civil or criminal case; it is waivable only 
by the communicant.
15
 Th e privilege is limited to communications (not acts) 
that transpire during a valid marriage—and it is deemed waived if the com-
munications are disclosed to third parties. Th e spousal-communications 
privilege, with its roots in the common law, was recognized by the Supreme 
Court in Wolfl e v. United States
16
 and Blau v. United States,
17
 and remains 
largely unmodifi ed and undisturbed. According to its proponents, the privi-
lege ensures free and frank communication between spouses; the idea is that 
without such protections, marriages would lack the open conversation 
appropriate for a confi dential relationship.
18
2. Other Intrafamilial Privileges
In contrast to the spousal privileges, federal courts tend not to provide any 
similar protection for a parent-child, sibling-sibling, or other intrafamilial 
relationship—regardless of whether testimonial immunity or a confi dential 
communication privilege is at stake. A parent-child privilege is the one most 
often claimed (and discussed in the secondary literature)
19
—and most often 
fl atly rejected by courts,
20
 with a few exceptions.
21
 It is true that the US 
Supreme Court, in Jaff ee v. Redmond,
22
 opened the door for federal courts 
below to recognize new privileges under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and 
specifi cally Rule 501. But federal courts have generally continued to reject 
the assertion of additional intra familial privileges.
23
Th e story is somewhat more complicated at the state level. A majority of 











 all have some lim-
ited form of parent-child privilege conferred by statute; additionally, New York 
courts have judicially carved a limited parent-child testimonial privilege.
29
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6Moreover, Virginia and Texas appellate court judges have written strong dis-
sents arguing for state recognition of a parent-child privilege.
30
Each of the jurisdictions that recognize the privilege gives the parent-
child privilege diff erent contours. Th e Idaho law seems to give the privilege to 
parents so they do not have to testify against their children, but it does not 
give symmetrical treatment to children who do not want to testify against 
their parents.
31
 Connecticut limits its grant of the privilege to “juvenile 
proceeding[s] in Superior Court.”
32
 Massachusetts limits its parent-child priv-
ilege to “unemancipated, minor child[ren], living with a parent,” ruling out 
application of the privilege to older children.
33
 Like Idaho’s Law, Massachusetts’ 
law is asymmetric, but in just the opposite way: in Massachusetts, parents 
can be forced to testify against their children, just not the other way around.
34
 
Minnesota, although supporting a symmetrical privilege, limits its grant of 
privilege to cases involving “minor” children, subject to waiver by parent or 
child.
35
 In short, there is little uniformity in the states about whether the 
privilege exists—and if it does, exactly how and when it applies. Most states 
that recognize the privilege, however, recognize an exception that applies if 
there is a dispute between a parent and a child, a possibility of parental abuse 
or neglect, or a crime of violence within the household.
• B. Exemptions for Family Members Harboring 
Fugitives
It’s a choice that no parent would want to make. Kelley Th omas’ 23-year-old 
son, Kelly Carter, escaped from a Georgia jail in April and shortly thereafter 
allegedly showed up at his dad’s doorstep on E. Lorado Avenue. Now, Th omas 
has been charged with harboring a felon. What’s a parent to do? It’s a diffi  cult 
question, even to Genesee County Prosecutor David Leyton. “Th e fact that 
he’s the father was discussed by my staff , and we will take that into consider-
ation as the case progresses,” Leyton said. “It’s hard to turn your back on 
your own fl esh and blood.”
36
Th e story of David Kaczynski, with which we began this book, is just one 
of the better known examples of family members grappling with the dilemma 
of whether to turn a family member over to the authorities.
37
 In California, a 
police sergeant was suspended for helping his son evade arrest after commit-
ting a series of bank robberies.
38
 In Louisiana, a sheriff ’s deputy helped his 
son fl ee the jurisdiction, after alerting him that warrants had been issued 
privilege or punish
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39
 In Minnesota, a mother arrived 
home just after her son had shot and killed an acquaintance in her kitchen. 
Instead of calling the police, the mother helped dump the body in an alley 
and clean up the bloody crime scene.
40
 Th ese confl icts of loyalty trigger 
signifi cant media and public interest in the decisions made by the family 
members;
41
 those who cooperate with law enforcement are often called 
“snitches” and are regarded as people who violate “the taboo against turning 
on one’s family.”
42
Some of the most diffi  cult decisions for law enforcement arise in relation 
to the charging decision associated with these kinds of cases. If a family 
member has cooperated with the primary defendant in some way, should 
that family member be prosecuted? Prosecutors have grappled with that 
question in several recent high-profi le corporate crime cases, such as those 
involving the Enron, Adelphia, and ImClone corporations.
43
 Th e prosecution 
decision is typically an easy one if the family member is involved in the crime 
as a principal in the classic sense of the term.
44
 Th e diffi  cult decisions for 
prosecutors lie at the margins of criminal involvement, when a family 
member has acted as an accessory, particularly as an accessory after the 
fact.
45
 Typical charging options in this scenario would be obstruction of 
justice or hindering prosecution, harboring a fugitive, or accessory after 
the fact for states that retain that criminal off ense.
Remarkably, in fourteen states, the prosecution of family members for 
harboring fugitives is not an option, regardless of the nature of the fugitive’s 
crime.
46
 Th ese states typically exempt spouses, parents, grandparents, chil-
dren, grandchildren, and siblings from prosecution for providing assistance to 
an off ender after the commission of a crime “with the intent that the off ender 
avoids or escapes detection, arrest, trial, or punishment.”
47
 An additional four 
states reduce liability for an immediate family member but do not exempt 
them from prosecution entirely.
48
Florida’s statutory exemption for family members provides an interesting 
example. It forbids prosecution of spouses, parents, grandparents, children, 
or grandchildren for helping an “off ender avoid or escape detection, arrest, 
trial, or punishment,” with one important exception.
49
 Th e exemption does 
not apply if the primary off ender is alleged to have committed child abuse or 
murder of a child under the age of eighteen, “unless the court fi nds that the 
person [claiming the exemption] is a victim of domestic violence.”
50
Th ese statutes are signifi cantly broader than the exemption that existed at 
common law, which forbade only the prosecution of a wife as an accessory but 
not the prosecution of a husband for aiding his felon wife or the prosecution 
a survey of family ties benefits
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51
 Despite the popularity of the broader exemptions 
among many states, the Model Penal Code drafters rejected the inclusion of 
a family member exemption in its accessory provision, “in part on the ground 
that this is a factor that can be taken into account at sentencing.”
52
 Th e draft-
ers also noted that “exemption rules create trial diffi  culties if the government 
bears the burden of proving that none of the specifi ed relations exists.”
53
No federal law currently provides a family member with an exemption 
from prosecution.
54
 A number of federal courts, however, have at least 
expressed sympathy with the pleas of family members charged with aiding 
an accused relative. For example, in United States v. Oley,
55
 the court upheld 
the right of the government to charge a wife with harboring her fugitive 
husband. Nonetheless, the court remarked that “[i]t would undoubtedly 
be diffi  cult to obtain a conviction charging wives with harboring their 
husbands” and that “it might be regarded as inhuman and unnatural on the 
part of a wife to surrender her husband to the authorities and contrary to the 
instincts of human beings to do so.”
56
A number of states have grappled with the constitutionality of the family 
exemption. For example, in upholding Florida’s statute against an equal pro-
tection challenge, a Florida appeals court emphasized “society’s interest in 
safeguarding the family unit from unnecessary fractional pressures” and 
applauded the legislature’s decision to “confer[] immunity so that these indi-
viduals need never choose between love of family and obedience to the law.”
57
 
Th e New Mexico Supreme Court, similarly, upheld its state statute against a 
constitutional challenge but did not engage in any sustained analysis and 
instead simply stated that the statute’s classifi cations were reasonable and 
thus consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
58
More recently, United States court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded, as a matter of federal law, that it was indeed constitutional to prose-
cute a spouse for hiding her husband and his assets.
59
 In United States v. Hill,
60
 
Patricia Hill claimed that her prosecution on charges of harboring a fugitive 
and accessory after the fact for helping her husband evade child support 
obligations to his fi rst wife was unconstitutional because the government 
sought to “criminalize conduct in which she is entitled to engage under the 
First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution,” specifi cally “her rights of 
association, marriage, privacy, and due process.”
61
 Although the court noted 
that “basing a harboring or accessory conviction on normal and expected 
spousal conduct might well violate Griswold,” it concluded that Hill’s con-
duct in this case crossed the line past “normal spousal conduct” and into the 
realm of the intentional frustration of law enforcement.
62
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Another important way in which the criminal justice system uses family ties 
to mitigate or eliminate criminal responsibility is when a defendant has 
selected a family member as his victim. Some of the most striking examples 
of the criminal justice system’s preferential treatment of family relationships 
occur in relation to crimes committed against spouses and children by a 
family member. A general hesitance to intervene in family life, even to pro-
tect a family’s most vulnerable members, is a deeply ingrained historical 
tradition in this country.
63
In recent years, we have, of course, seen some progress in criminal justice 
policy,
64
 such as the repeal of marital rape exemptions in many states,
65
 
the increased law enforcement attention and funding devoted to spousal 
battering,
66
 and the widespread adoption of mandatory child abuse 
reporting statutes.
67
 But the general tradition of noninterference in crime 
involving intrafamilial violence is hardly a historical relic.
1. Parental Discipline Defenses
In 1990, Artemio DeLeon became angry because his fourteen year-
old daughter repeatedly invited friends over to her house without his 
permission. On May 24, when he learned his daughter had once again 
invited friends over, DeLeon took a belt and hit her on her legs with it for 
approximately ninety minutes, causing bruises that lasted for a week. 
He then took scissors and chopped off  his daughter’s waist-length hair. Th e 
Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed his conviction for abuse of a family 
member, concluding that his action did not rise to the level of infl icting 
extreme pain, mental distress, or gross degradation.
68
Family ties recognition is quite pronounced in the context of crimes 
committed against children. A notable example of this kind of family ties 
benefi t is the acceptance of the “parental discipline defense” in child abuse 
prosecutions. Although the contours of the defense vary somewhat among 
states, in general, the defense exempts parents from prosecutions for assault 
if the corporal punishment was used to “benefi t” the child and if the nature 
of the punishment used was objectively reasonable.
69
 Th is defense is available 
in both fatal and nonfatal cases of child abuse.
70
 A recent comprehensive exam-
ination of child corporal punishment in the United States concluded that 
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every state still uses some variant of “a justifi cation-based defense that oper-
ates to defend parents from liability for even severe physical violence and 
injury to minors,” as long as the parent was “engag[ed] in ‘discipline’” at the 
time of the conduct in question.
71
 Th e use of this special defense for parents 
persists even though twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia ban 
spanking in public schools and thirty-nine states ban spanking in day care 
centers.
72
 Around the world, at least twenty four countries have banned or 
restricted spanking in the home.
73
 Th e Model Penal Code also recognizes a 
variant of this defense, stating that “the use of force against another is justifi -
able if: (1) the actor is the parent . . . and (a) the force is used for the purpose 
of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of the minor, including the preven-
tion or punishment of his misconduct.”
74
2. Manslaughter as Mitigation
Kenneth Peacock, was a long-distance trucker who “came home at the wrong 
time . . . [Upon return from work and being] caught in an ice storm last 
February while traveling from Pennsylvania to Florida, [he] got no answer 
when he called his wife to say he was coming home. When he arrived around 
midnight, his wife was in bed, naked, with another man. Mr. Peacock chased 
the other man away at gunpoint, and at about 4 A.M., after drinking and 
arguing, shot his wife in the head with a hunting rifl e. He pleaded guilty to 
voluntary manslaughter . . . Judge Robert E. Cahill sentenced Mr. Peacock to 
18 months in prison, saying that he wished he did not have to send him 
to prison at all, but knew he must ‘to make the system honest.’ ‘I seriously 
wonder how many men married fi ve, four years would have the strength to 
walk away without infl icting some corporal punishment,’ said Judge Cahill, 
referring to the circumstances of the case.”
75
In states following the common law rule, a jury can return a verdict of 
manslaughter instead of murder if it fi nds that the defendant killed under 
provocation that would infl ame a reasonable person to act in the heat of 
passion.
76
 Th e “archetypal” common law example of “adequate provocation” 
turns out to be a family ties benefi t: namely, if a defendant fi nds his or her 
spouse engaged in infi delity.
77
 At the time of Peacock’s conviction for volun-
tary manslaughter, Maryland followed the common law rule that “discover-
ing one’s spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another” constitutes 
privilege or punish
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adequate provocation for a manslaughter charge.
78
 Th is is a family ties 
benefi t because the mitigation to manslaughter under common law in this 
context was generally available only to persons who were lawfully married 
in such circumstances.
79
 Although the Maryland legislature later amended 
its manslaughter statute to preclude a spouse’s adultery as a basis for 
mitigation,
80
 the modern trend has been to expand what counts as adequate 
provocation.
81
 So, to the extent jurisdictions have broadened the availability 
of the partial defense by including non-married persons,
82
 then, strictly 
speaking, these newer laws are not family ties benefi ts. Indeed, under the 
modern version of the provocation doctrine, defendants often can reduce 
their liability for an intentional killing from murder to manslaughter if 
“the defendant claims passion because the victim left, moved the furniture 
out, planned a divorce, or sought a protective order.”
83
 Clearly, a number of 
those situations do not require marriage as a predicate. Th erefore, whether the 
provocation doctrine can be strictly construed as a family ties benefi t turns 
on whether the state in question retains traditional views of provocation or 
follows a more modern approach like that of the Model Penal Code.
3. Sexual Misconduct
Legislatures have also tended to privilege familial status in the context of sex 
off enders who victimize family members. For example, in the last dozen 
years or so, every state has enacted some form of scheme in which convicted 
sex off enders must register with the state.
84
 Under some statutes, family 
members may receive preferential treatment because, for example, 
“[i]ndividuals convicted of incest are excluded from the state’s online sex 
off ender database.”
85
 Other defendants benefi t if they commit crimes against 
spouses: some states continue to extend preferential statutory treatment to 
a sexual off ender who victimizes a spouse.
86
 A recent article, for example, 
explains these patterns in detail, concluding that “the law in more than half 
the states today makes it harder to convict men of sexual off enses commit-
ted against their wives,” as compared to convictions for sexual off enses 
against an acquaintance or a stranger.
87
 Th ese benefi ts to defendants fall into 
three categories: “those that exempt spouses from sexual off enses 
other than forcible rape, those that maintain separate spousal sexual off ense 
statutes, and those that impose extra requirements for the prosecution of 
marital rape.”
88
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• D. Pretrial Release
“A man released from jail to care for his seriously ill mother while awaiting 
sentencing for fondling a 5-year-old girl has been arrested again in connection 
with an attack on another child. Donald Ray Hager, 24, was arrested [. . .] after 
a 5-year-old boy told a school counselor about the incident that allegedly 
occurred on either Hager’s Jan. 14 sentencing day—when he got 3 1/2 years—or 
the day before. . . . According to police, Hager spent part of his free time with a 
female friend in Dade City; the boy was the woman’s son. . . . [Apparently,] Hager 
went into a bedroom, fondled the boy and forced him to have oral sex.”  
89
 
Family status sometimes serves to benefi t defendants in the context of pre-
trial release. Before a suspect is tried for his crime, the state must fi rst decide 
whether to detain or release him.
90
 If it releases him, the state must determine 
which conditions it will impose to ensure that the defendant appears at trial. 
If it detains the alleged off ender, the state must determine what kind of access 
to the outside world it will allow so that the defendant can prepare his case.
Determinations of pretrial release take diff erent forms in diff erent jurisdic-
tions, but they usually share at least one feature in common: decision-makers 
are explicitly directed to look at a suspect’s family ties and responsibilities 
when considering whether to release the suspect, and under what conditions. 
For instance, the 1966 Bail Reform Act (BRA) gave federal judges guidance 
regarding decisions about pretrial release, expressly articulating that courts 
should examine the accused’s family ties.
91
 Many states followed suit.
92
Additionally, some states delineate pretrial release conditions that are tied to 
family status. For example, in Illinois, the statute governing bail bonds informs 
judges that they should consider the imposition of conditions that require 
defendants to support his or her dependents.
93
 If the victim of the crime is a 
member of the household, then, depending on the precise circumstances, the 
court may impose conditions that require the defendant to vacate the home, 
refrain from contact,
94
 or make payments of temporary support.
95
 As we explain 
later, the state may have its own reasons for looking at a defendant’s family 
ties in the pretrial context.
• E. Sentencing
In the case of United States v. Johnson, two defendants were convicted of 
participating in the same crime and were found to have warranted the 
same off ense level.
96
 Nevertheless, Johnson, the defendant with caretaking 
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responsibility of four children, received a signifi cant downward departure 
from the Guidelines based on family responsibilities and was sentenced to 
six months’ home detention and three years of supervised release; meanwhile 
the other defendant, Purvis, who was without children and who was also 
found to have played a more minor role in the scheme, received twenty-seven 
months in prison and two years of additional supervised release.
97
According to a 1999 study, over half of all state and federal prisoners have 
children; indeed, more than a million minor children have at least one parent 
incarcerated.
98
 Accordingly, consideration of a defendant’s family status 
often arises in the sentencing context. Th is section explores ways in which 
family ties infl uence judicial consideration about the appropriate sentence 
for a particular off ender.
1. Federal Practice Pre-Booker
Prior to the US Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in Booker v. United States, which 
rendered the federal sentencing guidelines “eff ectively advisory,”
99
 the familial 
ties or responsibilities of an off ender were, generally speaking, accorded little 
signifi cance in the federal sentencing regime.
100
 Indeed, the United States 
Sentencing Commission (USSC) regarded “family ties and responsibilities” 
as a “discouraged” factor, and thus downward departures from the guidelines 
on such a basis were permissible only if the court found that the negative 
eff ects on the defendant’s family were “present to an exceptional degree or in 
some other way makes the case diff erent from the ordinary case where the 
factor is present.”
101
 Th at said, federal courts did make exceptions in a number 
of cases and even across a wide range of crimes.
102
Courts extending such departures usually did so after determining that 
the off ender provided an irreplaceable (or at least critical) role as caregiver to 
family dependents.
103
 Moreover, the exceptions were typically supposed to be 
made only if the downward departure contemplated by the judge would 
suffi  ce to “cure” the harm that would otherwise be visited upon the family 
member.
104
 Th us, the more severe the criminal off ense level of a particular 
off ender, the less likely it would be that a departure based on family respon-
sibilities would be granted—because, as the USSC stated in its commentary 
on the relevant provision,
105
 the departure should be capable of resolving the 
problem of the irreplaceable caregiver.
106
 Th at said, the fact that a defendant 
was an “irreplaceable caregiver” was not always a necessary or a suffi  cient 
explanation for federal court practice. Some courts authorized departures 
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if a defendant was not the sole caretaker because the court recognized the 
extraordinary nature of the family situation and wanted to minimize disrup-
tion to the children’s lives.
107
 Other courts refused to extend departures even 
if the defendant was an irreplaceable caregiver.
108
Th ese family ties departures had the capacity to cause wide disparities 
between otherwise similarly situated off enders, as shown by the description 
of the Johnson case above. Th e Johnson case dramatizes the disparity because 
the off enders were codefendants in the same case—but the disparity that 
resulted there is at least as likely to arise across cases as within them. 
Moreover, some judges recognized that departures motivated by a desire to 
minimize the harms infl icted on innocent third-party family members con-
ferred a windfall benefi t on the defendant.
109
 Th ose courts typically justifi ed 
their decisions by reference to a cost-benefi t analysis under which the costs 
to the innocent children were weighed against the public benefi t of incarcer-
ating the defendant; the reasoning under such analyses, however, was usu-
ally conclusory.
110
Finally, although departures on the basis of family responsibilities in the 
federal context had been discouraged pre-Booker, district court judges 
retained discretion to sentence within the range prescribed by the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, and in that area of discretion, judges may have con-
sidered the infl uence of the factor of family ties and responsibilities, although 
it is diffi  cult to determine just how much infl uence that factor had.
111
2. Federal Practice in the Post-Booker Landscape
With the Guidelines now advisory in a post-Booker world, federal courts 
have a wider berth to impose sentences outside of the ranges established by 
the USSC.
112
 As a result, courts are awarding more downward departures 
than were awarded under the old regime.
113
 In the post-Booker world, as the 
Ninth Circuit observed, “[c]onsideration of family responsibilities” may now 
be viewed as part of a defendant’s “history and characteristics,”
114
 and judges 
can assess those traits as reasons to mitigate the length of sentences.
115
 
Whereas various federal district court judges felt, prior to Booker, that the 
Guidelines were too harsh because they failed to give signifi cant weight to 
family ties and responsibilities,
116
 these judges can now invoke family ties 
and responsibilities as a basis for departure from the Guidelines with greater 
frequency and fl exibility.
117
 Indeed, given the US Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions in Gall v. United States
118
 and Kimbrough v. United States,
119
 which 
affi  rmed the wide discretion available to district court judges, we should not 
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be surprised to see more trial judges invoke those authorities as a basis for 
disagreeing with the USSC’s policy decision that family ties and responsibili-
ties should be generally discouraged as a basis for downward departures.
3. State Practices
Th e fl exibility that now exists in the federal sentencing system regarding 
consideration of family ties and responsibilities also prevails in many states, 
especially those that endow sentencing judges with wide discretion to deter-
mine the length of a sentence. Approximately thirty-two of the nation’s 
jurisdictions have retained an indeterminate sentencing scheme, with the 
remainder having some form of sentencing guidelines in place.
120
 Th ese eigh-
teen sentencing schemes may have voluntary guidelines, presumptive guide-
lines, or fi xed guidelines, depending on the jurisdiction, as well as variations 
on these themes. By contrast, the other states have traditional indeterminate 
sentencing schemes that extend virtually unfettered discretion to sentencing 
judges (or, in some cases, sentencing juries) to sentence within the statutory 
limits set by the legislature. In some jurisdictions, determinations about 
release on parole are also made under wide discretion. Generally speaking, 
the decision makers in those indeterminate sentencing states may consider 
the nature and extent of family ties or responsibilities (along with a wide 
range of other reasons for leniency) in setting a sentence or releasing an 
off ender.
121
 And, for the most part, they are not required to explain that a 
particular sentence was enhanced or reduced on account of family ties or 
responsibilities. Iowa’s sentencing scheme, for example, simply makes “clear 
that sentencing is a matter of [a] trial court’s broad discretion,” and trial 
courts will be reversed there only for “abuse of that discretion,”
122
 though 
what counts as an abuse of discretion is substantially unpredictable to 
the outside observer.
Th e multiplicity of sentencing structures in the states is mirrored by the 
various approaches states take in setting sentences in relation to the family 
ties or responsibilities of an off ender. In some jurisdictions, the presence or 
absence of family ties and responsibilities will do little to aff ect one’s sen-
tence.
123
 For instance, in Oklahoma’s noncapital sentencing proceedings that 
occur before a jury, a defendant may not introduce evidence solely designed 
to mitigate the sentence, such as information about family ties and responsi-
bilities.
124
 Florida’s sentencing scheme is somewhat similar in that it does not 
articulate any express exception for defendants with family ties and respon-
sibilities; the relevant statute states that sentencing “should be neutral with 
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respect to race, gender, and social and economic status,”
125
 but it is unclear 
whether social status includes familial ties and responsibilities.
By contrast, in Massachusetts, the state legislature authorized the courts 
to consider an off ender’s family ties and responsibilities in setting an off end-
er’s sentence.
126
 Consideration of family ties and responsibilities has also been 













 and North Carolina.
133
 Indeed, in Louisiana, the leg-
islature has said that a court, when deciding to suspend a sentence, should 
consider whether “[t]he imprisonment of the defendant would entail exces-
sive hardship to himself or his dependents.”
134
 Perhaps the most unusual 
feature of some courts’ family ties sentencing jurisprudence is that some 
judges will consider the absence of family ties to an area as a reason to not 
extend any leniency in a sentence.
135
• F. Prison Policies
Our punitive practices regularly require governments to make choices about 
how to address family ties and responsibilities. For example, should off end-
ers with families be entitled to special visitation rights? Should off enders get 
special dispensations (like furloughs) to see family members outside of 
prison? Should off enders with families have priority in terms of prison place-
ment decisions? While there is still empirical work to be done regarding how 
these issues are resolved among the fi fty states, we examine below how these 
questions are resolved in the context of the federal criminal justice system. 
Our descriptive discussion focuses primarily on the facial family ties benefi ts, 
but we also briefl y explore a few of the “informal” family ties benefi ts.
1. Federal Prison Visitation Policies
Th e Federal Bureau of Prisons’ policy statement announces that “visits [by 
family] are an important factor in maintaining the morale of the individual 
off ender and motivating [him] toward positive goals.”
136
 Although some 
advocates have gone so far as to argue that family visitation in prison is a 
“fundamental” right protected by the United States Constitution,
137
 courts 
have not, generally, found such a “right” to exist,
138
 though some courts have 
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In the fi nal analysis, however, courts rarely intrude on the wide discretion 
aff orded prison administrators in devising visitation policies.
140
Th at said, most prisons make some provision for family visitation, though 
such policies routinely give prisoners access to visitors who are not members 
of the off ender’s family as well.
141
 Accordingly, although families do not nec-
essarily get privileged status in the realm of visitation policies (because 
inmates can also be visited by friends and business associates),
142
 it is likely 
that family visitation would be greeted with greater deference than nonfa-
mily visitors at the prison administration level, given the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons’ general embrace of family ties as especially important for rehabilita-
tive purposes.
143
 Some jurisdictions may view furnishing families with spe-
cial opportunities for visitation as important to ensure family reunifi cation 
after incarceration and to avoid the termination of parental rights.
144
 Indeed, 
some states require reunifi cation services for incarcerated parents.
145
2. Federal Prison Furlough Policies
An off ender’s family ties are directly implicated in prison furlough policy. 
Furloughs are authorized unaccompanied absences from a corrections facility 
during a term of incarceration and are privileges (not rights); they are explicitly 
sanctioned by federal law at 18 USC §§ 3622 and 4082 and are available to eli-
gible inmates based on the severity of the crime and sentence, the inmate’s 
release date, and other factors. According to the federal guidelines, there are 
many reasons that might justify furloughs, including: needing to appear in 
court, participation in job training, participation in “educational, social, civic, 
religious, and recreational activities which will facilitate release transition,”
146
 
and participation in the “development of release plans.”
147
 Moreover, furloughs 
are often used to facilitate the provision of healthcare, mental health, or dental 
services not available on site at a correctional institution.
Nevertheless, according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Program 
Statement about furloughs, “[d]ay furloughs are generally used to strengthen 
family ties.”
148
 And the policies that govern furloughs make clear that fur-
loughs may be given so that an inmate may be “present during a crisis in 
the immediate family”
149
 and may request a furlough “[t]o reestablish 
family . . . ties.”
150
 Families get special consideration in the distribution of 
furloughs—and, all else being equal, those eligible inmates with families 
will likely get more furloughs than those without.
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3. Federal Prison Placement Policies
Notwithstanding the general preference of Congress and the USSC to 
discourage sentencing departures based on family ties and responsibilities, 
there are various ways in which the federal criminal justice system is 
sensitive to family ties and responsibilities when dealing with “the nature, 
extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sentence.”
151
 
In this respect, a judge could, in consideration of a family’s location, 
recommend that the Federal Bureau of Prisons place an off ender closer to 
his family.
152
 Indeed, as Judge Posner wrote in Froehlich v. Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections,
153
 concerning the transfer of a female state 
prisoner whose children sued to keep her in Wisconsin, although such an 
accommodation is not constitutionally imposed on prison offi  cials, “it may 
be a moral duty.”
154
Additionally, a series of programs to accommodate families in placement 
decisions have emerged, though often in very short supply.
155
 For example, 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons instituted a program called Mothers 
and Infants Nurturing Together (MINT). Under this program, “[e]ligible 
women who have been sentenced to incarceration reside in a community 
correction setting with their infants for up to 18 months after delivery.”
156
 
Myrna Raeder elaborates upon other similar programs put in place at 
the state level:
California funded its Pregnant and Parenting Women’s Alternative 
Sentencing Program Act and has opened two long-term community 
correctional facilities pursuant to California Penal Code 1174, to which 
women are sentenced directly, without serving time in prison, where 
they can reside with their minor children under six years of age for up to 
three years. Th e focus is not only on treatment of the mother, but empha-
sizes the development of the mother-child bond. In addition, for the last 
20 years, California also has operated a Community Prison Mother 
Program, where inmates with less than six years remaining on their sen-
tences may reside with their children in a residential facility where they 
receive comprehensive programming to enable them to better reintegrate 
into their communities. Small programs exist in a number of states, but 
currently there is no groundswell to make such programs the norm 
rather than the exception.
157
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4. Other Intersections of Family Status and Prison 
Practices
Th ere are still other punitive policies and practices involving family status. 
For example, in the event of an inmate’s death, the federal prison system 
notifi es family members and allows federal chaplains to be involved with the 
inmate’s family during the initial periods of grief.
158
 Th e Bureau has also 
developed parenting programs with the objectives of promoting “family 
values,” counteracting “negative family consequences resulting from . . . 
incarceration,” and intending for the “institutional social environment [to] 
be improved through opportunities for inmates to maintain positive and 
sustaining contacts with their families.”
159
 Th ese programs spend substantial 




As this Chapter has made clear, the criminal justice system in this coun-
try—at both the federal and state levels—provides a number of important 
family ties benefi ts.
161
 Members of state-recognized families fare better 
throughout the system, which is designed quite self-consciously to make sure 
defendants with families will get benefi ts that others will not. In the next 
Chapter, we try to build a normative framework to help analyze these family 
ties benefi ts.
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• A. Some Prefatory Remarks
Our survey in chapter 1 shows how there are various areas in which the 
criminal justice system explicitly distributes benefi ts to defendants based on 
their family status, benefi ts they would not enjoy in the absence of those 
family ties and responsibilities. Some important issues warrant discussion as 
a result of this phenomenon.
First, in making any benefi ts available solely on the basis of a defendant’s 
family status, the state necessarily is making express normative judgments 
regarding who counts as family and who does not.
1
 Th us, large numbers of 
persons who might justifi ably, in our view, see themselves as entitled to 
family ties benefi ts are excluded. Perhaps the most obvious example is fami-
lies of same-sex couples, who are routinely denied treatment as equals in 
the provision of family ties benefi ts, such as the evidentiary privileges.
2
 Th e 
same sense of exclusion applies to those individuals in polyamorous unions. 
If the state makes choices regarding families, it risks marginalizing persons 
who consider themselves family members but are not recognized as such by 
the state. In this sense, the use of the family to distribute benefi ts may be 
underinclusive.
3
Second, even assuming one could agree on which people count as a 
family, reliance on that category may be overinclusive. One might have a ter-
rible relationship with one’s spouse and be eager to testify against him, but the 
spouse still might reap the benefi ts of an intrafamilial testimonial privilege.
4
 
To be sure, the obvious advantage of using state-recognized family lines is 
ease of administration. But, as we describe later on, one possible solution to 
the administrability challenge would be for each eligible person to designate 
a discrete number of persons for privileges through a registry.
5
 As a general 
matter, because of the way in which these benefi ts might stand in the way of 
criminal justice, we are more eager to see them abolished than expanded to 
• two
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include more relationships. Yet if the government is committed to handing 
out benefi ts, we do not think it should do so in a way that discriminates 
against those in family units unrecognized by the state.
Th ird, the government does not always demonstrate a consistent pattern 
when choosing who counts as family for each of these benefi ts. In the federal 
sentencing context, for example, if the courts look to determine whether the 
defendant is an irreplaceable caregiver, the concept of family for determining 
extraordinary family ties and responsibilities appears rather broad.
6
 Th us, if 
a grandparent or an aunt can take care of the children, then the single-parent 
defendant is unlikely to get a substantial departure, if at all.
7
 By contrast, in 
other areas in which the government distributes family ties benefi ts, the 
range of relevant family members may be very narrow—for example, eviden-
tiary privileges that do not recognize same-sex partners or much family 
beyond the opposite-sex spouse.
8
 What this means is that family status in 
the criminal justice system is inconsistently defi ned.
Fourth, we recognize that a number of practices that confer benefi ts on 
defendants on account of their family status may also serve other purposes 
that in fact directly benefi t the state. For example, pretrial release determina-
tions that examine the presence of a defendant’s family ties in the area may 
be viewed as a benefi t both for the family and for the defendant lucky enough 
to possess meaningful family ties. Nonetheless, familial considerations may 
also serve as an imperfect proxy for assessing a defendant’s fl ight risk, an 
issue in which the state has a clear and appropriate interest. Moreover, if a 
parent or caregiver is being detained, dependents may fi nd themselves need-
ing the state to perform care functions that would be more cheaply and more 
carefully executed by defendants while they await trial. Similarly, the various 
accommodations of the family in the context of prison administration may 
refl ect (imperfect or indirect) choices of decision makers in the criminal jus-
tice system to advance goals such as strengthening precarious families or, 
alternatively, reducing recidivism or facilitating off ender rehabilitation and 
reintegration into society.
Although we therefore acknowledge the diffi  culty of identifying what 
counts as a genuine benefi t to the family (either as an institution or in par-
ticular cases), we think it remains necessary to examine more specifi cally 
those laws that benefi t defendants directly on the basis of their family status. 
Th us, our analysis in this book focuses on those sites and not the ones in 
which the criminal justice system may be said to be accommodating or 
promoting family interests as such. Consequently, we train our attention on 
those sites discussed in Chapter 1 in which the criminal justice system 
actively chooses policies that distinctively benefi t those off enders with 
22 privilege or punish
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families. Th is chapter shifts from the descriptive to the normative, as we 
consider what factors should help determine whether a particular accom-
modation of family interests by the criminal justice system is an appropriate 
policy choice.
• B. Th e Family and the Modern State: An 
Ambivalent Relationship
Th e modern defense of using the state, its institutions, its laws, and its 
coercive force to support the family often rings in communitarian tones. 







 selves that constitute a polity.
12
 Such selves are com-
posed of loyalties, role-responsibilities, and personal ties that are, in some 
very basic sense, logically and morally prior to the individual. Th e self, it is 
sometimes argued, is linked so inextricably to these group and relational 
affi  liations that any moral system embodied by a state and its laws must 
appreciate, respect, and facilitate the self ’s authentic expression of that 
which creates its very identity. States must either fi nd a way to acknowledge 
special associative duties fl owing to family members that may confl ict with 
and trump more general duties to people as such,
13
 or risk irrelevance and 
illegitimacy.
Accordingly, it can be argued that states ought not to ignore the individual 
self ’s derivation from and debt to the family.
14
 If the family helps defi ne the 
individual, a state’s administration of justice must serve its citizens by appre-
ciating the very sources of their individuality. Privileging and giving priority to 
family status may be one way to have the state connect with the individuals 
to whom it must dispense justice. Moreover, without extending benefi ts and 
immunities that might assist the family, the state risks losing compliance 
from its citizens; perhaps some family ties benefi ts are necessary to establish 
and maintain the state’s legitimacy. Indeed, even if the benefi ts seem inap-
propriate in the context of the criminal justice system, they might be viewed 
as a net benefi t for inducing general compliance with a legal regime.
15
Th ere is yet another available justifi cation for the state’s support of the 
family—one that is potentially more practical and less philosophical. One 
could argue that because the state either cannot or will not live in accor-
dance with what Plato’s Republic idealizes for the Guardian class—no private 
families with all children being held in common
16
—the state needs to keep 
families together and solvent. Th e state can draw from the rich panoply of 
resources naturally furnished and expended by the family in creating good 
a normative framework for family ties benefits
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citizens. By giving families special support through family ties benefi ts, the 
state may be able to economize on expenditures that it would otherwise 
be forced to bear in educating its citizenry and preparing its members to 
contribute to the stability and fl ourishing of the regime. Th is is a crude way 
of thinking about the matter, to be sure. But it is one that must have a grain 
of truth: the state simply cannot aff ord or perform on its own all the services 
families routinely provide; consequently, such work is, in eff ect, subcon-
tracted to the family—which is paid accordingly. Families will not be able to 
provide care services completely for free—and can rightfully demand that 
the state (which is parasitically living off  of its successes) subsidize the hard 
work of helping children “take their place as responsible, self-governing 
members of society.”
17
 Th e state helps itself when it subcontracts cheaply the 
“formative project of fostering the capacities for democratic and personal 
self-government”
18
—and leaves it in generally reliable hands.
Th ere is a third argument available to those wishing that the state continue 
to furnish families with special treatment. Some argue for an ethic of care in 
political and moral life more generally—and think the state can facilitate this 
ethic by supporting families in the right way.
19
 As Deborah Stone puts it,
Caring for each other is the most basic form of civic participation. We 
learn to care in families, and we enlarge our communities of concern as 
we mature. Caring is the essential democratic act, the prerequisite to 
voting, joining associations, attending meetings, holding offi  ce and all 
the other ways we sustain democracy. Care, the noun, requires families 
and workers who care, the verb. Caring, the activity, breeds caring, the 
attitude, and caring, the attitude, seeds caring, the politics.
20
 
Accordingly, making sure the state cares for the family ensures that 
citizens can care for one another, the state, and politics.
21
 A less “political” 
version of this notion states that families are instrumentally required for indi-
viduals to fl ourish, and states should help secure the conditions for human 
fl ourishing by facilitating the emergence and maintenance of family life.
Th ese arguments have much to recommend them. Together, they seem 
persuasive and suggest that the law’s recognition of family ties might be more 
than just irrational sentimentalism or a knee-jerk instantiation of “family 
values.”
22
 Th ese arguments go beyond the oft-heard notion that strong fami-
lies lead to a strong nation and the contention that families help furnish 
“civic virtue” and “social capital.”
23
 Although many have tried to connect 
familial self-government with democratic self-government,
24
 the scholars 
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we draw upon here put meat on the bones of the mottos and creeds routinely 
invoked. Obviously, we have not exhausted the fi eld or comprehensively 
explained how these ideas cash out in particular legal contexts; instead, we 
have aimed only to summarize very briefl y the arguments of those who grap-
ple with the role of the family in the state’s endeavor to secure the political 
conditions for human fl ourishing.
Ultimately, we fi nd little to quarrel with when these arguments are con-
sidered at the most general level. All things being equal, we do not think 
states can succeed without being attentive to the way in which selves are 
constructed through families—and we agree that if states are going to feed 
on the capacity-generating benefi ts families confer, it is not inappropriate for 
families to demand some subsidization in return. Families may be labors of 
love, but they are full of real undercompensated labor all the same.
Nevertheless, we do not think that the arguments to support family 
benefi ts at a general level of political theory can succeed in every area of 
the law. For the reasons we sketch in the remainder of this Chapter, we think 
that the criminal justice system needs to be especially leery about distribut-
ing benefi ts to defendants based on the state-drawn lines of who counts as 
family.
25
 Put briefl y, the consequences of wrongly or unfairly distributing 
criminal penalties or causing more crime trump the reason for granting 
family status special force in this legal venue.
We advance four normative cost considerations; together, we think they 
justify a presumption—albeit a rebuttable one—against family ties benefi ts 
in the criminal justice system. Th e structure of the presumption we have in 
mind is borrowed from philosopher Sam Scheffl  er: “To say that these [argu-
ments] are seen as [creating a] presumption is not to say that they can never, 
in the end, be outweighed by other considerations. It is merely to say that, in 
the fi rst instance, they present themselves as considerations upon which one 
must” render judgment.
26
 Th e normative costs we identify can be summa-
rized briefl y. Benefi ts based on a defendant’s family ties or status historically 
facilitate gender hierarchy; undermine the pursuit of accuracy in the eff ec-
tive prosecution of the guilty and the exoneration of the innocent (thus, pos-
sibly leading to unwarranted harshness or leniency in the administration of 
justice); disrupt our egalitarian political commitments to treat similarly situ-
ated persons with equal concern and discriminate against those without 
families recognized by the state; and can tend to incentivize more crime and 
more successful crime. For these reasons, we are generally skeptical of using 
the criminal justice system to distribute family ties benefi ts absent a sub-
stantial reason and no feasible alternative means.
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• C. Some Normative Costs of Family Ties Benefi ts
1. Patriarchy and Power: Historical Perspectives
Th e historical context in which family ties benefi ts evolved reveals that many 
family ties benefi ts often served (and, in some cases, continue to serve) to 
perpetuate patriarchy, gender hierarchy, or domestic violence.
27
 A few exam-
ples serve to make the point. In the context of evidentiary privileges, their 
patriarchal origins are clear: women could not testify against their husbands 
because they lost their claim to any separate legal existence upon entering 
into marriage.
28
 Defendants have long enjoyed a sanctuary from the reach 
of the criminal law in the context of crimes against children, specifi cally 
through the parental discipline defense. Th e cultural assumption here has 
been that the “natural bonds of aff ection” between parent and child will pro-
tect children, an assumption sometimes validated by members of the US 
Supreme Court.
29
 But this assumption has entailed a perverse result, namely, 
a culture of relative indiff erence toward violence in the family, particularly 
against children.
30
 To be sure, many family ties benefi ts have “liberalized” 
over the years and now operate to prevent family members from using their 
special immunities to subvert prosecution for domestic violence and child 
abuse. Still, there can be no question that some of the policies canvassed 
in Chapter 1 have ignoble origins and serve to facilitate domination in the 
private sphere. We think that places the burden of justifi cation on those 
seeking such benefi ts.
As recounted in Wayne Logan’s illuminating article, “Criminal Law 
Sanctuaries,” the family has long been understood as an untouchable site for 
criminal justice.
31
 Under Roman law, the doctrine of patria potestas empow-
ered fathers and husbands to dominate family life without fear of the state’s 
interference; thus, adulterous wives could be killed without public retribu-
tion, and wives could be beaten with impunity.
32
 In colonial America, Puritan 
courts squarely “placed family preservation ahead of physical protection of 
victims,”
33
 allowing men to use force against wives and children for “legiti-
mate” reasons, a limit rarely tested out of reluctance to disturb the privacy of 
family life.
34
 Law enforcement interest in family violence then waxed and 
waned over the generations, with periods of activism butting up against a 
deep-rooted tradition of noninterference in the aff airs of a family.
35
Over time, wife beating was offi  cially banned,
36
 but like so much else, 
the law on the books eclipsed life on the streets, as the act of wife beating was 
often viewed as a nonevent from the eyes of the state—it was, as one scholar 
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perhaps cynically called it, the “rule of love.”
37
 Unsurprisingly, children also 
suff ered under the de facto sanctuary from the reach of criminal law.
38
 
Needless to say, there was still great diffi  culty in prosecuting and punishing 
marital rape.
39
In the 1970s, matters improved at least in part as a result of greater sensi-
tivity to the concerns raised by feminists. Police offi  cers, for instance, were 
no longer urged or instructed to play the role of “mediator” or “peacemaker” 
when called to a domestic disturbance; they could play their normal role of 
enforcer of the criminal law.
40
 Th ose developments, of course, led to 
an expansion of the debate about how the criminal justice system can best 
serve the individual members of a family—for example, some scholars 
contest whether that “normal” role is a desirable role in the family context 
for fear that the implementation of “no-drop” or “shall-arrest” policies
41
 
might end up alienating victims from a criminal justice system that is 
indiff erent to or dismissive of their particular interests.
42
But the underlying problem remains. Notwithstanding some advances in 
prosecution norms for domestic violence, the criminal law system still exhib-
its a great reluctance to interfere in the private life of the family. Scholars, 
such as Logan, point to several examples of this ongoing phenomenon: elder 
abuse,
43
 tolerance of domestic violence in homosexual relationships,
44
 the 
continued diffi  culty of prosecuting marital rape,
45
 and the free use of corpo-
ral punishment against children.
46
 Moreover, the scourge of domestic vio-
lence continues at astonishingly high levels.
47
 Th e eff ects of these willful 
silences and deferential nods to defendants using violence in the family 
context have been, in Logan’s words, an unrelenting “form of criminal preda-
tions, perpetrated in the shadow of public law.”
48
Th e historical context briefl y sketched above only partly underwrites our 
presumption of skepticism.
49
 Our argument reaches well beyond the fear 
that family ties benefi ts facilitate the perpetuation of gender hierarchy and 
domestic violence—though these reasons alone might suffi  ce to reorient our 
doctrines and practices.
2. Accuracy and Justice
Family ties benefi ts in the criminal justice system also endanger the 
accurate and just imposition of punishment. As we described earlier, various 
jurisdictions aff ord defendants special privileges that allow them to bar 
others from testifying at trial or from providing other assistance to law 
a normative framework for family ties benefits
Dan Markel-Chap02.indd   27 2/26/09   11:02:08 AM
28
enforcement, even though the latter have information critical to the accu-
rate prosecution of the defendants or the exoneration of others.
50
 At bottom, 
there are places where truth and family loyalty confl ict, and the state should 
not knowingly aff ord defendants family ties benefi ts or exemptions from 
duties borne by other members of society simply because of familial status. If 
innocent people mistakenly sit in prison (or guilty people escape prosecution 
altogether) as a result of these benefi ts, then our commitment to the 
accurate distribution of justice is undermined at an intolerable cost.
To be sure, we recognize that our concern about family ties benefi ts also 
has an empirical component. For one thing, in defense of the testimonial 
privileges, the state can argue that it will be eff ectively inviting perjury with-
out them—and that no “truth” benefi t can be conferred by forcing people to 
testify against their better judgment to maintain the secrets of a loved one 
against state intrusion.
51
 Although we have found no empirical evidence to 
support the thesis that family members would lie under oath if forced to 
testify against a loved one (in suffi  cient numbers to undermine the quest for 
truth in criminal trials), there is some plausible appeal to the suggestion. 
Additionally, it may turn out that having the privilege deters future crime 
because the communication of the information to the spouse may have the 
salutary eff ect of prompting the spouse to encourage the defendant to for-
bear from further crime. (Of course, if it turns out that this is empirically 
grounded, then the privilege or immunity should be limited to communica-
tions regarding future conduct, not past conduct.)
Similarly, a necessary assumption at work in the exemption for family 
members’ harboring fugitives is that the temptation to commit the crime of 
harboring is overwhelming in certain contexts. A parent would have a very 
diffi  cult time turning away a child at the door precisely at a moment of 
extreme vulnerability. Some might think that prudence demands that we 
exempt those family members who are, in this situation, undeterrable.
52
 
Others might think leniency is appropriate for those unwilling to turn their 
closest relatives away in a time of desperate need. Indeed, some jurisdictions 
seem to acknowledge that family members have reduced culpability; accord-
ingly, some states do not immunize family members but charge them with 
a lesser crime.
Our reaction to these eff orts to excuse family members’ commission of 
a crime (perjury and harboring) is the same: the criminal law is a separate 
sphere of justice, with its own primary values, among which are the 
protection of citizens and the accurate and fair prosecution of those who 
have endangered public safety and contravened the laws passed to protect 
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that interest in security.
53
 Although it cannot be denied that humans are frail 
and fallible—particularly when it comes to family loyalty—the state simply 
cannot legitimize its acceptance of perjury and obstruction by refusing to 
prosecute individuals who engage in these practices. Moreover, those who 
think it is unattractive to make a parent testify against a child should under-
take a thought experiment: imagine that, because of a parent’s failure to tes-
tify against her child, another person sits wrongfully on death row, a person 
who would otherwise be exonerated. Th at wrongfully convicted person may 
also have a family whose interests in their child’s life should be protected. 
Th e fact that it appears to be only a distant and disembodied government 
that loses access to evidence should not obscure the fact that the state 
is acting on behalf of potential future victims, past victims, and family 
members of those who stand wrongfully accused. Th e state must fairly and 
eff ectively balance its solicitousness of the defendant and his or her family 
against its need to protect others in society.
Th ere are certainly other aspects of the criminal justice system that simi-
larly undermine the quest for accuracy, such as the exclusionary rule associ-
ated with evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
54
 But we 
do not believe the existence of such practices necessarily undermines our 
argument here. Th e exclusionary rule, for example, vindicates another criti-
cal interest of our system of criminal justice—the constitutional prohibition 
against unreasonable searches and seizures by state actors .
55
 In contrast, we 
do not think the interest typically invoked in defending those family ties ben-
efi ts that impede accurate punishment or exoneration—encouraging close 
familial relationships—constitutes suffi  cient reason for the state to deny our 
commitment to the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice system.
3. Equality
Family ties benefi ts not only impede the accurate and just administration 
of criminal penalties, but also threaten basic commitments to equality under 
law. Th us, our third diffi  culty with family ties benefi ts is that they can disrupt 
norms of equality.
56
 Criminal law investigation and prosecution should treat 
citizens’ interests with equal concern, without fear or favor based on morally 
arbitrary characteristics like family status. Th e extension of special privileges 
to persons simply because of their family situation (if that proxy bears no real 
relationship to a legitimate criminal justice goal) bears an onus of justifi ca-
tion, especially because any benefi ts that accrue to those who have specially 
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recognized family ties will be unavailable to those who lack such family ties. 
Whether this constitutes pernicious or permissible discrimination may be 
subject to some debate, but, for reasons we elaborate on in Chapter 3, we 
think it is the former in all but the rarest of circumstances.
We do not think it especially controversial to draw upon a principle of 
equality under the law. Th is basic egalitarian commitment underwrites not 
only our governing documents and institutions, but it is a prerequisite for a 
legitimate system of criminal justice as well. Accordingly, benefi ts and spe-
cial treatment that emerge from leniency on account of family status are, 
generally speaking, unattractive.
57
 Why should this be?
At one level of abstraction, if a criminal derogates from the democrati-
cally derived codes of proper conduct, he indicates a superiority that claims 
he is not bound by the rules that bind others. Society builds credible criminal 
justice systems to diminish the plausibility of those claims of superiority, and 
by its attempt to punish off enses, the criminal justice system endeavors to 
make clear that no one is superior to the law or to any other member of 
society. Family ties benefi ts can threaten the very basic equality principle 
undergirding our constitutional democracy, because, in some instances, they 
allow the off ender to maintain a claim of superiority and to point to that 
unanswered wrongdoing as evidence of that superiority.
58
 Th is is especially 
problematic when the judiciary confers this family ties benefi t on defendants 
without legislative imprimatur. Because at least part of the justifi cation for 
the state’s administration of criminal justice is that it must—under the prin-
ciple of equality—try to diminish the off ender’s claim of superiority, the state 
fails part of its essential purpose in having a criminal justice system when it 
distributes benefi ts to some off enders merely because of their family status.
59
 
Having a family, while “constitutively” relevant to an individual’s identity, is 
typically morally unrelated to the off ender’s claim of superiority represented 
by the crime. Accordingly, allowing leniency based on family ties subverts 
the institutional task of recalibrating the messages of equal worth undergird-
ing the legitimate institutions of criminal justice.
60
Th e principle of equality also has a more straightforward valence. 
Unjustifi ed disparities in sentence disposition or duration contribute to the 
perception of the illegitimacy of the criminal justice system. To illustrate, 
imagine that one physically attacks one’s neighbor and that such attacks are 
illegal. If the state, in its ordinary course of business, knowingly did nothing 
in the face of this crime, its inaction could be read to express two social 
facts. Th e fi rst fact is an indiff erence to the legal rights of its citizens, parti-
cularly to the security of their persons and property; and the second is the 
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condescending assertion to the off ender that his actions will not be taken 
seriously by the state. If the state makes an eff ort to investigate, prosecute, 
and punish the crime, by contrast, the message is that one will be held 
accountable for one’s unlawful actions. It also sends a signal to one’s fellow 
citizens that their legal rights are being vindicated by the state.
61
Th ese various expressions and communications of care and concern are 
signifi cantly more diffi  cult to articulate if the state must address many 
off enders, many victims, and many citizens. Th ese diffi  culties are best allevi-
ated if institutions exhibit fi delity to rule of law values, under which like cases 
are treated alike, in accordance with legal norms that are known or knowable 
to the off ender. In a situation in which we address two similarly situated 
off enders and an unjustifi ed disparity results, these departures from rule of 
law values will invariably trigger demoralization, resentment, and, perhaps 
in some cases, outrage and violence. Th us, in light of the risks associated 
with disparity—and the cuts in the moral fabric of impartial justice such dis-
parities create—the principle of equality should be a lodestar guiding our 
collective actions in the criminal justice system.
It goes without saying that invoking the principle of equality does not 
mean mindlessly giving every off ender the same punitive response. Some 
level of granular analysis is required to sort cases appropriately—only the 
“like” should be treated alike. But once we have devised reasonable bases for 
distinguishing among classes of off enses and off enders, only compelling rea-
sons and narrow options should suffi  ce to displace the outcome that would 
have been otherwise obtained in light of the classifi cation scheme that has 
been established through democratic institutions.
62
Th at said, we recognize that incarceration may wreak havoc on innocent 
third parties, many of whom are wholly innocent family members.
63
 But our 
concern for minimizing harms to innocent third parties should not neces-
sarily be tethered to the proof of a family relationship; it is both over- and 
underinclusive to limit benefi ts only to those individuals in a state-
sanctioned family unit. Moreover, as we explain later, there may be more 
broad-based ways to minimize these harms without actually extending 
unfair sentencing discounts to someone simply because that person is a 
father or mother, or son or daughter. Still, to the extent that rehabilitative 
aims are pursued through our corrections systems, we can imagine 
sites within the criminal justice system in which the presumption is over-
come by distributing benefi ts in a manner that is neutral to family status 
but still pays close attention to the obligations of those with unique caregiving 
roles.
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4. Do Family Ties Benefi ts Incentivize More Crime?
Finally, we note that some family ties benefi ts can have the unwanted eff ect 
of incentivizing more criminal activity—and more successful criminal 
activity to boot. To the extent that the law eff ectively signals to the public 
that family membership confers special benefi ts, some family ties benefi ts 
will encourage family members to keep their criminal enterprises in the 
family or to actively solicit help from other family members because, after 
all, they can assist without fear of punishment. Jeremy Bentham disfavored 
the notion of spousal privilege precisely because “it secures, to every man, 
one safe and unquestionable and ever ready accomplice for every imaginable 
crime”
64
—and facilitates criminals converting their own castles into “a den of 
thieves.”
65
 Today, many jurisdictions have acknowledged the need for a joint 
spousal criminal activity exception, precisely to reduce the likelihood of the 
den of thieves arising in the castle. Moreover, if sentencing policies serve to 
create a nonincarcerable (or less carcerable) class of persons because these 
persons are “irreplaceable caregivers,” then those persons will seek out crim-
inal endeavor or be, other things being equal, more sought after by others to 
serve in criminal enterprises.
In short, we fear that family ties benefi ts will help fortify a sanctuary from 
criminal law, and thus encourage the enlistment of family members into 
criminal enterprises of all sorts, whether fraud or murder, embezzlement, or 
racketeering.
66
 With respect to sentencing, we should be especially anxious, 
for as Judge Kleinfeld noted, “[n]o class of persons can be immunized from 
imprisonment without assisting recruitment for criminal enterprises by pro-
viding an incarceration-proof labor force.”
67
 Th is point has been reiterated by 
other appellate courts construing sentencing departures based on family 
responsibilities,
68
 as well as by members of other branches of government.
69
 
We note that we have, thus far, found little empirical research examining this 
hypothesis; it remains fertile ground for future research.
70
• D. Scrutiny of Family Ties Benefi ts: A Normative 
Framework for the Presumption
In light of these four distinct normative concerns, we think a presumption 
against family ties benefi ts is warranted when considering a potential policy 
in the criminal justice system that aff ects family life, even though not every 
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family ties benefi t triggers all of these concerns.
71
 Th us, the bare proposal of 
a benefi t should not be categorically rejected under this framework—it just 
means the benefi t should undergo scrutiny.
Th is scrutiny requires inquiry into several matters. First, to what extent 
does the particular family ties benefi t contribute to patriarchy, inaccuracy, 
inequality, or risk of heightened crime, collusion, or complicity? If the family 
ties benefi t does not incur one of these normative costs, then it may be 
appropriate to extend it, especially if the interest underlying the family ties 
benefi t is substantially benefi cial (and substantially achievable through the 
benefi t). Usually, though, we fi nd that the bare use of family status as a basis 
to distribute a benefi t to the defendant is one that triggers equality and 
discrimination concerns. Typically, these concerns can be resolved by more 
careful drafting such that the distribution of the benefi t occurs in a way that 
is neutral to family status while still achieving its underlying goal. When that 
is the case, there is good reason to distribute the benefi t more broadly than 
would be done under the rubric of family status currently recognized by 
most states.
On the other hand, if the family ties benefi t triggers normative costs that 
cannot be ameliorated through mere redrafting into family-neutral terms, 
then, at that point, we think the state must have a compelling or heightened 
interest that vindicates the use of the family ties benefi t (the purpose test) 
and the state must have adopted narrowly tailored means to achieve that 
purpose. A good example might be something like sentencing discounts for 
defendants with young children. Th is is a rather typical family ties benefi t, 
but we think the policy associated with such benefi ts can be more granularly 
administered, as we discuss in the context of time-deferred sentencing, 
such that it might apply to more people who could benefi t from it but in 
a way that does not create the same normative costs. By contrast, if the 
benefi t in question affi  rmatively impedes the state’s interest in ensuring 
the safety of vulnerable persons, such as the continued vitality of the 
parental discipline defense, which has been used to legitimate what would 
otherwise be criminal assaults upon one’s children, it should be soundly 
rejected.
In other words, an especially weighty public interest would be needed to 
justify the family ties benefi t, along with an inquiry into whether alternative 
measures were available to promote that interest without triggering or 
increasing the normative costs we identify. Moreover, we would still want 
to ensure that the underlying public interest that is being vindicated is 
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distributed in a way that is not predicated on family status alone, but 
rather on voluntarily assumed obligations of caregiving. To be sure, our pro-
posed method of scrutiny will not resolve all questions; we will inevitably 
have disputes about the strength of competing claims. But this method 
will help us think more clearly about the challenge of family ties in criminal 
justice.
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in this chapter, we apply the normative framework to a number of the family 
ties benefi ts discussed in Chapter 1. Using the framework developed in 
Chapter 2, we examine how some of the benefi ts from Chapter 1 fare under 
our normative approach. Th us, we briefl y explore how evidentiary privileges, 
harboring fugitive exemptions, violence within the family, pretrial release, 
sentencing, and prison practices should be analyzed in light of our norma-
tive framework. In most cases, our framework adds new insights into how 
policymakers, judges, and citizens should think about family ties benefi ts. 
In the case of any benefi t, there are multiple considerations that will be 
relevant to policymakers beyond our presumptions and analyses. But we are 
hopeful that our framework can shed new light on these benefi ts, some of 
which are very much contested while others have escaped any substantial 
analysis. As we will show, in many cases, our analysis recommends eliminat-
ing the benefi t.
Other benefi ts, by contrast, such as sensitivity in assigning prisoners to 
specifi c prison locations, survive scrutiny because there are compelling state 
interests that are properly vindicated or because the benefi ts trigger such 
minimal normative costs that the presumption against family ties benefi ts 
should be rebutted. However, even in these situations, we think there should 
be some eff ort to distribute the benefi ts in terms that are neutral to family 
status when possible. Doing so, at the very least, can remove some of the 
inherent gender and heteronormative biases that the benefi ts display. We 
also discuss how some benefi ts can succeed by being retailored through alter-
native means. In the section addressing sentencing, for instance, we discuss 
the case of the irreplaceable caregiver who is asking for a sentencing discount. 
In this connection, we discuss the use of “time-deferred sentencing,”
1
 as well 
as the use of programs that redound to the benefi t of family members, 
but not exclusively to them and not on account of their status as family 
members. Th is fi nal insight paves the way for the second part of the book, in 
• three
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center of the family ties burdens we discover; we are also able to start the 
project of redesigning all family ties intersections with the criminal justice 
system in family-neutral terms, focusing more on function than status. But 
that eff ort, which preoccupies us much more pointedly in the second part 
of the book, is also very useful in some of the cases of family ties benefi ts 
that we explore here. Ultimately, however, because inaccuracy, crime crea-
tion, inequality, and patriarchy are such severe costs of family ties benefi ts in 
the bulk of cases, we can only support, promote, and vindicate privileging 
family status in the rarest of cases of family ties benefi ts.
• A. Evidentiary Privileges
1. Competing Assessments of Familial Privileges
Views about the marital privileges are, unsurprisingly, mixed. Th ese privileges 
are ostensibly justifi ed not only because they are rooted in the common law 
but because they are presumed to have a persuasive rationale. For instance, the 
spousal immunity “provides social benefi ts by preventing marital discord,”
2
 
and the marital-communications privilege is said to “foster[] openness between 
spouses by ensuring that none of their confi dences will be revealed in court.”
3
 
In short, “[t]he basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or 
husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake [is] a belief that 
such a policy [is] necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefi t of 
husband, wife and children, but for the benefi t of the public as well.”
4
But not all agree that the spousal privileges are proper exceptions to the 
hoary rule that every man’s evidence should be available in the administra-
tion of justice. In recent years, the spousal immunity has come under more 
serious fi re from commentators than the marital-communication privilege, 
which on its face just looks like other confi dential communication privileges, 
such as the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges.
5
 Still 
others think that spousal immunity makes sense if we really care about pro-
tecting family harmony—and that we do not need the marital-communica-
tion privilege because people will trust their spouses naturally and are usually 
indiff erent to legal entitlements to privileges. Moreover, once the marriage 
dissolves, the justifi cation of “keeping the family together” dissolves with 
it—and a marital-communications privilege certainly should not outlive the 
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marriage (as it currently does in some of the jurisdictions that recognize it).
6
 
Finally, some oppose the immunity because, in practice, it operates in a 
gendered manner: “[t]he plain fact is that . . . the adverse testimony privilege 
operates largely to prevent wives from testifying against their husbands . . . 
[and] reinforce[s] a traditional ethic of self-sacrifi ce for women within 
marriage.”
7
 Th e detractors aside, the marital privileges enjoy widespread sup-
port in the nation’s courts and state legislatures.
8
With respect to broader intrafamilial privileges, there are several argu-
ments off ered by their proponents. Proponents argue that “[ f ]orced disclo-
sure of confi dential communications between children and parents not only 
destroys the trust between parent and child necessary to foster open com-
munication, it pits a parent against a child in a court of law.”
9
 As the In re 
Agosto court put it, “[t]o damage the parent-child relationship would result 
in damage to the child’s relationship to society as a whole.”
10
 Advocates rou-
tinely cite the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
which stressed that “[t]he history and culture of Western civilization refl ect 
a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their 
children.”
11
 Th e importance of this relationship is the reason that society 
seeks to foster open communication between parents and children.
12
 In 
short, the “arguments in favor of adoption of the parent-child privilege center 
around the importance of loyalty . . . inherent to the [] relationship.”
13
 Th is is 
generally known as the “preservation of the family” argument.
14
Another related argument relies upon the “cruel trilemma” presumably 
imposed upon subpoenaed family members who must “either (1) testify 
truthfully and condemn the accused relative, (2) testify falsely and commit 
perjury, or (3) refuse to testify and risk contempt.”
15
 As In re Agosto found, in 
putting witnesses in this position, “the law would not merely be inviting per-
jury, but perhaps even forcing it.”
16
 Th is argument emphasizes not only that 
we put family members in an awkward position but that the search for truth 
itself will be hampered because in our zealous pursuit of it, we are inviting 
falsifi ed testimony that will adulterate the system more than it will foster the 
system’s integrity. Th ere is also the possibility, as mentioned earlier, that the 
extension of these privileges works in favor of reducing crime; a spouse with 
an adverse testimonial immunity may decide to talk to his wife (because 
he knows she cannot testify against him), and during that talk, she may 
persuade him to desist from future crimes.
More generally, advocates of the expansion of intrafamilial privileges 
beyond the spousal privileges argue, by analogy, to other privileges already 
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recognized in the courts and by legislatures. Th e professional privileges are 
generally thought to encourage the free fl ow of information in socially valu-
able relationships in which trust is required for the success of the relation-
ship.
17
 Similarly, the marital privilege supposedly serves the function of 
preserving harmony and fostering openness in socially valuable relation-
ships. Proponents of other intrafamilial privileges argue by analogy to other 
relationships of trust to reinforce their case.
18
 A fi nal strategy proponents 
(and adopting courts) have drawn upon is basing the extended privilege in 
the constitutionally recognized right to privacy.
19
In response to those who favor extending intrafamilial privileges, critics 
(including judges on many federal and state courts) argue that there is no 
case law to support such a new privilege; that privileges are meant to be 
granted very sparingly and narrowly for they are in derogation of the search 
for truth; that further intrafamilial privileges do not pass the Wigmore Test
20
; 
and that Congress may, if it wishes, furnish such a privilege if there is a true 
need for it.
21
 More basically, critics “commonly assert that people typically 
know little or nothing about their privilege[s] and that, even if they did, the 
knowledge would rarely alter their communicative behavior.”
22
 In short, 
intrafamilial privileges are very unlikely to incentivize people to talk with 
their families if they are not otherwise inclined to do so. As unseemly as it 
may be to force people to testify against their family members, it may just be 
the cost of doing justice.
2. Th e Framework’s Application to Evidentiary Privileges
We think our normative framework off ers a diff erent perspective on intrafa-
milial privileges, one that has heretofore often been overlooked: that family 
ties generally ought not to be exalted or privileged in the administration of 
criminal justice. Accordingly, not only should courts and legislatures reject 
the parent-child and more attenuated intrafamilial testimonial privileges, 
but they should also revisit the marital privileges, which enjoy widespread 
support. In short, it is our view that the family neither needs nor deserves 
any special protection when the smooth and fair administration of criminal 
justice is at stake. Just as our society values friendship as a very benefi cial 
social relationship of trust but fails to entrust friends with testimonial privi-
leges,
23
 we believe that the family can sustain itself without special immunity 
from the criminal justice system. We take no position here, however, on the 
ongoing debates about whether there should be intrafamilial privileges in 
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 But because the intrafamilial evidentiary privileges impli-
cate our four normative considerations—and all four of them, no less—we 
think such benefi ts are inappropriate and should therefore be abandoned.
As we have already recounted, the testimonial privileges have an undeni-
ably patriarchal lineage. Based on an old English common law rule of 
complete disqualifi cation in which a wife was not allowed to testify against 
her husband,
25
 the testimonial privileges have roots that would off end our 
fi rst normative consideration. Indeed, at common law, women were not 
considered to be competent witnesses at all. Even those who contest the 
disqualifi cation theory of the derivation of the privileges and assume that the 
privileges developed from a theory of “petit treason” against the head of a 
household could not deny that the protection of the “head of a household” 
traditionally protected men.
26
 And although the testimonial privileges have 
been modernized in most places to defang their patriarchal origins,
27
 they 
continue to operate in a male-friendly manner: men commit more crime, so 
it will benefi t men more often if their spouses (or mothers or sisters) are pre-
vented from testifying against them. As Wayne Logan writes, “[e]videntiary 
law . . . continues to betray an age-old reluctance to interfere; the spousal 
privilege, for instance, prohibits the government from compelling the testi-
mony of a battered spouse, should prosecution ensue.”
28
 Th is is especially 
discon certing in the wake of Crawford v. Washington, which will only further 
exac erbate the use of spousal privileges to protect male domination in the 
household.
29
Even bracketing the gendered roots and eff ects of the intrafamilial testi-
monial privileges that give us pause, our second normative consideration is 
also implicated. Testimonial privileges are very much exceptions to the 
common law principle that “the public has a right to every man’s evidence.”
30
 
Because the public has a compelling interest in the effi  cient and correct 
administration of its criminal justice system, the law should not lightly 
create exceptions to the rule that people must testify truthfully before legal 
tribunals. Even the few privileges recognized by the law are not to be “expan-
sively construed” because they “are in derogation of the search for truth.”
31
 
Privileges that facilitate the exclusion of relevant evidence from a fact fi nder 
seriously impede the truth-seeking function of the trials, which hampers 
both the eff ective prosecution of the guilty and the exoneration of the inno-
cent. Th ese privileges matter not only at trial, but also beforehand, because 
their availability at trial casts a shadow over plea-bargaining between 
the state and the defense lawyer. Without other independent evidence, 
a prosecutor will be more likely to drop a case against a potential defendant 
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if the prosecutor knows a husband can block the testimony of, or revelations 
about communications to, his wife.
We acknowledge, of course, the speculative concern that the privileges 
may help prevent perjured testimony from polluting the trial. Perhaps the 
privileges function to prevent family members from lying on the stand—a 
result that may, after all, serve the truth. To the extent that any credible 
empirical evidence would bear out such a claim, we would reconsider our 
conclusions about the benefi t’s implication for the normative consideration 
of accuracy. We also recognize the empirical possibility that the privileges 
may have a deterrent eff ect on crime if spouses communicate intentions to 
commit future crime and are subsequently able to dissuade each other from 
committing that future crime.
32
 We have not seen empirical evidence to 
support this possibility, however, and we suspect such instances are rare.
Th ird, there is a basic inequity built into intrafamilial testimonial privi-
leges. Although this inequity is not as obvious as the central case in which an 
off ender gets diff erential treatment in a sentence on account of his family ties, 
the normative consideration of equality is implicated nevertheless; those with 
spouses (rather than friends or same-sex partners) get to share the details of 
their crimes with a loved one without consequence. Th is may have a cathartic 
eff ect for off enders, rendering an ultimate confession to the police less likely. 
And it may enable more intimacy to fl ourish in state-sanctioned families in a 
way that will be discouraged in less traditional family structures, though as we 
suggested earlier, we are uncertain about how responsive many people are to 
the signals or incentives created by these laws in particular.
More importantly, this particular benefi t creates a class of persons, who 
might otherwise have extremely useful information about an off ender, 
immune from questioning at trial. Th is allows the off ender to maintain a 
sense of superiority—both over his household and over the polity, whose 
interests in vindicating justice play second fi ddle to the protection of the 
sanctity of his family. Th is is unfair to the state and unfair to victims whose 
rights can be vindicated only if the police and prosecution can do their jobs 
eff ectively. Creating rules that prevent the police and the prosecution from 
learning the truth are counterproductive to the tasks of criminal justice. 
Although one can sympathize with the diffi  culty of testifying against a family 
member, we suspect that thoughtful citizens would not want to live in a 
regime with such privileges for family members when they realize that a per-
petrator of crimes is being shielded from justice by family members who are 
immune from questioning on the witness stand.
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Finally, our last normative consideration is also implicated by the testi-
monial privileges. To the extent that defendants receive signals from the evi-
dentiary privileges,
33
 the privileges furnish incentives to keep criminal 
conspiracies within the family. Spouses are more likely to recruit each other 
into criminal activity because they know they can shield their communica-
tions with their spouse later on. Th e law needs tools to disrupt conspiracy 
and make it less effi  cacious, not more so. A better system would realize that 
the law should aim at “help[ing to] destabilize trust within the conspiracy, cue 
the defection of conspirators, and permit law enforcement to extract more 
information from them.”
34
 Unsurprisingly, some jurisdictions have adopted 
a joint-spousal-criminal-activity exception to the marital-communications 
privileges.
35
 Obviously, in lieu of a full-scale abandonment of the privileges, 
we welcome at least this development.
But in light of the troublesome normative costs in the context of 
evidentiary privileges, we think there is a good basis to eliminate these 
privileges. We do not see any compelling state interests that could render 
these privileges appropriate or acceptable, unless our empirical concerns 
regarding perjury and deterrence were proven demonstrably.
36
 Moreover, 
although we recognize that some argue that familial interests are prepolitical 
or prelegal in some sense, such that the law needs to step aside in the face of 
family loyalties (rendering family interests to be suffi  cient to override the 
maxim that the public is entitled to every man’s evidence), we are not per-
suaded. At least as a matter of fi t with other aspects of the legal landscape, 
we note the state’s extensive regulation of family law; thus, it is hard to take 
this argument seriously. Marriage itself is an undeniably legal relation—and 
it betrays common sense to think a general respect for the private sphere of 
the family should be suffi  cient to overcome our normative framework, which 
itself derives from the task of trying to assess whether family ties benefi ts are 
appropriate in the criminal justice system. In this case, to say that family ties 
should override our normative framework is only to disagree that our nor-
mative framework establishes a presumption against family ties benefi ts in 
the criminal justice context in the fi rst place. When the benefi ts are dis-
bursed to reinforce inequality, gender bias, patriarchy, and inaccuracy in the 
criminal justice system, the costs are too great to bear.
Moreover, those who wish to support this family ties benefi t (and others 
like it) as a way of generally supporting an important social institution of 
caregiving have an extra step of justifi catory work to do that we think cannot 
be done successfully—one must defend not only the general idea that it 
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would be nice for the law to protect the family from some legal incursions 
but also the more specifi c proposition that the law must protect families in 
the context of criminal justice, a site where we think the law cannot aff ord this 
type of benefi t. Too much is at stake when the lives and liberties of men and 
women are held in the balance.
Th at said, we can imagine that jurisdictions might be interested in nar-
rower options than the ones we endorse. For instance, Maryland has a two-
strikes policy regarding the invocation of the privileges in courts.
37
 
Alternatively, jurisdictions might want to limit the application of the privi-
lege to cases involving a discrete set of crimes, leaving violent or more seri-
ous felonies outside the scope of the privilege (or even other benefi ts, such 
as the exemptions and defenses that are based on family status). A third 
strategy might be to limit the privilege to cover communications regarding 
only future conduct, not past conduct.
We cannot, of course, deny that our catalogue of normative considera-
tions might seem to condemn other testimonial privileges. For example, 
the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges might result in 
prosecutors and police having less information to pursue justice. Although 
these privileges have no especially ignoble histories, they are, at a general 
level, in derogation of the search for truth and have the potential to implicate 
an equality norm.
Still, we think the normative considerations we have highlighted con-
demn intrafamilial privileges in ways diff erent and more substantial. In the 
fi rst place, we think other testimonial privileges do not fare as badly through 
our normative framework: they neither off end our fi rst consideration, nor do 
they reasonably trigger substantial concerns under the fourth consideration. 
On the contrary, the lawyer-client privilege, for example, can help prevent 
crime by facilitating communications with potential off enders to steer them 
away from unlawful conduct. Moreover, even our second normative consid-
eration—accuracy—does not clearly disfavor the lawyer-client privilege. Th e 
lawyer-client privilege substantially contributes to the vindication of our 
adversarial system of justice. By giving the defendant a true and zealous 
advocate who is bound by a duty of confi dentiality to him, we give the defend-
ant a fi ghting chance to use the criminal justice system to prove his inno-
cence; this ultimately contributes to the project of accuracy. We do not often 
worry that psychotherapists and lawyers are actually going to become co-
conspirators (though, of course, such results are not unheard of). Moreover, 
our “crime-creation” prong fares better with the lawyer-client privilege and 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege than it does with the marital privilege: 
some professionals in some jurisdictions might be required to reveal when 
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their client threatens a third party with substantial harm or a crime. Not so 
with the marital privilege.
Finally, while one can make the claim that other testimonial privileges 
also fail our normative framework, we would not be the fi rst to notice that 
some of the privileges rest on less-than-fi rm footing: a number of scholars 
have argued that, to the extent the privileges have value, the value extends 
only to advice regarding prospective behavior—not past behavior.
38
 In any 
case, to the extent that the other privileges pursue compelling state interests 
that are appropriate in the criminal justice sphere, we acknowledge that 
our normative framework is not the fi nal word on whether a benefi t is 
accept able. Other testimonial privileges may be justifi able by counter vail-
ing interests that override the considerations outlined above.
• B. Exemptions for Family Members Harboring 
Fugitives
As discussed in Chapter 1, another way in which states favor family relation-
ships in a facial manner is by exempting family members from prosecution. 
Eighteen states currently exempt immediate family members from prosecu-
tion for harboring a fugitive or reduce their potential liability.
39
 What are the 
rationales off ered for these family exemptions? First, perhaps, “it is unrealistic 
to expect persons to be deterred [by the possibility of criminal prosecution] 
from giving aid to their close relatives.”
40
 Criminal punishment is therefore 
unwarranted as a deterrent because it would be ineff ective in any event. 
Second, perhaps such statutes are “an acknowledgement of human frailty.”
41
 
Under this view, legislatures have simply recognized that the bonds of 
familial love will inevitably trump any perceived obligation to the state. 
A third rationale suggests the exemption vindicates “society’s interest in 
safeguarding the family unit from unnecessary fractional pressures.”
42
Analyzing these statutes under the framework of our four normative con-
siderations, we conclude that the family exemption is misguided and should 
therefore be soundly rejected by state legislatures. Th e exemptions obviously 
contribute to a fundamental inequity: close friends who provide assistance 
face prosecution, while family members do not. Further, like the evidentiary 
privileges, these exemptions have patriarchal origins and may serve to shield 
from prosecution those who commit crimes in the home. Th e focus of these 
exemptions at common law was to exempt wives from liability for following 
their “duty” by shielding their husbands. To be sure, these statutes have now 
become gender neutral by extending their protection to other immediate 
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family members, so perhaps they should not be invalidated on the basis of 
their patriarchal roots alone. But these are not our strongest normative 
arguments; we therefore turn to our two remaining considerations.
In terms of accuracy, these exemptions do a diff erent kind of mischief 
than threatening our ability to sort the guilty from the innocent; they facili-
tate a guilty person’s escape from punishment entirely. Allowing an individ-
ual to obstruct justice by hiding a family member obviously frustrates “the 
essential government functions of locating and apprehending criminals.”
43
 
Moreover, this immunity is granted without regard to the heinousness of the 
underlying crime—the exemption is granted whether the fugitive is a forger 
or a murderer. Th e statutes sweep with too broad a brush in another regard 
as well—they protect those family members who might never have previ-
ously enjoyed a meaningful relationship with the primary off ender, but 
simply came to the aid of a relative when asked for assistance after the 
commission of a crime.
44
 Moreover, the laws are written only to protect those 
in traditional state-sanctioned familial units. It is also diffi  cult to accept that 
it is the government’s decision to prosecute that creates signifi cant stresses 
upon the family; rather, the responsibility for that would seem to lie squarely 
on the shoulders of the family member who decided to enlist his relatives to 
assist him in his illegal activities.
Finally, like the testimonial privileges, these statutory exemptions create 
perverse incentives. In a state with a family exemption, there is no reason for 
a defendant to commit a crime unilaterally; he has every incentive to enlist 
close family members to help him conceal evidence and hide from the 
authorities because those family members face no criminal consequences 
for their actions. Why should we create an incentive for a defendant to recruit 
accomplices and thereby increase the chances of success for his criminal 
venture? As the Supreme Court recognized forty years ago:
[C]ollective criminal agreement—partnership in crime—presents a 
greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted 
action both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be suc-
cessfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals 
involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group association for 
criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes possible the attainment of 
ends more complex than those which one criminal could accomplish.
45
Because family exemptions pose such signifi cant costs in terms of 
preventing the government from punishing criminal activity and creating 
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incentives for conspiratorial activity, we believe our presumption against 
such benefi ts is clearly triggered. Further, these benefi ts provide no substan-
tial benefi t to the criminal justice system. We reject the notion that allowing 
siblings to dispose of murder weapons for one another is an essential com-
ponent of family harmony. Even if we were to concede the point that not 
every brother would be deterred by the threat of criminal punishment from 
hiding a murder weapon for his beloved sibling, it might still be the case that 
the possibility of punishment would deter the killer from making the request 
in the fi rst instance.
• C. Violence Within the Family
In demonstrating how our normative framework would apply in the context 
of familial status defenses, we have chosen to focus here on the example of 
the parental discipline defense as it is used in child abuse prosecutions. 
Parents have employed corporal punishment to discipline children and mold 
their characters for centuries with minimal interference from the state.
46
 
Th e historical origins of the tradition of noninterference in matters of family 
violence, and its obviously troubling patriarchal origins, have been well doc-
umented.
47
 We choose here to focus on the less obvious concerns this defense 
raises in terms of equality and incentivizing more criminal activity.
In terms of equality, the parental discipline defense elevates the right of the 
parent to discipline his child over the right of the child not to be subjected to 
physical force. We would never allow an adult to exercise comparable physi-
cal force against another adult or against someone else’s child; any adult who 
took a belt to the backside of an unrelated adult or child would be eligible for 
swift and condign punishment.
48
 Why is a child’s relative entitled to escape 
punishment within the criminal justice system when an unrelated adult is 
not? Th e nature of the defendant’s conduct and the physical harm suff ered by 
the victim is the same under both scenarios. Critics, of course, respond that 
the motive underlying the conduct is diff erent, that the parent wishes to disci-
pline and the non-parent wishes to harm. But non-parents may also have 
“altruistic” motivations.  And we shouldn’t uncritically embrace the rose-
colored view of parenthood that so often permeates the practice of criminal 
law. We as a society desperately want to believe that all parents are altruistic 
and loving individuals who always act in their children’s best interest.
49
 But 
the prevalence of child abuse and neglect in America shows this assumption 
is too often untrue.
50
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In terms of the negative incentives created by the use of corporal punish-
ment, spanking is often a precursor to more serious parental violence.
51
 
Deanna Pollard argues that “the defense of ‘discipline’ is raised in forty-one 
percent of homicide prosecutions against parents who ‘accidentally’ killed 
their child.”
52
 Pollard further suggests that spanking increases the chances 
that the child victim of a parent’s violence will himself be more likely to 
engage in aggression and other antisocial behavior later in life, including 
engaging in domestic violence in his own family.
53
Because of the normative costs associated with these family status 
defenses, we believe it triggers our presumption. We recognize that critics of 
our position will argue that the utilities of this “family ties benefi t” are indeed 
substantial. Many believe spanking is in fact benefi cial to children; others 
simply believe that parents should be allowed to make their own disciplinary 
choices without undue interference by the state. For the reasons stated 
above, we are unpersuaded that these interests are suffi  cient to override our 
normative considerations. Far from promoting the safety of vulnerable per-
sons, this particular benefi t exposes children to state-sanctioned physical 
harm, and thus cannot survive scrutiny under our framework.
• D. Pretrial Release
As we described in Chapter 1, many jurisdictions expressly direct judges or 
magistrates to consider a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities when 
deciding whether or not to release him pending trial. Th us, it is not diffi  cult 
to imagine a scenario in which a defendant who is a father to minor children 
is able to secure his release pretrial, while a single, childless defendant 
charged with an equivalent crime is not. Equality and discrimination 
concerns are therefore clearly implicated under our normative framework. 
Th ese disparate decisions can have very real consequences. For example, 
it is undoubtedly easier to mount a successful defense from outside the 
correctional system than it is from the inside, because incarcerated 
defendants have much more constrained access to lawyers, witnesses, and 
other investigative resources. As a result, there is some statistical evidence 
showing that pretrial release is correlated with higher acquittal rates and 
even stronger evidence regarding sentencing. Detained defendants are more 
likely to receive a sentence including incarceration than those who are 
released.
54
 Accordingly, distributing the pretrial release benefi t only to family 
members risks creating a two-track criminal justice system with the “haves” 
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(with children and dependents) coming out ahead of the “have-nots.” Th at 
seems an odd and unfair result.
Our concerns about patriarchal origins do not seem to be implicated 
here. But we do worry that heteronormativity could rear its head if persons 
with ties or responsibilities to non-traditional family units (whether homo-
sexual or polyamorous) were being denied pretrial release while those in 
such state-recognized units were granted such release. Moreover, marginal 
increases in crime-creation may very well be an issue worth considering. 
During the period of release, a defendant with children might be especially 
prone to fl ee if he can take his family with him, because he knows that pos-
sible incarceration would have a terrible eff ect not only on him but also on 
his dependents. Th e same concern might especially motivate the defendant 
to attempt to obstruct justice in order to increase his chances for an eventual 
acquittal.
Our concern about accuracy may be relevant as well. As suggested above, 
a defendant who is released pretrial may be able to interfere with potential 
witnesses, evidence, and the like, such that the accuracy of the ultimate adju-
dication of his guilt is called into question. Th is problem may be particularly 
acute for defendants who are charged with committing a crime against a 
family member, because they will potentially have easier access to their 
victim and potential witnesses than defendants who committed a crime 
against a random stranger, for example.
In the end, if detention is being proposed because the defendant poses a 
danger to the community generally or an individual within it, then one’s 
family ties and responsibilities should not be enough to aff ord a defendant 
preferential treatment—the need to ensure the safety of the community 
must be the primary consideration. If the issue is whether a defendant poses 
a fl ight risk, then it would seem that responsibility for minor children, for 
example, could be considered as one of a myriad of factors that would lead to 
a conclusion that a defendant will not fl ee—but it is one of many possible 
relevant factors and not a dispositive one. Indeed, for reasons we mentioned 
before, the fact of responsibility for minor children might enhance the risk of 
fl ight. Th us, judges should try to reduce fl ight risk without reference to family 
ties and responsibilities; indeed, there are ways of reducing the risk through 
other means, such as GPS devices or other location tracking devices. And if 
such alternatives are not available, then we are ultimately more comfortable 
with judges focusing on whether the risk is attenuated by reference to all 
relationships of caregiving, rather than merely focusing on traditional family 
relationships, which may not refl ect any particular defendant’s actual circle 
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of aff ection. Indeed, to look only at traditional family ties or responsibilities 
would often entrench heterosexist conceptions of the family, which have no 
proper place in the criminal justice system.
One other aspect of pretrial treatment of defendants warrants mention. 
A child-sensitive arrest policy is a good example of a situation where our 
normative cost structure is not implicated.
55
 Arranging to arrest an individ-
ual outside the presence of his minor children, while ensuring that the 
children have safe and comfortable living arrangements after the arrest, can 
be a family ties benefi t or accommodation in the sense that it might be more 
administratively burdensome for police or prosecutors and might be dis-
bursed now only to those that meet a certain defi nition of status. But the four 
costs we identifi ed in Chapter 2 are of only attenuated relevance. Th erefore, 
the presumption against such a benefi t can be rebutted, and we believe the 
policy is an appropriate one for the criminal justice system to pursue. 
However, because we ultimately worry that this respect for certain relation-
ships of caregiving can still be carried out in a manner that is heterosexist 
and insensitive to those outside traditionally recognized familial organiza-
tions, we are hopeful that these policies can be revised to extend their pro-
tections outside the limited confi nes of the solely biological and heterosexual 
family. For instance, in the context of the arrest of a caregiver, and in the 
absence of exigent circumstances, we think it is not too much to ask the 
police to apprehend the caregiver in a manner sensitive to the responsible 
care of any vulnerable persons under the care of the arrestee.
• E. Sentencing
As discussed earlier, until the recent Booker decision by the Supreme Court, 
which rendered the federal sentencing guidelines advisory,
56
 the federal 
government’s position on family ties discounts at sentencing has probably 
been the most restrictive compared to the policies guiding sentencing in the 
states. Even in the federal context, of course, courts found ways to extend 
discounts to off enders with extraordinary “family ties and responsibilities.” 
Now, with the imprimatur from the Supreme Court in Booker, federal courts 
are more likely to award discounts out of compassion for the defendant’s 
family responsibilities. Moreover, to the extent that the federal courts 
conform to the pre-Booker guidance from the United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC), it bears emphasis that the federal courts address only a 
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small fraction of the cases in the national criminal justice system. And as we 
saw earlier in Chapter 1, many states expressly tell judges to calibrate a sen-
tence based, in part, on one’s family ties and responsibilities in sentencing 
off enders.
Th us, off enders who are parents or caregivers to spouses or elders may, 
depending on the jurisdiction, be in a position to receive a sharp discount 
from the punishment they might otherwise receive. Not only does this 
facilitate ad hoc disparities between off enders who are otherwise similarly 
situated across cases, it also creates inequalities between persons involved in 
the very same off ense.
57
 Th ese disparities require justifi cation.
An off ender—so long as he satisfi es the competence criterion for punish-
ment
58
—anticipates (or should reasonably be expected to anticipate) a risk 
that he will be punished in accordance with extant sentencing norms. If we 
make that presumption, which is not an unreasonable one, there is nothing 
unfair—putting aside proportionality issues—about the off ender seeing that 
risk of punishment materialize. No unfairness to the defendant attaches to 
punishing persons for conduct they could, by hypothesis, control with con-
sequences they can reasonably anticipate.
59
 Th e resulting disparities in 
sentences across otherwise similarly situated defendants at least shift the 
burden of justifi cation for discounts onto their proponents. A person who 
commits a crime can reasonably foresee that, if prosecuted and punished, 
his punishment will aff ect not only himself but also his family. Extending a 
discount to an off ender for a reason unrelated to his crime constitutes an 
undeserved windfall. In addition, as we adverted to earlier, giving benefi ts to 
defendants with family ties in the currency of sentencing discounts will also, 
on the margin, incentivize this class of defendants to seek out greater crimi-
nal opportunities, or they will be recruited or pressed into action by others.
Of course, the fact that off enders do not “deserve” sentencing discounts in 
an abstract sense does not mean that accommodations should never be 
made—there may be compelling, non-desert-related reasons to extend such 
accommodations. Incarcerating a defendant with signifi cant family respon-
sibilities unquestionably imposes tremendous costs on innocent family 
members, and those costs are most severe when the defendant is an irre-
placeable caregiver to vulnerable family members. Th erefore, although we 
advance the unusual position—taken primarily and unpopularly by the fed-
eral government’s sentencing guidelines—that, ordinarily, a defendant’s 
family ties and responsibilities should not serve as a basis for a lighter sen-
tence, we are sensitive to the serious arguments made by proponents of 
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sentencing departures for those with signifi cant caregiving responsibilities.
60
 
Th ese arguments merit attention and amplifi cation.
Primarily, the proponents of these departures can point to the anticipated 
harms to innocent third parties as a reasonable basis to distinguish the 
sentences caregivers should get from those who do not have those responsi-
bilities.
61
 In other words, they can reject the claim that off enders with urgent 
family responsibilities are similarly situated to those off enders without press-
ing family responsibilities. Insisting on such a distinction is reasonable, they 
might add, because, in a particular case or class of cases, the private harm of 
removing a caregiver’s support to an innocent third party outweighs the 
public gain from continuous incarceration.
62
 In this respect, the judge need 
not be expressing any claim about the diminished moral culpability of the 
off ender who receives the sentencing discount. Rather, the claim is simply 
that, although this off ender deserves no breaks, the weight of these harms to 
innocent third parties should trump the need for a lengthy incarceration. To 
the extent that this departure disrupts equality norms, the proponents say, 
such departures are justifi able.
Th e justifi cation may take several forms. First, it can be argued that 
depriving children of parents in order to incarcerate the parents for the pur-
pose of punishment is itself a criminogenic (crime-creating) policy.
63
 Second, 
notwithstanding the culpability of the off enders and the harm suff ered by the 
victims of their crimes, it can be argued that the harm is already done; the 
state should not infl ict its own harms on the off ender’s children or other 
persons benefi ting from the off ender’s caregiving. Indeed, if we urge off end-
ers to bear responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of 
their actions, so too must the social planners who create institutions of 
punishment bear such responsibility.
By that logic, our compassion and concern should properly extend to the 
harm imposed on innocent third parties by the state’s punishments.
64
 We are 
therefore willing to agree that compelling circumstances arise when an off ender 
is the sole and irreplaceable caregiver for minors or for aged or ailing persons 
with whom the defendant has an established relationship of caregiving. 
However, we abjure any reason to privilege only the traditional familial relation-
ship in the context of any accommodations made to “irreplaceable caregivers.” 
What matters from our vantage point is that the defendant is serving a critical 
social role as an irreplaceable caregiver. We recognize our approach may incur 
slightly higher “information costs” by abandoning the simple proxy of family 
status, but this approach in practice is not apt to be more costly than the extant 
costs of verifying the reality of familial caregiving responsibilities.
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Ordinarily, however, we think that harms to innocent third parties should 
be ameliorated through the institutions of distributive justice, not criminal 
justice. In an attractive polity, a child without a parent should receive state 
and communal aid regardless of whether the parent is not around due to 
sickness, death, or imprisonment. But where the state has persistently failed 
its obligations of distributive justice, it would not be unreasonable to tailor 
the punishment of caregiver off enders in a way that mitigates third-party 
harms without simultaneously elevating the off ender’s status in violation of 
the principle of equal justice under law.
For that reason, we think, assuming the crime was severe enough that 
some form of incarceration is deemed necessary, it may be appropriate for 
legislatures to authorize greater use of time-delayed sentencing to off enders 
with irreplaceable caregiving responsibilities.
65
 For example, if an off ender is 
the irreplaceable caregiver for children, the off ender in a time-delayed sen-
tencing scheme would defer the incarcerative aspect of his punishment until 
after the children reach the age of majority or until alternative and feasible 
care can be arranged.
66
 In the case of caring for aging parents or ill spouses, 
the sentence may be delayed until the person receiving the care is deceased, 
improves in health, or is able to obtain care from another person or entity. 
During the period that the sentence is deferred, the off ender’s freedom of 
movement would be dramatically limited so that only work and necessary 
chores (i.e., taking one’s child to the doctor) would be permitted. Electronic 
bracelets or other tracking devices could be used to ensure compliance. 
Additionally, during the time of deferral, the state could attach extensive 
community service obligations or other release conditions, such as drug test-
ing. Failure to abide by the conditions would lead to more severe punish-
ment than would be experienced absent the deferral of the sentence to 
minimize possible exploitation by the defendant.
Of course, this option should not be restricted to only those with a blood 
relationship or marriage. If there is an established relationship of caregiving, 
then that should be the critical issue. On the other hand, this option should 
not be available when the defendant has already committed a crime either 
with or against the recipient of the care, or has exhibited a propensity to 
harm his family (e.g., prior convictions for reckless endangerment of a child), 
or is such a dangerous criminal that it would be foolish for society to let him 
remain free. Simply put, there might be some crimes whose nature would 
render an off ender ineligible for this kind of diff erentiated-sentencing 
scheme. But generally speaking, there are ways of implementing punish-
ments that still, by their coercion or deprivation, communicate to the 
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off ender the norms of equal liberty under law without wreaking (as much) 
havoc on the lives of innocent third parties.
As should be clear from the foregoing, we are very sympathetic to the con-
cerns of innocent third parties aff ected by draconian sentencing policies. 
Myrna Raeder, for example, has forcefully illustrated that our current sentenc-
ing regime has particularly harsh consequences for incarcerated mothers and 
their children.
67
 But recognizing the consequences of a sentencing regime is 
not the same as eff ectively condemning it in whole cloth. For one thing, a 
caregiver who is also a serial killer should not receive a sentencing discount 
simply because of the caregiver’s status as a mother. Rather, the critical issue 
here seems to be that many of the crimes for which women are convicted 
(providing low-level assistance to a drug traffi  cking ring, for example) do not 
deserve the extremely harsh sentences that are currently imposed for such 
activity. Th us, many of Raeder’s very legitimate concerns about the “gendered 
diff erences in criminality”
68
 could be taken into account if we properly con-
sider factors such as the nature of the criminal conduct, the criminal history 
of the defendant, and so on, in making a sentencing decision for an individual 
defendant or a class of defendants similarly situated. Further, many of the 
harms to innocent third parties can be addressed by reducing across the 
board the sentences imposed for nonviolent crimes, which are the crimes, 
some suggest, that women are more likely to commit in any event. But this 
analysis and the prescriptions that fl ow from it do not require an uncritical 
extension of sentencing discounts simply because of family ties or responsi-
bilities. Instead, we need to focus on whether a defendant has irreplaceable 
caregiving responsibilities and how we can best accommodate that caregiv-
ing role. It bears emphasis that for us it is the voluntary caregiving and not the 
familial status that justifi es greater sensitivity.
In sum, we recognize that punishment (especially in the form of incar-
ceration) aff ects innocent third parties. Th ose innocent third parties, how-
ever, are not connected to the defendant through family status alone. Th us, 
to the extent legal offi  cials should tailor a punishment in recognition of its 
deleterious impact on innocent third parties, the law should reject a categor-
ical eff ort to accommodate only those innocent third parties who are family 
members.
69
 Second, we doubt that the criminal justice system should be the 
fi rst resort to resolve the social needs of families in distress. But in those situ-
ations in which distressed-family problems arise with no alternative resources 
available to ameliorate the situation, it is preferable to establish more options, 
including time-deferred sentencing or, for example, custodial options where 
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the sole caregiver and the cared-for individuals can live together, assuming 
that the off ender’s off ense was not directed against his children (or other’s 
children) in the fi rst instance.
70
• F. Prison Policies
Our normative framework requires a fairly nuanced approach to the evalua-
tion of prison policies. Th at is because each individual policy we mentioned in 
Chapter 1 implicates diff erent normative considerations. Accordingly, we 
cannot present a unifi ed approach to prison policies as such. At some very 
basic level, it is understandable that our punitive practices aim to take account 
of family ties; we often harm entire families for one member’s wrongdoing by 
punishing and removing the wrongdoer from the home. Still, our normative 
framework furnishes some reasons to think that there is an unfairness and 
inequality associated with state promotion of family ties in the penal context. 
Moreover, we think many of the policies can be recrafted in terms that are 
neutral to family status.
We think there is one central diff erence, however, between most of 
the other family ties benefi ts discussed and the set of practices we group 
together as prison policies: the state’s legitimate interest in successful 
off ender reentry. In the context of corrections, we cannot ignore that one’s 
family can play a central role in facilitating successful prisoner reentry, one 
of the most important, if often overlooked, functions of our penal system. 
Th e criminal justice system’s interest in off enders prior to the service of a 
sentence must focus on the inculpation of the guilty and the exculpation of 
the innocent—a task routinely undermined by the provision of benefi ts for 
family ties. Nevertheless, once an off ender is sentenced and responsibility for 
a crime is placed on the right shoulders, our penal system can rightfully draw 
upon the resources of the family to help reintegrate an off ender back into 
society and encourage rehabilitation during periods of incarceration. It is 
the penal context that the interests in rehabilitation and reintegration might 
trump the considerations within our normative framework—and where 
family networks might warrant benefi ts precisely because they are doing 
work that is subcontracted out by the state. As we discussed in our introduc-
tory remarks to Chapter 2, one of the strong arguments for having the state 
benefi t the family arises when the family is doing work the state very much 
wants done—but the task can be accomplished more cheaply and eff ectively 
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by drawing upon the natural resources within the family. Nonetheless, our 
normative framework remains useful in analyzing a host of prison policies.
For example, in trying to assess the furlough policies we recounted in 
Chapter 1, our normative framework demands an inquiry into how such 
policies could potentially implicate an ideal of fairness or equality. Why 
should those with family members get more days off  from their prison 
sentences than those without family? Although our other normative consid-
erations do not seem applicable to furloughs, our norm of equality seems 
off ended by policies that favor those with family members.
Similarly, visitation policies that bar visitors who are not within the state’s 
defi nition of family are very unfair to those without a family recognized by 
the state.
71
 Because courts give prison offi  cials substantial discretion in 
devising visitation policies,
72
 there can be inequities that escape notice. 
Accordingly, the normative framework we off er here indicates that prisons 
ought to devise such policies with care. It off ends a sense of justice when 
inmates with families receive preferential treatment via certain prison 
policies as compared to those inmates without families. To the extent that 
discrimination against those without families implicates our third norma-
tive consideration, our presumption against family ties benefi ts has some—
albeit limited—force.
Yet, in the post-sentence phase of the criminal justice system, we cannot 
help but conclude that certain substantial interests of the state may counter-
act our worries about family ties benefi ts. First, only one of our four norma-
tive considerations is implicated here—the equality prong. Moreover, we 
acknowledge the role that relations of caregiving can play in the corrections 
system. Th e policy statements of the Federal Bureau of Prisons embrace 
family ties because they can be especially rehabilitative.
73
 We acknowledge 
that family reunifi cation after incarceration may serve as an appropriate 
predicate to favor the family in certain prison policies. Accordingly, our 
sympathy for some of the “pro-family” arguments we adumbrated at the 
beginning of Chapter 2 are given eff ect in this context. In particular, the state 
interest in successful off ender reentry informs our assessment of how family 
ties should be addressed by the criminal justice system.
Still, as with child-sensitive arrest practices, we are mindful that there are 
ways to administer these benefi ts that do not reinforce a heterosexist and 
overly traditional conception of the family. Our preferred strategy would be to 
look at function instead of status. If it is possible to craft the relevant policies 
in ways that satisfy the goals of prisoner reentry without reliance on family 
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status—because family status may be both under- and overinclusive—then 
we should look at those possibilities rather than using the imperfect proxy of 
“family” to achieve these goals.
An additional way in which we think the state can satisfy the imperatives 
of punishment while exhibiting concern for innocent third parties and suc-
cessful prisoner reentry is to realize that the coercion the state metes out as 
part of its punishment need not be done in temporally contiguous ways. 
If we think of punishment in terms of units, and we assume, arguendo, that 
some period of incarceration is required, it might be better to ensure that 
off enders spend fi ve days a week working at home and the remaining two 
days in a carceral facility. Th at might lengthen the period in which the pun-
ishment occurs, but it might also serve society’s interest by ameliorating 
innocent third-party harms and achieving successful prisoner reentry. 
If courts or prison offi  cials are given the guided discretion to decide whether 
a punishment-units approach should be embraced, then the off ender is still 
being coerced—and for the public’s purposes, not for the sole benefi t of the 
off ender. Moreover, the condemnatory social message of this punishment 
can still be expressed clearly by limiting the off ender’s movements when not 
serving time in prison.
A related issue requiring sensitive application connects to the placement of 
inmates within the correctional system.
74
 If prisons are built in remote rural 
areas, or if prisoners are sent to prisons far from their families, then it will be 
harder for the families of most prisoners to visit. Equally diffi  cult may be access 
to the programs we want to make available to off enders as part of the coercive 
punishment they endure at the hands of the state.
75
 Family ties are routinely 
considered when establishing an inmate’s “place of service.”
76
 Although this 
eff ort to use prison placement to help families might be seen as a family ties 
benefi t—and might also implicate the inequality/discrimination aspect of our 
normative considerations (like furlough and visitation policies)—we think the 
heightened state interest in successful reentry works to rebut the presumption 
against such benefi ts. It seems perfectly appropriate for states to consider ease 
of access for those who may facilitate reentry (whether family or friends) when 
making decisions regarding prison construction or prison assignment after 
conviction. A location-sensitive policy does not off end our four normative 
considerations and simply prevents the intimates of inmates from paying 
extra costs and forcing off enders to serve “harder” time.
77
 Still, our normative 
consideration of nondiscrimination against those without family counsels for 
sensitivity in designing such benefi ts: those with other good and rehabilitative 
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reasons for visits, furloughs, and specifi c placement needs should be 
heeded so as to minimize favoritism toward those with families recognized 
by the state.
Th ere is yet another potential state interest that also counsels for 
more toleration of family ties benefi ts in the penal system, namely, the inter-
ests of extremely vulnerable third parties and their need for care. Just as 
irreplaceable caregivers can, under certain conditions, get some reconfi g-
ured sentencing, they may appropriately be given special consideration in 
their incarceration as well. As we mentioned in Chapter 1, a number of 
innovative programs have been created to help mothers and their children 
stay together, notwithstanding a prison sentence that would otherwise 
seperate a mother from her children.
78
 To be sure, the focus on providing only 
women with these alternatives could be said to implicate our fi rst normative 
consideration insofar as such programs reinforce traditional gender roles 
and stereotypes (i.e., that parenting is primarily a woman’s responsibility, and 
that men are entitled to less consideration for their status as fathers). 
Moreover, our third normative consideration is potentially off ended because 
women who are not pregnant or mothers do not get the same “discount” in 
their prison terms; and men are almost completely excluded from such 
programs as the federal Mothers and Infants Nurturing Together (MINT) 
Program and California’s Pregnant and Parenting Women’s Alternative 
Sentencing Program Act.
79
 Finally, our fourth normative consideration is 
implicated because such programs could set up incentives for mothers to be 
targeted for criminal recruitment because they may be aff orded especially 
light sentences.
Nevertheless, we think these programs may yet be defensible in service of 
the potential irreplaceability of a caregiver, something we discussed at length 
above, in connection with sentencing. We would recommend, however, that 
such programs become non-gendered, in that they be made available to men 
who, for example, have sole custody of infants.
• G. Conclusion
We think it bears emphasis that the accommodations to caregiving that we 
endorse or tolerate in this Chapter might better be viewed as doing away 
with a burden on all off enders than aff ording a real benefi t to those with 
family ties recognized by the state. For instance, time-deferred sentencing 
for irreplaceable caregivers may benefi t those with families more often 
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than others, but we would not want to see the benefi t of time-deferred sen-
tencing restricted only to those who give care for their children. Th is is a 
perfect example of how helping families need not off end our normative con-
siderations—and we have no trouble signing on to policies that help families 
in this benign way, aff ording a benefi t in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 
Although we are generally skeptical toward distributing family ties benefi ts 
prior to and in determinations of criminal liability, and in many instances 
of sentencing, when it comes to sentencing of irreplaceable caregivers 
and matters aff ecting the incarceration of an off ender, we are more 
inclined to reengineer the current panoply of family ties benefi ts in terms 
that are neutral to family status. In those contexts, we prefer to allocate 
benefi ts in a manner sensitive to promoting established relationships of 
caregiving.
We hope we have demonstrated how privileging individuals because of 
their membership in a state-denominated family unit potentially threatens 
some core functions of the criminal justice system. When we excuse certain 
classes of individuals from prosecution entirely, solely on account of a family 
relationship, we both allow potentially dangerous individuals to escape 
punishment and create a more attractive class of accomplices. When we 
allow a husband to prevent his wife from off ering relevant testimony on the 
witness stand that may exculpate someone else, we inhibit the truth-seeking 
function of a criminal trial. When we allow a wife to claim a privilege but 
not a partner in a same-sex relationship, we subtly but inevitably convey our 
disapprobation of that relationship. Although this seemingly simple story 
can get more complicated, we have argued that it rarely gets so complicated 
as to sanction the privileging of family ties over our commitment to doing 
justice in a sphere in which the liberty and lives of women and men are 
at stake.
To be sure, the troubling normative costs we associate with these family 
ties benefi ts require verifi cation; and we hope other scholars will participate 
in assessing the empirical costs of these family ties benefi ts.
80
 It is possible 
that comparing crime rates in jurisdictions that have these benefi ts with 
those that do not (both domestically and abroad) will yield interesting 
results. Some family ties benefi ts for instance, may prove to be self-defeat-
ing.
81
 Other family ties benefi ts might demonstrate tangible public advan-
tages, such as securing greater compliance with the legal system.
82
 And still 
others are less susceptible to empirical “verifi cation” because the benefi ts 
involve tradeoff s between competing normative values, such as the family 
ties benefi ts that pose risks to relevant equality norms.
83
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Although we are open-minded about the possible empirical eff ects these 
various benefi ts cause, we are, at least right now, doubtful that the family 
needs systematic support through the use of criminal justice benefi ts in 
order to enable and ensure its fl ourishing.
84
 We recognize that the tension 
between loyalty to the family and loyalty to the state is real, and that the 
choices faced by families like the Sheinbeins and Madoff s are agonizing. But 
when confl icts between family and the criminal justice system arise, espe-
cially prior to the determination of the sentence, the state’s and the public’s 
interests should generally prevail over the need to promote the compara-
tively private interest of family preservation and “harmony.” Indeed, if family 
relationships involve criminal complicity, those families are already in disre-
pair and are likely undeserving of state protection.
Although our presumption against family ties benefi ts can be rebutted, 
we believe the scrutiny called for under our presumption is warranted—and 
entails curtailing some of the family ties benefi ts we have already and being 
cautious in the creation of new ones.
But, thus far, we have addressed only part of the story. It is certainly true 
that the criminal justice system extends a number of privileges and benefi ts 
to those with state-recognized family relationships. Th ere are, however, a 
number of instances in which off enders are treated worse than other off end-
ers by virtue of their family relationships. We turn to that part of the story in 
the next half of the book.




In 2005, Christina Madison watched while her new husband repeatedly 
punched her four-year-old son in the stomach after the child refused to get 
dressed for school. Madison did nothing to stop her husband from hitting the 
child. Th e child eventually died from internal bleeding as a result of a tear 
in his intestine. Prosecutors charged Madison for her failure to act; she was 
sentenced to twelve years in prison.
1 
Stories like Christina Madison’s abound. In the absence of her family 
status, Christina’s omission or failure to rescue a child would trigger no 
criminal liability. But because of it, she faces a very signifi cant sentence. In 
this part of the book, we examine the various places in the American 
criminal justice system in which the law imposes burdens on defendants 
on account of their familial status or familial connection to the crime. Where 
do these burdens exist? Why do we have them? What, if anything, is wrong 
with them? How can they be reformed? Th us, this part of the book analyzes 
various “family ties burdens” and asks whether they are justifi able—or 
whether they could be justifi ed if redesigned. Although scholars have consid-
ered these burdens individually, part of our contribution here is viewing 
these burdens synthetically and explaining what, if any, sense can be made 
of them once taken as a whole.
Our research uncovers the following family ties burdens: parental respon-
sibility laws imposing liability on parents because of crimes or misdeeds 
committed by their children, omissions liability for failing to prevent harm to 
family members, and criminal liability for nonpayment of child or parental 
support. Defendants are also burdened on account of their family status 
when they face prosecutions for incest, adultery, and bigamy.
2
 We survey 
these family ties burdens in Chapter 4. In all seven of these instances, in 
the absence of the particular familial status of the defendant, the actions 
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or omissions at issue would largely be ignored by the criminal justice system 
or, in some cases, treated more leniently.
We begin Chapter 5 by explaining why we have generally taken a 
defendant-centered perspective in thinking about the sites of family ties 
burdens, since many burdens on defendants based on family status may, 
conversely, have been established in order to advantage the family members 
of such defendants (and potential defendants).
3
 Focusing on family ties 
burdens from the defendant’s perspective helps raise awareness about why 
such burdens are normative yellow fl ags. As we explain, most centrally, they 
have tremendous potential to discriminate.
Consider the example of omissions liability. When the state charges an 
individual because of his or her failure to protect another human being from 
harm, the state is signaling that the relationship at issue is one worthy of spe-
cial treatment from the state. But in the context of family ties burdens, large 
numbers of persons who might justifi ably, in our view, see themselves as enti-
tled to benefi t from omissions liabilities are excluded. Absent a contract or 
other special circumstances, a hypothetical Jill cannot rely upon the state to 
signal to her life partner Denise that Denise is obligated by law to reasonably 
prevent harm to Jill. When the state makes choices regarding families and 
uses the criminal justice system to send normative signals about those 
choices, it risks marginalizing persons who consider themselves family mem-
bers but are not recognized as such by the state or other institutions. In this 
sense, targeting persons with unusual treatment on account of familial status 
is an underinclusive (and, at times, overinclusive) mechanism to distribute 
both the tangible and expressive benefi ts conferred by the criminal law.
Th e rest of Chapter 5 constructs a normative framework to explain the 
circumstances under which burdening family status might be justifi ed. We 
highlight that the vast majority of the burdens implicate the caregiving func-
tion of families. For example, society imposes liability on parents for their 
omissions to reinforce the notion of a special obligation, one worthy of 
enforcement through the criminal justice system, to care for their children 
by protecting them from harm. Th e same logic of promoting caregiving plau-
sibly motivates criminalization of nonpayment of child and parental support 
and some of the other family ties burdens we discuss. Th e problem is that the 
ways the promotion of caregiving is expressed in these family ties burdens 
are at times illiberal and insuffi  cient.
Th is conclusion is underwritten by an underappreciated point about how 
the criminal justice system allocates family ties burdens. Our research shows 
that the criminal justice system tends to enforce family ties burdens against 
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those who have voluntarily chosen their caregiving role.
4
 In other words, state-
imposed burdens tend to fall chiefl y on those persons who have voluntarily 
entered into a status relationship and enjoyed the privileges associated with 
that relationship, thus making it seem more just to be required to carry some 
burdens in return. Building upon this internal coherence, we argue that a vol-
untary caregiving orientation to burden allocation in the criminal justice 
system is much more attractive than allocation on formal familial status alone. 
Regardless of what one thinks about relational obligations within the family 
that are divorced from ideas about consent or voluntarism, when it comes to 
criminal justice design, liberal principles recommend focusing on voluntary 
caregiving rather than an arbitrary status-based allocation of duties.
Indeed, a voluntarist approach to family ties burdens is expressive of and 
consistent with our liberal minimalist orientation to criminal law legislation 
more generally. Th at orientation, in other words, is liberal in that it justifi es 
additional interference into interpersonal relationships through criminal 
sanction only through a showing that individuals have roughly consented to 
these extra obligations by their antecedent conduct to join or start particular 
relationships. And it is also liberal in a second sense, in that it tries to carve 
out a large space for personal freedom to operate in a way compatible with 
the personal freedom and security of others. It is only with respect to these 
two notions (voluntarism and respect for robust individual liberties) that we 
use the term liberal or liberalism.
Our orientation is minimalist in two ways too: fi rst, we seek a narrow tai-
loring between government objectives and the means used to advance those 
objectives, and second, we seek to constrain the use of the criminal law sanc-
tion when non-criminal measures are available and equally or nearly as eff ec-
tive in realizing the substantial interest the public has in reducing the 
prohibited conduct. Th us, even when the promotion of voluntary caregiving 
motivates the establishment of a family ties burden, that is not suffi  cient 
justifi cation if there are alternative and equally eff ective means of achieving 
the goal without resort to the criminal justice system and its particular 
power to infringe upon citizens’ liberties.
With these principles in mind, Chapter 6 rethinks the family ties burdens 
we identifi ed earlier. We hope to show why some burdens do not pass muster 
and how others can be preserved in some form, as long as they are recon-
structed to avoid the substantial costs of using family status alone to distrib-
ute burdens. Although we do not make the constitutional claim that family 
status should be a suspect classifi cation worthy of strict scrutiny when the 
criminal justice system discriminatorily burdens individuals on the basis of 
punishing family status: a roadmap
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family status, we do believe that, as a policy matter, the government should 
view skeptically the use of family status. In other words, to use the language 
of equal protection, without making the constitutional claim, the objective of 
the government should be at least “important” and perhaps “compelling,” 
and the means adopted to pursue that objective should be “narrowly tai-
lored,” looking especially to see whether alternative non-criminal measures 
might be equally eff ective. We also believe that the impairment of liberties 
(including those associated with sexual autonomy) by pain of criminal sanc-
tion on the basis of family status needs to survive heightened (if not strict) 
scrutiny as a matter of policy.
5
As we discussed in the book’s Introduction, there are many important 
studies of the ways various criminal justice policies unintentionally wreak 
devastating harm on families and their communities. Our focus here is 
diff erent and has yet to be suffi  ciently addressed by the community of schol-
ars interested in how the criminal justice system aff ects  families. Here, we 
examine those distinctively purposeful practices that consciously target 
defendants for special burdens on account of their familial status. Scholars 
have been successful in analyzing the eff ects of certain criminal justice poli-
cies and practices on the family. But most scholars have not recognized the 
panoply of laws expressly written to disadvantage persons based on family 
status alone. Th is part begins that inquiry.
In defi ning our focus this way, we do not intend to suggest that the par-
ticular liabilities addressed in this part of the book are necessarily guided by 
the intent of hurting or burdening family life as such. Indeed, it may be that 
many burdens on family status are “remedial” or intended to benefi t family 
life even though they penalize particular defendants on account of their 
familial status. But in this context, it is worth remembering that many laws 
disadvantaged women, for example, in the name of “protecting” them.
6
 Our 
purpose here is to excavate the family ties burdens currently imposed by the 
criminal justice system and to assess their desirability both now and as they 
could be.
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certain crimes permit the prosecution of a defendant for conduct that 
would otherwise be lawful in the absence of a defendant’s familial connec-
tion to the crime. For instance, incest statutes generally proscribe sexual 
conduct otherwise permitted between mature and consenting individuals. 
Th e examples of this phenomenon on which we focus include certain 
omissions and parental responsibility laws; incest, bigamy, and adultery 
statutes; and statutes criminalizing the nonpayment of child and parental 
support.
1
 In all of these examples, state-determined familial status alters the 
blameworthiness that the criminal justice system assigns to the underlying 
conduct.
2
 Although these examples are not necessarily exhaustive, we believe 
they are the most frequently found examples of the criminal justice system’s 
decision to criminalize certain conduct on the basis of family status.
3
 In what 
follows, we provide an overview of the doctrine associated with these family 
ties burdens.
• A. Omissions Liability for Failure to Rescue
In June 2002, prosecutors charged Shavon Greene, a twenty-one-year-old 
mother, with aggravated manslaughter after her boyfriend allegedly beat her 
twenty-one-month-old daughter to death. Th e prosecutor did not allege 
Greene was even present during the beating; instead, the prosecutor alleged 
she had disregarded warnings from a social services investigator not to leave 
the child alone with her boyfriend. Greene eventually pled guilty to culpable 
negligence.
4
At a high level of generality, the dominant rule in American criminal 
justice (as well as tort law) systems remains that citizens are under no 
• four
A Survey of Family Ties Burdens
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obligation to rescue each other.
5
 In other words, even though the failure to 
help another person in distress can constitute a moral failing, the criminal 
justice system does not generally impose liability on those who simply keep 
on walking.
6
Th e exceptions to the general rule are well-known. As the D.C. Circuit 
stated in Jones v. United States:
Th ere are at least four situations in which the failure to act may constitute 
breach of a legal duty. One can be held criminally liable: fi rst, where a stat-
ute imposes a duty to care for another; second, where one stands in a 
certain status relationship to another; third, where one has assumed a 
contractual duty to care for another; and fourth, where one has voluntary 
assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to 
prevent others from rendering aid.
7
In addition, one bears liability if one directly created the conditions of the 
victim’s peril or if one bears responsibility for the cause of the conditions of 
peril to the victim (e.g., parents of children who pose peril to the victim). 
Th ere are limits to when liability will be imposed, however. First, liability will 
not be imposed if rescue requires the defendant to make an undue sacrifi ce 
or if the defendant cannot physically perform the rescue.
8
 Second, “the 
defendant’s failure to act must be accompanied by whatever mens rea 
the crime requires for its commission.”
9
Of special interest here are the triggering conditions for liability based on 
family status. Th e relationship of spouse to spouse and parent to child are par-
adigmatic, even if not exclusive, examples of status relationships in which one 
owes a duty to rescue suffi  cient to trigger criminal responsibility (rather than 
mere tort liability).
10
 Th us, if a defendant “realizes (or culpably fails to realize) 
his wife is in danger, realizes (or culpably fails to realize) that he can rescue her 
with minimal risk and/or sacrifi ce, and realizes (or culpably fails to realize) that 
she is his wife,” then he can be liable for homicide “if he is aware of the existence 
of the three elements (wife’s peril, his ability to rescue with low risk/eff ort, and 
wife’s identity).”
11
 In the parent-child context, parents have been held criminally 
liable for neglect for failing to protect a child who was being sexually abused by 
another individual,
12
 and held criminally liable for manslaughter for failing to 
protect a child from fatal physical abuse infl icted by another.
13
 Th ese prosecu-
tions exemplify the family ties burden phenomenon by which persons in cer-
tain family relationships are held accountable for harms to others even when 
those harms are infl icted by another independent actor.
64 privilege or punish
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Trying to understand who precisely faces omissions liability based on 
the status of spouse or parent can be a bit tricky since these categories are 
sometimes defi ned by courts with sensitivity to diff ering circumstances. 
With respect to spouses or spouse-like relationships, courts have been leery 
of recognizing the obligation to rescue outside of a state-sanctioned mar-
riage. It is generally not enough to simply be dating or be paramours to trig-
ger the duty to rescue,
14
 but some courts have recognized obligations between 
unmarried couples. Where that has happened, however, it can often be 
explained on alternative grounds, such as situations in which the long-term 
girlfriend caused the peril to the boyfriend and thus is assigned a duty to 
rescue for having created the peril.
15
 But drawing the line can be diffi  cult in 
other places too. Why should couples who married within days of meeting 
each other have more legal obligations to each other than couples who have 
lived together for ten years but never married? Why should the heterosexual 
married couple have duties to rescue each other but not the long-term 
homosexual couple who are legally prevented from marrying in most states? 
What should happen when there is a married couple who have lived apart 
for years but are not formally divorced?
16
Th e murkiness is worse in the context of duties to rescue children. To be 
sure, biological parental linkage is not required to create a duty and thus 
the law places the same package of burdens on adoptive parents. But courts 
are divided over whether to extend duties to rescue to people who have 
not expressly consented to assuming legal responsibility for a custodial 
role over the children.
17
 Further, just as biology may not be necessary to 
impose a duty to rescue, there are certain circumstances in which it is 
not suffi  cient: what should happen if biological parents have renounced or 
terminated their parental rights prior to or after conception or birth of 
the child, e.g., sperm or egg donors, or surrogate mothers and the resulting 
children?
Importantly, consider the status relationships associated with grand-
parents, cousins, uncles, and aunts: none of these individuals is ever under 
a legal duty to rescue their reciprocal relations—nor are siblings, regardless 
of whether the relationship is biological, adoptive, or step-sibling in nature. 
Th at said, it is possible that any one of these people might be under a duty 
toward the victim for other reasons: perhaps they have induced detrimental 
reliance, agreed to care for the victim, created the perils, etc.
18
 But in the 
common law and around the country, it is exceptionally rare to fi nd duties to 
rescue based on familial status relationships outside the context of spousal 
and parental relations.
a survey of family ties burdens
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• B. Parental Responsibility Laws
In St. Clair Shores, Michigan, prosecutors charged Susan and Anthony 
Provenzino with a misdemeanor for failing to “exercise reasonable control” 
over their sixteen-year-old son, Alex Provenzino.
19
 Alex had committed a 
number of crimes, including burglarizing churches and homes and attacking 
his father with a golf club. Despite knowledge of some of his burglaries, the 
Provenzinos supported Alex’s release from juvenile custody, after which he 
continued to commit crimes. Th e jury convicted the Provenzinos after fi fteen 
minutes of deliberation. Th e parents were each fi ned $100 and ordered to 
pay $2,000 in court costs.
20
Parental responsibility laws command widespread attention among poli-
ticians, courts, and academics.
21
 To provide an avenue of restitution for 
victims and a stronger dose of deterrence to reduce the incidence of juvenile 
crime, some jurisdictions permit criminal liability for parents whose children 
misbehave.
22
 Statutes criminalizing the parenting of those like the 
Provenzinos have an extended history,
23
 and their popularity seems to ebb 
and fl ow.
24
 Th is section provides a short overview of the nature and scope of 
parental responsibility laws in recent years and how courts have evaluated 
them.
To begin with, it’s worth mentioning that most states have laws that spe-
cifi cally prohibit any adult from endangering the welfare of a minor or con-
tributing to the delinquency of minors through specifi c affi  rmative actions, 
such as knowingly providing guns or alcohol to them, which can be viewed 
as proximate causes of the child’s wrongdoing.
25
 Th ese kinds of statutes are 
not only ubiquitous but longstanding, beginning at the latest in 1903.
26
 In 
some instances, these statutes may also target any person’s omission that 
arises under special circumstances, as opposed to affi  rmative acts, and 
sometimes these statutes create liability resulting in fi nes or imprisonment 
without any specifi c showing of fault required by the government.
27
In truth, parental responsibility laws might reasonably be seen to encom-
pass civil liability statutes or laws criminalizing the knowing contribution of 
an adult to the minor’s violation of truancy and curfew laws, or laws creating 
liability for parents who provide a weapon to a child.
28
 However, for our pur-
poses here, we want to restrict what we refer to hereafter as parental respon-
sibility laws to the category of criminal liability imposed upon family members 
based on a theory of failure to supervise. Th is category is controversial in 
large measure because, under a generalized failure to supervise theory, the 
privilege or punish
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wrongdoing of the defendant’s child is enough to trigger liability, subject, in 
most cases, to certain affi  rmative defenses the parent may raise.
29
In a number of cases, these laws require the government to show a lower 
level of mens rea—usually criminal negligence, but in others strict liability. In 
other situations, these improper parenting statutes diff er from the general 
delinquency statutes by defi ning the child’s misconduct with greater sweep 
(beyond actual criminality). And in some cases, the parental responsibility 
statute both lowers the mens rea and broadens the scope of a child’s miscon-
duct (beyond actual criminality) that together expands potential liability for 
parents.
30
 Th ese parental responsibility statutes are diff erent in that they have 
to do with parents and legal guardians of the children—the scope does not 
extend to any adult, unlike most of the statutes that address endangering the 
welfare or contributing to delinquency of a child.
31
Th ese parental responsibility laws are exemplifi ed by an Oregon statute 
that holds parents criminally liable of a misdemeanor if their children violate 
a curfew law, violate a truancy requirement, or commit an act that brings the 
child within juvenile court jurisdiction.
32
 Th ere does not need to be a show-
ing that the parent specifi cally knew about or contributed to the violation 
or criminal wrong by the child. Similarly, a Cleveland suburb not long ago 
passed an ordinance under which parents can be charged with a crime based 
on the misdeeds of their children; a third conviction under the statute could 
result in parents serving 180 days in jail.
33
 Although parents would be per-
mitted to raise as a defense that they had taken reasonable steps to control 
the child, an Ohio court recently struck down the Cleveland ordinance 
because it was inconsistent with a state statute requiring the person charged 
to commit an act or omission as a predicate for culpability.
34
 Th e ordinance, 
however, was modeled on a similar and widely reported law in Silverton, 
Oregon.
35
 And according to the Mayor of Silverton, the law was very success-
ful at reducing crime committed by juveniles in part because “[w]hen their 
parents are being dragged into it, most kids see things a little diff erently. Th ey 
realize they’re not the only ones who pay the price for their actions, and kids 
begin to take stock of themselves.”
36
Because many of the failing to supervise laws are created at the municipal 
level,
37
 they are more diffi  cult to survey, and no accurate scholarly estimates 
exist so far as we know.
38
 At the state level, only a few states appear to have 
created parental responsibility statutes that go beyond the general delin-
quency statutes discussed above.
39
 But various cities or towns have similar 
laws around the country.
40
 And some have created unique hybrid laws 
that both lower the mens rea required for the parent and defi ne as 
a survey of family ties burdens
Dan Markel-Chap04.indd   67 2/26/09   7:23:17 PM
68
evidence of improper parenting conduct by a minor that would not be 
separately subject to criminal sanction.
41
 Moreover, proposals to create such 
liability regimes are regularly considered around the country.
42
Jurisdictions vary with respect to how courts greet these legislative eff orts. 
To be sure, there are relatively few reported cases considering the constitu-
tionality of these parental responsibility statutes. In addition to the court 
that struck down the local Maple Heights ordinance, two state appellate 
courts have also struck down parental responsibility statutes that rested 
upon strict liability.
43
 In State v. Akers, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
struck down a statute that imposed criminal liability on parents for a child’s 
violation of a statute concerning recreational vehicle usage. Th e court 
concluded that the statute violated the due process clause of the state 
constitution because it did not impose liability on the basis of any act or 
omission committed by a parent but instead imposed liability solely because 
of an individual’s status as a parent.
44
 Similarly, an appellate court in New 
Jersey struck down a town’s parental responsibility ordinance under the 
United States Constitution’s Due Process Clauses, concluding that its pre-
sumption that repeated juvenile misconduct “was the result of parental 
action or inaction” could not be sustained based on the information about 
the root causes of juvenile delinquency presented to the court.
45
But not all courts have reached the same conclusions. Th e California 
Supreme Court has upheld a parental responsibility statute with criminal 
penalties.
46
 On its face, the statute seemed like a relatively straightforward 
attempt to criminalize contributing to the delinquency of a minor, but a 1988 
amendment to the statute provoked the constitutional challenge at issue. 
According to the statute, “a parent or legal guardian to any person under the 
age of 18 years shall have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, 
protection, and control over their minor child.”
47
 Th e court rejected the 
complainants’ challenge that the statute was “unconstitutionally vague, 
overbroad, and an impingement on the right to privacy.”
48
 Th e court rejected 
the vagueness challenge on the basis that requiring parents to exercise “rea-
sonable care” provided “suffi  ciently certain” guidance because it “incorpo-
rates the defi nitions and the limits of parental duties that have long been a 
part of California dependency law and tort law.”
49
 Th e court acknowledged 
that “neither the amendment nor prior case law sets forth specifi c acts that 
a parent must perform or avoid in order to fulfi ll the duty of supervision 
and control” over minor children, but the court shrugged off  that obvious 
diffi  culty, stating that a statutory defi nition of perfect parenting would be 
“infl exible.” Instead, “law-abiding parents” should simply understand that 
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“the concept of reasonableness” should serve as their guide for complying 
with the statute.
50
Notwithstanding some courts’ disapproval of parental responsibility stat-
utes, we anticipate that state and local legislatures will continue to explore 
regulatory strategies to reduce juvenile misconduct that will invariably 
burden those of a particular state-sanctioned family status.
51
 And burdens 
they are. One of the most interesting features of these parental responsibility 
laws is the way they frequently create liability for parents based on their 
status as a parent and the misconduct of their child alone, leaving the inten-
tionally responsible parent to plead their good parenting skills as an affi  rma-
tive defense instead of making the prosecution show the absence of good 
parenting as part of its case-in-chief against the parent.
52
 We say more about 
the rationales and problems associated with these laws in Chapter 6.
• C. Incest
In 1997, Allen and Patricia Muth were convicted of incest after they entered 
into a sexual relationship and had four children. Allen and Patricia were bio-
logical brother and sister, although they did not meet until Patricia was eigh-
teen because she had been in foster care since she was a baby. At the time of 
their convictions, Allen was 45 and Patricia was 30. At the time of sentencing, 
the judge stated “I believe severe punishment is warranted in this case. . . . 
I think they have to be separated. It’s the only way to prevent them from having 
intercourse in the future.”
53
 Th e judge then sentenced Allen to fi ve years in 
prison and Patricia to fi ve years. Th eir parental rights to at least one of their 
children were also terminated because of the incestuous relationship.
54
 
Incest laws, which prohibit both sexual relations and marriage within cer-
tain kinship relations, refl ect one of the enduring sexual taboos.
55
 Perhaps 
surprisingly, incest was not a crime at English common law,
56
 and it is not 
even today a punishable off ense in all jurisdictions.
57
 It is also yet another 
complicated example of a situation in which criminal liability may attach to 
a person only on account of some familial status (though as we suggested in 
Part I, it can sometimes be “benefi cial” for a defendant to be prosecuted 
under incest laws rather than generally applicable sexual misconduct laws, 
because the penalties and collateral consequences may actually be less 
severe).
58
 Th e elements of incest are usually (1) sexual relations between two 
persons within a particular prohibited level of consanguinity (or affi  nity 
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through adoption or marriage); and (2) the defendant’s awareness of that 
relationship.
59
While prohibitions of incest are usually general, in theory they can be 
grouped into three diff erent categories: regulation of sex between adults, 
regulation of sex between an adult and a minor, and regulation of sex between 
minors. Most jurisdictions are unlikely to make these distinctions; indeed, 
under most incest statutes, it is irrelevant whether the participants jointly 
consent to the sexual activity.
60
 Th e issue of consent bears further mention. 
As alluded to above, in most states, lack of consent is not an articulated ele-
ment of the incest charge, which, in theory, renders victims vulnerable to 
prosecution under statutes that are lacking specifi city. In cases in which joint 
consent exists, both parties may still be criminally liable, as in the case of the 
Muths, whose parental rights were terminated and who were both convicted 
and incarcerated. Th is crudeness in drafting raises a series of normative 
questions we address in Chapter 6.
In the United States, all states but Rhode Island have criminal prohibi-
tions on at least some consanguineous relations between family members 
who are not a so-called conjugal couple, although there is some variation 
between the states in terms of what relationships are prohibited.
61
 For 
example, all states having criminal incest statutes ban sexual relationships 
between (biological) parents and their children, regardless of the child’s age,
62
 
but not all incest statutes prohibit sex between adult stepchildren and the 
stepparent.
63
 All states with incest statutes also ban sexual relationships 
between consanguineous siblings and most ban relationships between aunts 
and uncles and their nephews and nieces.
64
 Th ere is more divergence on the 
question of cousins; only eight states criminalize sexual contact between 
fi rst cousins,
65
 but twenty-fi ve states do not permit fi rst cousins to marry. 
Some states also extend their prohibitions beyond blood relationships: 
“twenty-two states criminalize sex between stepparents and stepchildren,” 
and some states treat adopted children the same as biological children for 
purposes of incest prohibitions.
66
• D. Bigamy 
In 1953, Marlyne Hammon’s father and dozens of other men in her commu-
nity were arrested and sent to jail on charges of polygamy. Although her 
father was released shortly thereafter, the family corresponded in secret and 
continued to live apart because they feared further prosecution. Now an 
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adult, Hammon is involved in a polygamous relationship and advocates for 
the decriminalization of polygamy.
67
 
Bigamy laws in the United States, broadly stated, prohibit an individual 
from entering into multiple and simultaneous marriages when the fi rst 
spouse is still alive and the initial marriage relationship has not been termi-
nated.
68
 Although there is some variation around the country regarding 
incest prohibitions or the scope of omissions liability and parental responsi-
bility laws, no such ambivalence exists regarding criminal laws prohibiting 
polygamy in the United States. Indeed, these bigamy laws are universal 
around the country,
69
 and, with a few exceptions in certain geographic com-
munities, they are often enforced.
70
 As we discuss in Chapter 6, these 
prohibitions raise substantial questions about the proper scope of the crimi-
nal law and its relationship to issues of family status.
• E. Adultery
In 2004, John R. Bushey Jr., the former town attorney of Luray, Virginia, was 
charged with adultery after his paramour reported the misconduct to the 
police when the aff air terminated. Bushey eventually pled guilty and was 
sentenced to twenty hours of community service. Along with twenty-three 
other states, Virginia can prosecute a husband or wife for having consensual 
sex outside marriage.
71
Adultery laws, at least as crafted in some jurisdictions without fornication 
statutes,
72
 prohibit a married individual from engaging in extramarital sex, 
notwithstanding that such sexual relations would not otherwise be subjected 
to legal sanction.
73
 Perhaps because of the pervasiveness of adultery,
74
 a bare 
majority of states no longer regulate extramarital relations,
75
 even though 
large majorities of Americans continue to view adultery as immoral.
76
 
Regardless of the cause of adultery’s relative demise as a crime, we recognize 
that most jurisdictions do not actively prosecute or punish this misconduct 
anymore, even though twenty-three states and the District of Columbia still 
have statutes criminalizing this conduct.
77
Although one might be tempted to dismiss the signifi cance of adultery laws 
today, we are loathe to do so in light of the continued enforcement of such laws 
in some jurisdictions,
78
 especially in the military.
79
 Indeed, although civilian 
courts have generally seen a decrease in adultery prosecutions, there is a 
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steady fl ow of such prosecutions in the military courts.
80
 And during the 
Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, many members of the armed forces were especially 
critical of their Commander-in-Chief, who could have faced a court-martial on 
adultery-related charges if he had been a mere service member.
81
 Additionally, 
even though someone might not get prosecuted for the crime of adultery in a 
jurisdiction forbidding such misconduct, it bears mention that the fact that 
the criminal laws remain on the books has real consequences in civil contexts 
other than the military, such as child custody, adoption, and employment.
82
 
Moreover, there is an odd discrimination resulting from adultery laws that only 
apply to heterosexual couples,
83
 which we think needs some articulation and 
evaluation. It goes without saying that, as applied to the defendant who is 
married, adultery laws are a clear and conventional family ties burden.
• F. Nonpayment of Child Support
 In 1997, an Anchorage, Alaska father was sentenced to fi ve days in prison 
and fi ve years probation for failing to pay almost $98,000 in child support.
84
 
A government offi  cial stated: “Our job is to collect money for children. Parents 
need to realize there are penalties for ignoring their children.”
85
Ordinarily, the failure to pay a debt to a non-governmental entity (like 
one’s cable TV provider) is not a criminal act.
86
 An aggrieved party is forced 
to pursue civil remedies to obtain redress.
87
 In contrast, failure to pay child 
support is a crime. For example, the Child Support Recovery Act,
88
 amended 
in 1998 as the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act,
89
 makes it a federal crime 
to owe more than $5,000 in child support or to be in arrears for longer than 
one year if the child owed the support lives in a diff erent state than the delin-
quent parent. In addition, many states have statutes criminalizing a parent’s 
failure to pay child support.
90
 Th is statutory regime demonstrates yet another 
way family status can turn an act that ordinarily would be non-criminal into 
a criminal one.
• G. Nonpayment of Parental Support
Th e last area we explore here is a variant of the preceding family ties burden. 
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Th ese laws, as their name suggests, require adult children to provide care or 
support to their indigent parents if the adult children have the fi nancial 
means. But fi lial responsibility is actually a bit of a misnomer; many of the 
very statutes that establish these obligations to parents also encompass 
the obligation to materially support spouses and children as well. Most of 
the thirty states that have fi lial responsibility statutes authorize only civil 
actions. Nonetheless, twelve states currently authorize courts to levy a 
criminal sanction upon adult children who fail to provide adequate care for 
their parents.
92
 When applied to the situation of adult children with elderly 
and indigent parents, it bears mention that, in contrast to the period prior 
to the 1970s, the vast majority of these state statutes are not enforced at all, 
or very rarely, especially in the criminal context.
93
As to the mechanics of these statutes, California’s language is typical: 
“every adult child who, having the ability so to do, fails to provide necessary 
food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for an indigent parent, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor.”
94
 Massachusetts, like some other states, adds a proviso 
that such liability will not attach to a person who was not supported by 
parents as a minor or to a person who, “being one of two or more children, 
has made proper and reasonable contribution toward the support of such 
parent.”
95
 Our analysis in Chapter 6 will focus on the requirement to support 
parents under these laws.
Having canvassed some of the ways that a defendant’s family status is 
burdened in the criminal justice system, we now turn to develop a normative 
framework to assess these various family ties burdens.
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in the previous chapter, we identifi ed some practices we characterize as 
family ties burdens. Here, we present a normative framework for analyzing 
whether and how such burdens can be justifi ed. First, we explain why we 
adopt a defendant-centered perspective despite the fact that when other per-
spectives are introduced, family ties burdens could be thought of as bringing 
benefi ts to the family as an institution or to particular family members other 
than the defendant. Th en, we revisit some of the normative costs of family ties 
benefi ts that we explored earlier in the book to ascertain whether any retain 
applicability in the context of family ties burdens. Finally, we highlight the vol-
untary caregiving feature we see in the structure of many family ties burdens. 
We think this feature of voluntary caregiving can serve as a guide for scruti-
nizing burdens more generally, especially within a criminal law framework 
informed by what we call a “liberal minimalist” approach. Informed by these 
various principles, we off er a potential structure of normative analysis for 
laws creating criminal liability predicated on the defendant’s family status.
• A. A Defendant-Centered Perspective, Among 
Others
In looking at family ties burdens, we have been making a claim that the 
defendant is being treated diff erently, on account of some action or inaction, 
because of his family status. In this Section, we explain why we make the 
choice to use a defendant-centered perspective but we also try to contextu-
alize that choice among the other perspectives one could adopt when 
looking at the laws that create family ties burdens in the criminal justice 
system.
• five
A Normative Framework for Family Ties Burdens
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1. Th e Defendant as the Object of Punitive Coercion
In examining family ties burdens the way we have examined family ties 
benefi ts in Part I, we are clearly looking at the nature of the wrongdoing from 
the defendant’s perspective. We think this perspective is important because 
it is, after all, the defendant whose liberty the state seeks to place in peril. Th e 
conduct-guiding rules at the core of this book are aimed at defendants—and 
it seems necessary to analyze those conduct-guiding rules on their own 
terms. Ultimately, it is the defendants who are coerced in the name of state 
punishment; and the criminal justice system’s coercive nature is its most 
important feature demanding justifi cation.
But there is, of course, much more to say on the matter. Although family 
ties burdens might be thought of as burdens on the defendant, they might 
also be viewed as burdens on or benefi ts to others, such as victims, other 
family members, the state, or society at large. Let us explain how these other 
perspectives might operate.
2. Family Members as the Object of Harm
In a number of cases, the burden imposed on the defendant is also a burden 
on those whom it is allegedly supposed to help. Th us, for example, a woman 
whose ex-spouse is jailed for failure to pay child support may object on the 
ground that this burden imposes a terrible hardship on her family as well as 
on the defendant, in that it reduces the ability of her children’s father to 
play any kind of meaningful role in their lives. Th us, many of the practices we 
have described in Chapter 4 powerfully aff ect family interests beyond those 
of the defendant. Consider how the punishment of someone for failing to 
supervise, rescue, or support a family member might impair that person’s 
future ability or willingness to supervise, rescue, or support a family member. 
Th e nature and intensity of the punishment for the off ender may have 
serious detrimental eff ects on the very family members who were initially 
harmed by the defendant’s antecedent failure to satisfy his duty. Th e same is 
true, at least in certain conditions, when we punish off enders for bigamy, 
incest, or adultery. Incarceration or fi nes for violation of these laws may 
impair the capacity of the off enders to care for and support their families. 
In other words, the children in the Muth family felt the weight of that family 
ties burden too.
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Undoubtedly, no legislator enacts these family ties burdens with the 
intention of infl icting harm on innocent family members. But because 
the harms to innocent third parties are often foreseeable, it is the 
legislators’ obligation to weigh these costs in the balance of deciding 
whether and how to insert family ties burdens in the criminal justice 
system.
3. Burdens as Devices for Promoting “Family Life and 
Values”
Another prism arises when we view these laws from the ex ante rather 
than the ex post perspective. In other words, we might consider whether 
the family as a social institution could be described as benefi ting from 
the law creating the family ties burden. On this view, what appears to be 
a penalty on familial status in an individual case could have been created 
as part of a strategy designed to confer benefi ts to the social institution of 
the family as a whole. So, even if some individual families lose out because 
of the penalty imposed on the defendant enduring the family ties burden, 
the goal is that many more families will ultimately benefi t from having 
these laws.
For instance, the recent criminalization of nonpayment of child support 
looks like a family ties burden in the sense we defi ned it earlier. Th at is 
because, as a general matter, the failure to pay a debt is not a reason for 
criminal punishment. Indeed, other legal mechanisms exist to help debtors, 
most prominently bankruptcy. But now, the failure to pay child support, 
which is a form of debt, is a basis for criminal punishment. Indeed, family 
support obligations may not generally be discharged during bankruptcy. 
Th us, failures to meet some kinds of intrafamilial fi nancial obligations are 
now penalized much more harshly than the failure to meet other fi nancial 
obligations. Th at defi nitely creates a burden on a defendant, at least as we 
defi ned it earlier.
Characterizing these practices as burdens on the particular defendant 
might be mistaken if we alter the lens through which we are looking at the 
problem. If we move from an ex post perspective focused on the defendant to 
an ex ante perspective focused on the institution of the family, the off ender 
in question might have agreed with having these family ties burdens as laws 
if he assessed them impartially, that is, without anticipating that he would 
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end up being the target of these laws. He might approve of these laws in the 
belief that the family ties burdens were important to promote a certain vision 
of family life within society. Th us, from the ex ante position, criminalizing 
failures to rescue, failures to supervise, or failures to support, and banning 
incest, adultery, or bigamy are all aimed at keeping certain kinds of families 
together to perform the work associated with a certain kind of idealized 
family life. If this is the purpose, the policy of criminalizing nonpayment of 
child support might provide a benefi t to both the off ender and the institu-
tion of the family overall. Imposing a penalty on the off ender for his violation 
of these laws is simply a way to ensure that people do not defect from what 
they themselves, as reasonable and rational persons working in concert with 
each other, would otherwise agree is needed to secure the conditions for 
human fl ourishing.
1
4. Burdens as Devices to Serve Goals Beyond Family 
Promotion
Family ties burdens might have other rationales too—aside from simply pro-
moting a particular vision of family life. First, the various burdens placed on 
off enders may refl ect the imperfect or indirect choices of decision makers in 
the criminal justice system to enhance distinctive criminal justice goals such 
as deterrence or retribution. For example, the state legislature may be using 
the criminal justice system to communicate to off enders that when one 
wrongs certain family members, one is more worthy of reproach and con-
demnation.
2
 In this respect, the burdens might be thought to advance the 
criminal justice system’s norm-projection purposes by refl ecting society’s 
deep values. Th us, certain burdens based on failures to care for one’s family 
members entail a breach of a trust relationship, which certain persons cre-
ated when opting into a caregiving relationship.
3
 If heightened penalties 
attach in the context of crimes against victims with whom one has opted into 
a relationship of caregiving, then those burdens might be justifi able: when one 
hurts or fails to protect someone whom one has already signaled to society 
that one will care for, then one might plausibly say there is an extra wrong 
(a breach of trust based on implicit or explicit promise) that has been commit-
ted. Th at wrong is not only a wrong against a particular victim, remediable by 
compensation. Rather, the wrong has a diff erent texture because the wrong-
doer has lulled others in the public into a false sense of security, leading the 
public to fail to help or monitor the vulnerable person in question.
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A distinct but related idea is that these burdens serve other legitimate 
goals of the state that have little to do with deterrence or norm projection 
or even the vitality of family life. On this view, it might be that family ties 
burdens stand to serve other purposes that, in fact, directly benefi t the state. 
For instance, the legislature might believe that imposing impediments to 
even consensual incest between adult siblings is important for reducing 
the prospects of increased social expenditures on food stamps and medical 
care, because the legislature assumes that incestuous relationships will pro-
duce off spring who are more likely to require subsidized medical support.
4
 
Again, here, we will have to weigh very carefully these purported benefi ts in 
any one instance; if they serve compelling or important interests, perhaps 
discrimination on the basis of family status is justifi able. But these compel-
ling interests cannot be assessed in the abstract and must be pursued in 
the specifi c context of each burden, an analysis we begin undertaking in the 
next chapter.
5. Burdens in Relation to Family Ties Benefi ts
As shown in the preceding discussion, we obviously do not deny that the 
laws creating what we call family ties burdens lend themselves to examina-
tion from a variety of perspectives. We do think, however, that there is some-
thing about these family ties burdens that requires more caution than 
typically extended in discussions of any one of these laws in isolation from 
one another and in isolation from the benefi ts the criminal justice system 
extends to defendants based on family status. Indeed, in light of the fact that 
our work in the fi rst half of the book examines the benefi ts the criminal jus-
tice system extends to defendants based on family status, we don’t think 
there is something inherently biased when we look at the burdens placed on 
family ties here. To our minds, then, the inquiry at the core of this part of the 
book is important—when should family ties become the basis of distinctively 
criminal liability?
One answer to this question would be to look at these burdens in relation 
to the various family ties benefi ts. It might be thought that the burdens “bal-
ance out” this discriminatory treatment pervasive within the criminal justice 
system, just as, perhaps, family ties benefi ts may be a form of compensation 
for the havoc the criminal justice system indirectly wreaks upon families. 
But balance itself requires further justifi cation to explain why there is a need 
to have any family ties benefi ts or burdens at all. After all, there would be 
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reciprocity or balance in the absence of both family ties benefi ts and family 
ties burdens.
Th e better approach, we think, sees family ties benefi ts or burdens or both 
as serving some “protective” role of a particular notion of family and its asso-
ciated caregiving responsibilities. But this protective role itself needs further 
elaboration. Consider the following: how exactly do sentencing discounts for 
those with family ties and responsibilities rest consistently with criminaliz-
ing polygamy, adultery, or incest? At fi rst glance, the benefi t and burden 
seem to be in tension—why would we make allowances based on family ties 
in one place and then punish based on family ties in the other situation?
But there may be an identifi able logic here. Th e former—sentencing dis-
counts based on familial obligations—is arguably protective of family care-
giving functions ex post. Th e others can be deemed “protective” of such 
caregiving functions from an ex ante perspective. Th at’s because some might 
plausibly view incest, adultery, or polygamy (or the conduct giving rise to any 
of the other family ties burdens) as endangering the caregiving functions 
associated with the traditional family unit. On this view, these family ties 
burdens and benefi ts work in tandem to signal that society cares deeply 
about promoting particular conceptions of family even when they interfere 
with other norms informing the construction of an attractive and eff ective 
criminal justice system.
While this explanation sounds plausible, it suff ers from the randomness 
of choice as to when to adopt an ex ante perspective and when to adopt an 
ex post perspective. It is arbitrary because it chooses to justify the practices 
by selecting an ex post focus on benefi ts and an ex ante focus on burdens 
without any further explanation of why such a choice is justifi able. Th e prob-
lem is that the protective function could arguably be promoted by selecting 
an ex ante view of benefi ts and an ex post view of burdens. But that would 
require a radical reorientation of the rules we have.
To illustrate: when taking an ex ante perspective on family ties benefi ts, 
one might think that if a state decided it will not give sentencing discounts 
based on family ties and responsibilities, then that would create extra deter-
rence with those parents sensitive to the signals the criminal law is emitting. 
Th e same rationale attaches to spousal testimonial immunities or exemp-
tions from prosecution for harboring fugitives. In those situations, ex ante, 
people might think that they will forbear from crime so as not to put their 
loved ones in jeopardy of having to testify against them or to house them 
when they are fugitives. Forbearing from wrongdoing could be a way to 
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demonstrate how they care about each other because it avoids putting the 
family members in a tough spot later on, a spot where they will have 
to choose between the obligations of kinship and citizenship. Moreover, 
because the ex ante view means that persons will consider themselves 
from the perspective of the victim’s family at least as much as the perspective 
of the accused’s family, they will have a more impartial and multifaceted 
view about what the better rules are here. Examined ex ante, most of the 
family ties benefi ts should be jettisoned when they interfere with particular 
criminal justice objectives they otherwise value. All this would be an argu-
ment for getting rid of at least those family ties benefi ts that impede criminal 
justice objectives.
By contrast, when examining family ties burdens from the defendant’s 
ex post point of view, the defendant will strenuously argue that punishment 
for the family ties burdens will actually serve to interfere with caregiving 
roles served (or potentially served) by the defendant—especially when they 
strip resources (time, liberty, and money) from the defendant that might 
otherwise be allocated toward caregiving functions.
Th e preceding discussion shows only that legislators need not have nec-
essarily adopted an ex post view of benefi ts and an ex ante view of family ties 
burdens. Moreover, since legislatures and scholars have likely not looked at 
these benefi ts and burdens systematically and as designed to be off setting, 
critical and independent analysis is warranted.
• B. Revisiting the Costs of Family Ties Benefi ts
When we analyzed family ties benefi ts in the fi rst half of the book, we 
scrutinized the plausible justifi cations for getting the state to help the family 
in Chapter 2. Th ere, we highlighted how critical it is to appreciate how 
the family both molds the individual and reduces the states’ burdens. 
Indeed, without repeating our views unnecessarily, we recognize that 







 selves that depend heavily 
on our families and our familial associations for survival and sustenance.
8
 
And by giving families special support, the state can economize on expendi-
tures that it would otherwise be forced to bear in educating its citizenry and 
preparing its members to contribute to the stability and fl ourishing of the 
regime.
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Notwithstanding the recognition that the family’s role properly warrants, 
and the risk that states incur of irrelevance and illegitimacy when they 
fail to treat persons as constituted selves, we ultimately concluded in 
Chapter 2 that general arguments rooted in communitarian political theory 
were insuffi  cient to underwrite the special treatment of the family in the 
criminal justice system. In particular, we noted how these family ties 
benefi ts create the risks of inequality, gender bias, inaccuracy, and more 
crime. Consequently, we expressed hesitation and skepticism toward many 
of the family ties benefi ts distributed throughout the criminal justice 
system.
Th e reasons for our skepticism toward the distribution of family ties ben-
efi ts inform our approach to thinking about family ties burdens. First, we 
must address whether, and to what degree, the normative considerations we 
identifi ed earlier in connection with family ties benefi ts—patriarchal domi-
nation and gender bias, inaccuracy, inequality, and crime-creation—apply in 
the context of family ties burdens. But because we are also looking at the 
creation of criminal liability (as opposed to exemptions or benefi ts), we must 
also say a bit more about the liberal minimalism that informs our view of the 
proper basis of criminal liability in a liberal democracy.
Let’s begin with the framework used for assessing family ties benefi ts and 
how it translates to the context of burdens. One can see relatively quickly 
that two of these considerations—crime creation and inaccuracy—are 
mostly inapplicable in the context of family ties burdens. In other words, 
unlike family ties benefi ts, family ties burdens rarely trigger concerns that 
they will create more misconduct or impede the accurate prosecution of the 
guilty and the exoneration of the innocent.
9
 Although it may be possible that 
these two costs are implicated in a hypothetical burden that we have not 
identifi ed, we do not see them as generally applicable in the case of family 
ties burdens and do not think it would be appropriate to criticize family ties 
burdens along these lines.
But two of the normative considerations that we identifi ed earlier do 
seem generally relevant when analyzing family ties burdens: inequality (and 
its relationship to morally arbitrary discrimination) and the related issue of 
gender bias. Notice that although inequality and gendered eff ects of a neu-
trally drawn criminal justice regulation would not come within the ambit 
of our discussion—for family ties burdens, as we defi ne them, must facially 
discriminate against family status—they are normatively relevant in judging 
the viability of any particular burden drawn on the basis of family status. 
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So, even though omissions liability, bigamy, and nonpayment of child sup-
port law are, for example, written in gender-neutral terms, once they are 
identifi ed as facially discriminatory against family members, it is appropriate 
to ask under our model whether they have eff ects that reinforce gender 
stereotypes.
1. Inequality and Discrimination
In many contexts, family ties burdens risk treating similar conduct 
unequally—and affi  rmative discrimination against the family is hard to jus-
tify. For example, incest prohibitions aff ecting consensual sexual relations 
among adults restrict liberties that would otherwise be unregulated and 
generally protected. Th e nonpayment of a debt becomes a criminal off ense 
in one context (child support) while it remains a civil action in most others. 
Although it is obvious through the exaction of burdens that we are often 
seeking to have family members take special precautionary measures to 
protect vulnerable potential victims, the tool of punishing otherwise 
non-criminal conduct on the basis of familial status alone is surely worth 
scrutinizing more carefully, since it does implicate norms of equality and 
nondiscrimination that a criminal justice system within a constitutional 
democracy should embrace.
10
Indeed, as a general matter—and in ways we will expand upon presently—
we tend to think that targeting familial status is generally both an overinclusive 
and underinclusive approach to achieving sound policy objectives. It may 
make sense for the criminal justice system to try to protect our most vulnera-
ble members of society. But many types of citizens are vulnerable, and target-
ing the state-defi ned family is not a suffi  ciently narrowly tailored means to 
achieving that objective. Nothing about estranged family members, for exam-
ple, necessarily renders them especially vulnerable to one another to justify the 
imposition of special burdens upon off enders and potential off enders. Th us, 
family ties burdens could be overbroad if they penalized, say, estranged 
siblings with duties to rescue, support, or supervise. By contrast, many vulner-
able citizens warrant protections that the criminal law currently renders 
unavailable. Th e families of same-sex couples, for example, experience the 
same vulnerabilities as the idealized traditional family does—but get few or 
none of the criminal law protections. Th us, family ties burdens that do not 
protect people who would agree to such protection and such burdens ex ante 
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should be reconfi gured to promote the underlying value of voluntary caregiv-
ing relationships. We say more about this below.
2. Gender Bias, Heteronormativity, and 
Repronormativity
Imposing a burden or penalty on an individual in the criminal justice system 
solely on the basis of family ties enmeshes the state in an expressly norma-
tive dispute over who counts as family and who does not—and in what the 
family should be doing, namely, procreating.
And the position the state takes is one that is not merely conventional; it 
also threatens to promote a discriminatory and gendered set of policies. 
Th us, as noted above, in the context of family ties burdens, large numbers of 
persons who might (justifi ably, in our view) see themselves as entitled to 
benefi t from the imposition of family ties burdens are excluded. In this sense, 
the use of the family as traditionally delineated is an underinclusive (and at 
times, overinclusive) mechanism to distribute the tangible and expressive 
benefi ts conferred by the criminal law when it targets persons with unusual 
treatment on account of familial status. Although the exclusion of same-sex 
coupling is the most obvious example of the criminal law’s heteronormativ-
ity bias,
11
 grandparents and other relatives routinely create homes that fall 
outside the criminal law’s design for family ties burdens as well.
12
Additionally, as we will argue, several of the family ties burdens express a 
clear policy to promote procreation—an orientation some scholars have 
called repronormativity.
13
 To the extent that the criminal justice system is 
engaged in penalizing citizens criminally to further its repronormative 
agenda, we think that calls for special justifi cation. On the other hand, we 
think that some family ties burdens are a useful counterbalance to repronor-
mativity bias. Th at is, although the state promotes having children, some of 
the family ties burdens serve as a way to mitigate the eff ects of subsidizing 
procreation through tax and welfare policies.
Finally, in certain circumstances, family ties burdens are used in ways 
that reinforce gender stereotypes. Although routinely drafted today in 
gender-neutral terms, many family ties burdens raise substantial questions 
about gender relations more broadly—and once a family ties burden is iden-
tifi ed, it seems fair game to analyze whether the burden is contributing to 
gender bias more systematically. As we explain in Chapter 6, we think that 
some of the family ties burdens raise this concern.
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• C. Uncovering a Structure of Family Ties Burdens: 
Voluntary Caregiving
Five of the seven family ties burdens we fi nd in the law—omissions liability 
( for failure to rescue), parental responsibility laws, bigamy, adultery, and 
nonpayment of child support—refl ect a pattern that, to our mind, has not 
been suffi  ciently emphasized. Th is pattern suggests an internal structure 
that we fi nd helpful in rethinking family ties burdens in our criminal justice 
system.
Specifi cally, these fi ve burdens occur in the context of relationships that 
have a voluntary or opt-in nature, meaning that the individual who faces the 
burden has voluntarily entered into the relationship that serves as the basis of 
potential subsequent liability for doing or forbearing from actions that would 
otherwise be lawful. Th is is not the case with most incest statutes, which pro-
hibit sexual conduct in relationships that are both voluntarily and involun-
tarily created. Nor is it the case with fi lial responsibility statutes, which attach 
liability to persons who did not consent to the relationship—though there is, 
perhaps, some reason to marginalize this example in light of the relatively 
trivial level of enforcement. But if one looks at the dominant practices with 
respect to family ties burdens, they are imposed on defendants in two kinds of 
relationships: spouse to spouse and parent to child.
Although we do not see this pattern as itself authoritative, we do think it 
is illuminating in various ways. First, when family ties burdens are limited to 
relationships refl ecting this voluntary nature, we fi nd the imposition of these 
burdens more attractive. Th e voluntary nature at the heart of these obliga-
tions takes at least some of the bite out of the charge of discrimination: if 
parties freely choose relationships that themselves trigger liability after fair 
notice, liability on the basis of family status seems more defensible, at least 
up to a point at which the penalty is proportionate to the wrongdoing and 
the reason for imposing the burden can withstand some critical scrutiny of 
the sort we describe below.
14
While voluntarism matters, there’s also a basic trade-off  going on: if one 
wishes to benefi t from the ways in which society privileges building family 
relationships through institutions of distributive justice, then one needs to 
be aware that greater burdens may be imposed to ensure the discharge of one’s 
caregiving responsibilities. Moreover, in light of the fact that society confers so 
much leeway to persons regarding how they treat children, there is a strong 
reason to create a fl oor of obligations to rescue, support, and supervise in that 
context. By contrast, extending family ties benefi ts only to those who have 
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opted in to relationships of caregiving seems to discriminate more against 
those who are deprived of the opportunity to develop legally recognized 
caregiving relationships in the fi rst place. In other words, not everyone can 
choose (or wants to choose) to marry or procreate—and those who do not 
make this choice should generally not be treated disfavorably by the criminal 
justice system.
To be sure, voluntary relations can be fuzzy at the margins: Have we really 
chosen our in-laws even though they have not chosen us? Have we really 
chosen to have children when a pregnancy is the result of failed birth control 
methods? Still, we think the relatively easy cases of spousal and parent-child 
relationships help expose an important insight about appropriate burden 
distribution; that is, family ties burdens generally seem more palatable in the 
context of voluntary relationships of caregiving.
Why should voluntariness matter? For one thing, restricting the imposi-
tion of family ties burdens to those who choose to bear them is a way of 
respecting one’s autonomy; if we forced all sorts of obligations on family mem-
bers who did not choose to enter a relationship of care with someone, we 
would be impinging on their reasonable liberty interests. Th is is why we think 
the fi lial responsibility statutes have been improperly adopted—they are basi-
cally illiberal, as we explain in Chapter 6, because their basis is established 
through reciprocity and “required” gratitude, rather than consent. Incest laws 
that do not track consent suff er from similar problems.
Additionally, the special obligations some family ties burdens impose can 
be understood in terms of signaling theory.
15
 On this view, family ties bur-
dens are appropriately imposed on someone who has voluntarily entered 
into and maintained a relationship because by their consent to that relation-
ship they are signaling to others that they are going to be “fi rst responders;” 
society can then trust them to look after the people with whom they have 
created a covenant of caregiving. Th e germ of this idea appears in duty to 
rescue law.
As we discussed earlier, one does not generally labor under a duty to 
rescue other people.
16
 But as we explained, there are widely acknowledged 
exceptions to this no-duty principle. For instance, if Alice is walking by the 
beach and sees Charlie drowning, and she then waves away Bob, who was 
also on his way to rescue Charlie, Alice is now under a special obligation to 
rescue Charlie. She cannot just walk away at that point, absent special justi-
fi cation (such as a new threat to her life). Th e actions of marrying or parent-
ing can be interpreted to be creating similar statements about responsibility. 
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When a person enters into a covenant of care in the form of marriage or 
parenting, one message that decision signals to society is that she will be a 
“fi rst responder” to the person with whom she is covenanting when that 
person is in danger.
Beyond signaling a willingness to be a fi rst responder, those whose actions 
exhibit a willingness to take on the obligations of spouse or parent have also 
signaled their willingness to create a relationship of trust to care and support 
the other spouse or child. When someone fails to rescue, support, or super-
vise (in the case of minors), there is a breach of that trust relationship, a breach 
which the state has an especial interest in since the state has been eff ectively 
waved away by the person opting into the caregiving relationship.
17
It follows, we believe, that if voluntariness matters, then a family ties 
burden should not be placed on someone who has had a familial status 
imposed upon him. Consider siblings. Almost no child freely chooses whether 
or not to have a sibling; that decision is generally made by parents. 
Unsurprisingly, the law ordinarily does not impose special obligations upon 
an individual to take or face risks on a sibling’s behalf. Other family relations 
fall into the same category: no one freely chooses whether to have an aunt, 
uncle, or cousin.
By this logic, it seems clear that some family relationships are involuntary 
in the sense that they were not deliberately entered into by the relevant par-
ties. Th e fi lial responsibility laws, which place burdens on adult children to 
support their parents in their dotage, are an example of a family ties burden 
that is at odds with the general vein of promoting voluntary caregiving rela-
tionships. Th e children never consented to the relationship they have with 
their parents. Indeed, maybe that explains why there is so little enforcement 
in the case of this family ties burden.
Th e more diffi  cult question is whether there are family relationships that 
are, in fact, truly voluntary. At fi rst blush, the most obvious example of a vol-
untary relationship would seem to be that of spouses—it is certainly true for 
most cultures in this country that no one is forced to marry and individuals 
may freely choose their own partner.
18
 To be sure, some human traffi  cking 
victims are coerced into marriage, but that marriage results from legal wrong-
doing; it does not instantiate or exemplify what we think to be marriage’s 
modern nature.
19
 Although some have argued that social and economic 
forces render marriage compulsory,
20
 we think such conclusions are gener-
ally unpersuasive. Th e strong social and economic pressure to marry does 
not vitiate the voluntariness that renders people’s decisions their own for 
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the purposes of being responsible to take on family ties burdens and benefi ts. 
Of course, current government policies and social norms undoubtedly 
reward an individual’s decision to marry, and make that choice more attrac-
tive, but these rewards nonetheless stop short of compelling an individual to 
marry. By the same token, some government policies also prevent an indi-
vidual from marrying a person of his or her choice and that, to our mind, is 
an undue intrusion of the state, since it denies opportunities and expressive 
benefi ts on grounds we fi nd morally irrelevant.
As to the parent-child relationship, we see this relationship as generally 
voluntary (although there might be some social pressures in some commu-
nities to reproduce).
21
 A mother who does not wish to parent is legally free to 
use very reliable birth control methods—and she may terminate her preg-
nancy or place a child up for adoption. To be sure, there are complications 
with this general observation of voluntariness.
22
 For example, fathers have 
long been held by courts to be forced to parent against their will in the sense 
that they are subject to child support obligations even if they take affi  rmative 
steps to avoid fatherhood.
23
 Still, for the most part, these complications are 
indicative of the exceptions, not the general case. Most parents want and 
choose their children. Th is is not to say that the laws that attach to parents 
as family ties burdens are always justifi ed. Rather, the fact that these rela-
tionships are usually voluntary helps us understand the underlying structure 
of burden allocation by the criminal justice system.
Let us reiterate some features of this analysis, for we have earlier left 
prior commentators on this aspect of our argument confused. Professor 
Michael O’Hear suggests, in his thinking on our work, that we embrace the 
view that “the voluntary assumption of a duty . . . adds substantial support 
for the criminal enforcement of that duty.”
24
 Professor Rick Hills likewise 
worries that we “root” criminal liability in “consent” to provide care.
25
 
Although we think that voluntariness is relevant in analyzing family ties 
burdens, we think the use of the phrase substantial support overstates our 
position because we believe that voluntariness is not in and of itself a 
suffi  cient reason to bring the criminal law to bear. Similarly, we resist the 
idea that we root liability in consent, since it is not itself the reason for liabil-
ity; it is only a necessary, not a suffi  cient condition for criminal law liability. 
In the omissions context, for example, it is the failure to perform some under-
lying caregiving duty that remains the basis for the liability; voluntariness 
with respect to the assumption of that duty only plays a role in delineating 
whose acts or omissions may properly serve as a basis for criminal liability in 
a liberal state. 
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So what is our account of voluntariness and how is it diff erent from the 
voluntariness associated with criminal acts that the criminal law routinely 
focuses upon? In deriving our voluntariness test we examined the way in 
which criminal justice systems picked out familial relationships for burden-
ing. In fi ve out of the seven family ties burdens that we explore here—adul-
tery, bigamy, parental responsibility, omissions, nonpayment of child 
support—the liability only attached to a person who could plausibly be said 
to have voluntarily created the relationship of caregiving. Moreover, with 
respect to fi lial responsibility laws, we noticed the near complete lack of 
enforcement today.
To be sure, this casual empiricism does not decide the matter for us. But 
it does illuminate it for us because voluntariness must clearly play a central 
role in assessing the fairness of allocating criminal law liability in these 
contexts. Th at is, the pattern of voluntariness evidenced by the family ties 
burdens we uncover here is consistent with what we think a liberal state 
should do: namely, give people some autonomy about entering relationships 
before using the relationship status as an element of a crime. Th is autonomy 
principle is in some sense being stifl ed by the use of traditional family status, 
since the laws in question often exclude from coverage many people who 
should be covered because of the nature of their caregiving roles in others’ 
lives, whether they are persons in homosexual relationships, polyamorous 
unions, siblings, or some other form of committed un-married persons.
Although this conception of voluntariness does not have a large explicit 
role in most areas of the criminal law, if the criminal law seeks to burden a 
relationship with the use of a status-oriented approach, we think liberalism 
requires that the burdens created have been voluntarily assumed. If the law 
requires that public offi  cials provide the public their “honest services,”
26
 that 
is, to act as quasi-fi duciaries to the public, it is fair, in part, because they have 
not been forced into these jobs. In the world of family status liabilities that 
we have found, most of which are predicated on a relationship, we think that 
being able to choose or reject the relationship is a necessary requirement to 
have the law comply with our basic commitments to autonomy specifi cally 
and liberalism generally.
27
Of course, that we are voluntarists in criminal law design does not commit 
us to any voluntarist vision of the constitution of moral life and the source of 
moral norms. We simply take a position about the institutional design of 
criminal justice practices in a liberal state. It may well be the case that our 
parents or siblings have legitimate moral claims on us that stem from their 
relationships to us, independent of choice. But the liberal state should avoid 
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enforcing those claims through the criminal law for all the reasons we have 
specifi ed here. In short, voluntariness of the sort we have identifi ed is a 
reasonable test for legislators to surmount if they are designing the enforce-
ment mechanisms of the criminal law to target relational obligations.
• D. Overcoming Family Status Th rough a Focus on 
Voluntary Caregiving
Notwithstanding the ambiguities that might attach in particular situations 
regarding whether a familial relationship is voluntary, using voluntariness 
rather than familial status as a basis for distributing these kinds of obliga-
tions is initially quite attractive. Indeed, using voluntariness as a criterion 
helps us solve the problems of underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness 
that arise when using family status alone. Importantly, it allows us to 
encompass those who view themselves as obligated to others through 
their own choices and actions regardless of the state-established delinea-
tions of an “acceptable” family. Th us, same-sex partners, unmarried hetero-
sexual partners, grandparents caring for extended family members, even 
platonic or polyamorous friends living together in a committed caregiving 
relationship—all of these people are engaged in voluntary relationships. 
Th ey may both want and warrant the protections and expressive benefi ts 
of burdens solely allocated on the basis of family ties in our current policy 
environment.
Yet, how can one go about limiting the extension of such burdens that the 
state is expected to prosecute with its criminal justice resources? Can a teen-
ager choose his third closest friend as the person to whom he owes a special 
obligation of protection? If he does, should scarce criminal justice resources 
be used to reinforce that obligation? We need to know, in other words, both 
who decides and by what criteria a particular relationship should be deemed 
a voluntary relationship in which the party is willing to assume obligations 
toward another and for which the law is willing to intervene. 
In our view, voluntariness as a stand-alone criterion is insuffi  cient for 
assessing whether it is just and attractive to impose or enhance criminal 
penalties on the basis of a particular relationship. When assessing criminal 
liability, we suggest that voluntariness be used in conjunction with whether 
a component of the relationship includes an obligation of some form of 
caregiving. Our sense is that many sorts of people assume these caregiving 
roles and not all of them are familial in nature. Roommates, for example, 
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might choose to adopt an ethos of mutual care over a period of time. If that 
relationship is freely entered into and maintained by individuals capable of 
informed and intelligent consent,
28
 we do not see why they should not be 
able to enter into the covenants of care similar to the ones that presump-
tively characterize spousal or parental relationships.
29
 But they should not 
necessarily be required to adopt all of the obligations that the law ascribes to 
parents either. Although this scenario may be unlikely, one roommate might 
only choose to undertake a duty to perform easy rescues, while the other 
might undertake obligations of fi nancial support and a duty to rescue. 
Friends or roommates should be able and encouraged to create obligations 
that are both capable of being scaled in size or intensity and enforced through 
threat of criminal sanction. Th at is, if we are going to recognize caregiving 
responsibilities through the criminal law, they should not be restricted to 
ones that are familial.
Th at said, we do think there are meaningful diff erences between a spousal 
or parental duty of care and the additional covenants of care that we are 
prepared to recognize. For example, we believe that one’s familial status qua 
spouse or parent may be presumptively used to establish that the relation-
ship involves voluntarism, whereas such a presumption would not be justifi -
able in the case of roommates. After all, the act of marriage in our society is, 
absent any contrary evidence in particular cases, the product of individuals 
choosing to marry each other; and the same goes for the choice to raise chil-
dren, generally speaking. In contrast, the presumption in other relationships 
would not automatically attach. Th us, familial status as such would be nei-
ther necessary nor suffi  cient to justify a family ties burden.
Th ere is also the related question of whether voluntary assumptions of 
responsibility can be terminated. We think they ought to be terminable 
under certain conditions, depending on the context. In the context of mar-
ried couples, legal separation would be the appropriate way to signal an 
opting out of the marital family ties burdens. And in the context of a parent 
giving up his or her child to friends across the country, the termination of 
parental rights is the way to opt out of the special duties of parenthood. But 
it is not obvious to us that these potentially costly signaling mechanisms 
should be the only ways to break the covenants that trigger the special 
responsibilities of voluntary caregiving.
Although for the average dyad (whether parent-child or spouse-spouse), 
the legal opt out might not be unduly burdensome, there might be cases 
when it seems unfair to require divorce or termination. Perhaps, in excep-
tional circumstances, parties to these special relationships ought to be able 
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to show that they should be deemed “equitably” divorced or terminated for 
the purposes of the family ties burdens. One way to determine the bona fi des 
of these parties is to ascertain whether they have tried to capture family ties 
benefi ts through either the criminal or the civil system (say, by claiming a 
dependent for tax purposes); in situations in which the parties have not 
claimed those benefi ts, we can envision the very rare case when parties 
should be saved the pain and cost of an offi  cial divorce and termination.
Spousal relationships, however, should not be treated the same as par-
ents’ obligations toward their children. After all, minor children cannot avoid 
their own vulnerability.
30
 Th us, although letting spouses opt out does not 
generally off end a sense of fair play, letting parents ditch their vulnerable 
children without their consent ( for minors cannot really consent by law) 
quite centrally violates the most basic tenets of what many think parents 
owe their children.
31
 But that is just another way of specifying why allowing 
parental opt out without termination should be even rarer than allowing 
spousal opt out without divorce.
Nevertheless, just because it should be rare does not mean it must be 
categorically proscribed. Indeed, if we are right that voluntary caregiving 
underwrites and furnishes justifi catory principles for some status-based 
burdens in the criminal justice system, we should seek ways to narrowly 
tailor the family ties burdens to capture only the right kinds of off enders. If 
we had to give up our children to good friends for several years because of 
illness or incapacitation, for example, the scope of criminally enforceable 
parental duties would have to be adjusted, though not necessarily elimi-
nated. If a child visits her parent in prison, it is not wrong to continue to 
assign that parent an obligation to perform an easy rescue just because the 
parent is not the primary caregiver anymore. On the other hand, the fact that 
the parent is in prison may be a good basis for not assigning criminal liability 
on the basis of nonpayment of support if there is no income or wealth for the 
parent to tap for the child’s support.
For most other relationships outside of childrearing and spouses, how-
ever, we think a registry could be created in which people opt in and opt out 
of relationships of caregiving as long as they provide notice to the aff ected 
parties.
32
 Th is strategy would allow adults to select a number of additional 
persons eligible for receiving the adult’s responsibility. If unrelated room-
mates wanted to sign up (or create such covenants as a prerequisite for living 
with another adult), they could do so, signaling commitments of care for 
each other, to each other, and to those around them. And if adult children 
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wanted to signal their willingness to shoulder burdens to care for their par-
ents, then that would be an option, rather than the requirement it is under a 
few states’ rules.
To be sure, there is something cheaply administrable when the law selects 
simply a few family status relationships instead of creating a registry for rela-
tionships of voluntary caregiving. But it does not seem that much more diffi  -
cult to use a registry of the sort we describe, especially when it lends promise 
to the prospect of all sorts of people pledging their hearts and sense of obliga-
tion to others around them. Moreover, as alluded to above, the administrabil-
ity of this system can be rather cheaply achieved by requiring that spouses 
and children occupy a special role with respect to family ties burdens—i.e., 
certain duties can be imposed on parents and spouses to ensure they meet 
the responsibilities they agree to when they volunteer to be a spouse or parent. 
Our registry network, in other words, would supplement the core relation-
ships of spousal and parental obligation, not supplant it.
In short, adopting a voluntarist approach to burden distribution in the 
criminal justice system harmonizes well with what we think the system 
appears to seek for itself, albeit imperfectly. Moreover, it might provide for a 
better intellectual fi t with the competing interests in promoting freedom and 
autonomy, which is thought by many to undergird the no-duty-to-rescue 
pattern of law.
33
 Additionally, the diffi  culties associated with the under- and 
over-inclusive nature of family status can be remedied in large measure by 
use of a registry where one can declare who counts within one’s sphere of 
accepted responsibility for the purpose of some of the crimes discussed here. 
Th is would strengthen voluntary assumptions of caregiving responsibilities 
(of which the family is sometimes a great example) rather than rely upon 
infl exible categories based upon antiquarian notions of status.
Spurning our embrace of a voluntariness requirement, Professor O’Hear, 
in his published comments on earlier versions of these arguments, off ers an 
alternative basis of liability premised upon vulnerability and proximity.
34
 
Presumably, this would entail an obligation of an older sibling to rescue a 
younger sibling when possible, not to mention neighbors and co-workers.
35
 
We certainly believe there is a moral basis for rescue in these scenarios, but 
the question upon which we focus is whether the criminal law ought to be 
used to punish a failure to satisfy that moral obligation. To our mind, vulner-
ability and proximity are aspects that matter insofar as they are parts of a 
voluntarily created relationship of caregiving.
36
 But insofar as they serve to 
create liability where no one consented to that caregiving obligation, we fi nd 
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such status-based obligations problematic.
37
 Under our view of these duties 
to rescue, without one party agreeing to perform some degree of caregiving, 
no criminal liability ought to attach.
38
 So we do not disagree that Professor 
O’Hear’s normative foundations for these liabilities should also play a role in 
thinking about when to exact them and from whom; it is just that we remain 
convinced that the liberal state needs to assess some baseline voluntariness 
of the relationship in the fi rst instance.
39
Instead of voluntariness or proximate vulnerability, Professor Hills, in his 
published comments on a previous version of this argument, off ers a diff er-
ent principle that, on his account, both fi ts and justifi es a number of the 
family ties burdens we reveal here. Hills would reorganize family ties burdens 
to promote child-rearing. We fi nd that alternative deeply troublesome for 
the liberal state.
Professor Hills makes a good case for the child-rearing value as a good fi t 
with some of the family ties burdens we discovered in the law. Each burden 
in its own way can be part of a story in which the criminal justice system 
brings itself to bear on families because families are subcontracted the 
task—without much oversight—of raising children for the state.
Yet it does not suffi  ce to say, as Professor Hills does, that our society would 
“be deprived of the future value of humanity” without “properly raised 
children.”
40
 Th at may or may not be true. Indeed, if children are a positive 
good, why do they become less valuable to society once they are less vulner-
able as adults? Presumably what makes children valuable is also what makes 
adults valuable, in which case Professor Hills has a hard time explaining why 
we would not extend the reach of these family liabilities to all, or at least to 
those who still have procreative (and caregiving?) capacity. In sum, we think 
a liberal state may not use its criminal law to reinforce a very particular ver-
sion of the right way to organize the institution of the family through the use 
of status-based liabilities that citizens have never had the opportunity to 
reject. We are also mindful that child-rearing values are often used in service 
of discriminating against non-traditional groups.
Th us, at least two central diff erences with Hills’ focus on child-rearing are 
worth highlighting. First, we see family ties burdens as eff orts to cope with 
and oversee relationships in which people often fi nd themselves vulnerable 
in intimate contexts in which the state can perform comparatively little 
oversight. So we would not have criminal liabilities contingent on whether 
anyone had children, something that—the future of humanity, notwithstand-
ing—seems morally arbitrary to us, at least as far as the criminal law is con-
cerned. Second, while we might concede the view that the perpetuation of 
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our species and the acculturation of our citizens through private resources 
are central goods that the state should pursue by propping up the family and 
subsidizing its activities,
41
 we are still committed to the view that there are 
certain liberal norms that constrain how the state may choose to pursue 
such ends in the criminal law. Our normative framework highlights that 
point through both our voluntariness inquiry as well as our minimalism. 
Without some compelling proof that the state needs to use the criminal law 
to forward its agenda of only allowing one man and/or one woman to raise 
a child, we remain convinced that our account is more consistent with basic 
liberal commitments, requiring only a focus on whether the obligation of 
care was voluntarily assumed. It still might be a bad use of resources to 
criminalize this world of intimacy and inaction; but that is a separate ques-
tion from our threshold inquiry into whether a liberal state should create 
such crimes in the fi rst place.
• E. Bringing It Together: How to Scrutinize a 
Family Ties Burden
In light of all these various considerations, we propose that family ties 
burdens—whether the ones we described in Chapter 4 or some others that 
might be contemplated—undergo scrutiny, using a set of normative speed 
bumps designed to track our discussion here. Our general approach in light 
of the foregoing is that special criminal justice burdens based on familial 
status alone require justifi cation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, just as we exhib-
ited a tendency to be skeptical toward most family ties benefi ts in the fi rst 
part of the book, we are also inclined to protect individuals from penalties or 
burdens based simply on traditional familial status. However, because we are 
sensitive to the caregiving contributions that might stand in need of special 
protection from the state, we believe that some of the concerns people might 
have about abandoning family ties burdens can be addressed instead through 
careful drafting that substitutes attentiveness to voluntary relationships of 
caregiving in the place of familial status alone. Th us, our skepticism toward 
family ties burdens does not entail eliminating all such burdens. Instead, we 
propose that such burdens undergo a searching inquiry framed by a liberal 
minimalist paradigm.
What is liberal minimalism? A liberal minimalist approach to criminal 
liability is refl ective of two basic, though not uncontested, values. With 
respect to the word liberal, we are relying on its roots to connect to 
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a particular notion of when it is appropriate to use family status as an 
element of a criminal law. To our mind, the family relationship that is an 
element of criminal liability must be one that is the product of freely chosen 
behavior. Specifi cally, we deem a burden to pass muster under our fi rst 
“liberalism” concern if the relationship which serves as the basis for a family 
ties burden is one that the defendant freely created through her choice. Th e 
consent is not always explicitly extended, but it may, in some cases, be 
reasonably inferred in light of the other available options available to the 
off ender. Beyond this fi rst basic liberal concern is also a need for some 
showing that the relationship is one of caregiving. Without this additional 
element, we risk allowing the criminal justice system’s apparatus to be 
co-opted by mere contract.
42
A second and more general liberal concern we deem important is that a 
justice system must allocate liberty to citizens consistent with other persons’ 
liberty, putting the burden of justifi cation on those who would limit individual 
liberty.
43
 For this reason, in designing laws that target family status, one must 
assess the liberty interest at stake—and how important it is.
With respect to minimalism in criminal law, we ask whether the govern-
ment has an important or compelling objective it is trying to achieve through 
the use of the family ties burden. Th is purpose analysis is obviously fraught 
with controversy and so, in many situations, we usually stipulate to the 
objective’s importance in order to assess the means used to pursue the ends. 
Th is means analysis involves two kinds of questions. First, has the govern-
ment narrowly tailored the criminal sanction to its putative objectives to 
avoid overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness? Second, is there good reason 
to believe that the use of a family ties burden via criminal sanction is justifi ed 
if and when other alternatives (education, advertising, regulation, tort, or 
contract) could be equally eff ective in achieving the state’s objective?
44
 Th ese 
questions are important because criminal sanctions use coercion to limit 
liberty; are especially costly to both the state and to the off ender; and are 
subject to error and abuse. For those reasons, we support a principle of prag-
matic frugality both in the drafting of criminal legislation and the amount of 
punishment imposed. Punishment should be no more severe than necessary 
to achieve the legislature’s reasonable interests, and the legislature should 
forbear from coercion through criminal sanction when possible. At a rela-
tively high level of abstraction, this is a principle (also connected to propor-
tionality) that theorists of many stripes can embrace.
45
 Although there is 
much more that can be said about both these notions of liberalism and min-
imalism,
46
 we do not wish to stray too far from the subject at hand.
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As applied to our project on the use of family status to create criminal 
liability, we think the liberal minimalist agenda, coupled with the concerns 
about discrimination and gender bias alluded to earlier, trigger a set of ques-
tions for the normative review of the family ties burdens we discussed in 
Chapter 4. Th ese questions are similar (though not identical) to the ones 
asked by courts in liberal democracies like the United States and Canada 
when they review legislation alleged to impair a fundamental liberty or 
alleged to rely on a suspect classifi cation.
Of course, we must determine as a threshold matter whether the state is 
in fact targeting a defendant for prosecution (or enhanced punishment) 
based on his family status.
47
 But in the case of the seven burdens we have 
discussed in Chapter 4, we can readily conclude that family status is relevant 
and necessary for the liability the defendant faces, so when it comes to the 
application of the framework in Chapter 6, we will dispense with this thresh-
old question and instead focus on the rest of the framework develop here, as 
follows.
First, does the burden fall only on persons who have voluntarily created a 
relationship of care? Second, does the burden impinge on some liberty that 
should be recognized as deserving of protection in a liberal society? Th ird, 
are the laws drafted in such a way as to be narrowly tailored to the govern-
mental objectives? Fourth, are there non-criminal measures that could be 
equally eff ective in achieving these government objectives, assuming these 
government objectives were suffi  ciently compelling or important to vindi-
cate through law? Last, in what ways do the existing family ties burdens con-
tribute to concerns about gender, inequality, and discrimination?
As before, this kind of scrutiny will not resolve all questions. Inevitably, 
disputes about the strength of competing claims will persist – and means 
testing will implicate empirical evidence, which is too often indeterminate 
or simply non-existent. But, as we hope we achieved in our systematic inquiry 
into family ties benefi ts in Part I, we hope to do some important work in 
helping clarify the problems under consideration and alerting lawyers, 
policymakers, and judges to some of the potentially hidden costs of family 
ties burdens in the criminal justice system.
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in this chapter, we undertake some analysis of the various family ties bur-
dens we identifi ed in Chapter 4. In what follows, we do not exhaustively ana-
lyze each family ties burden—even from within our own framework. As we 
acknowledged at the very beginning, each of the burdens we have identifi ed 
requires its own long-form analysis, taking account of its particularized con-
text and its systemic eff ects on the justice system and relevant family mem-
bers. Accordingly, all we endeavor to do in this Chapter is furnish a basis for 
how our framework contributes to a more comprehensive accounting when 
analyzing each family ties burden. We think our framework recommends cau-
tion about the bulk of the family ties burdens we have identifi ed and urges 
creativity in redesigning these burdens to make them less discriminatory.
• A. Omissions Liability For Failure to Rescue
Th e question of omissions liability for failure to rescue is a diffi  cult one, and 
the analysis seems to vary according to the kind of family status relationship 
at issue.
1. Parental Duties to Rescue Children
Let us begin with the most common scenario where we see liability imposed: 
the prosecution of parents who fail to protect their children. What are the 
rationales used to describe why we impose criminally sanctioned obligations 
on parents to rescue their children when they are imperiled and when 
parents have an easy rescue to make?
Imposing liability on parents for failing to protect their children seems to 
vindicate a compelling state interest—the need to protect children from 
harm.
1
 It is in this scenario that our concerns about fostering the caregiving 
• six
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capacity of individuals reach their zenith. But the concern for protecting 
children from harm would seem to require that anyone with the chance to 
make an easy rescue should be under such an obligation. After all, young 
children are often helpless to protect themselves from harm; responsibility 
must seem to fall on the shoulders of those adults in the position to be a 
child’s only lifeline. But this is not how the laws of rescue are drafted as a 
general matter.
Th us, the objective of restricting the duty to rescue a child to its custodial 
fi gure has to do, at least in part, with an expressive function about the kind of 
commitment made by a parent to the world regarding the child. Th e law 
seems to be saying that parents who have voluntarily chosen to retain the 
benefi ts conferred by the parent-child relationship should endure some bur-
dens in return, and ensuring the safety of a child entrusted to the parent’s 
care represents the most fundamental of reasonable burdens. When a person 
opts to have children, the parent is, as we suggested earlier, signaling to 
others that the parent will be a fi rst responder.
In this respect, imposing a duty to rescue here is analogous to the imposi-
tion of liability on those people who have “waved away” others. Th e goal, of 
course, is not to tie an albatross around the neck of every parent. Omissions 
liability does not create a responsibility to rescue against unreasonable risks. 
It operates only to ensure that when a parent is in a position of protecting the 
child from imminent harm, the parent takes reasonable measures to do so.
a. Voluntary Caregiving and Its Limits
We think it is fair to conclude, in most circumstances, that imposing obliga-
tions to rescue one’s children (defi ned as minors for whom one has legal cus-
tody) is consistent with voluntarist caregiving. Th at said, the question of 
what justifi es a status-based duty to rescue is a bit more complicated than 
the one that grounds a spouse-like relation. To be sure, the vast majority of 
parents eagerly assume the obligations associated with parenting—and, 
therefore, the law’s placing a burden to rescue may be unnecessary. But 
whether it is necessary or not as a policy matter is not our primary concern 
here: we are fi rst concerned about how consistent the policy is with a general 
commitment to voluntarist caregiving.
Some parents might resist the ascription of voluntariness to their actions 
or to the results of their actions. First, one might say that he volunteered to 
have sex, but he didn’t consent to have a child that resulted from sex. Or one 
may claim, under the circumstances of rape or stolen sperm, that one didn’t 
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even volunteer to have procreative sex.
2
 As a general matter, however, we 
view the risk of pregnancy as a risk people voluntarily assume when they 
engage in sexual relations, even when using birth control. Th e question is 
whether the risk of pregnancy should also be confl ated with the risk of being 
conscripted into parental obligations that are vindicated through the crimi-
nal law.
If women have exclusive control over the decision to abort and primary, 
albeit not necessarily exclusive, control over the adoption decision, then that 
makes more compelling the inference that mothers who have ultimately 
acquiesced to or embraced the task of raising children should bear responsi-
bility for caring for the child, at least as far as the criminal law is concerned. 
To be sure, the absence of either of these alternatives would undermine the 
moral basis for ascribing a burden of care to a person. So, too, would it be 
inappropriate to establish omissions liability on sperm or egg donors who 
make clear that they are renouncing future interests to those accepting the 
sperm or eggs.
As to men: if men who have taken reasonable precautions in terms of 
birth control—or who reasonably relied on express precautions taken by the 
woman—lack control over the choice to abort or give the baby up for adop-
tion, then it is inaccurate to say that they are consenting to the obligations 
associated with parenting unless there is some other way to categorically 
renounce their parental rights and obligations. Th us, if one biological parent 
objects to becoming a parent over the wishes of the other parent, and secures 
a pre-conception waiver from the other person, then, at least according to 
two of us (Markel and Leib), that might be a basis for releasing the objecting 
parent from the family ties burden.
3
 But in the absence of such evidence, it is 
not unreasonable to place a burden on parents who, through biology or 
adoption, assume this caregiving role. Indeed, to the extent that there are 
borderline cases, we might highlight that the burden (on the potential defen-
dant) may operate to help the vulnerable child, so questionable cases of con-
sent should default to burdening the parent.
Might these consent or voluntarism arguments founder if we ask whether 
parents specifi cally consented to taking care of a child with X, where X is 
illness or a behavioral problem? Th e consent still exists so long as there is a 
procedure by which parents can terminate their parental rights to the state 
through voluntary relinquishment, a relatively widespread practice.
Still, because not all children live with their biological parents,
4
 we 
believe that the use of traditional family status to limit omissions liability is 
a problem. A child could reside with another relative, such as a grandparent, 
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a family friend, or a foster family, to name just a few possible permutations.
5
 
Alternatively, as we explain below, there may be homosexual couples or gay 
and straight persons involved in polyamorous contexts who care for the child, 
but their parenting status may not be recognized by the state. Th ere is also the 
diffi  cult question about the caregiving responsibilities that occur outside the 
home: schools, religious institutions, Girl Scouts, sports leagues—in all these 
sites, adults and adolescents with supervisory roles play an increasingly impor-
tant role in the rearing of children.
6
 Th erefore, limiting omissions liability to 
biological parents and their children has the potential to be underinclusive, in 
that it does not recognize non-traditional relationships of caregiving.
Using only an opt-in registry system (of the sort described in Chapter 5) 
seems unsatisfactory when it comes to duties to rescue children. Parents 
who bring children into the world should be presumptively required to rescue 
and care for their children, who are, after all, without resources to avoid their 
own vulnerability and cannot suffi  ciently protect themselves from harm 
through other means. However, the underinclusiveness (and, in certain cir-
cumstances, overinclusiveness) of biological parentage necessitates a test 
that focuses on something other than only biological parenthood in the con-
text of duties to rescue children: does the individual in question stand in the 
position of a primary caregiver to the child? If the answer to this multi-factored 
question is yes,
7
 then that individual should face liability for failure to rescue 
on an omissions liability theory, absent any relevant and compelling excuse 
or justifi cation.
8
 It is important to note that more than one individual could 
fall into this category—for example, both the mother and the father of the 
child, assuming they both live with the child, and a grandparent who also 
lives in the home. Th is test would avoid the overinclusiveness problem of 
relying on biology too. Th ere might be situations in which a biological parent 
has parental rights terminated, and in those situations, we think (and the law 
concurs) there should be no duty to rescue under the criminal law.
Several options exist for dealing with underinclusiveness and overinclu-
siveness and the use of presumptions or registries. First, one could entirely 
decouple omissions liability in this context from parental status. Although we 
do not embrace this position, we recognize that if we abolished the estab-
lished linkage between parental status and omissions liability, then that would 
serve as a default rule that might spur the use of the registry and at the same 
time decenter the role of parents in our quest to ensure the safety of children. 
Under this rule, family units may choose to require opting in as a precondition 
for hiring nannies and babysitters;  additionally, private associations such as 
neighborhood groups or churches might require opt-ins of members to signal 
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that this is an especially caring community. (Th e registry would eff ectively 
create an easier method than exists now to facilitate a private ordering regime 
that the state could monitor for purposes of prosecuting omissions cases.)
Alternatively, one could abolish the link between omissions liability and 
status and instead simply require all primary caregivers (and discard special 
references to parents altogether) to face omissions liability.
9
 Th is second 
option creates a baseline in which liability for all primary caregivers is created 
(as opposed to a baseline of no liability for anyone in the fi rst situation); it 
would also preserve an opt-in registry for others. Although we generally like 
this approach, there are some diffi  culties with it. One downside is that requir-
ing a duty to rescue by all primary caregivers may risk overinclusiveness 
(and, thus, discourage persons from becoming primary caregivers) and some 
degree of vagueness—given that the tests for who is a primary caregiver will 
be hard to apply in some borderline cases.
A third option is another hybrid approach to reduce problems of underin-
clusiveness. First, retain the status-based duty for parents as a strong pre-
sumption that is rebutted only with the termination of parental rights; 
second, impose omissions liability on all other primary caregivers; and third, 
create an opt-in registry for all others. Our own view is that this option is 
probably the most feasible and attractive in part because it involves only an 
incremental adjustment from the current practice of most jurisdictions. 
Th ere is not much diff erence between the second and third option, but the 
presumption of parent-based duties to rescue makes the third option argu-
ably cheaper to administer from a social cost perspective and there is less 
need to worry about chilling eff ects because, under this regime, parents 
would generally have responsibility for children, whatever the status of other 
primary caregivers.
A fourth option is to require all persons to make easy rescues regardless of 
parental status. Th is option violates a thick commitment to voluntarism, 
perhaps, but it might be said that the compelling interest underlying the 
goal (saving vulnerable lives through actions that pose little to no risk to the 
rescuer) justifi es the infringement here. Here, we note that such infringe-
ments on voluntarism occur in other contexts where the stakes are high, 





and conscription for armed services.
12
 And as a practical matter, it refl ects 
the prevailing norm by which most persons actually do undertake “easy 
rescues.”
13
Even though we can agree on the scope of duty attaching to parents and 
others regarding obligations to rescue minor children, we must also consider 
applying the framework to family ties burdens
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whether such obligations persist with children who are no longer minors. 
Should their primary caregivers still owe them a duty to rescue? If we take 
the fourth approach—by which we impose general duties to rescue—then 
the answer is yes. But two of us (Leib and Markel) believe that if we take any 
of the three approaches described that focus on the relationship between 
adult caregivers and children, then it makes sense to recognize that adult 
children typically stand in a diff erent position than minor children—they can 
both utilize a registry system and have more options available to remove 
themselves from a dangerous situation.
14
 In addition, the dynamics of the 
relationship may be very diff erent with an adult child. It may seem justifi able 
for parents to wish to sever a relationship with a child who has committed a 
heinous crime or even victimized his parents, for example, whereas we would 
not allow parents of a minor child to walk away from their obligations to that 
child because of the child’s misconduct unless they were prepared to termi-
nate their parental rights. On the other hand, if an adult child is ill or inca-
pacitated in some way, it does not seem unfair to require that the parental 
status-based or caregiver-based duty to rescue should apply. Professor 
Collins, by contrast, believes the parental duty to rescue one’s child should 
persist into adulthood unless the parent has terminated his or her rights on 
grounds such as having been victimized by the child’s criminal activity.
b. Minimalism and Means-Analysis
As to whether there are equally eff ective non-criminal alternatives available 
to the imposition of omissions liability, several options are worth consider-
ing. Most people would say that a parent’s love and the social norm of being 
a Good Samaritan together mean that any legal remedy is unnecessary. But 
we often have criminal sanctions prohibiting or requiring conduct that 
would otherwise be obvious and attractive to most people. Th us, the crimi-
nal law and its concomitant sanction may be used to deny defendants the 
claim that the polity deprived them of fair notice of how they were expected 
to act to avoid reproach.
15
Couldn’t a tort remedy enunciate the same requirement of responsible 
behavior here? It might, but chances are that it will be less eff ective. For one 
thing, relying on the tort remedy here may be insuffi  cient when there might 
not be a plaintiff  to bring a claim against a parent who fails to rescue a child. 
Another issue is that the parent might be judgment-proof, which would give 
parents inadequate incentives to monitor their care of their children. Parents 
on the fence about the duty to rescue may be more likely to discharge the 
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reasonable duties we impose in exchange for the benefi ts and latitude 
aff orded to parenting.
16
 So the criminal sanction here may serve to both edu-
cate the public about the obligation parents have toward children and to 
eff ectively punish parents for their failing to live up to the obligations that 
accompany the raising of children. When a parent fails to rescue a child 
under the restrictive conditions that make one eligible for criminal sanction, 
the parent is making a condemnable choice and is worthy of punishment 
for that breach of trust described above. Th e criminal sanction also is 
appropriate to ensure that parents do not skimp on their responsibilities 
because they know they might not be attractive tort defendants under 
existing law.
c. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
Even if omissions liability based on a parent’s failure to rescue passes our 
voluntariness test and means test, we need to acknowledge that imposing 
liability on a parent for failing to protect a child from harm certainly has the 
potential to perpetuate inequality and discrimination. In those jurisdictions 
where gays and lesbians are prohibited from marriage and from adoption, 
these failure to rescue laws facially discriminate against families headed by 
homosexual couples or polyamorous unions.
For example, imagine a state that does not permit homosexual couples to 
adopt.
17
 One adult, John, might nonetheless formally adopt a child, but John’s 
long-standing partner, Larry, who may have informally taken on a parental 
role to the minor, will not be under the duty to rescue the child absent some 
contract or other basis for omissions liability as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Although this rule discriminates against Larry on the basis of Larry’s lack of 
state-recognized family member status, the person who is harmed or left at 
risk by this discrimination is the minor child.
18
 Th is is just one of the ways in 
which state default rules based on status of a certain kind can risk arbitrary 
and unintended harms against children.
19
Because protecting minors from harm in the context of “easy rescues” is a 
compelling interest of the state, regardless of how one feels about discrimi-
nation against gays, even a state that does not grant homosexual couples 
adoption rights should make available a registry by which individuals may 
volunteer to take on the duty to rescue a minor (or anyone else). Getting 
“registered” might be a prerequisite that adoption agencies require of cou-
ples like John and Larry to ensure that the minor child is in a secure home. 
Moreover, if Larry were not willing to register then that might be a good 
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information-forcing device relevant to John’s choice to adopt the minor 
individually or to continue in a relationship with Larry. 
In addition to concerns about inequality and discrimination, we are also 
worried about how prosecutorial practices regarding omissions statutes 
are used in a way that may perpetuate stereotypes about gender.
20
 Th e fi rst 
concern is that focusing on caregiving relationships that are voluntarily 
undertaken might have a chilling eff ect that exacerbates gender inequalities 
operating in the current practices of caregiving. In a recent article,
21
 Professor 
Melissa Murray observed that allowing nonparental caregivers to have rights 
or authority over a child might deter parents from structuring care networks 
comprised of non-parental caregivers. In a note to us, Professor Murray sug-
gests the same concerns might attend a policy that extends criminal liability 
to those who voluntarily provide care and thus risks further insulating fami-
lies and caregiving within the private sphere, emphasizing caregiving as a 
“private” (and presumably, more female) responsibility.
22
With respect, we think most parents, male and female, would be pleased 
to know that more caregivers for their children could face omissions liability 
because that would redound to the benefi t and safety of their children. 
Indeed, to the extent that people are aware of broader omissions liability, 
it might make them more inclined to separate from their children under 
certain conditions and view caregiving as a task shared with the government 
or non-governmental organizations.
23
 In other words, although we under-
stand Professor Murray’s concerns in the context of the extension of rights or 
benefi ts to non-parental caregivers, we think that in the context of obliga-
tions to children by non-parental caregivers this deterrent eff ect is unlikely to 
be realized except to the extent that some non-parental caregivers might be 
worried about their exposure to criminal omissions liability. But even in this 
context, this anxiety is misplaced since it is likely that omissions liability 
would already attach based on some of the other traditional bases for 
omissions liability discussed in Chapter 4.
Th e second gender-related worry is that prosecutions based on omissions 
liability disproportionately target women. Indeed, women are more likely 
to bear the brunt of such prosecutions than men simply by virtue of the 
fact  that they are, more often, the custodial parent.
24
 Further, women are 
commonly thought to be held by the public to a higher standard of care 
in childrearing relative to men.
25
 As Naomi Cahn has argued, “Cultural 
middle-class norms expect all women to be primarily responsible for their 
children. Th e criminal justice system supports this norm by criminalizing 
privilege or punish
Dan Markel-Chap06.indd   106 2/26/09   7:31:51 PM
107
the abusive and neglectful behavior of parents, penalizing mothers particu-
larly harshly.”
26
We also cannot ignore the linkage between domestic violence and 
prosecutions for failing to protect a child from abuse by another. In our view, it 
is important to acknowledge that, in many cases in which children are being 
battered, a parent (usually the mother) may be the victim of battering as well.
27
 
To be sure, in particular situations, it might be a male father who is battered, 
and our approach to omissions liability does not hinge on the precise identity 
of the defendant qua mother. But the general point here is that the adult 
victims of violence may have few available options, from their perspective, to 
remove their children from an abusive situation.
28
 Th ey may (correctly) 
perceive that attempts to leave will escalate the violence.
29
 Additionally, they 
may have no economic options in terms of being able to fi nd housing or a job 
that will provide suffi  cient income to support a family.
30
Th ese issues are weighty and important, and thus, we need to consider 
practical options to help mitigate the potential disparate impact of omis-
sions liability. As a policy matter, we should partner any attempts to hold 
parents accountable for their failure to protect with eff orts to make it more 
viable for battered spouses to leave abusive partners—for example, by ensur-
ing adequate funding for shelters, job training, and child care resources.
31
 
Th e question remains, however, whether the existence of domestic violence 
should preclude prosecuting a parent for failing to rescue the child. Supporters 
of prosecutions of passive parents argue that even a parent’s status as a 
victim of domestic violence cannot categorically excuse a failure to act to 
prevent the abuse of a child. Professor Mary Becker has suggested that 
“mothers, even when abused themselves, should be held to a high standard 
of care for their children and should normally be held responsible for their 
own abuse or neglect of their children and for failing to protect their children 
from others’ abuse and neglect, provided that they knew or had reason to 
know of the harm to their children.”
32
 Th at’s because even though the mother 
may have been weakened physically or mentally by virtue of the abuse she 
has suff ered, unless she is “literally a hostage,” she still has options to employ 
in an attempt to protect her child that are not available to the child itself; 
young children, after all, are utterly defenseless and completely dependent 
upon adults for their protection.
33
In domestic violence cases in which prosecution may be appropriate 
because the parent did have some protective options available, there should 
be some strict limitations on when the state seeks to impose liability. 
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Th e focus needs to be on the easy rescue; thus, in cases involving child 
abuse, we should limit omissions liability to those circumstances where a 
parent had prior knowledge of past abuse and had the practical opportunity 
to seek help, such as access to a telephone to contact law enforcement 
authorities.
34
 Second, parents who fail to protect in a case involving a fatality 
should only face the same homicide charge as the actual killer if they had the 
same (or worse) mens rea; otherwise, a lesser (and perhaps non-homicide) 
charge is appropriate to refl ect the reduced culpability.
35
 And of course, in 
some cases, no conviction is appropriate if the defendant had no easy 
rescue to make based on her own circumstances or diminished capacity as a 
battered spouse.
Another option legislatures should consider is adopting a statutory 
scheme that recognizes the defendant’s omission as a distinct and separate 
crime of failure to rescue like reckless endangerment. A separate charge by a 
prosecutor would better refl ect the idea that there is a meaningful moral 
distinction between actually infl icting the fatal blows and, for example, 
making the mistake of leaving a child alone with an individual who has been 
abusive in the past.
2. Spousal Obligations to Rescue Each Other
Regarding spouses, the foregoing analysis calls for refi nement though it also 
tracks the discussion above. Th e plausibly strong interests the state has in 
penalizing a failure to rescue between spouses are (1) saving human lives in 
danger and (2) affi  rming the signifi cance of marital obligations.
Th e problem with the fi rst interest is that the means used here—spousal 
obligations to rescue each other, policed through the criminal law—is woe-
fully underinclusive, so much so that it’s hard to take seriously the idea that 
this is what’s motivating the use of this family ties burden. Th e second objec-
tive, by contrast, makes more sense. Although the obligation to undertake 
easy rescues is not specifi cally articulated in many wedding vows, it reason-
ably falls under the language that often is used in those vows.
36
 Th us, it makes 
sense to impose the duty to rescue on those who become vulnerable after 
they have already made commitments to each other to serve as caregivers.
Th e notion undergirding the legal obligation here is that spouses who 
have voluntarily chosen to obtain the benefi ts conferred by the spousal rela-
tionship should endure some burdens in return, and facilitating the safety of 
a spouse is a reasonable burden. When a person opts to marry, the person is, 
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as we suggested earlier, signaling to others that he or she will be a fi rst 
responder. In this respect, imposing a duty to rescue here is analogous to the 
imposition of liability on those people who have “waved away” others. Just as 
with children, the goal here is not to tie an albatross around the neck of every 
spouse. Omissions liability does not create a responsibility to rescue against 
unreasonable risks. Rather, it simply punishes the breach of a trust relation-
ship that marriage creates between the parties to the marriage and those 
creating the political community around them.
But let’s consider further how our normative framework applies to this 
family ties burden. We note at the outset that even more so than with children 
who may not have been “wanted,” spouses have already evidenced their com-
mitment to take care of each other. Th us, we view obligations to spouses as 
grounded in voluntarily created commitments to care for each other and that 
easily includes the duty to undertake an easy rescue. Together, married couples 
share a freedom to pursue in concert those goals and goods they cannot or will 
not pursue alone or without the stamp of social recognition.
37
With respect to minimalism, we need to examine the same arguments 
about whether an eff ective alternative to criminal sanction is available. As 
with children, the need to create a spousal obligation seems practically 
redundant because most people would say that romantic love would render 
any legal strategy unnecessary. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to 
legislate criminal sanctions prohibiting or requiring conduct that would 
otherwise be obvious and attractive to most people; as explained above, the 
criminal law and its concomitant sanction may be used to deny defendants 
the claim that they were denied fair notice of how they were expected to 
act with respect to certain conduct.
As with children, here, too, reliance on tort remedies as a substitute 
seems unhelpful. Th ere might not be a plaintiff  to bring a claim against 
a spouse who fails to rescue another spouse (though a plaintiff  is more likely 
in this context than in that of the wrongful death of a child). Moreover, the 
spouse might be judgment-proof in a civil case involving money damages, 
and knowledge of one’s inability to pay may marginally cause spouses (on 
the fence) to have inadequate incentives to rescue. So the criminal sanction 
here may serve to both educate the public about the obligation spouses have 
toward each other and to eff ectively punish spouses for their failing to live 
up to their caregiving obligations. In other words, when a spouse fails to 
rescue a partner under the conditions eligible for criminal sanction, the 
spouse-defendant is making a condemnable choice and is worthy of punish-
ment for that breach of trust described above. Th e criminal sanction also 
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is appropriate to ensure that spouses do not renege on their responsibilities 
because they know they might not be attractive tort defendants under 
existing law.
Any law calling for the prosecution of a person for failing to protect his or 
her spouse from harm also has the potential to have a discriminatory impact, 
in a diff erent and critical sense: it treats diff erently those who cannot or 
choose not to enter a spousal relationship recognized by the state.
38
 For 
example, these laws currently do not clearly give the family members of 
homosexual couples the comfort of knowing that omissions liability is par-
celed out in a non-discriminatory fashion. One way to see this discrimina-
tion is through analogy: if omissions liability were distributed on the basis of 
race, such that whites had a duty to rescue their spouses but blacks did not 
unless they separately contracted for that duty, what message would that 
send? It clearly exhibits a lack of respect to the value of the spouses of black 
people.
39
 Th e same inference of disrespect is true when a state restricts omis-
sions liability along lines that are tethered to the few family status relation-
ships recognized by the state. Why should a heterosexual man have an 
obligation to protect his spouse from harm while a gay man in a similarly 
meaningful and voluntary partnership does not?
40
 In both instances, impos-
ing liability serves the same valuable functions: increasing safety and pro-
moting an ethos of caregiving relations triggered by voluntary choices. Th us, 
limiting omissions liability to those in a state-sanctioned relationship seems 
plainly underinclusive—it leaves out those who cannot get married because 
of a plainly troubling moral choice made by the state.
41
For the most part, we do not have much problem with marriage 
being an overinclusive obligation because divorce is an option by which the 
obligation can be terminated. But because marriage is an underinclusive 
basis for imposing omissions liability, we think several options should be 
explored.
One solution would be to decouple omissions liability from marriage alto-
gether and instead ask parties to any relationship to register sua sponte.
42
 
Th is would treat all persons the same and without favor. But a no duty to 
rescue rule in marriage could act like a penalty default rule. On the one hand, 
it would probably encourage more people outside of marriage to think about 
whom they wish to rescue. On the other hand, it might also add needless 
costs associated with persons who by virtue of marriage would already be 
willing to undertake a duty to rescue. A better solution, based on reducing 
the social costs of the scheme, would be to require duties to rescue in mar-
riages and to create a registry for all others who want to participate in a 
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“covenant of care” such that they have a duty to perform easy rescues. 
Marriages would simply have the implicit term of duty to rescue built into 
them and others outside marriage (including those in polyamourous rela-
tionships) could opt into it. Th is would also allow persons to insist on seeing 
evidence of opt-in by another person before they decide to jointly acquire 
property, cohabit, or perform caregiving tasks for one another.
3. Duties to Rescue in Other Relationships
Some might raise concerns that we are too focused on spouses and parents 
as paradigmatic relationships here. Th e worry here would be that we are 
constructing the sexual family or marriage as the normative ideal for adult 
interactions with each other. We respectfully disagree. Indeed, the point of 
our registry system is to obviate this concern entirely. People who are not 
married do not have to register, but they may choose to do so. In any given 
relationship, just one person may decide to do so for the other since the reg-
istry is a place of declaring one’s assumption of obligation—it is not predi-
cated on norms of reciprocity, nor does it require contractual formalities. 
To be sure, our slight preference for assigning duties to rescue in the context 
of marriage and custodial parenting is responsive to what we think of as 
the specifi c features of caregiving written into the “scripts” of marriage 
and parenting, but no one should be forced into assuming those burdens 
otherwise.
Th at said, people should be free to and encouraged to assume these obli-
gations outside the scripts of marriage and parenting. Th e registry we dis-
cussed in Chapter 5 permits siblings or cousins or roommates or friends to 
enter into covenants of care, but the idea is not to require it through the 
criminal law outside voluntary choices or the specifi c circumstances of the 
parent-child or spousal relationships. Indeed, we would resist any state’s 
attempt to impose a duty to rescue on those persons outside the parent-
child or spousal context because we simply cannot say these relationships 
have been entered into voluntarily. In the context of platonic roommates, 
imposing a duty of rescue through the criminal law would be drastic restruc-
turing of the traditional boundaries of that relationship. On the other hand, 
we certainly believe that individuals should be able to create a legally enforce-
able relationship of caregiving through the use of a registry. Th is allows 
individuals to signal their commitment both to each other and to those 
around them.
43
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It is, of course, possible that very few individuals will choose to register—
why would they voluntarily assume the risk of a legal liability that they 
currently do not face? But if that is the outcome, we are no worse off  than we 
are now, as these individuals do not currently face liability. If, on the other 
hand, some individuals do choose to undertake an obligation to rescue, the 
benefi ts that decision conveys in terms of promoting safety and promoting 
an ethos of care and compassion certainly seem worth the eff ort. We can also 
imagine the state incentivizing such registrations through small tax breaks 
or norm entrepreneurs (private employers or faith groups) that mobilize 
“opt-in days” to foster solidarity among members of their communities. And 
because people’s relationships ebb and fl ow, we could imagine that the regis-
try would permit people to withdraw from these covenants of caregiving 
when adequate notice is given to the aff ected parties.
Allowing more private-ordering in the context of criminal law 
regulation (with suffi  cient attention to third-party harms) is also consistent 
with the suggestions we make later in the contexts of incest, bigamy, and 
adultery.
• B. Parental Responsibility Laws
When adults have committed an affi  rmative act contributing to a minor’s 
delinquency with a culpable state of mind, the traditional core requirements 
for a crime have been satisfi ed; moreover, in those situations in which the 
laws speak to a general obligation by all adults to forbear from contributing 
to a minor’s truancy or curfew violation or criminal misconduct, there is no 
specifi c family ties burden. But as we saw in Chapter 4, some states and more 
municipalities have created criminal liability for parents when their children 
commit some misconduct based on nothing more than a failure to supervise 
theory. It is these laws we focus on here because parental status is an 
element of liability.
Discussions of these laws suggest several reasons for their passage: fi rst, 
they are thought to reduce crime; second, they are viewed as vehicles to proj-
ect norms of parental conduct by instructing parents to monitor their chil-
dren carefully and to remain actively involved in parenting; third, these laws 
are regarded as an avenue of restitution to victims for the harms committed 
by the minors. Despite these plausible justifi cations, we view these laws as 
normatively troublesome and think they should be jettisoned for the reasons 
we articulate below.
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We are willing, for the purposes of argument, to stipulate that the state has 
compelling interests in the reduction of crime, whether by minors or adults; 
the proper instruction of parental obligations in supervising minor children; 
and ensuring adequate compensation to victims of crime. However, we are 
not of the view that the state claiming to pursue these objectives has shown 
that the means used here are appropriately tailored to these ends, especially 
if other non-criminal alternatives are available and equally eff ective.
To begin with, if the goal is to reduce crime, why not require all adults who 
are aware of criminal mischief by a child to prevent the crime and/or report 
it if prevention fails? It does not make sense to restrict failure to supervise 
laws to parents for the sake of reducing crime. Th e second argument, restrict-
ing the reach of these laws to parents, makes sense if the state’s goal is to 
instruct parents to be involved in raising their children and to act diligently 
in the supervision of their children. But if that is the case, then it is not clear 
why mandatory parenting classes, public advertising, civil recovery statutes, 
and a showing of an affi  rmative culpable act or omission by the parent would 
be insuffi  cient, as we explain below. Th e use of strict liability and a criminal 
sanction are unnecessary and have problematic eff ects. As to the adequate 
compensation of victims, every state has a civil recovery statute or tort in 
place by which victims can seek compensation from parents for harms 
perpetrated by their minors.
44
 Th e criminal sanction is redundant in that 
respect.
1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
Admittedly, these laws attach obligations only to the person who voluntarily 
creates a relationship (i.e., the parent, not the child). In that respect, these 
laws are consistent with one aspect of liberalism.
However, because these laws create strict criminal liability by punishing 
parents without proof of a choice to commit an action, they fail to respect a 
reasonable liberty-maximizing rule by ensuring that the defendants have 
performed a voluntary action or omission with a culpable mind that 
warrants condemnation and punishment. To visit the full weight and 
condemnation of a criminal sanction upon an individual for an action by 
another person beyond his or her control is antithetical to the spirit of a lib-
eralism that respects individuals and their liberties.
A plausibly fair interpretation of the failure to supervise theory requires 
proof that the parents could reasonably have done something to prevent the 
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minor’s misconduct and chose not to. But the statutes as drafted, which hold 
parents criminally and strictly liable for the misconduct of their children, 
leads to absurd results in some situations: for instance, parents could be 
liable for prosecution when they themselves were the victims of the minor’s 
misconduct. To be sure, some jurisdictions allow this or other reasons 
(e.g., the parent acted reasonably in the situation) as an affi  rmative defense,
45
 
but the absence of reasonableness by the defendant should be part of the 
government’s case-in-chief—not a burden allocated to the defense in a 
criminal case.
2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
As suggested above, we think imposing criminal liability is misplaced in 
the absence of a blameworthy state of mind and a wrongful action or omis-
sion by the caregiver in question. If a parent acted with something approach-
ing at least criminal negligence, we could better understand the impetus to 
punish the parent with a light sanction. But imposing criminal responsibility 
on a strict liability theory does not seem to promote more eff ective caregiv-
ing than a negligence standard. Rather, it would only chill the underlying 
activity of raising or adopting children or foster children and/or force par-
ents to take unreasonable steps in monitoring their children. Th is would 
undermine the very point of trying to cultivate and support voluntary 
caregiving relationships through family ties burdens. Some examples can 
illustrate our point.
Imagine a parent goes out on a date and leaves a fourteen-year-old alone 
in the house with unsecured fi rearms and an unlocked liquor cabinet, even 
though the parent knows the child has attempted to play with the guns and 
drink liquor on prior occasions. If the fourteen-year-old proceeds to get 
drunk and use the parent’s gun to shoot up the neighbor’s car, the parent has 
been reckless, or at a minimum, criminally negligent by “failing to exercise 
reasonable control” over the child. Imposing liability in this scenario will 
signal both to this particular caregiver, and other caregivers in the commu-
nity, that caregivers must supervise their children more vigilantly.
But imagine instead that the child buys the gun on his own with his 
money from an after-school job and shoots up the neighbor’s car on the way 
home from school, despite repeated admonitions by his parents to stay away 
from guns and people with guns. Under an ordinance like the one passed 
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in Silverton, Oregon, and other jurisdictions, parents could face prosecution 
on a strict liability theory because their child had been charged with a crime. 
But such a prosecution would have little impact in terms of promoting better 
caregiving in situations like the one that gave rise to the misconduct in our 
hypothetical—there is very little caregiving the parent could have done that 
would have prevented the crime in question. Perhaps the parent could pre-
vent the child from earning extra money or going to school independently, 
but children who are determined to fi nd trouble can do it, notwithstanding 
all reasonable eff orts by parents.
Th e consequences of parental responsibility laws warrant consideration 
too. To the extent that criminal law successfully projects norms about correct 
values, the strict liability standard in some parental responsibility laws will 
deter people from becoming foster parents, adoptive parents of teenagers, or 
on the margins, parents of their own biological children. Th at’s not the signal 
regarding the promotion of caregiving that society should emit.
As to restitution, there is no reason that a civil tort remedy against the 
parents (or the minor) would not suffi  ce in providing an avenue of repair for 
the harms caused by a minor. After the children themselves, parents are 
likely the next cheapest cost avoider, and so pinning parents with obligations 
under civil recovery statutes gives parents a strong incentive to monitor their 
children closely and provide an avenue of compensation for victims.
46
 To be 
sure, there is the possibility—as there was above—of parents being judg-
ment-proof and of there being no available plaintiff  to sue. But if parents 
were reasonably nowhere near the misconduct of the minor—if, for example, 
the child goes on a supervised school trip with teachers—then, quite gener-
ally, the assumption that parents are the next least cost avoider may be mis-
placed. In any event, under the parental liability laws we discuss, the 
defendant is not being forced merely to pay for harm; the defendant is being 
condemned through criminal punishment for wrongdoing that someone 
else committed even if the defendant was non-culpably unaware of and did 
not participate in the wrongdoing and even though the defendant instructed 
the wrongdoer that such misconduct was forbidden.
To be sure, we allow vicarious liability elsewhere in the criminal justice 
system: for example, in the crime of conspiracy. Co-conspirators have been 
permissibly held liable for substantive crimes committed by another member 
of the conspiracy, through the Pinkerton doctrine,
47
 even if they are not pres-
ent at the scene of that crime or aware of the crime’s commission.
48
 Th ese 
eff orts are controversial and have been subject to substantial criticism.
49
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But the parental responsibility law diff ers signifi cantly from the Pinkerton 
scenario. To impose liability under Pinkerton, the defendant must have com-
mitted the act of joining a conspiracy, and the additional crime by the co-
conspirator must be committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and be 
reasonably foreseeable. In a recent article, Professor Kreit excavates the con-
stitutional foundations for Pinkerton, noting that many courts have acknowl-
edged the Pinkerton criteria—that the co-conspirator’s crimes be in 
furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable—to be due process 
requirements.
50
 If Pinkerton can be read roughly to establish a fl oor of a neg-
ligence rule in the context of vicarious liability for conspiracy then why, we 
might ask, doesn’t the negligence rule operate in other cases of criminal 
vicarious liability, such as felony murder, or for our purposes, parental respon-
sibility laws?
Putting the constitutional issue aside, we do well to consider whether 
these laws are likely to be eff ective at reducing the incidence of crime by 
minors. Professor Dan Filler suggests that such statutes could be eff ective if 
the consequences for violation were suffi  ciently severe and certain, although, 
of course, we might not be willing to live with stakes of such high magni-
tude.
51
 For example, if parents whose children threw an alcohol-fi lled party 
for their friends faced a felony conviction and a lengthy prison term, most 
reasonable parents, Filler argues, would quickly “lock up the booze and 
perhaps install a nanny-cam to monitor the house.”
52
 We think they might 
take even more drastic measures—put their children on lockdown. Moreover, 
to be eff ective, the government would have to enforce these laws more 
often. Th e fact remains that though these statutes are on the books in a 
number of jurisdictions, criminal prosecutions remain extremely rare.
53
 Th e 
laws receive most of their attention in the media on account of those few 
prosecutions that have taken place, such as the St. Clair prosecution dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.
But even if these statutes could be made eff ective, would it be appropriate 
to use them? We have already articulated some reasons for thinking that 
other alternatives might better achieve the goals sought by these parental 
responsibility laws. But it is also important to question the assumptions 
associated with these laws. Support for these statutes is motivated in part by 
the belief that “poor parenting” is a root cause of much of the juvenile crime 
in this country. As one family outreach worker exclaimed, “We have an adult 
problem, not a children problem . . . If we can get our adults together, the 
children will naturally fall in line.”
54
 One commentator has suggested that 
that “the rationale behind the parental liability laws—punishing the parents 
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to reduce acts of juvenile delinquency by their children—must be based on a 
series of interconnected assumptions:” fi rst, that the nature of the child’s 
behavior is directly—if not primarily—caused by the quality of the parenting 
in the household; second, that we can somehow create a “universal model of 
adequate parenting,” which all parents can and should adopt regardless of 
their circumstances; and third, that the threat of punishment will induce 
parents to adopt this government-sanctioned model of parenting.
55
Critics of these statutes contend that the link between poor parenting 
and juvenile crime is far less certain than their proponents suggest.
56
 
Juveniles are no doubt also profoundly infl uenced by their peers, their 
schools, their communities, the media, and perhaps their genetic makeup.
57
 
In addition, the threat of criminal liability might actually negatively impact 
parenting, rather than enhance it. One critic suggests that parental responsi-
bility statutes will induce some parents to “over-parent[], that is by either 
severely restricting their child’s freedom or by excessively punishing the 
child.”
58
 Other parents might respond by “under-parenting,” that is, by 
distancing themselves from their children “by fi ling ungovernability or simi-
lar petitions to transfer responsibility to the state.”
59
 In either case, the 
relationship between parent and child would become more adversarial and 
negative, rather than more productive and positive.
60
3. Gender, Inequality and Discrimination
From the preceding discussion, one can see why we are dubious about the 
value of these statutes as to their capacity to reduce crime through parental 
vigilance, to signal commitment to parenting values, or to provide restitu-
tion not available through other measures. Here we note that limiting 
vicarious liability to those parents within a state-sanctioned family unit 
seems underinclusive as well and, therefore, discriminatory. If vicarious lia-
bility is embraced by legislatures because of its crime-reduction promise, 
then it should be applied whenever there is a relationship of asymmetrical 
dependency and voluntary caregiving, and not just when there is a strictly 
construed version of the parent-child relationship.
61
 For at least in this way, 
more of the deterrence will be achieved by extending vicarious liability’s 
ambit to same-sex or non-married child-rearing partners, and the impor-
tance of the supervision as part of caregiving will be communicated to those 
who have opted to raise or supervise minors. A narrower structure would be 
to restrict the reach of parental responsibility laws to the same class of people 
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who constitute voluntary “primary caregivers” that would face a duty to 
rescue children.
Having already considered heteronormativity concerns, here we want 
simply to recognize that women will likely bear the brunt of these duties to 
supervise in light of the fact that women currently most often serve as the 
heads of single-parent homes. Although women may be deemed to have vol-
untarily assumed their parenting duties, it is critical to understand that, 
based on a variety of factors, it might be diffi  cult to conclude that parents 
can eff ectively control their minor children, especially in the context of a 
single-parent home. For one thing, the number and/or physical strength of 
some children may prove overwhelming in particular situations. Th e parent 
might also be a victim of a child’s misconduct. Additionally, parents might 
fear that reporting their children to the police will lead to the involuntary 
termination of their parental rights. All these serve as additional indepen-
dent reasons to be concerned with the structure of parental responsibility 
statutes or ordinances. In omissions liability, the parent being held 
responsible is the last lifeline to prevent real harm to vulnerable and inno-
cent children; in the context of parental responsibility laws, by contrast, the 
children are generally neither wholly innocent nor in danger.
4. Summary 
Although the burdens associated with parental responsibility statutes attach 
to voluntarily created caregiving relationships, and therefore deserve some 
leeway, our view is that they fail to be fully justifi ed as drafted because of the 
ways in which they raise substantial concerns under our minimalism, gender, 
and inequality inquiries. It bears emphasis that our critique does not aff ect 
those criminal laws that apply to any adult who commits a culpable act or 
omission that proximately contributes to the delinquency of a minor or 
endangers the minor’s welfare—assuming the statutes and courts defi ne 
those terms with reasonable specifi city.
• C. Incest
At the outset, we acknowledge that the topic of incest, like that of bigamy, 
which follows, is a complicated one. Our modest goal is to contribute some 
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preliminary thoughts to a diffi  cult dialogue about whether the criminal law 
is an appropriate vehicle to regulate the intimate activities of mature per-
sons. As we discussed in Chapter 4, there are various kinds of incest rules: 
some regulate conduct regardless of the age of participants, some regulate 
conduct regardless of the consent of the participants, and some regulate 
conduct among intimates regardless of an actual blood relationship. 
Unsurprisingly, there is overlap across these categories depending on the 
jurisdiction.
We emphasize that our focus here is on those criminal laws that punish a 
person’s conduct that, but for the family ties of the defendant, would other-
wise be lawful in a given jurisdiction. We are specifi cally not talking about the 
sexual abuse of children, which is sometimes referred to as incest but is 
clearly and rightly illegal conduct regardless of the identity or family status of 
the perpetrator. As we explain below, we will focus our discussion on consen-
sual sexual conduct between adults, but our analysis also has potential 
implications for how states regulate sexual conduct between minors and 
adults and between minors and other minors, which we touch on toward the 
end of this section.
Consistent with our positions developed in Chapter 5, we think that in 
situations where genuine and mature consent between the parties is possi-
ble and where negative externalities can be eliminated, the criminal law 
should prescind from application. If genuine and mature consent cannot be 
presumed or achieved, then the sexual activity should be investigated and 
punished largely in the way other sexual misconduct is punished—though 
we have some concern that coercion is too narrowly defi ned in some juris-
dictions. Nonetheless, we also believe that sentencing enhancements based 
on breach of trust can be justifi ed in contexts where a primary caregiver has 
abused a minor child or other person who might be incapacitated (e.g., an 
elderly parent or disabled adult child).
62
Let’s begin by determining the objectives articulated on behalf of incest 
statutes. Th e most commonly cited rationale for prohibiting consensual rela-
tions is that incestuous relationships have the potential to create children 
with genetic problems if the parties reproduce.
63
 Moreover, incestuous rela-
tionships have special potential to be abusive and nonconsensual, and this 
coercion may be diffi  cult to detect, thus calling for a separate and perhaps 
more severe set of penalties.
64
 Additionally, some have viewed the incest 
taboo as a way to “prevent intrafamilial sexual jealousies and rivalries,” when 
a parent fi gure has relations with both another parent and a child.
65
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Yet, these rationales cannot account for the scope of the incest prohibi-
tion in almost all American states. For example, consensual relationships 
between adult siblings who were adopted from diff erent birth parents, 
and thus share no genetic link, raise none of the concerns associated 
with genetic diffi  culties, and raise fewer relevant concerns related to sexual 
jealousies or coercion.
66
 It is therefore impossible to underestimate the 
infl uence of the “disgust factor.”
67
 In large part, these relationships are 
criminalized because Americans view them with distaste or because they 
are, in some situations, religiously proscribed.
68
 As we develop below, we 
think that at least as to some of these relationships, the state should step in 
to proscribe the sexual conduct—and with regard to others, the state should 
step aside and refrain from using the criminal justice system to sanction the 
conduct.
1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
In most jurisdictions, incest laws apply to both voluntarily and involuntarily 
created relationships—parents are prohibited from sex with their children 
the same way that siblings are prohibited from having sex with each other.
69
 
To the extent that these family ties burdens are placed on relationships that 
are involuntarily created, we think these prohibitions fail one of our liberal 
concerns and should be regarded very carefully before being legally imple-
mented. However, to the extent they apply to voluntarily created relation-
ships of caregiving, we have little problem in extending some deference to 
legislative decisions to penalize these relationships.
Our reasons for doing so, however, are not predicated on the biological 
issues undergirding support for most incest laws. Rather, we think a general 
rule is appropriate, one that prohibits sexual relations between an adult and 
any person for whom the adult provides caregiving functions such that the 
other person is involved in a relationship of asymmetrical dependency—
regardless of whether the dependency relationship is established through 
consanguinity. Examples of asymmetrical dependents include, on the one 
hand, foster parents, adoptive parents, stepparents, and biological parents 
and, on the other hand, all minors under their charge and responsibility until 
that dependent is no longer under their charge and responsibility.
70
 Our con-
cern is that the relationship of asymmetrical dependency lends itself to 
peculiar risks of abuse such that establishing a norm of protecting vulnerable 
persons from coercion or improper pressure requires a rule that may be 
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overprotective in some cases. Such a law would emit a clearer signal of 
which relations are prohibited than the mishmash that characterizes 
current incest laws.
71
Th is more general rule ties in with our liberal concern that seeks to 
assess whether the family ties burden in question unnecessarily infringes 
on one’s liberty. With respect to sex crimes, it is the lack of (intelligent 
and mature) consent that should drive the liberal state’s punishment of 
off enders. When a person stands in a position of asymmetrical dependency, 
it is very hard to determine whether truly voluntary consent was given. 
Th ere are also complicated questions about whether persons who were 
once in relationships of asymmetrical dependency, but now are not, could 
voluntarily consent to have relations with persons with whom they were 
once vulnerable; thus, at a minimum, some regulatory speed bumps should 
be erected to ferret out the existence of genuine and meaningful consent in 
those contexts.
72
As to relationships between independent adults, we believe that a respect 
for autonomy and limited government should permit consenting individuals 
to engage in the sexual relations they deem appropriate without fear of crim-
inal sanction.
73
 Th at is not to say we endorse any of these relations; rather, we 
simply think the state should not be using the criminal law to tread upon the 
intimate associational rights of mature individuals. As they stand, the cur-
rent laws chill consensual activities by adults that should be unencumbered 
by threats of arrest, prosecution, and punishment.
74
 Indeed, criminal prose-
cution is ordinarily unnecessary to prevent this conduct; most of these rela-
tionships will be deterred by social stigma. We recognize the concern that 
incestuous relationships have the potential to be abusive and nonconsen-
sual,
75
 and we think that these concerns are substantial and important. But 
in the context of adults, these problems can ordinarily be punished through 
the traditional crimes tracking lack of consent, i.e., the crimes regulating 
sexual assault.
76
We acknowledge that, in some circumstances, those available “back-
ground” laws may be unsatisfactory. For example, it is quite possible that 
the coercion involved in an incestuous relationship would be psychological 
rather than physical, and many states still do not consider psychological 
coercion suffi  cient to satisfy the required elements of their rape or 
sexual assault statutes.
77
 Th us, although our background laws forbidding 
sexual assault and rape may be suffi  cient bases for prosecuting and punish-
ing off enders in cases involving physical coercion, it is important to recog-
nize that the current status of rape law may leave some non-consensual 
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incestuous relationships outside the reach of criminal law sanctions. Th us, 
reform of current rape laws continues to be an important goal. It is also 
important to recognize that various gender inequities within households 
raise questions about whether consent to an incestuous relationship could 
ever truly be voluntary, but these are fact-bound inquiries. Assuming there 
are such consensual relations between mature adults, then prohibiting adult 
step-siblings or any other adult couple from having consensual relations is 
primarily a form of squeamishness—at least from a liberal criminal justice 
perspective that does not seek to impose a particularly traditional vision of 
sexual morality.
78
In the absence of consent between adults, as we’ve qualifi ed it here, we 
think sexual misconduct should be punished as if the crime were committed 
by an acquaintance or stranger. However, we support legislative decisions to 
impose breach of trust enhancements—whether treated as elements of a 
crime or sentencing factors—for crimes by primary caregivers against 
persons in relationships of asymmetrical dependency, where the caregiver 
voluntarily assumed the caregiving relationship.
79
2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
In this sub-section, we explore whether the purported objectives of the incest 
prohibition match up to the laws we have, focusing on the degree of narrow 
tailoring extant in the current practices. Let’s begin with the concern about 
coercion. Th is problem, which we think is the government’s most compelling 
interest, can be punished through general laws prohibiting coercive sex. Th us, 
the need for articulating a specifi c family ties burden requires justifi cation. 
One argument associated with coercion is that it is very diffi  cult to achieve 
adequate deterrence in the family context because of the problems associated 
with getting minor victims to report parental misconduct because of the 
supervisory relationship. But if that’s the case, we can have, as suggested above, 
heightened penalties in any context where a breach of trust with a supervisory 
adult arises—whether schools, churches, or the home. In other words, the 
breach of trust enhancement need not be limited to family status, even though 
family status in some contexts creates the inference of betrayal of trust. 
Admittedly, this strategy won’t do the work of addressing the reluctance of a 
minor to report a sibling’s or cousin’s improper conduct, but that same reluc-
tance can easily arise if it is a close family friend or neighbor who commits the 
sexual misconduct.
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As to the sometimes articulated goal of preventing intrafamilial sexual 
jealousy, there are reasons to doubt that this is truly a governmental interest 
of the sort that can vindicate the use of the criminal sanction. For one thing, 
it is hard to understand why sexual jealousy is a form of jealousy that the 
state should be particularly worried about, as opposed to the jealousy and 
rivalry that may arise from economic disparities, parental favoritism, or 
other forms of rivalry. Second, incest laws do not currently attach to whole 
clusters of possible relationships that might also give rise to intrafamilial 
sexual jealousy—thereby creating serious underinclusiveness relative to this 
goal. A heterosexual woman may marry a man and also sexually desire his 
father or brother; a heterosexual man might marry a woman and desire her 
mother or sister. If persons act on these desires, they are not subject to incest 
laws in the vast majority of jurisdictions, but they will surely trigger intrafa-
milial jealousies.
As to the genetic concerns, there are several responses. First, for persons 
not engaged in activity capable of causing genetic repercussions—gay cous-
ins, elderly siblings, etc.—the rules prohibiting their relationships are over-
broad and cannot be justifi ed on this ground. With respect to those not 
related by consanguinity, there is no basis for genetic fears at all. Admittedly, 
such fears increase when talking about closely related persons, such as 
brothers and sisters.
80
 But as others have noted, “in no other legal realm 
does the government criminally prohibit two people from having children 
because their off spring are more likely to inherit genetic defects.”
81
 Put 
simply, we have long since retired the idea that eugenics preferences are a 
reasonable basis for criminal justice policy.
82
Related to the genetics-based fears is concern for the economic costs of 
allowing incestuous relationships. In other words, some might be tempted to 
justify criminal law incest prohibitions to reduce the costs associated with 
increased medical care for children of consanguineous parents. But again, 
the solution of using incest prohibitions is both overbroad and underinclu-
sive. First, some couples deemed incestuous may choose not to have chil-
dren or may not be able to have children, and yet their conduct would still be 
subject to criminal sanction. Second, we do not use the criminal law as a tool 
to reduce potential medical costs in any other context, so it would be hard to 
justify its use here. When we criminalize murder or theft, it is not because we 
want to keep insurance payments down; it is because murder or theft is 
wrong. Th ird, if we were genuinely concerned about increased medical costs, 
we could test all couples with high risks of disease or complications who are 
contemplating having children. But this would be both an off ensive policy 
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to many people, and it would sweep in far more persons than those who are 
blood relatives.
Th e preceding discussion of narrow tailoring has largely addressed family 
ties burdens in the context of relations between adults. We acknowledge that 
concerns about family ties burdens on persons engaged in relationships with 
minors raise weightier concerns than those arising in the context of consent-
ing adults.
83 
Although all of us agree that the possibility of coercion is far more 
signifi cant in this context and that it is less likely that the minor in question 
is capable of truly informed consent, we disagree among ourselves how much 
to credit the consent of minors who choose to have sex with adults to whom 
they are related, and what measures might be taken to prove such consent to 
the state.
84
 Although many states have a variety of statutory rape laws avail-
able to punish and deter adult-minor and minor-minor sex, these laws may 
not be suffi  cient to address all the possible concerns arising from these rela-
tionships where incest is involved. Th us, we address below the use of family 
ties burdens in these contexts.
As to sexual relations strictly among minors, we are not all of one mind—
proving the point, perhaps, that our framework for analyzing  these laws 
does not require a single conclusion on all family ties burdens. One of us 
(Markel) thinks that sex with and between minors should also be regulated 
in family-neutral ways. Th is would mean that either the criminal law applies 
to prohibit sexual activity for all persons under a certain age or that the crim-
inal law does not apply in the context of consensual relations among those 
credited with the capacity to consent. (Th is would be in addition to the gen-
eral rule that would prohibit sexual activity between supervisory caregivers 
and dependent caretakers.) Th us, there would be no categorical rules pro-
hibiting sexual conduct between, say, seventeen-year-olds on the basis of 
family status alone. Under this view, those worried about physical or psycho-
logical coercion or abuse or retaliation can simply rely on the laws available 
to punish that independent misconduct. If sexual relations are to be decrim-
inalized for those over an age of consent, then it should be immaterial from 
the state’s perspective whether they are brothers or fi rst cousins or friends. 
Th e key would be to ensure an absence of coercion or abuse.
85
But at least one of us (Collins) fi nds these conclusions troubling. Sex 
between minor siblings, for example, does not implicate a signifi cant liberty 
interest that is worth protecting. In addition, some of the concerns used to 
justify incest bans take on heightened importance in the context of minors. 
For example, because the potential public health ramifi cations of incestuous 
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sex are admittedly non-negligible—and because it would be extremely hard 
for minors to give meaningful consent to such complex sexual relations—
there may be sound reasons to preserve criminal statutes against incestuous 
sex among minors. Minors, because of their emotional immaturity, are more 
vulnerable to psychological coercion. In addition, minors in incestuous 
sexual relationships may be less likely and able to seek outside help in ending 
the relationship. It would seem far easier, for example to report one’s forty-
year-old uncle to the authorities than it would to report one’s brother.
One of us (Leib) cannot make up his mind, though his sympathies are 
largely with Collins. Indeed, not only are Collins’ concerns serious, there are 
serious costs associated with creating new and complicated institutions and 
bureaucracies—would minors be expected to use registries too?—to chan-
nel and sanction conduct (minor sex with family members) that hardly 
seems like an especially grave liberty interest for the state to protect. Th ere is 
also, fi nally, the reality that the juvenile justice system is a diff erent beast 
from the adult system and probably raises diff erent concerns, which have 
not been systematically examined or considered suffi  ciently here to reach 
a clear conclusion on the merits.
3. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination 
Th ere are a couple of important points about inequality and discrimination 
that bear mention regarding the use of family ties burdens in the incest con-
text. First, as we have noted above, incest laws appear motivated in part by 
concerns about genetic repercussions in the off spring. Th at implicates both 
heteronormativity and repronormativity—and signals to the polity that we 
expect couples engaged in sex to procreate. We note, additionally, that to the 
extent that the family ties burden operates ex ante in a protective manner 
(of a particular model of family relations), it denies that protection to those 
whose families do not fi t the particular model of family relations informing 
the contours of most incest statutes. Th us, if a gay couple lives in a state 
where they cannot adopt as a couple together, then the incest statute will 
not “protect” a child who has been adopted by X against the sexual miscon-
duct perpetrated by X’s partner, Y—assuming that Y has not been able to 
create a legally binding relationship to the child. Of course, Y is susceptible to 
the general statutes prohibiting sexual misconduct, but that just shows the 
general redundancy of most incest statutes. Last, we note that the incest 
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statutes around the country are generally drafted and, to our knowledge, 
prosecuted in manners that do not especially and unfairly burden one sex 
over another.
4. Summary
Having applied our normative framework from Chapter 5, we see that in 
many jurisdictions, incest laws by their scope create family ties burdens not 
only in the context of consensual sexual conduct between adults, but also 
when states otherwise permit consensual sexual conduct between adults 
and minors, and between minors and minors. In the context of adults, and 
subject to the caveats discussed above, we fi nd this burden on the intimate 
associational rights of consenting mature individuals unjustifi able because 
the interests underlying incest laws can be promoted through more appro-
priate measures short of invoking the particular power of the criminal law. In 
the context of incestuous sex between adults and minors, and minors and 
minors, we are divided about whether incest laws—which create specifi c 
family ties burdens that create liability where, in the absence of a family rela-
tionship as designated by the state, none would otherwise exist—should 
survive scrutiny. Th at said, we agree that when sexual misconduct occurs in 
a relationship of asymmetrical dependency, a sentencing enhancement is 
warranted for the breach of trust created by that dependency. Th ose enhance-
ments would be sensibly extended even to those secondary caregivers who 
exert supervisory powers over minors—including teachers, scout leaders, 
and faith group leaders.
However one redrafts criminal law in the incest arena to address the vari-
ous diffi  cult issues surrounding adult-adult, adult-minor, and minor-minor 
incest, we doubt we will gain much traction with the political community 
that favors these laws in the near future. In large part, these relationships 
are criminalized because Americans view them with distaste or because they 
are, in some situations, religiously proscribed. Th at said, the topic of 
consensual adult incest has actually been the subject of some legal and 
political discourse of late because of its links to the same-sex marriage 
debate. Some have suggested—with an intention to alarm—that if we legalize 
(as we have in some jurisdictions) same-sex marriage, the legalization of 
incest is sure to follow.
86
 But in contrast to the issues of gay rights and 
same-sex marriage,
87
 there is no committed and vociferous mainstream 
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advocacy movement of which we are aware that is currently arguing for the 
liberalization of incest laws.
88
Similarly, there is very little legal scholarship seeking to make an affi  rma-
tive case for greater recognition of intrafamilial romantic relationships; 
discussions about incest usually involve simply pointing out that many of the 
arguments made in favor of the criminal laws are problematic. For example, 
commentators remark that the evidence related to the possibility of genetic 
harm is far less certain than once believed, and, in any event, many of the 
relationships currently prohibited do not trigger this concern at all.
89
Th ere are a few recent exceptions in the academic literature to this gen-
eral pattern. For example, Christine Metteer argues that the individual’s con-
stitutionally protected right to marry trumps the state’s interest in prohibiting 
incestuous marriages when the parties are related only by affi  nity rather 
than consanguinity.
90
 More provocative is a recent article by Ruthann Robson, 
who suggests that “the proff ered explanations for incest prohibitions should 
be deeply problematic for any same-sex marriage advocate.”
91
 She argues 
that attempts to justify prohibitions against incest by appealing to religion or 
longstanding community mores should be soundly rejected, because “tribal 
customs should not govern our current cultural mores and constitutional 
notions any more than Leviticus should prevail.”
92
 She also argues that we 
should reject the genetics justifi cation, because it “rests upon identity 
between marriage and procreation—the same logic that is used to resist 
same-sex marriage.”
93
Our own view of the matter is, as we have said, limited to the reach of 
the criminal law. We think these criminal prohibitions, regardless of their 
motivation or provenance, are problematic from our liberal minimalism 
perspective, as well as from the viewpoint that considers how family ties 
burdens trigger concerns of inequality and discrimination, especially in the 
context of mature individuals engaging in consensual sexual relations.
• D. Bigamy
Our analysis of bigamy takes some cues from the preceding discussion of 
incest. Th e rationales for bigamy laws (by which we refer to the criminal bans 
on the practice of polygamy) are familiar and, in America, deeply rooted.
94
 
Th ey are nonetheless underscrutinized,
95
 something we hope to remedy 
below. In describing the objectives of bigamy laws, some have adverted to the 
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many “[p]opular depictions of polygamists in the media and in society, 
[which] generally focus on the prevalence of underage brides, accounts of 
sexual abuse, and the subservient role of women in these relationships.”
96
 
Indeed, historically, polygamy has been decried by some as a tool to 
subordinate women and so bigamy laws would presumably be responsive to 
those concerns. Some supporters of bigamy laws have also noted their 
importance in reducing the costs of social welfare programs. Th e underlying 
assumption here appears to be that if a person has eight spouses (and their 
off spring) for whom she or he must provide care and resources, there is 
greater concern that these people might become charges of the welfare state. 
Last, some critics of polygamy have stated that polygamy is especially danger-
ous to the governance of the liberal state itself. We fl esh out these claims on 
behalf of bigamy below. Our perspective on how to approach this family ties 
burden will, we hope, illuminate the debate—and raise questions about 
whether the criminal law is the proper tool with which to respond to the 
practice of polygamy.
1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
To begin, we note that bigamy laws satisfy our fi rst liberal concern in that the 
legal burden of a criminal penalty only applies to someone who has previ-
ously created a voluntary caregiving relationship. Th us, when a criminal pen-
alty based on family status is imposed on X, who is married to Y, for also 
marrying Z during an extant and valid marriage to Y, that is a burden that 
can be regarded as one for which X was on notice. Th at notice and implicit 
consent to the burden partially diminishes the problem of bigamy laws, but 
it does not provide an affi  rmative and independent justifi cation for these 
family ties burdens. Th ey must still undergo further scrutiny.
Our second inquiry asks whether there is some liberty at stake that a 
society committed to advancing one’s liberty should respect. Our view is that 
the act of plural marriage itself can be expressive of one’s basic rights to 
establish intimate associational relationships without undue intrusion by 
the state. We also believe that the right to terminate those marriages is a 
right properly belonging to individuals within a liberal state. So, using the 
terms above, if X marries Z even though Y opposes X’s second marriage to Z, 
Y should be able to terminate his marriage to X via divorce for this reason. 
And if X and Y  had signed an agreement that X would not undertake a second 
marriage, then that should be enough to keep X from marrying Z while X is 
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also married to Y. But statutes simply and completely criminalizing polyg-
amy infringe on the fundamental rights of consenting mature individuals to 
enter into covenants of mutual care with other persons. Th us, if we are to 
criminalize this behavior, the reasons should be very substantial.
2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
a. Coercion and Minors
Recall that the fi rst objection to repealing bigamy laws is that polygamous 
practices are thought to entail the frequent coercion of underage persons, 
usually females.
97
 In light of the recent events involving the Fundamentalist 
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints (FLDS) community in 
Texas,
98
 we view this as a very substantial (though obviously contingent) 
consideration, especially because such girls often have had little recourse 
to reach beyond the relatively insular communities in which they were 
raised. To be sure, the problems that arise in prosecuting persons guilty of 
misconduct—the unwillingness or inability of family members to testify 
against the perpetrator, and the participation or enabling of the family mem-
bers in the abuse—arise in monogamous situations too. But the problems 
are especially stark where an entire community may be supportive of the 
polygamist adult male and not his underage wives. Indeed, these problems 
also exist for potential wives who are technically of legal age because they are 
eighteen but may also face intense pressures from their communities and 
have no avenues of economic or social support outside them.
Th ere is another important consideration related to the coercion of 
underage women. Some practitioners of polygamy seek to evade criminal 
sanctions by simply not declaring to the state that the parties have entered 
into what would otherwise be a formal marriage relationship.
99
 Yet, bigamy 
laws are not always drafted or interpreted to target this wrong.
100
 Indeed, 
they sometimes render the coerced parties themselves as criminals.
101
 
Th at we must vigilantly guard against harm to minors does not mean that we 
must necessarily prohibit the decision of three or more consenting adults to 
enter into a polygamous relationship. Using broadly written polygamy bans 
to fi ght coercion or exploitation of minors is overinclusive and facially 
discriminatory because it punishes those adults with polyamorous desires 
or dispositions who are willing to abide by norms requiring both consent 
and maturity.
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Th ere are other laws currently available, or that could be enacted, to 
punish the commandeering of immature or unconsenting minors without 
infringing upon legitimate associational rights and interests. First, as we 
suggested in connection with the discussion about incest, we should make 
sure the law is especially scrutinizing of and skeptical toward sexual and 
marital relationships involving minors generally and especially minors or 
other persons in relationships of asymmetrical dependency. Th us, under our 
approach, relationships established upon pressure or coercion would be pro-
hibited (though the “poly” aspect of this prohibition is essentially irrelevant 
since it would apply to monogamous marriages too). We should also be 
vigilant about allowing parental authorization of marriages below an age of 
maturity and consent because that could facilitate abuse within communi-
ties committed to fl outing those normative benchmarks. We emphasize, 
however, that the concern for coercion of minors (and adults) is relevant in 
the context of both monogamous marriages and polygamous ones. Th is 
concern would entail, perhaps, criminal prohibitions on persons knowingly 
facilitating or solemnizing marriage ceremonies regardless of whether they 
involve a license.
102
In sum, although we need laws that prohibit the coercion of persons into 
marriage or sex, we do not believe these laws need to be drafted in such a way 
that unnecessarily infringe upon the rights of mature persons to structure their 
family lives in the way they feel appropriate. Rather, the government can 
develop specifi c strategies for dealing with acute dangers of coercion of minors 
or adult victims traffi  cked into marriages. In light of our commitment to being 
minimalist about the criminal law’s reach, if policy-makers are determined to 
encourage particular structures within the household, they should not do so 
though the criminal law, especially when there are alternative civil options that 
can incentivize monogamous marriages.
b. Economics
Another reason some might think criminalizing polygamy is appropriate 
is based on the economics of social welfare. If a person has eight spouses 
(and their off spring) for whom she or he must provide care and resources, 
there is greater concern that these people might become charges of the wel-
fare state. Th e problem with this argument is its contingent and highly spec-
ulative nature: as scholars have shown, the economics of polygamy are quite 
complicated and thus might not justify any criminal encroachments on the 
rights people have to intimate association.
103
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First, in any given polygamous cluster, there might be economies of scale 
that attach to family units that allow for optimization of human capital. One 
woman who is a polygamy activist in Utah paints her participation in a 
polygamous relationship in exactly such a manner.
104
 Her husband has eight 
other wives and children with a number of them. One of the wives is employed 
by the others to tend to the collective children for several years at a time 
while the other wives are free to pursue careers of their choosing for longer 
periods. Indeed, some research shows that women are materially better off  
in societies in which polygamy is allowed or encouraged.
105
 To be sure, it is 
not our goal to improve the lot of women at the needless expense of any 
other group, but we advert to such studies simply to show that who benefi ts 
from polygamous arrangements is a more complicated matter than often 
assumed.
Second, if an economic burden on the state were a suffi  cient reason to 
infringe upon an otherwise important liberty in associational freedom and 
privacy, the state could take a more narrowly tailored measure to ensure the 
fi nancial viability of such unions, i.e., the disqualifi cation of additional 
spouses from social benefi ts.
106
 Indeed, one could insist that adding more 
spouses is subject to higher taxes or proof of assets—both of which are non-
criminal rules that can achieve the same end of reducing numbers on the 
dole.
107
 Obviously, these rules should be crafted in gender-neutral terms.
Polygamous arrangements are not to everyone’s taste, but in a world in 
which women, empirically, continue to shoulder the brunt of childrearing at 
the cost of their careers, fl exibility in marital arrangements might be a way to 
minimize the social and personal costs of abiding by these extant social 
norms.
c. Bigamy Laws as a Safeguard Against Defi ance of the 
Liberal State
As alluded to earlier, some propose banning polygamy because of the general 
injuries that the practice infl icts on liberal democratic states. For example, 
Professor Strassberg argues, with respect to some polygynous communi-
ties,
108
 that children from polygamous unions impose an unusual burden on 
the state because they are often concealed; that polygamous practices 
conduce to create theocratic communities that fail to abide by or support 
the government’s rules; that these practices create a secrecy that leads to the 
denial of individual civil rights; and, last, that these polygynous communities 
fail to pay suffi  cient taxes.
109
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Th ese arguments, while well-motivated, are largely misplaced. Concealment-
based harms are only a challenge in the context of a state that criminalizes 
polygamy. It is the threat of criminal liability that often drives the parties 
underground. Putting aside social norms that will bend over time, and recog-
nizing that these norms have already changed somewhat, there is no legal 
need to conceal polygamous relations if bigamy laws are repealed. If we were 
worried that people were denied their civil rights, then that would be a sepa-
rate reason to intervene in any specifi c situation, but there is nothing inher-
ently denigrating of civil rights by expanding options for plural marriage. 
If we are worried about concrete legitimate wrongs (such as the failure to pay 
taxes) resulting from the theocratic tendencies of certain polygynous com-
munities, we have separate laws available to punish violations of any given 
law. It is not as if polygamous communities are the only communities in 
which fundamentalist views pose a threat to the vitality and security of a 
liberal state. Using polygamy bans to remedy these harms on these grounds 
is unjustifi able as a government policy.
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3. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
Some arguments Professor Strassberg mentions bear special scrutiny because 
they run parallel to arguments opposing polygamy based on cultural or racial 
bias. As various scholars have shown, with ample record in the Supreme Court’s 
nineteenth-century cases to support the argument,
111
 opposition to polygamous 
practices is often rooted in prejudice against other cultural practices.
112
 Although 
opposition to polygamy today is not usually expressed in racial or ethnic under-
tones,
113 
it does sometimes take on a cast of hostility to religious views.
114
A more powerful reason to be worried about decriminalizing bigamy is 
that polygamy, in some views, serves to facilitate the subordination of 
women, even if they are adults.
115
 Although bigamy statutes are facially 
neutral to women, and thus prohibit both polygyny and polyandry,
116
 we 
acknowledge the sociological and anthropological evidence showing that 
polyandry is much rarer.
117
 Nonetheless, the research on this topic indicates 
that the claims that polygamous relationships subordinate all its female par-
ticipants go too far in light of the diverse reasons that polygamy erupts and 
the diverse forms polygamy takes under diff erent conditions.
118
 Moreover, it 
is a mistake to resist polygamy (or more specifi cally, polygyny) as oppressive 
to women without noting that the same norms that exist within some polyg-
amous communities also exist within some monogamous communities.
119
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Th ere is also some empirical evidence indicating that abuse is no more likely 
in polygynous communities than monogamous ones.
120
 Indeed, perhaps 
because of the marginalization of polygamous practices, polygamy support-
ers argue that it is harder for female victims or allies of victims to report 
abuse because it might lead to bad consequences for the victim.
121
 Of course, 
this same reluctance to report abuse or coercion is a concern in monoga-
mous relationships; but unlike in monogamous relationships, the victims 
of abuse in polygamous relationships might face serious collateral conse-
quences from the state, such as the termination of parental rights.
122
Consequently, we have to sift carefully among the potential causes of 
harms to women. As Professor Shayna Sigman trenchantly writes:
Th e belief that polygyny causes gender discrimination or a low status of 
women in a given society is a classic example of the fallacy of post hoc ergo 
propter hoc. Th at polygyny can be found in societies that treat women poorly 
does not mean that the practice itself causes the gender inequality. Often, 
the true culprit of oppression merely lies in limitations on property rights for 
women, a practice that can be facilitated through polygamous life, but need 
not be. Indeed, where polygyny can help women economically by linking 
them with men who can provide more resources, it is the societies with less 
gender discrimination that are found to have this arrangement.
123
 
Moreover, there is the quite powerful point that taking away a woman’s right 
to participate in a polygamous arrangement (whether with men or women 
or both) is itself a way of subordinating women. Again, as Professor Sigman 
observes: “prohibiting polygamy infantilizes women, declaring them inca-
pable of providing consent and foreclosing true choice by criminalizing one 
of their options for family living.”
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In response to the claim that bigamy laws work to protect women from 
subordination, we note that many of the claims about how women are 
subservient in plural marriages have been said many times about monoga-
mous marriage itself and the legal institutions accompanying it. So if anti-
subordination is the goal, then two questions arise: fi rst, whether, as an 
empirical matter, plural marriage prohibitions in fact achieve marginal harm 
reduction—or, alternatively, whether marriage as a legal institution should 
be abolished.
125
 In light of the fact that many prominent feminists have over 
the years argued for decriminalizing bigamy, including active support by 
Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
126
 we should evaluate more 
carefully blanket claims about the subservience of women in plural marriage 
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made in the absence of hard empirical evidence—and note that empirical 
evidence of polygamy’s harms in liberal democracies would be diffi  cult to 
come by in light of the prevalence of the ban on the practice.
Last, we think bigamy laws’ eff ects on gay unions of two or more persons 
warrant attention. Obviously, to the extent gays are denied the right to marry 
one partner, they are also denied the right to marry two partners simultane-
ously. To gays, bigamy laws just add further insult to injury since whatever 
protective benefi t or function the bigamy laws were designed to achieve for 
heterosexuals is denied to homosexual families. Despite this problematic 
discrimination, however, we note that the particular problem can be solved 
either by leveling down (decriminalization for all) or leveling up (expanding 
criminalization).
127
 Th us, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
could also be overcome by an expansion of bigamy laws, one that would 
encompass and sanction the misconduct of gays who have chosen to register 
their union with the state for this purpose alone or for other protections and 
benefi ts the state might off er to homosexual couples.
4. A Solution
Assuming the liberty to enter multiple covenants of mutual care is at least 
morally defensible on grounds of respecting the autonomous and honest 
choices of mature persons, then it seems that the state should abandon the 
business of criminalizing polygamy and let private ordering, and perhaps 
civil taxes and subsidies, determine who marries whom. Th is would entail, of 
course, that persons with same-sex poly-orientations should be able to group 
together as well without fear of prosecution.
In practical terms, here is what we propose. We would start with the 
decriminalization of bigamy as between mature and consenting individuals. 
Partners who wanted to secure exclusivity of marital relations could 
contract around such a rule through a private contract calling for, if desired, 
liquidated damages. Th is would place the burden of talking about the prefer-
ence for imposing the family ties burden on the person who wanted the 
family ties burden imposed. Given our general concerns about family ties 
burdens, this burden-shifting makes sense as a penalty default rule.
128
Several advantages from this regime obtain. First, it encourages couples 
to discuss in advance of their marriage whether both parties have a 
desire to keep the union monogamous. Second, it allows couples the 
fl exibility to work out these issues without fear of the criminal law sanction. 
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In other words, couples could create agreements in which polygamy is pro-
hibited, but without the involvement of criminal law penalties. Th ird, it 
allows those who want the benefi ts that accrue from having a penalty to opt 
in to a regime of regulation by contract. To be sure, a regime like the one we 
endorse still forces individuals to have conversations that might be deemed 
uncomfortable, but it seems that such a statute would prove to be a powerful 
information-forcing device prior to marriage. Fourth, because liquidated 
damages provisions are only enforceable to the degree that they are a reason-
able estimation of the damages to an individual, they can be set at a level 
suffi  cient to communicate condemnation of the breach of trust, while still 
ensuring that the breacher can remain a productive member of society and 
caregiver to any dependents. How exactly one should estimate the worth of 
the breach is surely a diffi  cult question. But we suspect a common sense 
judgment can be made about what might count as an impermissible penalty 
clause.
Th at we think bigamy should be decriminalized does not mean the state 
must affi  rmatively endorse “poly” relationships. Emphatically, the views 
developed here (as in our discussion of all these family ties burdens) are lim-
ited to the proper scope of the criminal law. Our argument does not require 
that the state forbear from promoting certain kinds of relationships through 
the civil system—and if the state wanted to endorse the view that children 
are better raised through monogamous marriages,
129
 then it could do so 
through the use of civil subsidies and taxes, rather than criminal penalties. 
We do not necessarily agree that the state should use the civil justice system 
in this way, but at the very least, the civil justice system’s carrots and sticks 
do not trigger the most fundamental liberty interests of citizens.
Despite the appeal of some of these recent arguments in favor of decrimi-
nalizing bigamy, opposition to the practice continues to be widespread in 
American society. As of 2004, more than ninety percent of Americans still 
viewed polygamy as immoral.
130
 If polygamy activists will have their say, they 
will have to demonstrate to Americans that the parties to these unions are 
genuinely consenting and that the externalities of such practices, both on 
the state and on any resulting children, will be close to trivial.
• E. Adultery
As we saw in Chapter 4, almost half the states in the United States still retain 
adultery laws. Even though they are sparingly used to prosecute individuals 
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outside the military context, their existence on the books could have 
important collateral eff ects in various civil proceedings aff ecting child 
custody, adoption, and employment. To be sure, some might view this state 
of prosecutorial desuetude as a sign of progress that we are no longer 
interested in pursuing “mere” morals legislation. However, there is still 
support in various regions to retain these prohibitions, even if they are 
largely symbolic.
131
 And the reasons for this support are worth consideration: 
some may view adultery’s potential wrongful harm to children or to spouses 
who do not consent to their partner’s non-exclusivity as profound and 
worthy of criminal sanction. Indeed, a decision to commit adultery has 
the potential to undermine an individual’s ability to perform necessary care-
giving functions, in that one’s energies and attention will be focused outside 
the family unit rather than within it. Moreover, some may view these laws as 
helping to further the state’s interest in keeping the institution of marriage 
strong and stable.
1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
As with bigamy laws, the current prohibitions on adultery attach only to 
voluntarily created relationships—indeed, the paradigmatic one of marriage. 
So in that sense, adultery laws meet the fi rst liberal concern we highlighted 
in Chapter 5. However, there are still other considerations. When adultery is 
defi ned simply as a married person’s sexual relations with a person not his 
or her spouse, then the question is whether there is some normatively 
attractive liberty to commit adultery such that a liberal society should respect 
it or at least tolerate it by not harnessing the condemnatory power of the 
criminal law upon it. On the one hand, if adultery is performed with duplic-
ity, it hardly warrants praise; but it still leaves the question of whether it 
warrants the condemnation associated with criminal sanction, especially 
if non-criminal alternatives are available, as we discuss below. On the 
other hand, imagine a devoted couple wherein one person faces prolonged 
illness or some emotional development precluding the desire or capacity 
for sex or intimate companionship. One can easily imagine couples who 
might jointly authorize, either through a prenuptial agreement, or through 
open or tacit consent, to a partner’s sexual relations with someone outside 
the marriage. It is hard to understand why a liberal state should be opposed 
to that private ordering arrangement if harms to third parties are trivial to 
non-existent.
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2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
Th e objective of preventing betrayals of the marriage bond can be achieved 
through various non-criminal law norms, though admittedly it is hard to tell 
whether these non-criminal means are equally eff ective (though the degree 
of non-enforcement suggests that deterrence is not really the rationale). In 
those states without adultery laws, however, there are still strong social 
norms against cheating in one’s marriage. Th e strength of these social norms 
should not surprise. In various states in the United States or in liberal demo-
cratic countries around the globe, strong social norms persist against stig-
matized activities: gambling and private tobacco use come to mind. It is hard 
to believe that the modern state could not adopt eff ective norm-shaping and 
regulatory strategies that encourage faithful monogamous unions without 
the use of the criminal law.
132
3. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination 
Because only a very few jurisdictions permit same-sex marriage, it bears 
emphasis that adultery laws work primarily for the benefi t of partners 
(and, arguendo, children) of heterosexual marriages and not for the benefi t of 
partners (or children) of gay unions.
Although we think adultery laws should generally be abolished based 
upon the very limited state interest in proscribing this conduct, we think this 
added discrimination is very problematic. We note, however, that, like the 
bigamy laws, the discrimination can be overcome by an expansion of adul-
tery laws, one that would sanction the misconduct of gays who have chosen 
to register their union with the state for this purpose alone or for other pro-
tections and benefi ts the state might off er to homosexual couples. Yet this 
expansion to alleviate discrimination sits in tension with our commitment 
to minimalism.
4. A Solution
We understand the viewpoint that, at least in certain contexts involving 
duplicity, adultery statutes help punish and deter injury to persons who 
did not consent to extramarital sex—for example, the spurned spouse. 
But what adultery laws don’t permit, and what they should, is a life in which 
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both parties consent to one or both parties living in marriage but outside the 
bonds of monogamy, whether permanently or temporarily. Th is would have 
the eff ect of destabilizing the confl ation of marriage with persistent sexual 
companionship.
As with bigamy, we view adultery laws that criminalize the extramarital 
sex of married persons as facial family ties burdens warranting careful scru-
tiny despite the fact that they are triggered by virtue of a voluntarily created 
relationship of caregiving. Th at’s because, in the absence of such adultery 
laws, the proscribed activity would otherwise be lawful. Given that adultery 
laws are drafted in gender-neutral terms across the country, we do not 
believe they inherently raise issues of patriarchy or gender bias against 
women.
133
 Nonetheless, because same-sex marriage is not permitted in 
almost all American jurisdictions, adultery laws protect the interests of 
(potentially) betrayed heterosexual partners while not being similarly avail-
able to those in same-sex partnerships. For us, that is a basis for rethinking 
adultery laws.
Assuming that adultery statutes could be made indiff erent to sexual orien-
tation, would there be any reason to retain them in some fashion? We think 
the strategy we endorsed in the bigamy context is instructive. We would begin 
with a default rule that decriminalizes adultery because of the way adultery 
intrudes on the choices of autonomous and consenting individuals. But we 
would encourage prospective partners to contract around that default rule if 
they wished by agreements that called for liquidated damages.
134
 As with 
polygamy, several advantages from this regime obtain.
First, it will give couples an undoubtedly useful incentive to have an 
important conversation before marriage about whether both parties 
want their relationship to be monogamous, and it will give couples the 
fl exibility to address these issues without fear of the criminal law sanction. 
Couples could create agreements in which adultery is prohibited, not by the 
criminal law, but by allowing a regime of regulation by contract. In addition, 
because liquidated damages provisions are only enforceable to the degree 
that they are a reasonable estimation of the damages to an individual, they 
can be set at a level suffi  cient to communicate condemnation of the breach 
of trust, while still ensuring that the breacher can remain a productive 
member of society and caregiver to any dependents. Th e same disclaimer we 
referenced above applies here too: these reasonable liquidated damages 
are hard to set in the abstract but we are confi dent courts could fi nd a way 
to determine when the damages clauses become impermissibly high 
penalties.
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It needs to be emphasized that the burden for contracting around the 
default rule of permitting adultery falls upon the individual who has informa-
tion regarding his or her preference for monogamous relations.
135
 Th us, the 
person wanting the extra burden imposed has to raise the issue and force a 
conversation about monogamy. We think that, in light of the diffi  culties raised 
by many family burdens, the burden should lie with this party. Th is is also 
consistent with our sense that if we are to have other family ties burdens like 
duties to rescue or supervise, the benefi ts fl owing from these duties should be 
available for a wide range of persons who either have signaled their caregiving 
commitments through parenthood or partnership or those who are not in 
such relationships but nonetheless want to create a covenant of caregiving.
Admittedly, we toyed with an idea—inspired by an article by Professor 
Elizabeth Emens—that parties should be able to opt into a regime of voluntary 
criminal law regulation, such that breach of a contract for monogamy could 
lead to criminal prosecutions for bigamy or adultery.
136
 But upon further con-
sideration, we recognized the unfairness of using public resources to investi-
gate, prosecute, and punish conduct that amounted to a breach of private 
promises between individuals. Th e notion that average people would have to 
pay more taxes or suff er the eff ects of diverting scarce prosecutorial resources 
to prosecute the failure of a private party to live up to its contractual sexual 
expectations seemed ultimately unsupportable. By contrast, even in the 
absence of the “contractual criminal law regulation” of adultery or polygamy, 
parties of any sexual preference can contract for monogamous commitments 
on pain of liquidated damages, and private ordering could thus be made to 
supplant the clunky machinery of the state’s prosecutorial apparatus.
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In sum, because we believe the protections of the criminal law should 
not be arbitrarily denied to couples of diff erent stripes, and because we 
think there are serious minimalism concerns and some liberalism concerns 
with categorical rules against adultery, we support the decriminalization 
of adultery laws. Th is would put everyone on the same footing. At the same 
time, it would permit parties of all sorts to contract around a world without 
criminal penalties.
138
 As we explained above, we would prefer to set the 
default rule in a way that incentivized the person wanting the family ties 
burden imposed to secure the agreement of the other spouse.
Th us far, we have not said much about what criminal law consequences, 
if any, should be visited upon a person who has sexual relations with a mar-
ried person.
139
 (Recall that in some jurisdictions, adultery statutes encom-
pass the “outside” person who intrudes upon the marital relationship.) We 
think the reach of these statutes goes too far, violating our second liberalism 
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principle, and that such adultery statutes should also be modifi ed to end 
criminal liability for those persons. But note that if the adultery statutes 
extend criminal liability to those third persons, there is no family ties burden 
imposed on the basis of that person’s familial status or familial connection to 
the crime. Properly understood, those provisions of adultery laws are not 
family ties burdens as we defi ne them.
• F. Nonpayment of Child Support
As we described in Chapter 4, criminal sanctions have been adopted across the 
country to ensure that parents do not fl out their obligations to provide material 
support for the well-being of their children. Th is development has occurred, no 
doubt, for a few reasons. First, it is politically attractive for elected offi  cials to 
stand against parents who neglect their children.
140
 Second, and more impor-
tantly, the nonpayment of child support is a serious problem in our society.
141
 It 
obviously harms children, who rely on support payments for subsistence. 
Moreover, it harms the single parents left to struggle alone for the care of their 
children. And because more single parent households are headed by mothers, 
it leaves women to bear most of the brunt of parenthood and its unique 
challenges.
142
 It also harms society at large, in that taxpayers may be forced to 
shoulder the burden of fi nancially supporting those children who end up on the 
welfare rolls as a consequence of the nonpayment of child support. It is, accord-
ingly, unsurprising that our criminal justice system takes special interest in 
child support debts. Additionally, when we know the “creditors” are especially 
vulnerable children with very little recourse to self-help options, we can see why 
it would be appealing at fi rst blush for policymakers to look to the criminal jus-
tice system to help make sure these debts are paid. Nonetheless, we must see if 
these laws stand up to scrutiny.
1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
Criminally punishing parents for debts to their children clearly triggers the 
concern that most family ties burdens do: it punishes the same conduct—
failure to pay a debt—diff erently based on the familial status of the debtor. 
Th is is a straightforward family ties burden. For the reasons we adverted 
to earlier in Chapter 5, we think we can explain why these family ties 
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burdens continue to have some appeal or at least seem somewhat 
fair: because parents can be plausibly deemed to have consented to assume 
certain obligations and responsibilities by having their children. Th e family 
ties burden here is one that should be imposed on persons voluntarily 
creating these caregiving relationships.
But the case of a criminally punished obligation to support one’s children 
may reveal a limitation of our approach because one could plausibly retort 
that it is too facile to say that the nonpayment of a contractual debt to a 
phone company, for example, is the same conduct as the nonpayment of 
child support. In other words, one could argue that our society has diff eren-
tial views about the inherent blameworthiness of these two forms of nonpay-
ment precisely because we see them as diff erent sorts of conduct, not as the 
same conduct treated diff erently on the basis of status. We cannot deny that 
this re-description of the burden has some rhetorical force; however, we 
still think our organizing method of scrutiny helps expose something deep 
and pervasive about how the criminal justice system in the United States 
interacts with a normative conception of the family.
Although our fi rst liberal concern focusing on autonomy seems met by 
these laws, our second liberal concern asks whether there is some underly-
ing liberty worthy of respect to the act of not satisfying one’s obligations to 
support one’s child. Our short answer is that it depends. As we discussed in 
Chapter 5, there are some situations in which we agree the obligation should 
not attach. A sperm donor may be the genetic parent, but if he disclaims, 
prior to the donation of the sperm, all future rights to the resulting off spring, 
he should not be held to pay child support. Similarly, a parent who gives a 
child up for adoption and thus terminates his or her parental rights should 
not be on the hook. But someone who has voluntarily entered into a parent-
ing relationship should not be able to enjoy the benefi ts associated with par-
enting without also facing the obligations to be a minimally competent and 
supportive parent. Th e question is whether those obligations should be fi xed 
by criminal law, and if so by what kinds of sanctions.
2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
We think that the criminal sanction should be used sparingly if there are 
non-criminal alternatives that might be equally eff ective at satisfying the 
goals here. Our sense is that using the criminal justice system with respect to 
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this particular duty to support is not likely to be good—or eff ective—use of 
criminal sanctions. First, depending on the sanction imposed, criminal sanc-
tions might risk putting “deadbeat” parents in prison, where they certainly 
will not be able to earn money to help support their children. Prison and 
other forms of forced separation also prevent the debtor parent from having 
meaningful relationships with their children—even if their only failure as 
parents was being too poor to pay support. If the sanction is a fi ne that 
goes to the state, then that is money that might otherwise be needed for 
the child.
But these criticisms of imprisoning or fi ning deadbeat parents do not close 
the debate, especially since a pretty basic empirical question is in play. We have 
earlier acknowledged that the ability of the criminal law to have an educative 
or expressive eff ect is worth careful attention. Having a criminal statute apply 
in a way that does not itself make matters worse for the child may be possible 
through alternative or intermediate sanctions.
143
 For one thing, in these con-
texts, the adjudication alone may be valuable for both general deterrent and 
specifi c communicative purposes—when a public body declares, “you have 
fl outed one of your most pressing obligations, the support of the children, and 
you warrant condemnation for that,” that can be a powerful tool in shaping 
attitudes. But it might be that alternative non-criminal measures can also 
bring home that message to the off ender in question, and to the public at large. 
Moreover, our anxiety about using the criminal sanction promiscuously here is 
that it focuses attention too narrowly on the economic aspects of parenthood, 
devaluing other important contributions to parenthood. When applied mostly 
to fathers, as is typical, it further reinforces outdated views about fathers dis-
charging their parental obligations through money rather than direct caregiv-
ing.
144
 To be sure, some fathers who are failing to pay fi nancial support are likely 
failing to provide emotional support as well. But the fact that the criminal law 
takes an interest only in fi nancial support in these statutes can have the eff ect 
of reinforcing gender stereotypes.
Our minimalist approach would try to ensure that we have considered 
how else to reduce the incidence of nonpayment of child support. First, we 
think it is worth noting that a number of other non-criminal enforcement 
mechanisms already exist to induce individuals to comply with their 
mandated child support payments. For example, wages can be garnished, 
tax refunds can be intercepted, and licenses and passports can be sus-
pended.
145
 Further, these remedies can often be pursued outside the criminal 
courts, for example, through state administrative agencies or through medi-
ation. Th ese civil proceedings can potentially promote the important ends 
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that animate the current laws with more sophisticated, more sensitive, and 
less troublesome means—and without the stigma of criminal conviction, 
debtor parents can more easily get the jobs, education, and housing needed 
to get on their feet and meet their obligations. Primarily, these other enforce-
ment mechanisms might be suffi  cient to keep deadbeat parents in their 
children’s lives while at the same time ensuring that the children receive the 
funding to which they are entitled.
We cannot avoid the core question, however: if these mechanisms fail, 
say with repeat off enders, should enforcement through the criminal justice 
system, and in particular the use of incarceration, be an option of last resort? 
Th ere is at least one study, albeit somewhat dated, that suggests that crimi-
nal sanctions can be eff ective in reducing the incidence of the problem. 
Professor David Chambers “found a close parallel between payments and 
jailing: the counties that jailed more did in fact collect more.”
146
 But other 
mechanisms have been shown to be even more eff ective than incarceration, 
with suspension of driver’s licenses being the most eff ective stick.
147
 Th at is 
not to say the criminal justice system cannot play any role in regulating 
parental behavior; conviction and probation may well be valuable in induc-
ing a repeat off ender to pay. But we generally do not think incarceration 
should be an available sentencing option for this off ense, because, among 
other reasons, incarceration affi  rmatively impedes caregiving instead of 
fostering it. More empirical evidence would be helpful in fi nally resolving 
this issue since, if jailing were the most eff ective means of making deadbeat 
parents pay support, we would concede that the case for criminalization and 
incarceration would be stronger.
3. Gender, Inequality, and Discrimination
Although the statutes that criminally punish deadbeat dads are drafted in 
gender-neutral ways, fathers are most often the ones imprisoned under these 
laws.
148
 We think it is undeniable that punishing mostly men for failing to 
pay child support contributes to a gender stereotype that assumes that men 
are supposed to be breadwinners and women are supposed to be caregivers. 
Th is system contributes to and reinforces gender stereotypes in our society—
and it therefore raises our general concerns about family ties burdens.
149
Although we applaud the drafting of these laws in gender-neutral language, 
we think more work can be done to take the focus off  the family in particular, 
and instead focus more on voluntary caregiving relationships. Because our 
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general approach is to defl ect attention away from state-sanctioned families 
and promote the reorientation of family ties burdens to target relationships of 
voluntary caregiving, we suggest broadening the ambit of whatever approach 
the law takes to include all nonpayment of debts of support to those in asym-
metrical relationships of voluntary caregiving. So, if we are to have a criminal 
sanction imposed, its reach should encompass all individuals who have 
assumed that responsibility by becoming a primary caregiver for the child in 
question. Th at would avoid the discrimination typically occurring ex ante 
against persons in same-sex or polyamorous relationships and at the same 
time would extend to the children of such unions the “protective” benefi t 
these burdens are supposed to achieve.
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4. A Solution
We cannot deny that there are countervailing values that justify these laws in 
many people’s minds. As we suggested, these debts, when unpaid, can largely 
harm vulnerable children and even primary caregivers themselves. So what 
does our particular framework off er to the public policy community on the 
issue of nonpayment of child support? Must the legal system get out of the 
business of these prosecutions?
Based on what we noted above, we would favor a solution that minimizes 
the use of the criminal sanction to ensure these obligations are met. 
One possibility, the use of restorative justice processes, would simultaneously 
help communicate the nature of the wrong to the debtor parent while 
also furnishing a forum in which the debtor can explain why the debt is 
not yet paid. And, in those cases where the criminal sanction is used to 
condemn unjustifi ed selfi sh behavior by the debtor parent, it should be 
applied using a sanction to only and all those persons who have undertaken 
a voluntary caregiving role towards the child, thus using a sanction that 
actually promotes or is consistent with the caregiving obligations of 
the off ender.
• G. Nonpayment of Parental Support
In Chapter 4, we described the family ties burden created by criminal 
statutes that punish adult children who fail to provide fi nancial support to 
their indigent parents. Because of the rarity with which prosecutions are 
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brought under these laws, we will be relatively brief in our assessment, which 
is, on the whole, negative.
Th e plain objective of these laws is, fi rst, to ensure aid to those who are 
vulnerable in old age, and second, to educate the public and to reinforce a 
sense of obligation through the criminal law to parents based on gratitude or 
a notion of unbargained-for reciprocity. Do these laws pass muster under our 
normative framework?
1. Voluntary Caregiving and Liberty Interests
Th ese laws fail our initial concern regarding voluntary caregiving because it 
creates a family ties burden on a person who did not voluntarily establish a 
relationship with the indigent parent. Th e adult child is penalized simply by 
virtue of being the indigent parent’s child.
From the perspective of our second concern with liberty, we ask whether an 
adult child should retain the liberty to support only those he volunteered to 
support. We think the answer to this, at least from a liberal legal perspective, is 
yes. Obviously, it is appropriate and praiseworthy for an adult with means to 
support his parents, whether based on love, reciprocity, or gratitude. But we 
think it is not the business of the criminal law to require that support, and, 
when it does, it violates a basic precept by condemning a person for failing to 
act gratefully. Th is seems too slender a reed to justify criminal sanctions.
2. Minimalism and Means Analysis
We begin by looking at the fi rst objective of these laws. Here it is to ensure 
necessary aid to indigent and vulnerable persons, usually when they are 
elderly and without physical means to help themselves. To our mind, the 
obligation to help such persons is one that is agent-neutral, and thus, if it is 
to be undertaken, it should be undertaken and funded by the public at large; 
otherwise, it discriminates against those indigent elderly persons without 
children or those whose children predeceased the parents. In any event, 
there is no special need for using the criminal sanction to ensure support, 
when social services funded out of taxes could more readily ensure that the 
public interest in protecting the indigent elderly is satisfi ed.
As to the second objective, we note that, given our liberal orientation, we 
are doubtful that the state has an important public interest in vindicating 
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norms of care based on gratitude. Assuming arguendo that we stipulate to 
the compelling or important nature of the second goal—of educating the 
public and reinforcing an obligation to parents based on gratitude—we do 
not understand why the civil remedies available to enunciate this obligation 
would be insuffi  cient.
As with duties to support children, if the goal is ensuring norm projection 
and compensation, the goal can be expressed and the money can be obtained 
through civil actions or garnished through wages and tax refunds. If a 
criminal penalty were to attach, such that the person went to prison or had 
to pay a fi ne to the state, then that sanction would usually impede the fi rst 
goal of ensuring adequate resources to the vulnerable elderly parent ex post 
even though it might achieve some marginal deterrence ex ante against the 
prospect of adult children walking away from their parents. We would invite 
empirical scholars to weigh this cost based on existing data, but we would 
not really seek out new legislative experiments based on our view that 
imposing this family ties burden on children is improper because of its 
incompatibility with the voluntarist underpinnings of an attractive criminal 
justice system in a liberal society.
Regarding the concerns about gender, inequality, and discrimination, we 
note fi rst that imposing criminal liability on those violating fi lial responsibility 
norms discriminates ex ante against children raised by parents in those gay or 
polyamorous unions that are not recognized by the state; these children are 
told, eff ectively, that they are not viewed as “children” of this or that person to 
whom they properly regard as a parent. Th e discriminatory injury to the child is 
admittedly quite slight. But these laws also have the eff ect of denying to gay and 
polyamorous parents the “protective” benefi t these burdens are supposed to 
achieve.
Although the urge to promote an ongoing ethos of reciprocal care between 
parents and children is powerful in some cultures, we must bear in mind that 
a child’s relationship with his parents is not voluntary in the same sense as a 
parent’s relationship to his children; after all, no child asks to be born, let 
alone to these parents. Th us, it is no surprise to us that many jurisdictions 
are reluctant to impose such liability now, even if that position leads to 
seemingly harsh results.
151
 Because of the voluntariness problem, an opt-in 
registry makes sense in the context of adult children who wish to signal 
their covenants of care with their parents. And if they want, parents can opt 
to signal their ongoing commitment to their children by agreeing to face 
liability for failing to protect or support them as adults.
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But, in the end, we think the current state of aff airs, in which about a 
dozen states use the criminal sanction to establish fi lial responsibility 
norms,
152
 violates our normative framework on every dimension. Th erefore, 
we think these laws should be abandoned. However, if these criminal laws 
are to be retained for their expressive and/or compensatory purposes, we 
think that they should at least not involve fi nes or incarceration, and that the 
reach of the law should be expanded to include, under its umbrella, persons 
who would otherwise be excluded based on discrimination against children 
from same-sex or polyamorous unions.
Last, we think it bears mention that although there was once wide legisla-
tive support for fi lial responsibility laws in both civil and criminal form, these 
norms no longer act with much force. Th e reason for that desuetude, we 
think, is an increased appreciation for the voluntarist basis for holding people 
criminally liable. We also think the signifi cance of that norm helps explain 
why, for example, we almost never see family ties burdens prominently used 
against persons—siblings, grandparents, aunts—who did not themselves 
voluntarily undertake to create that relationship of caregiving. Th at norm—
of promoting voluntarily caregiving—illuminates much of the terrain we 
have surveyed here, and it lends promise to the project of how better to 
reform our existing laws.
∗∗∗∗∗
We hope to have accomplished three things here. Most concretely, we 
have demonstrated that there are a series of burdens that defendants face in 
the criminal justice system on account of their family status, when that 
status is recognized as part of a state-sanctioned family unit. Although our 
work in Part I on the range of family ties benefi ts might suggest that family 
status could only help a defendant, our exploration here reveals that such a 
picture is incomplete. Indeed, there are also some ways that the criminal 
justice system goes out of its way to punish persons on account of their 
family status. Th e extent of this phenomenon has not, to our knowledge, 
been previously examined systematically and we hope to get scholars and 
policymakers to take interest in these fi ndings.
Second, we made an eff ort to organize a normative framework for 
thinking through whether special penalties should attach to family status. 
What we discovered is that these sorts of penalties are more palatable when 
they are eff orts to reinforce relationships of voluntary caregiving. Accordingly, 
we developed a set of tests or questions that we used to assess these family 
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ties burdens. First, did the burden fall on persons who had voluntarily cre-
ated a relationship of care? Second, did the burden impinge on some liberty 
that should be recognized as deserving of protection in a liberal society? 
Th ird, were the laws drafted in such a way as to be narrowly tailored to the 
governmental objectives? Fourth, were there non-criminal measures that 
could be equally eff ective in achieving these government objectives, assum-
ing these government objectives were suffi  ciently compelling or important 
to vindicate through law? Last, in what ways do the existing family ties bur-
dens contribute to concerns about gender inequality and discrimination?
Finally, we tried to spell out how our normative framework might contrib-
ute to thinking through each of the family ties burdens we were able to iden-
tify here. We recognize, however, that ultimately we cannot hope to have 
analyzed each family ties burden exhaustively—for they are each embedded 
within a policy space of their own and each burden functions diff erently to 
control diff erent kinds of conduct. Nevertheless, our hope has been to 
respond to older debates and start new ones through the framework we have 
adopted and the policy choices we have suggested. Indeed, we hope that 
looking at these burdens synthetically will illuminate how the criminal jus-
tice system is tempted to use each particular family ties burden to punish 
family status in several ways—and how we might reorient these burdens in 
a more normatively attractive light.
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we believe that there very well may be appropriate places for the modern 
liberal state to recognize and accommodate the signifi cance of family life 
and caregiving networks. Indeed, the general subsidization that the family 
receives throughout our legal system is probably a fact of life that would be 
too utopian to oppose (though we remain discomfi ted by the way in which 
the family is too often defi ned in terms that are not true or respectful to the 
ways many people choose to organize their circles of aff ection). More than 
that, there is potentially some increase in compliance the legal system 
achieves by having family ties benefi ts and burdens. But even these relatively 
straightforward statements trigger some fundamental questions: how should 
we be defi ning the term family to achieve these possible, though ultimately 
speculative, gains in compliance? Is there any reason to assume that compli-
ance would go down if we moved from a focus on family status to voluntary 
caregiving? And, in any event, even if such gains existed, might there not be 
a moral constraint on using the criminal justice apparatus to further a 
particular conception of which relationships constitute a family?
As we hope we have shown in this book, the criminal justice system, with a 
few exceptions, is not generally an appropriate place to foster a particular vision 
of family life. While our criminal justice system haphazardly refl ects many 
values, surely its critical and appropriately dominant ones are the promotion of 
accurate and fair determinations of guilt or innocence and the protection of 
citizens from serious wrongful harm. As we saw in Part I, privileging individuals 
because of their membership in a state-denominated family unit can threaten 
these core functions. Conversely, as we saw in Part II, burdening defendants 
because of family status also threatens to extend the criminal justice system 
into an arena beyond its proper scope. We are mindful that a criminal justice 
system can do many other things, incident to its central functions. But we have 
endeavored to analyze and explain why propping up a narrow conception of the 
family through facial benefi ts and burdens is unacceptable from the stand-
points of liberalism, minimalism, and criminal justice.
Coda
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Th e conclusions we have drawn in our comprehensive investigation of 
the intersection of family ties and the criminal justice system are as follows. 
We think marital and other intrafamilial evidentiary privileges are trouble-
some; familial exemptions for harboring fugitives cannot be tolerated; and 
that violence within the family cannot be punished less severely than stranger 
violence. Yet we think certain benefi ts that family members get in pretrial 
release contexts, sentencing practices, and prison visitation and furlough 
policies can remain viable in a liberal criminal justice system so long as 
these benefi ts are extended more broadly on the basis of relationships of 
caregiving, rather than arbitrary familial status, which is itself highly con-
tested, gendered, and otherwise unjustifi able.
On the burdens side of the ledger, we support decriminalization in the 
cases of parental responsibility laws (based on strict and vicarious liability), 
bigamy, adultery, and nonpayment of parental support; we endorse decrimi-
nalizing incest between most adults, though we are divided on certain sub-
issues in the incest context; and we are highly skeptical of criminalization in 
the nonpayment of child support context, though we concede that more 
research needs to be done on just how eff ective criminalization is in achieving 
compliance. Th e only area in which we are largely unconfl icted about crimi-
nalization on the burden side is the omissions (duty to rescue) context.
We are open to being proven wrong through credible empirical evidence 
that would show that the benefi ts or burdens are necessary to achieve some 
compelling state goal that cannot be achieved through less discriminatory 
means. At the very least, we hope our evaluation of the benefi ts and burdens 
defendants receive throughout the criminal law encourages other thinkers 
and policymakers to develop more refi ned and systematic thinking about 
these pervasive practices. It will not do, for example, to simply suggest that 
the benefi ts and burdens somehow balance one another out, rendering 
the system equitable. For that balance to happen, there would likely have to 
have been some evidence of intentional action by either legislators or courts, 
even though such evidence appears scant; moreover, it would be hard to 
understand, for example, what the logical nexus is that translates, say, the 
burden of being susceptible to prosecution for incest into an entitlement for 
testimonial privileges or harboring fugitives.
1
It also bears mentioning here that the somewhat diff erent foci of the two 
Parts’ normative frameworks (essentially Chapters 2 and 5) might mislead 
readers in the following way: although Part II focuses on voluntary relation-
ships of caregiving as central to the justifi catory apparatus that could render 
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“burdens” legitimate, one might—in our view, mistakenly—conclude that 
this justifi catory apparatus could underwrite all the benefi ts we describe in 
Part I. Th at is, just because we think some legitimate criminal justice burdens 
may be placed upon people in relationships of voluntary caregiving does not 
mean that we think the criminal justice system is necessarily the best place to 
incentivize these relationships by aff ording caregivers all the perquisites sur-
veyed in Part I. Rather, we carved out just a few of these benefi ts that make 
sense to apply to such caregivers: sentencing discounts for the non-violent 
irreplaceable caregiver and certain prison policies and practices. Ultimately, 
the primary criminal justice values—prosecuting the guilty fairly and pro-
tecting the innocent from crime and prosecution—warrant more respect in 
a liberal criminal justice system than the possibility that these family ties 
benefi ts can contribute to promoting and sustaining caregiving relation-
ships. So we do not think giving caregivers of any sort (within the extended 
family or outside it) the right to harbor fugitives, say, is a benefi t worth 
extending broadly to promote caregiving relationships. When, however, the 
caregiving rationale does not endanger those fundamental pursuits of fair 
and accurate retribution and reasonable crime control (as it might not in 
some pretrial and post-sentencing contexts, for example), we think it is 
important not to run afoul of the heteronormativity and repronormativity 




We cannot leave the topic of the challenges the family poses to the crimi-
nal justice system without off ering a few thoughts on the special and pro-
nounced problem of domestic violence. We have not addressed it in depth in 
Parts I or II because state statutes regarding domestic violence cannot neatly 
be characterized as representing either a benefi t or a burden on the basis of 
family status; indeed, diff erent states take wildly inconsistent positions. For 
example, one jurisdiction makes domestic violence off enders eligible for a 
diversion program whereas another jurisdiction bars domestic violence 
off enders from diversion even though defendants charged with other misde-
meanor off enses might be eligible.
3
 Indeed, some jurisdictions may decide to 
codify approaches to domestic violence that simply do not vary in any impor-
tant way from stranger violence. In light of this diverse set of possible struc-
tures, we can only try to off er some general observations that bring to bear 
the insights of the book on this important and challenging issue.
coda
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First, any jurisdiction that might persist in treating domestic violence 
off enders better than off enders who victimize acquaintances or strangers, 
either through the law on the books or the law “on the streets,” clearly would 
run afoul of the principles for analyzing family ties benefi ts that we set forth 
in the fi rst half of the book. Such practices would probably have patriarchal 
origins and would certainly have gendered eff ects. Th ey would thus off end 
our core concerns about equality and justice. To be sure, our analysis has 
focused on facial benefi ts, and the law “on the streets” falls a bit outside the 
purview of our book. Still, at least in this application, it is easy to see how we 
would react to such a family ties benefi t as a matter of principle.
Second, any jurisdictions that utilize traditional, circumscribed notions 
of the family in their domestic violence statutes would also run afoul of the 
concerns about discrimination and heteronormativity that we have dis-
cussed in this book. For example, Professor Ruth Colker undertook a com-
prehensive survey of state domestic violence statutes in 2006.
4
 She concluded 
that four states—Delaware, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina—
only extend certain protections of their domestic violence statutes to oppo-
site sex or married partners, thereby excluding individuals in same sex 
relationships who are not married.
5
 Some other states, such as Massachusetts 
and New Mexico, limit coverage to individuals in a long-term romantic rela-
tionship.
6
 Like Professor Colker, we would endorse using a functional 
approach to determining which individuals should receive the protections of 
domestic violence statutes. If individuals voluntarily perform primary care-
giving roles to another, then they should be included within the coverage of 
a state’s domestic violence statutes, regardless of whether they are part of a 
formal heterosexual marriage relationship. Th us, for those individuals who 
choose to utilize the registry that we described in Chapter 5, in which people 
opt into certain obligations of caregiving to aff ected parties, we would fully 
support including as part of the obligations covered by that registry a willing-
ness to be bound by any reasonable state statutes proscribing domestic 
violence or state statutes that especially burden those voluntary caregivers 
in their domestic violence regulation.
Yet, there are more subtle and diffi  cult issues raised by domestic violence 
statutes, to which our normative frameworks can also make a modest con-
tribution. In some jurisdictions, domestic violence statutes can be construed 
as a family ties burden upon a defendant rather than as a family ties benefi t. 
Th at is emphatically not to suggest that domestic violence laws are currently 
doing a good job of protecting women; as Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer 
privilege or punish
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has forcefully argued, “the disconnect between battering as it is practiced 
and battering as it is criminalized is vast and it is signifi cant.”
7
 But on its 
face, as Professor Ruth Colker has argued, “the law is not ‘neutral’ with 
respect to domestic violence; it now articulates the presumption that domes-
tic violence is worse than other kinds of violence.” She adds that “this evolu-
tion in the law has not been accompanied by the development of a theory 
to explain why we have an enhanced, rather than neutral, law of domestic 
violence.”
8
Although the full articulation of such a theory would be far beyond the 
scope of this project, we hope that we have contributed some ideas to a 
dialogue about when and why such an enhanced law might be appropriate. 
Th e criminal justice system possesses its greatest moral force for interven-
tion in relationships between individuals when it is necessary to protect 
persons from wrongful harms. Omissions liability, as we discussed in Part II, 
is a classic example. By entering into a relationship of voluntary caregiving, 
presumed in the case of a parent-child relationship and available for volun-
tary entry in the case of mature adults, we argued that one has signaled a 
willingness to be a fi rst responder when a party to the relationship is in peril. 
If an individual has signaled a willingness to be a fi rst responder, to rescue a 
vulnerable member of the relationship from harm, that individual has also 
signaled a willingness to forego being the actual cause of any harm and that 
individual’s exploitation of—and failure to protect—the consequent vulner-
ability is itself an independent wrong that exacerbates the wrong of harming 
in the fi rst place. Breaking a covenant of care by infl icting injury is thus a 
greater moral wrong than infl icting injury on an individual to whom such a 
specifi c covenant of care is not owed because exploitation of a particular 
vulnerability is a separate wrong. Accordingly, enhanced penalties (or sepa-
rate charges) for that breach would seem to be appropriate to refl ect the 
greater moral wrong that has been committed.
Ultimately, the issues surrounding the criminalization of domestic vio-
lence are tremendously complex and diffi  cult, and we do not mean to sug-
gest here that we have addressed them in any sort of comprehensive way. We 
have obviously not adequately addressed issues related to race or class—or 
the ways in which criminalization may itself be threatening to women’s 
autonomy, to name just a few of the important questions that are beyond the 
scope of our limited eff orts here. We simply wish to suggest that domestic 
violence policy may implicate some of the concerns about the criminal jus-
tice system’s refl exive reliance on family status in setting legislative policy 
coda
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that we have discussed throughout this book, and we hope that legislators, 
courts, and policymakers will take a hard look at some of the questions that 
we have suggested might be useful in analyzing any particular policy a state 
is considering implementing regarding criminal justice and the family.
∗∗∗∗∗
In sum, whether benefi ts or burdens, privileging or punishing, is at issue, 
the core inquiry is in a fundamental sense the same: how should family status 
be used by the criminal justice system? We conclude that, in general, it 
should only rarely and cautiously serve as a vehicle for directly promoting 
the institution and goods of family life. Th e American family is a far more 
complex entity today than our current system of benefi ts and burdens 
acknowledges. Th us, in the fi nal analysis, family ties benefi ts and burdens 
should be viewed with skepticism for two reasons. First, they undermine the 
core functions of a fair and attractive criminal justice system within a liberal 
democracy. Second, using the criminal justice system to refl ect and consti-
tute traditional ideals of the family is ineff ective at best and, more often, 
plainly and perniciously discriminatory.
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21. See Sandra Enos, Mothering from the Inside: Parenting in a Woman’s 
Prison (2001) (descriptive treatment of challenges of parenting in prison).
22. See Joan Petersilia, When Prisoners Come Home: Parole and Prisoner 
Reentry (2003).
23. Here, we develop an account drawing on several sources, including Linda 
McClain’s work. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering 
Capacity, Equality and Responsibility (2006); Linda C. McClain, Th e Domain 
of Civic Virtue in a Good Society: Families, Schools and Sex Equality, 69 Fordham 
L. Rev. 1617, 1624–27 (2001).
24. For examples of scholarship advocating such benefi ts, see Leslie Acoca & 
Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: Th e Plight of Nonviolent Female Off enders 
and Th eir Children, 11 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 133 (1999); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender 
and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in 
the Gender-Free World of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 Pepp. L. Rev. 905 
(1993) [hereinafter Raeder, Gender and Sentencing]; Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal 
Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2045 (1995).
25. When we use the term inaccuracy, we are using that term to refer to the idea that 
justice is not being accurately realized (in terms of the eff ective prosecution of 
the guilty and exoneration of the innocent). In this sense, inaccuracy might also 
indicate an unjustifi ed leniency (or harshness), which is a matter that can also 
be seen when considered in the context of equality issues.
26. For the most part, our discussion centers on legal policy issues, which are, in many 
cases, more appropriately developed by legislatures. However, our argument does 
address the issue of new intrafamilial privileges, as well as the use of some common 
law defenses, which are typically addressed in the courts in the fi rst instance.
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• Part 1. Privileging Family Status
1. In the course of our exposition, we tend not to use the word “privilege” to help 
avoid confusion between the species and the genus; evidentiary privileges are just 
one example of these family ties benefi ts. Some might think these benefi ts merely 
“respect” family ties rather than benefi t them, but we think that because these 
benefi ts have real consequences (as opposed to simply conveying attitudes of re-
spect), it is better to characterize them as actual benefi ts (or in the case of our 
titles, privileges).
• Chapter 1. A Survey of Family Ties Benefi ts
1. See Louisiana v. Taylor, 642 So. 2d 160 (La. 1994) (describing facts of case). Th e 
Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately carved out an exception to the spousal privi-
lege in cases in which the spouse was the victim of the charged crime and the 
evidence supported a conclusion that the spouse was refusing to testify because 
of fear or coercion.
2. 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 ( John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961). 
See generally United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
3. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
4. Th e law has several sources for testimonial privileges. Most commonly, the com-
mon law is the root of them. Th e attorney-client privilege, for example, is one of the 
oldest recognized privileges in the common law—and every court recognizes it 
to some extent. See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998). 
Th e Fifth Amendment is another source of a testimonial privilege in that it gives 
persons a privilege against self-incrimination. US Const. amend. V (“No person 
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”).
5. As a general rule, federal courts are cautious before creating new mechanisms to 
allow people to refuse to help the justice system. State systems, by contrast, tend 
to be a bit more generous, recognizing clergyman-parishioner and doctor-patient 
privileges, as well as journalist-source and accountant-client privileges rejected 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. See generally 2 Scott N. Stone & Robert K. 
Taylor, Testimonial Privileges § 3 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining the accountant-client 
privilege and where and when it applies); id. § 6 (addressing the clergy-penitent 
privilege); id. § 7 (doctor-patient privilege); id. § 8 (journalist-source privilege).
6. See, e.g., Regan, supra intro., n. 24, at 2119.
7. To see which states have adopted this privilege and which version, see 2 Stone & 
Taylor, supra chap. 1, n. 5, § 5.02, nn.4, 8, 12, 13.
8. “[I]t hath been resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either 
against or for her husband.” 1 E. Coke, A Commentarie upon Littleton 6b 
(1628); see also 8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2227. Some have contested this 
story and have argued that the immunity has its roots in petit treason, the crime 
of violence against a head of household. See Wigmore, supra, at § 2227.
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 9. See Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 
1564 (1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
10. 290 U.S. 371, 380–82 (1933).
11. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
12. Id. at 78.
13. Id. at 79.
14. 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980). Th e Court’s claim is not always true; prosecutors can 
threaten spouses and off er them fairly substantial incentives to testify against 
their loved ones, even if the relationship is otherwise strong.
15. To see which states have adopted this privilege and in what way, see 2 Stone & 
Taylor, supra chap. 1, n. 5, § 5.09.
16. 291 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1934).
17. 340 U.S. 332, 333–34 (1951).
18. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, (Ernst Behler ed., Gary 
Handaerk trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1995) (1878) (“Marriage as a long conversa-
tion. In entering into a marriage we should put the question to ourselves: Do you 
believe that you will enjoy conversing with this woman all the way into old age? 
Everything else in marriage is transitory, but most of the time together is spent 
in conversation.”).
19. See, e.g., Maureen P. O’Sullivan, An Examination of the State and Federal Courts’ 
Treatment of the Parent-Child Privilege, 39 Cath. Law. 201 (1999); Catherine J. Ross, 
Implementing Constitutional Rights for Juveniles: Th e Parent-Child Privilege in Con-
text, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 85 (2003); Amee A. Shah, Th e Parent-Child Testimo-
nial Privilege—Has the Time for It Finally Arrived?, 47 Clev. St. L. Rev. 41 (1999); 
Erica Smith-Klocek, A Halachic Perspective on the Parent-Child Privilege, 39 Cath. 
Law. 105 (1999); Shonah P. Jeff erson, Note, Th e Statutory Development of the Par-
ent-Child Privilege: Congress Responds to Kenneth Starr’s Tactics, 16 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 
429 (1999); Kimberly L. Schilling, Note, Intrafamilial Communications: An Analysis 
of the Parent-Child Privilege, 37 Fam. & Conciliation Cts. Rev. 99 (1999).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385 (4th Cir. 1998) (no recognition 
of privilege when the defendant father was charged with gun crimes and abus-
ing children with those guns; protection of this family unit not warranted); In re 
Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997) (no confi dential communication privilege 
in child-parent relationship because the overwhelming majority of states and 
federal courts reject the privilege); In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993) (no recogni-
tion of the mother’s asserted right not to testify against her adult son, particularly 
when she benefi ted from her son’s illegal activity); In re Doe, 842 F.2d 244 (10th 
Cir. 1988) (no parent-child privilege recognized); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 
1253 (6th Cir. 1985) (children have no right not to testify against parents and can 
be forced to do so); In re Santarelli, 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (no federal sup-
port for a family privilege); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) (no 
“family” privilege so a fi ve-year-old had to testify against his mother).
21. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983) (recognizing a parent-child privi-
lege); see also cases cited infra chap. 1, n. 29.
22. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
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23. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997).
24. See generally Kelly Korell, Testimonial Privilege for Confi dential Communications 
Between Relatives Other Th an Husband and Wife—State Cases, 62 A.L.R. 5th 
629 (1998).
25. Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203(7) (2008) (“Any parent, guardian or legal custodian 
shall not be forced to disclose any communication made by their minor child 
or ward to them concerning matters in any civil or criminal action to which such 
child or ward is a party.”). Th e privilege does not apply in all cases, including cases 
involving allegations of child abuse.
26. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46b-138a (2008) (“In any juvenile proceeding in superior 
court, the accused child shall be a competent witness, and at his or her option 
may testify or refuse to testify in such proceedings. Th e parent or guardian of 
such child shall be a competent witness but may elect or refuse to testify for 
or against the accused child except that a parent or guardian who has received 
personal violence from the child may, upon the child’s trial for off enses arising 
from such personal violence, be compelled to testify in the same manner as any 
other witness.”).
27. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 233, § 20 (2008) (“An unemancipated, minor child, 
living with a parent, shall not testify before a grand jury, trial of an indict-
ment, complaint or other criminal proceeding, against said parent, where the 
victim in such proceeding is not a member of said parent’s family and who does 
not reside in the said parent’s household.”).
28. Minn. Stat. § 595.02.1(j) (2008) (“A parent or the parent’s minor child may not 
be examined as to any communication made in confi dence by the minor to the 
minor’s parent. . . . Th is exception may be waived by express consent to disclosure 
by a parent entitled to claim the privilege or by the child who made the com-
munication or by failure of the child or parent to object when the contents of a 
communication are demanded.”). Th e statutory privilege in Minnesota does not 
apply in all circumstances, including cases involving allegations of child abuse or 
the termination of parental rights.
29. See In re A & M (People v. Doe), 403 N.Y.S.2d 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (common 
law recognition of a parent-child privilege through the constitutional right to 
family privacy); People v. Fitzgerald, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309, 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) 
(extending the parent-child privilege to an older child; holding that the privilege 
is not limited to minors); In re Ryan, 474 N.Y.S.2d 931, 931 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984) 
(recognizing a grandmother as a parent for parent-child privilege purposes). But 
see People v. Hilligas, 670 N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (rejecting Fitzgerald 
for independently living adults).
30. See Diehl v. Texas, 698 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. App. 1985) (Levy, J., dissenting); 
Belmer v. Virginia, 553 S.E.2d 123, 129 (Va. Ct. App. 2001) (Elder, J., dissenting).
31. See Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203(7).
32. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-138a (2004).
33. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20 (2005).
34. Compare Idaho Code Ann. § 9-203(7) with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 233, § 20.
35. See Minn. Stat. § 595.02.1(j) (2004).
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36. Joe Lawlor, What’s a Parent To Do? Escaped Convict Case Raises Questions, Flint 
J., June 11, 2008, http://www.mlive.com/fl intjournal/index.ssf/2008/06/whats_a_
parent_to_do_escaped_c.html.
37. For similar examples of a brother making the same decision as David Kaczynski, 
see Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Elise Ackerman 
& Marianne Lavelle, Th icker Th an Blood, U.S. News & World Rep., Dec. 1, 1997, 
at 30, 32 (describing the case of Joe Cantu, who turned his younger brother in to 
the police after hearing his brother laughing about the fact that he had just partic-
ipated in the gang rape and murder of two young girls); Linda Grace-Kobas, Death 
Penalty Off ers Families No Closure, Law School Speakers Say, Cornell Chron., Mar. 
20, 2003, available at http://www.news.cornell.edu/Chronicle/03/3.20.03/death_
penalty_forum.html (describing case of Bill Babbitt, who told the police that he 
believed his brother Manny had killed an elderly woman and then was horrifi ed 
when Manny, a paranoid schizophrenic, was eventually executed for the crime); 
Serge F. Kovaleski, His Brother’s Keeper, Wash. Post, July 21, 2001, at W10.
38. See Beth Shuster, Veteran LAPD Offi  cer Aided Fugitive Son, Panel Finds, L.A. Times, 
Mar. 27, 1996, at B3. Th e sergeant ultimately received a thirty-three-day suspen-
sion. See also Andrew Blankstein, Member of Robbery Ring Convicted, L.A. Times, 
Apr. 25, 1997, at B4.
39. See Mandy M. Goodnight, Vernon Deputy Sentenced to Jail, Alexandria Daily 
Town Talk (Alexandria, La.), May 24, 2003, at 4A. Th e deputy was convicted of 
assorted criminal charges related to his assistance and sentenced to spend one 
year in prison.
40. See David Chanen, Woman Charged As Accomplice to Her Sons in Shooting Death, 
Star Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Dec. 15, 1998, at 5B. For other examples, 
see Ackerman & Lavelle, supra chap. 1, n. 37, at 30 (describing how the brother 
of Th omas Capano, a well-known political fi gure in Delaware, helped him dump 
the body of his former mistress into the ocean); M. Hernandez, Woman Sentenced 
for Role in Killing, Ventura County Star, Apr. 26, 2005, at 2 (describing how a 
mother, who had witnessed her son stab a man to death, helped her son fl ee to 
Mexico to avoid arrest); Ed Pope, Police Charge Father in Fugitive Insurance Fraud 
Case, San Jose Mercury News, Mar. 2, 2000 (describing how a father destroyed 
evidence to prevent police from locating his daughter, who was charged with 
participating in a $10 million insurance fraud scheme).
41. See William Booth, Kaczynski’s Brother Expresses Sadness, Relief in Aftermath of 
Plea; Accuser Still Feels Powerful Sibling Connection, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1998, 
at A3; Don Oldenburg, What If He Were Your Brother? When David Kazcynski 
Fingered the Unabomber Suspect, He Became the Star in a Morality Play, Wash. 
Post, Apr. 11, 1996, at C1.
42. See Oldenburg, supra chap. 1, n. 41 (describing comments by G. Gordon Liddy). 
We were unable to locate any rigorous empirical work attempting to answer the 
question of what most Americans would do if they learned a family member had 
committed a serious crime. USA Today conducted a telephone poll of 305 adults 
in 1990 that was prompted by the Charles Stuart case in Boston, in which Stuart 
murdered his pregnant wife and famously accused a black man of committing 
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the crime. Stuart became a suspect only after his brother went to the police. 
Eight percent said they would not turn in a family member accused of murder; 
79 percent said that they would. Tom Squitieri & John Larrabee, Poll: 79% Say 
Th ey’d Turn in Kin Who Killed, USA Today, Jan. 15, 1990, at 3A. Th e newspaper 
acknowledged two problems with the survey: fi rst, the outcome might well 
have been aff ected by the outrageous facts of the Stuart case itself. See id. 
(quoting criminologist James Fox, who stated that “[t]hese poll results would 
have been very diff erent if the survey had been done last year. . . . It’s not what they 
would do, but what they would have liked the Stuarts to do.”). Second, “experts” 
acknowledged that the results might “refl ect the ‘socially desirable response’ rather 
than the real-life action” that people would take if actually confronted with the
situation. Id. We suspect that relatives’ decision-making would vary on two 
vectors: the severity of the crime and the degree of closeness of the relative 
(whether closeness is measured in emotional closeness or bloodline closeness). 
It probably would be hard, for example, to turn in a child for all but the most 
heinous crimes, and it would be comparatively less heart-wrenching to turn in a 
distant cousin when a more serious crime is involved.
43. In the Enron case, for example, Enron Chief Financial Offi  cer Andy Fastow and 
his wife Lea were both indicted in connection with the fraud. See Carrie Johnson, 
Prosecutors Making Fraud Cases Relative: Government Targets Family of Accused, 
Wash. Post, Nov. 27, 2003, at A1. In the Adelphia case, prosecutors indicted the 
founder of the company and his two adult sons. Id. Similarly in ImClone, executive 
Sam Waksal pled guilty to fraud charges “in an attempt to spare his daughter and 
his [eighty-year-old] father from being charged with insider trading.” Id. Johnson 
also cites the case of Aldrich Ames, whose deal to plead guilty to espionage 
charges included a promise of leniency for his wife. Id.
44. A principal in the fi rst degree is a person who physically commits the of-
fense. Joshua Dressler defi nes a “principal in the second degree” as “one who is 
guilty of an off ense ‘by reason of having [intentionally assisted]... in the com-
mission thereof in the presence, either actual or constructive, of the principal in 
the fi rst degree.’” Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 464 
(3d ed. 2001).
45. Dressler describes an accessory after the fact as “one who, with knowledge of 
another’s guilt, intentionally assists the felon to avoid arrest, trial, or conviction.” 
Id. at 465. Although most states have eliminated the various common law catego-
ries of principal and accomplice liability, many states still treat accessories after 
the fact as a separate category of off ender. Id. at 432–33.
46. Th e states that provide exemptions for family members are Florida, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 777.03 (2008); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/31-5 (2009); Ind. Code 
Ann. § 35-44-3-2 (2009); Iowa Code Ann. § 703.3 (2009); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 520.110 (2008); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 274, § 4 (2009); Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 195.030 (2008); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-4 (2008); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
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§ 14-259 (2008); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-1-4 (2008); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, 
§ 5 (2008); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-19 (2008); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-11-6 (2009); 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 946.47 (2008).
47. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 777.03. Iowa is more restrictive in that it only exempts 
spouses from criminal liability. See Iowa Code Ann. § 703.3. Illinois and North 
Carolina do not include grandparents or grandchildren within their exemptions. 
See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/31-5; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-259. Indiana 
does not include grandparents, grandchildren, or siblings. See Ind. Code Ann. 
§ 35-44-3-2.
48. Th ese states are Arkansas, New Jersey, Washington, and Wyoming. See Ark. 
Code Ann. § 5-54-105 (West 2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-3 (West 2007); Wash. 
Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.76.070 (West 2007); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-202 (West 2007). 
Washington, for example, typically treats rendering criminal assistance to a mur-
der suspect as a Class C felony, but only as a gross misdemeanor if committed by 
an immediate family member. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.76.070.
49. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 777.03 (1)(a).
50. See id. § 777.03 (1)(b).
51. See William Blackstone, 4 Commentaries *38–39 (“So strict is the law where 
a felony is actually complete, in order to do eff ectual justice, that the nearest rela-
tions are not suff ered to aid or receive one another. If the parent assists his child, 
or the child his parent; if the brother receives the brother, the master his servant, 
or the servant his master, or even if the husband relieves the wife, who have any 
of them committed a felony, the receivers become accessories ex post facto. But a 
feme-covert can not become an accessory by the receipt or concealment of her 
husband; for she is presumed to act under his coercion, and therefore she is not 
bound, neither ought she, to discover her lord.”); Leo Gerard Smith, Note, Family 
Member Exemption for Accessory After the Fact, 20 J. Fam. L. 105, 107–09 (1981) 
(discussing common law exemption for wives).
52. Model Penal Code § 242.3 cmt. at 237 (1980).
53. Id.
54. See Smith, supra chap. 1, n. 51, at 123–24 (discussing the treatment of family 
member exemptions in the federal system).
55. 21 F. Supp. 281, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 1937).
56. Id.; see also Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947). In Haupt, the defendant 
was charged with treason for aiding his saboteur son during World War II, but the 
Supreme Court noted that the possibility the defendant’s acts were motivated by 
“parental solicitude” rather than “adherence to the German cause” was certainly 
a relevant factor for the jury’s consideration. Id. at 641.
57. State v. C.H., 421 So. 2d 62, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
58. See State v. Lucero, 541 P.2d 430, 434 (N.M. 1975).
59. United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 733–34 (9th Cir. 2002).
60. See id.
61. Id. at 736.
62. Id. at 737.
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63. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility, and Commitment to Children: Th e New 
Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1111, 1165 (1999) (“One of the 
most deeply embedded principles in American family law is the principle of family 
autonomy, which limits the state’s intervention in the aff airs of the intact family.”); 
Carl F. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 
Mich. L. Rev. 1803, 1835–39 (1985) (discussing the “legal tradition of noninterference 
in the family”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert F. Scott, Parents As Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. 
 Rev. 2401, 2406 (1995) (noting that academic commentators have begun to argue 
that “the latitude given to parents in rearing their children is. . . excessive, allow-
ing some parents to infl ict unmonitored and unsanctioned harm on their children” 
and that “the tradition of legal protection of parental rights has deep historical 
roots”). But see Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 
1880–1920, 77 U. Colo. L. Rev. 101, 101 (2006) (revising the “feminist understanding 
of the legal history of public responses to intimate homicide by showing that, in both 
the eastern and the western United States, men accused of killing their intimates 
often received stern punishment, including the death penalty, whereas women 
charged with similar crimes were treated leniently” for the period under review).
64. See generally Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domes-
tic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 801 (2001) [hereinafter 
Coker, Crime Control].
65. See Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper 
Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Off enses by Intimates, 54 Hastings L.J. 1465, 
1485 (2002–2003) (stating that since the mid-1970s, marital immunity for sexual 
off enses was eliminated in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia).
66. See generally Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic Violence: The 
Criminal Justice Response (2d ed. 1996) (describing reform eff orts in police 
and prosecutors’ offi  ces); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 Yale L.J. 
2, 7 (2006) (appraising critically the “use of protection orders to prohibit the 
cohabitation and contact of intimate partners” where domestic violence has 
occurred).
67. See Elizabeth Pleck, Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy 
Against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present 173 (1987) 
(noting that “no other piece of modern social legislation has been so quickly ad-
opted by all the states”).
68. See State v. DeLeon, 813 P.2d 1382 (Haw. 1991); see also Deanna Pollard, 
Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 575, 641 n.415 (2003) (discuss-
ing the DeLeon case).
69. Pollard, supra chap. 1, n. 68, at 641.
70. Id. at 621.
71. Id. at 634–35. Professor Pollard’s article contains an excellent discussion of 
diff erent approaches states take in evaluating parental claims that the injuries 
they infl icted upon their children should not be considered child abuse because 
they were simply disciplining their children. Id. at 635–46. She also notes that, 
despite mounting evidence about the dangers posed by spanking, ninety percent 
of American parents still hit their children. Id. at 577.
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72. See id. at 586.
73. See Legal Reforms, Center for Eff ective Discipline, at http://www.stophitting.
com/laws/legalReform.php (visited November 21, 2008).
74. See Model Penal Code § 3.08 (1985); see also Pollard, supra chap. 1, n. 68, at 641 
(discussing the Model Penal Code’s adoption of a parental discipline defense).
75. Tamar Lewin, What Penalty for a Killing in Passion?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1994.
76. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who 
Kill, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 71, 72 (1992) [hereinafter Coker, Heat of 
Passion].
77. People v. Th ompkins, 240 Cal. Rptr. 516, 518–19 (Ct. App. 1987) (“At least as early 
as Manning’s Case (1793) 83 Eng. Rep. 112, an archetypical illustration of ad-
equate provocation to invoke the common law heat-of-passion theory for vol-
untary manslaughter has been the defendant’s discovery of his wife in bed with 
another man.”); see also Coker, Heat of Passion, supra chap. 1, n. 76, at 72; Laurie 
Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat of Passion Manslaughter and 
Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1679, 1692–96 (1986).
78. Girouard v. State, 321 Md. 532, 538 (1991).
79. People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. 1989) (“In Illinois, adultery with a spouse 
as provocation generally has been limited to those instances where the par-
ties are discovered in the act of adultery or immediately before or after such an 
act, and the killing immediately follows such discovery.”); People v. McDonald, 
212 N.E.2d 299 (Ill. 1965) (mitigation available only to persons who kill lawful 
spouses, not girlfriends or mistresses).
80. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 2-207 (b).
81. Tripp v. Maryland, 374 A.2d 384 (Md. 1977) (“Th e modern tendency is to extend 
the rule of mitigation beyond the narrow situation where one spouse actually 
catches the other in the act of committing adultery.”).
82. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation 
Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331, 1332 (1997)
83. Id. ( footnotes omitted).
84. See generally Wayne A. Logan, Knowledge As Power: Criminal Registra-
tion and Community Notification Laws in America ( forthcoming 2009).
85. See Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 Law & Soc. Inquiry 267, 
291 (2006). Corrigan notes this exclusion was supported by rape care advocates 
in order to promote victim confi dentiality. Even if the exclusion does protect 
victims, however, it clearly gives off enders the obvious benefi t of avoiding 
identifi cation as a sex off ender to friends, employers, and other members of 
the community. It bears emphasis, however, that charging decisions (like pros-
ecuting a sex off ender for incest rather than rape or sexual abuse) really do not 
come within the ambit of our discussion, since they are not a formal family ties 
benefi t. Indeed, as Chapter 4 reveals, incest is a family ties burden, as we defi ne 
that term.
86. See Anderson, supra chap. 1, n. 65, at 1486.
87. See id. at 1472–73.
88. Id.
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 89. See Associated Press, Child Molester Charged in Assault on Boy, 5, Miami Her-
ald, Jan. 21, 1987, at 10A. We recognize this story does not necessarily involve 
a family ties benefi t, but it illustrates the kind of risks associated with such 
benefi ts in the context of pretrial release.
 90. For an overview of pretrial release patterns, see Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. 
Wright, Criminal Procedures 847–80 (3d ed. 2007).
 91. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codifi ed as amended at 
18 U.S.C. 3142 (g)(3)(A) (2000)).
 92. See, e.g., Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.2(a)(1) (2006) (requiring court to consider a 
range of factors in determining pretrial release, including “the age, background 
and family ties, relationships and circumstances of the defendant”); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 903.046(2) (West 2001) (mandating court to consider “[t]he 
defendant’s family ties[and] length of residence in the community”); Watson 
v. State, 158 S.W.3d 647, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting that the Court of 
Criminal Appeals has determined that a court in setting bail should consider, 
among other things, the “defendant’s: work record, family ties, . . . length of 
residency”).
 93. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/110-10(b)(10) (2002).
 94. See Suk, supra chap. 1, n. 66, at 2 (describing use of protection orders as a form 
of “state-imposed de facto divorce that subjects the practical and substantive 
continuation of intimate relationships to criminal sanction”).
 95. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/110-10 (c).
 96. United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1992).
 97. Id. at 126; see also Karin Bornstein, Note, 5K2.0 Departures for 5H Individual 
Characteristics: A Backdoor out of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 24 Colum. 
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 135, 135 (1993); Gregory N. Racz, Note, Exploring Collateral 
Consequences: Koon v. United States, Th ird Party Harm, and Departures from 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1462, 1480 (1997).
 98. Christopher J. Mumola, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report: In-
carcerated Parents and Their Children NCJ 182335, at 1 tbl.1 (reporting 
fi gures for 1999, “an estimated 721,500 State and Federal prisoners were parents 
to 1,498,800 children under age 18”), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/iptc.pdf.
 99. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005). In his remedial opinion, Justice 
Breyer highlighted the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which says that “[n]o limita-
tion shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, 
and conduct of a person convicted of an off ense which a court of the United 
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate 
sentence.” Id. at 252.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“[F]amily circumstance is a discouraged factor under the Guidelines.”); U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 (2000) (stating that “family ties and 
responsibilities and community ties are not ordinarily relevant” in deciding if 
a departure is warranted); see also United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1127 
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(9th Cir. 2000) (referring to family circumstance as a “discouraged” factor). See 
generally Melissa E. Murray, Th e Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Under-
standing of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 Va. L. Rev. 385 (2008) (canvassing 
family circumstances departures in federal courts).
101. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996).
102. United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1994) (price fi xing); United 
States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 974 (1st Cir. 1993) (drug distribution); United States 
v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 1992) (bribery and theft); United States v. 
Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (drug off enses); United States v. Pena, 930 
F.2d 1486, 1494–95 (10th Cir. 1991) (drug distribution); see also United States v. 
Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 86 (3d Cir. 1993) ( fraud case).
103. United States v. Aguirre, 214 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding four-level 
departure “based on the fact that there is an 8 year-old son who’s lost a father 
and would be losing a mother for a substantial period of time”). However, in 
cases where another parent (aside from the defendant) was available, courts 
routinely rejected the downward departure by the trial court. See, e.g., United 
States v. Miller, 991 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Chestna, 
962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that, although defendant was single 
with four small children, this was not “an unusual family circumstance”); United 
States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir. 1992) (declining to view a single 
mother of two minor children as warranting extraordinary family circumstances); 
United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that “the 
imprisonment of a single parent was not extraordinary,” even where the woman 
had fi ve minor children).
104. See Roger W. Haines, Jr., Frank O. Bowman III, & Jennifer C. Woll, Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines Handbook 1445 (2006) (addressing whether “the 
departure eff ectively will address the loss of caretaking or fi nancial support”); 
United States v. Leon, 341 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. 
Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 68–69 (1st Cir. 2004) (looking at whether “there are feasible 
alternatives of care that are relatively comparable” to the defendant’s).
105. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1(B) (2006).
106. Th e implication is that if the departure simply reduces rather than eliminates 
the diffi  culty, the departure should not be awarded. Th us, courts have been 
reluctant, given the state of the law, to confer departures to minimize all the dis-
ruptions typically caused by incarceration of a family member. See, e.g., United 
States v. Wright, 218 F.3d 812, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Today we conclude that 
a downward departure for extraordinary family circumstances cannot be justi-
fi ed when, even after reduction, the sentence is so long that release will come 
too late to promote the child’s welfare.”). Th is state of aff airs leads some judges 
to believe that the law they must apply here is quite “cruel.” United States v. Jura-
do-Lopez, 338 F. Supp. 2d 246, 254 n.17 (D. Mass. 2004) (Gertner, J.) (excoriating 
case law prohibiting departures for ordinary family responsibilities as “cruel”). 
Commentators often agree. See Raeder, Gender and Sentencing, supra intro., n. 24, 
at 960; Myrna Raeder, Remember the Family: Seven Myths About Single Parenting 
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Departures, 13 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 251 (2001) [hereinafter Raeder, Remember the 
Family]; Jack B. Weinstein, Th e Eff ect of Sentencing on Women, Men, the Family, 
and the Community, 5 Colum. J. Gender & L. 169, 169 (1996) (stating that sec-
tion 5H1.6 “is so cruelly delusive as to make those who have to apply the guide-
lines to human beings, families, and the community want to weep”).
107. United States v. Spero, 382 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2004) (affi  rming downward 
departure for defendant who provided critical care for autistic son and other 
three children, notwithstanding that defendant had a spouse); United States v. 
Jebara, 313 F. Supp. 2d 912, 919–20 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (splitting defendant’s sen-
tence between incarceration and home confi nement due to judge’s view that 
a short-term disruption to the defendant’s children would be tolerable but not 
a long-term one).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 104 (3d Cir. 2000) (invalidating a 
Section 5H1.6 downward departure for a single mother of fi ve children (one af-
fl icted with some neurological disorders)). Sweeting might be distinguished on 
account of the defendant’s substantial criminal history and the severity of the 
penalty under the guidelines, which in this case exceeded fi ve years.
109. United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 703–08 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J., 
dissenting).
110. Id. (criticizing lower court’s departure on grounds of family responsibilities 
because the sentence failed to adequately refl ect seriousness of the off ense).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Duarte, 901 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that trial 
court may properly consider defendant’s stable family ties and responsibilities 
in setting sentence within the prescribed range).
112. See Dan Markel, Luck or Law? Th e Constitutional Case Against Indeterminate 
Sentencing Schemes 28–38 (unpublished manuscript on fi le with authors).
113. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Final Report on the Impact of United States 
v. Booker on Federal Sentencing (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
booker_report/Booker_Report.pdf (summarizing results).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000).
115. Menyweather, 431 F.3d at 700 (noting that, after Booker, district court judges 
“have the discretion to weigh a multitude of mitigating and aggravating factors 
that existed at the time of mandatory Guidelines sentencing, but were deemed 
‘not ordinarily relevant,’ such as age, education and vocational skills, mental 
and emotional conditions, employment record, and family ties and responsibili-
ties”) (citation omitted). Th us, for example, “[t]he diffi  culty of providing appro-
priate care for a child of a single parent may, when balanced against factors 
such as the nature of the off ense, § 3553(a)(1), deterrence to criminal conduct, 
§ 3553(a)(2)(B), and protection of the public, § 3553(a)(2)(C), warrant a sentence 
outside the Guidelines.” Id. at 700.
116. Linda Drazga Maxfield, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Final Report: Survey 
of Article III Judges on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 8 (2003), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/judsurv/jsfull.pdf (“More than half of all 
judges would like to see more emphasis at sentencing placed on an off ender’s 
mental condition or the off ender’s family ties and responsibilities.”); cf. Stanton 
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Wheeler et al., Sitting in Judgment: The Sentencing of White-Collar 
Criminals 154 (1988) (quoting a judge who explains that “[w]hether there are 
people who are dependent on him or her [i.e., the defendant], . . . whether there 
is going to be an injury to others if I incarcerate him: that has a profound eff ect 
on me and when I sense that, I am more inclined to be lenient”).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 990–91 (E.D. Wis. 2005) 
([D]efendant is fi fty years old, had no prior record, a solid employment his-
tory, and is a devoted family man. He has two children, one of whom is still 
in school. Prior to his recent marriage, he was a single father who did an ex-
cellent job of raising two daughters. He also provides care and support for his 
elderly parents. His father suff ers from Alzheimer’s disease and is particularly 
dependent on defendant—defendant is one of the few people he still recognizes. 
Defendant’s mother is also elderly and suff ers from depression. I concluded that 
defendant’s absence would have a profoundly adverse impact on both his chil-
dren and his parents.”); United States v. Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 383 (D. Mass. 
2005) (“Measuring a departure for ‘extraordinary family obligations’ now in the 
light of Booker and the purposes of sentencing (particularly the likelihood of 
recidivism), I would fi nd that Momoh qualifi ed for a downward departure on 
these grounds.”). But see Myrna Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker 
World, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 691, 716 (2006) (contending that “many judges are 
not exercising their Booker discretion” and that “a relative handful of judges” are 
responsible for most of the family ties departures”).
118. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
119. United States v. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct 558 (2007).
120. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unre-
solved Policy Issues, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1190, 1191 (2005).
121. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 3003(b)(4) (West 2007) (including family ties with-
in a list of “suitability factors” that the Parole Board is to consider in awarding 
parole).
122. State v. Killpack, 276 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Iowa 1979); State v. Warner, 229 N.W.2d 776, 
782–83 (Iowa 1975); see also State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa 1979) 
(“Punishment must fi t the particular person and circumstances under consid-
eration; each decision must be made on an individual basis, and no single factor, 
including the nature of the off ense, will be solely determinative”).
123. For example, in Washington, the state guidelines contain “no provision com-
parable to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6,” which, as discussed above, expressly discourages 
the consideration of family ties and responsibilities. State v. Law, 110 P.3d 717 
(Wash. 2005). Rather, the Washington sentencing scheme “explicitly prohibit[s] 
such considerations” when considering departures. Id. at 725. Th e state simply 
requires a “substantial and compelling reason[]” to depart from the state guide-
lines. Id. at 733 (Sanders, J., dissenting); see also People v. Coleman, No. 231299, 
2002 WL 1340891, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. June 18, 2002) (holding that under the 
sentencing statute in Michigan, a court may depart from minimum sentence if 
it fi nds “substantial and compelling reasons” to do so; defendant’s family ties did 
not constitute a reason to depart downward).
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124. Malone v. State, 58 P.3d 208, 210 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that when 
jury decides punishment for noncapital off enses “there simply is no provision 
allowing for mitigating evidence to be presented in the sentencing stage of 
the trial. Th is is a limitation enacted by our Legislature, and the limitation 
is undoubtedly constitutional. . . . [A] criminal trial is not to be based upon 
so-called ‘character’ evidence, and the same principle applies to sentencing 
proceedings”).
125. Th e courts in Florida must also bear in mind that the “primary purpose of sen-
tencing is to punish the off ender. Rehabilitation and other traditional consid-
erations continue to be desired goals of the criminal justice system but must 
assume a subordinate role.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701.
126. See Commonwealth v. Langill, No. ESCR2002-729, 2003 WL 22459077, at *3 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2003) (enumerating a list of mitigating factors, in-
cluding family ties and responsibilities, in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211E § 3(d)); 
Commonwealth v. Morris, No. ESCR2002-1227, 2003 WL 22004943, at *6 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 2003) (legislature’s intent was for the court to refer to the 
nonexclusive list of mitigating factors found in Massachusetts Sentencing Act, 
which included family ties and responsibilities of off ender).
127. State v. Luke, 917 So. 3d 1226, 1228 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that, when sen-
tencing an off ender, courts should consider, inter alia, “age, family ties, marital 
status” but noting that “[t]here is no requirement that specifi c matters be given 
any particular weight at sentencing”); State v. Douglas, 914 So. 2d 608, 610 (La. 
Ct. App. 2005) (“Th e important elements which should be considered are the 
defendant’s personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employ-
ment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of off ense and the likelihood of 
rehabilitation.”); State v. Fultz, 591 So. 2d 1308, 1310 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (uphold-
ing sentence after trial court considered “defendant’s age, employment, family 
ties and responsibilities, and criminal history”).
128. Pennsylvania’s sentencing guidelines themselves do not suggest specifi c miti-
gating factors, see 204 Pa. Code § 303.1 (2006), but the law in Pennsylvania does 
require consideration of alternatives to incarceration, and the rules for pro-
bation state that courts should, when deciding whether to impose probation 
instead of incarceration, consider whether “[t]he confi nement of the defendant 
would entail excessive hardship to him or his dependents.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 9722 (2006).
129. Utah has sentencing guidelines that courts are encouraged to use as a 
starting point. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(7)(e) (2002) (“In determining a just 
sentence, the court shall consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission.”). 
Th ose guidelines state that courts may consider mitigating a sentence 
when an adult off ender has “exceptionally good . . . family relationships . . . 
[or i]mprisonment would entail excessive hardship on off ender or dependents.” 
Utah Sent’g Comm’n, 2006 Adult Sentencing and Release Guidelines 
17 (2006), available at http://www.sentencing.utah.gov/Guidelines/Adult/
AdultGuidelineManual2006.pdf.
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130. Wisconsin has a purely advisory guidelines system in place, and the guide-
lines provide that courts may mitigate the sentence of a defendant when he 
has “strong and stable ties to family and community.” See Wis. Sent’g Comm’n, 
Wisconsin Sentencing Guidelines Notes 7 (2003), available at http://wsc.
wi.gov/docview.asp?docid=3297.
131. State v. Turner, No. M2003-02064-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2775485, at *6 n.2 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 1, 2004) (“[T]his court has stated that . . . work ethic and 
family contribution are entitled to favorable consideration under Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 40-35-113(13).”); see also State v. McKnight, 900 S.W.2d 
36, 55 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (“Th e defendant would normally be due some 
favorable consideration based upon his family contributions and work ethic. 
Because, however, the ‘help’ he provided to young people was improperly mo-
tivated, the factor is inapplicable here.”). Th e sentencing statutes in Tennessee 
also permit sentence mitigation if the defendant committed the off ense in order 
to “provide necessities for the defendant’s family or the defendant’s self.” Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 40-35-113(7) (2006).
132. State v. Johnson, 640 P.2d 861, 867 (Ariz. 1982) (“[S]entencing judge listened to 
the mitigating evidence before him and apparently concluded that appellant’s 
family ties, military record, and good reputation did not off set the seriousness 
of appellant’s murderous design.”).
133. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16 (2006). North Carolina’s Sentencing Guidelines 
permit mitigation of sentences when “[t]he defendant supports the defendant’s 
family” and when the “defendant has a support system in the community.” Id.
134. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 894.1.B(31) (2006).
135. See, e.g., State v. Baker, No. 02-1332, 2003 WL 22339644, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 
2003) ( fi nding no abuse of discretion where trial court, which was required to state 
on the record its reasons for sentencing in a particular way, said to defendant, in 
explaining its imposition of sentence, that “you lack a stable residence; you have 
no family ties to the area, or [sic] no substantial family ties to the area”).
136. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 7300.4A(1) (2003); see also Dan-
iel Glaser, The Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System 366 (1964) 
(interaction with family members promotes rehabilitation); Am. Correctional 
Ass’n, Manual of Correctional Standards 542 (1966) (stating that family 
members “should be permitted and encouraged to maintain close contact with 
the inmate”); Am. Prison Ass’n, A Manual of Correctional Standards 342 
(1954) (parole success depends on family ties during incarceration); Comm’n on 
Accreditation for Corrections, Manual of Standards for Adult Cor-
rectional Institutions 88 (1981) (same). Th e Bureau provides in its bill of 
rights for inmates that inmates “have the right to visit and correspond with 
family members and friends.” Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 
5270.07 § 541.12(5) (1987).
137. See generally Virginia L. Hardwick, Note, Punishing the Innocent: Unconstitution-
al Restrictions on Prison Marriage and Visitation, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 275, 295–98 
(1985) (arguing that families have a constitutional right to see their imprisoned 
family members).
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138. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1984) (“Prison inmates have 
no absolute constitutional right to visitation.”); Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656, 
674 (D. Nev. 1975) (“So long as there are reasonable alternative means of commu-
nication, a prisoner has no First Amendment right to associate with whomever he 
sees fi t.”); see also Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 124 F.3d 774, 779 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing and 
following Bellamy); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1977) (leav-
ing visitation regulations to prison administrators); Harris v. Th igpen, 727 F. Supp. 
1564, 1581 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (citing and following Newman); Th ompson v. Bland, 
664 F. Supp. 261, 262 (W.D. Ky. 1986) (same); White v. Keller, 438 F. Supp. 110, 115 
(D. Md. 1977) ( fi nding that the incarcerated have no right to visitation).
139. See Griff en v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 122–23 (N.Y. 1996) ( fi nding a prison policy 
that required attendance in a religiously oriented substance abuse program to qual-
ify for the prison’s Family Reunion program to violate the Establishment Clause); 
McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 742, 764 (W.D. La. 1982) (rejecting policy prevent-
ing children under fourteen from seeing their jailed parents); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 
437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (holding that “visitation privileges may be cur-
tailed as a punishment for disciplinary infractions” but “may not be so great as to 
infringe upon inmates’ First Amendment rights to familial association”).
140. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984); Bell v. Wolfi sh, 441 U.S. 520, 
547–48 (1979); Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 538 (N.Y. 1987) (ruling that a 
prison can exclude inmates with HIV/AIDS from family visitation programs); In 
re Dyer, 20 P.3d 907, 912 (Wash. 2001) ( fi nding that prison authorities have wide 
discretion to administer an extended visitation policy because “[i]t is not in the 
best interest of the courts to involve themselves in the ‘day-to-day management 
of prisons, often squandering judicial resources with little off setting benefi t 
to anyone. Courts ought to aff ord appropriate deference and fl exibility to state 
offi  cials trying to manage a volatile environment.’” (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 
515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995))).
141. But see Jeremy Travis, Families and Children, Fed. Probation, June 2005, at 31, 
37 (“[M]any prisons narrowly defi ne the family members who are granted visit-
ing privileges.”).
142. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (upholding prison regulations 
that impose two-year visitation bans and regulations that excluded visits by 
minor nieces and nephews and children as to whom parental rights had been 
terminated). As the regulations upheld in Bazzetta did allow visits between an 
inmate and her own children, grandchildren, and siblings, the Court did “not 
imply . . . that any right to intimate association is altogether terminated by incar-
ceration or is always irrelevant” in evaluating the legitimacy of prison policies. 
Id. at 131. In Bazzetta, however, the Court found a legitimate penological interest 
in excluding certain extended family members from visitation. Id. at 126–27.
143. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 7300.4A(1) (2003).
144. See Lanette P. Dalley, Imprisoned Mothers and Th eir Children: Th eir Often Confl ict-
ing Legal Rights, 22 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 1, 40–43 (2001); Philip M. Genty, 
Permanency Planning in the Context of Parental Incarceration: Legal Issues and 
Recommendations, 77 Child Welfare 543, 545–46 (1998); Heidi Rosenberg, 
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California’s Incarcerated Mothers: Legal Roadblocks to Reunifi cation, 30 Golden 
Gate U. L. Rev. 285, 325–26, 329–30 (2000).
145. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 361.5(e)(1) (West 2007); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 
384-b(2)(b), 7( f ) (McKinney 2007).
146. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5270.07 (1987).
147. Id. § 570.32(a)(2).
148. Id. § 570.31(a)(1). Such furloughs are also granted “to enrich specifi c institution 
program experiences.”
149. Id. § 570.32(a)(1) (defi ning immediate family as “mother, father, step-parents, 
foster parents, brothers and sisters, spouse, and children”).
150. Id. § 570.32(a)(3).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
152. Notably, it is easier to accomplish this accommodation for men than it is for 
women; there are many fewer prisons with female populations. See Myrna S. 
Raeder, A Primer on Gender-Related Issues Th at Aff ect Female Off enders, 20 Crim. 
Just. 4, 18 (2005) [hereinafter Raeder, A Primer].
153. 196 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 1999).
154. Id.
155. Raeder, A Primer, supra chap. 1, n. 152, at 11, 18.
156. Id. at 17.
157. Id.; see also Myrna S. Raeder, Creating Correctional Alternatives for Nonviolent 
Women Off enders and Th eir Children, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 377 (2000).
158. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5553.06, Escapes/Deaths No-
tification (updated 1999).
159. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement 5355.03, Parenting Program 
Standards (updated 1995).
160. Id.
161. It bears mention that our study of family ties benefi ts in this book is more fo-
cused than the one we wrote about in our article in 2007. See Dan Markel, Jen-
nifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 
2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1147 [hereinafter Markel, Collins & Leib, Family Ties]. Th ere 
we wrote about the criminal justice system’s promotions of family interests 
without focusing our inquiry, as we do here, on the issue of whether a defen-
dant’s family status is examined by the law in question. Here we are focused 
on facial family ties benefi ts to defendants, though we acknowledge that this 
analysis may imperfectly survey that landscape.
•  Chapter 2. A Normative Framework for Family Ties 
Benefi ts
1. See, e.g., Travis, supra chap. 1, n. 141, at 37 (“[M]any prisons narrowly defi ne the family 
members who are granted visiting privileges. Michigan’s corrections department, for 
example, promulgated regulations in 1995 restricting the categories of individuals 
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who are allowed to visit a prisoner. Th e approved visiting list may include minor 
children under the age of eighteen, but only if they are the prisoner’s children, 
stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings. Prisoners who are neither the biological 
parents nor legal stepparents of the children they were raising do not have this 
privilege. . . . Many prisoners’ extended family networks, including girlfriends and 
boyfriends who are raising prisoners’ children, are not recognized in these narrow 
defi nitions of ‘family.’”). See generally Murray, supra chap. 1, n. 100.
2. As we explain in Chapter 3, we fi nd the bright-line marriage rule impossible 
to justify. Others agree that same-sex partners ought to be granted the same 
privilege rights that married couples get. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Brannen, Unmar-
ried with Privileges? Extending the Evidentiary Privilege to Same-Sex Couples, 
17 Rev. Lit. 311 (1998) (arguing that same-sex couples should be entitled to 
claim spousal privileges); Elizabeth Kimberly (Kyhm) Penfi l, In the Light of Reason 
and Experience: Should Federal Evidence Law Protect Confi dential Communica-
tions Between Same-Sex Partners?, 88 Marq. L. Rev. 815, 845 (2005) (“[T]he debate 
between those who would protect communications between same-sex part-
ners and those who would not more readily resembles the paradigmatic dispute 
between Antigone and Creon. Th ose who, like Creon, believe the current, state-
imposed laws are inviolate will refuse the privilege. Th ose who, like Antigone, 
believe the eternal laws of family loyalty and ethical choice supercede the state’s 
current pronouncement of the law will seek to apply the privilege.”); Nancy D. 
Polikoff , Ending Marriage As We Know It, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 201, 202 (2003) 
(advocating “sweeping reform” in rewarding diverse adult relationships, rather 
than just marriage).
3. Of course, the exclusion of people here is not a problem unique to the criminal law 
context. And the fact of a benefi t’s underinclusiveness is not a suffi  cient reason to 
jettison the benefi t, but rather is a potential reason to expand who receives it.
4. It bears mention, though, that many jurisdictions confer a right to a willing spouse 
to testify.
5. See Chapter 5.
6. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1(B) (2006).
7. Consequently, in the federal context, it might appear that family ties actually work 
against some defendants because of the broad network of persons on which they 
might rely. On this view, this could seem more like a burden on defendants with 
family ties than a benefi t to them. We disagree. By narrowing the class of off enders 
who might benefi t from family ties departures to simply those who occupy a role 
of irreplaceable caregiver, the cases implementing the 5H1.6 provision help ensure 
that defendants with family ties are not benefi ted vis-à-vis those similarly situated 
defendants without any special family ties or responsibilities.
8. Th e federal courts, in other words, expand the notion of family capaciously 
for purposes of sentencing but restrict it for purposes of extending evidentiary 
privileges.
9. See George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships 
3 (1993).
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10. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, in Harmful 
Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self, and Morality 199–200 (2002) (originally 
published at 105 Harv. L. Rev. 959 (1992)).
11. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Alone Together: Law and the Meanings of 
Marriage 15–29 (1999); Regan, supra intro., n. 24, at 2067–89.
12. Th ese accounts of the self have their roots in the early communitarian theories 
of Charles Taylor and Michael J. Sandel. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: 
The Making of the Modern Identity 3–24 (1989) (developing the idea that 
selves have “inescapable frameworks” that any theory of justice and the state 
must accommodate); Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity 37–39 
(1991) (developing the idea of the self with “horizons of signifi cance”); Michael 
J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982) (developing the idea of 
the “encumbered” self ).
13. For more on the distinction between associative and general duties, see Samuel 
Scheffler, Families, Nations, and Strangers, in Boundaries and Allegiances: 
Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought 48, 49–50 
(2001).
14. A variant of this argument is off ered by Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Th e Constitution-
al Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 144, 147 (2003) [hereinafter 
Hills, Constitutional Rights]. Drawing on Joseph Raz, The Morality of Free-
dom 38–69 (1986), Hills suggests that state offi  cials should defer to decisions 
made by competent “private governments”—of which the family is an example. 
Hills, supra, at 193–96. Such private governments promote individual freedom 
and should be accorded special associational rights and liberties. Hills’s presump-
tion that families’ internal decision-making processes should command defer-
ence holds so long as the decision at issue would be more likely to be handled 
appropriately by the private government than by the state. In what follows, we 
ultimately contest the notion that the family and its internal decision-making 
process should receive any deference by the state in the criminal law context. 
Th is is ultimately no real challenge to Hills, who concedes that deferring to pri-
vate governments may be inappropriate if such deference does not improve deci-
sions. See id. at 195–96. Nevertheless, with Hills, we are mindful that the state can 
draw on the family’s comparative expertise and effi  ciency—and appreciate that 
these reasons may sometimes help as a basis for distributing certain benefi ts or 
burdens in the realm of distributive justice institutions.
15. See Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, De-
ontological, and Empirical, 67 Cambridge L.J. 145 (2008) (“If the criminal law 
tracks the community’s intuitions of justice in assigning liability and punish-
ment, it is argued, the law gains access to the power and effi  ciency of stigma-
tization, it avoids the resistance and subversion inspired by an unjust system, it 
gains compliance by prompting people to defer to it as a moral authority in new 
or grey areas (such as insider trading), and it earns the ability to help shape 
powerful societal norms.”); see also Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Th e Utility 
of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453 (1997).
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16. Plato, The Republic 155–68 (Francis MacDonald Cornford ed. 1945).
17. Linda C. McClain, Care As a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and 
Republicanism, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1673, 1674 (2001).
18. Linda C. McClain, Negotiating Gender and (Free and Equal) Citizenship: Th e Place 
of Associations, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1569, 1569 (2004); see also Martha Fineman, 
The Autonomy Myth, at xviii (2004) (“It is very important to understand the 
roles assigned to the family in society—roles that otherwise might have to be 
played by other institutions, such as the market or the state.”). Although space 
constraints have prevented us from giving the subtle and important work of 
McClain and Fineman its due, we think it important to give a fl avor of this form 
of argument in the text.
19. See Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an 
Ethic of Care 3 (1993); Deborah Stone, Why We Need a Care Movement, 
Nation, Mar. 13, 2000, at 13, 15.
20. Stone, supra chap. 2, n. 19, at 15.
21. Some feminists remain suspicious of the “ethic of care” because it seems intrinsi-
cally gendered—and using the state to promote care might only further ensnare 
women in particular into the hard work of caring. See Joan Williams, Unbend-
ing Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What To Do About It 179 
(2000).
22. McClain, supra chap. 2, n. 18, at 1569.
23. See Braman, supra intro., n. 20, at 6–7.
24. See Nancy Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 
(2000); Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History (2000).
25. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 491, 530 
(2005) (arguing that we can furnish respect for intimate relationships through 
various means—and need not pursue all strategies at once in every issue area).
26. Samuel Scheffler, Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism, in Boundaries and 
Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought, 
supra chap. 2, n. 13, at 121.
27. Cf. Markus Dirk Dubber, Th e Power to Govern Men and Th ings: Patriarchal 
Origins of the Police Power in American Law, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 1277, 1345 (2004) (de-
scribing the patriarchal genealogy of the modern police power and noting that 
a clear view of the origins of state power can help achieve the legitimate use of 
power).
28. See Trammel v. United States, 440 U.S. 40 (1980) (describing the origin of the privi-
lege).
29. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); see also Lehr v. Robertston, 463 U.S. 248, 
256 (1983) (“Th e intangible fi bers that connect parent and child have infi nite 
variety. Th ey are woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with 
strength, beauty, and fl exibility.”).
30. See generally Jennifer M. Collins, Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet: Th e Crimi-
nal Justice System’s Romanticization of the Parent-Child Relationship, 93 Iowa L. 
Rev. 131 (2007).
31. See Wayne Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 321 (2003).
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32. Terry Davidson, Conjugal Crime: Understanding and Changing the Wifebeating 
Pattern 99 (1978); Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 339; see also Mason Th omas, Child 
Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 
50 N.C. L. Rev. 293, 295 (1972) (explaining that doctrine of patria potestas also 
gave a father the right to “kill, mutilate, sell, or off er his child in sacrifi ce”).
33. Pleck, supra chap. 1, n. 67, at 17–33.
34. Id. at 27–29; see also Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 340.
35. See generally Elizabeth Pleck, Criminal Approaches to Family Violence, 
1640–1980, in Family Violence 19, 19–57 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry, 
eds., 1989) (describing the history of reform eff orts in matters of family violence). 
Pleck notes that “[t]he greater the defense of the rights and privileges of the 
traditional family, the lower the interest in the criminalization of the family.” 
Id. at 20.
36. See, e.g., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146–48 (1871); Commonwealth v. McAfee, 
108 Mass. 458, 461 (1871).
37. See Reva B. Siegel, “Th e Rule of Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
Yale L.J. 2117 (1996).
38. Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 341 (“Child abuse, by mothers and fathers alike, 
similarly continued without signifi cant intervention.” (citing 1 Joel Prentiss 
Bishop, Commentaries on the Criminal Law §§ 878–891 (Little Brown 
5th ed. 1872) (elaborating upon the chastisement right in families))); Robert 
W. Ten Bensel et al., Children in a World of Violence: Th e Roots of Child Maltreat-
ment, in The Battered Child 3 (Mary Edna Helfer et al. eds., 5th ed. 1997) 
(providing historical survey of child abuse). As Logan explains, it was not until 
the widespread use of x-ray technology, which could discern evidence of abuse 
that children were too afraid to discuss, that the tide changed, and jurisdic-
tions began adopting criminal laws against child neglect or abuse. Logan, supra 
chap. 2, n. 31, at 342–43.
39. According to Logan, “[m]arital rape, as of the mid-1980s, largely remained a legal 
impossibility, with the drafters of the infl uential Model Penal Code expressing 
concern over ‘unwarranted intrusion of the penal law into the life of the family.’”
Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 347; see also Model Penal Code § 213.1 cmt. 
8(c) (1985).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring units of government to “en-
courage or mandate arrests of domestic violence off enders based on prob-
able cause that an off ense has been committed” to be eligible for certain 
grants); Miller & Wright, supra chap. 1, n. 90, at 331–40 (discussing changes 
in police responses to domestic violence); Lawrence W. Sherman et al., 
Policing Domestic Violence: Experiments and Dilemmas (1992); Deborah 
Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1843, 1851–56 (2002); Cheryl Hanna, Th e Paradox of Hope: 
Th e Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1505, 
1518–19 (1998).
41. See R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 Am. 
J. Crim. L. 339, 348 (2006) (distinguishing soft from hard no-drop policies).
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42. See Coker, Crime Control, supra chap. 1, n. 64, at 803–05; Linda G. Mills, Killing 
Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 
550, 569–70 (1999); Suk, supra chap. 1, n. 66, at 45. But see Annalise Acorn, Sur-
viving the Battered Reader’s Syndrome, or: A Critique of Linda G. Mills’ Insult to 
Injury: Rethinking Our Responses to Intimate Abuse, 13 UCLA Women’s L.J. 335, 
340 (2005); Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 350 (surveying counter-arguments and 
studies supporting claim that welfare and autonomy of women are improved 
through tough policies on domestic violence).
43. Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf: Elder Abuse and Neglect—the 
Legal Framework, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 77 (1998); Audrey S. Garfi eld, Note, Elder Abuse 
and the States’ Adult Protective Services Response: Time for a Change in California, 
42 Hastings L.J. 859 (1991).
44. Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Sphere While 
Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 325 (1999); Ruthann 
Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law and Lesbian Legal Th eory, 
20 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 567 (1990); Symposium, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender Communities and Intimate Partner Violence, 29 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
121 (2001).
45. Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 347; see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: 
A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1373, 1482 (2000) (noting the “par-
tial norm and uneven” reform of marital rape law).
46. Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 347 (citing Murray A. Straus, Beating the 
Devil Out of Them: Corporal Punishment in American Families (1994); 
Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal 
Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 353 
(1998); David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of Children by 
Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 147 (1998)).
47. Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 372 (citing Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, 
Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Find-
ings from the National Violence Against Women Survey III (2000)) 
(estimating that 4.8 million women experience every year some form of sexu-
al or physical abuse, and that annually about 2.9 million men endure physical 
assaults by their partners).
48. Id. at 348.
49. If our skepticism toward family ties benefi ts were implemented in law and prac-
tice, we might see the state’s criminal justice system serve as a vehicle to inter-
rupt and upend patterns of private patriarchy and domination. But this would 
only be a fi rst step; as Laura Rosenbury pointed out to us in a comment on an 
earlier draft, reducing private patriarchy would not address the various ways the 
state’s institutions historically perpetuated its own kind of public patriarchy.
50. See supra chap. 1.
51. Fletcher, supra chap. 2, n. 9, at 81 (arguing that the perjury rationale for the 
intrafamilial privileges might justify it where other rationales fail).
52. See 5 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 338 (1827).
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53. Cf. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 283 (1983).
54. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is an 
essential part of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
55. Moreover, with the right alternative measures available, some scholars have sug-
gested that there is good reason to revisit the wisdom of the exclusionary rule. 
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: 
First Principles 20–31 (1997).
56. See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and Antidis-
crimination Law, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1194, 1198 (2000) (noting that liberal 
discourse normally entails commitments which respect that “individuals, and 
not groups, are the primary political units and bearers of rights; [and] that equal-
ity means, fi rst and foremost, the right of every individual to ‘equal respect and 
concern’ in pursuit of her conception of the good”).
57. See Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1452–74 (2004) [hereinafter 
Markel, Against Mercy].
58. Th is account draws from Jean Hampton’s discussion in Jeffrie Murphy & Jean 
Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 157–61 (1988), and Markel, Against Mercy, 
supra chap. 2, n. 57, at 1453–56.
59. Of course, the degree of disruption to the equality norm is diminished if the 
liability of the off ender is established and the leniency aff ects only the sentence 
incrementally rather than the fact of being adjudged guilty.
60. Indeed, various feminist scholars have emphasized the importance of holding 
women accountable when they are off enders. See Kay Levine, No Penis, No Prob-
lem, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 357, 385 n.125 (2006); cf. Martha Mahoney, Women’s 
Lives, Violence and Agency, in The Public Nature of Private Violence 59, 64 
(Martha Fineman & Roxanne Mykituik eds., 1994) (discussing how it is “so dif-
fi cult” for us “to see both agency and oppression in the lives of women”).
61. Th us, when family members receive punishment discounts on account of who the 
victim was, we are saying that their victim is not worth the same amount as she 
would have been if the victim were not a family member. Cf. Andrew von Hirsch, 
Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments 73 (1976) (“[D]isproportionately 
lenient punishment for murder implies that human life—the victim’s life—is not 
worthy of much concern.”).
62. But see Peter Westen, Th e Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982) (ar-
guing that the rhetoric of equality should be abandoned). It is true that Peter 
Westen cleverly shows why the concept of equality itself is, in some very real 
sense, tautological, circular, and uninteresting. Th at likes should be treated alike 
is also not actually true as an independent moral principle: if someone said to 
treat all murderers to green lollipops equally, we would think they were crazy, not 
egalitarians. His very reasonable point is that the substantive moral rules that tell 
us who are relevant equals and how to treat any one individual from that class 
contain all the relevant data to perform any moral calculus. Th e equality principle 
only contains what we already know—that the rule that prescribes conduct or 
treatment of one person in a group would likewise apply to anyone else with 
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the same relevant conduct or orientation. Id. at 572–73. He delightfully argues 
that “justice” fares little better, rendering “equal justice under law” one big empty 
redundancy. See id. at 558.
   Still, we think Westen’s thesis goes too far when he calls equality (and by ex-
tension, justice) an “empty vessel with no substantive moral content of its own.” 
Id. at 547. For our purposes, the ideal of equality is a proxy for the uncontro-
versial claim that the criminal justice system’s intrinsic legitimacy rests on its 
ability to treat all fairly, without favoring certain classes of citizens because of 
morally irrelevant characteristics. Having a family—like being of a certain race 
or religion—may be psychologically relevant to a person’s identity; but it is 
often morally irrelevant from the standpoint of determining criminal liability. Th e 
principle of equality functions as a stand-in for the more general point that a 
person’s status as a family member ought not, in principle, be a mitigating or 
aggravating factor in the administration of punishment. Making assumptions 
that family members are entitled to a special brand of criminal justice is incon-
sistent with the criminal justice system’s focus on distributing punishment for 
culpability without favoring the status of an off ender.
 More generally, we are sympathetic to the response to Westen’s article made 
by Kent Greenawalt. See Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equal-
ity?, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1167, 1169–70 (1983) (“Th e applicability of the principle 
[of equality] provides an additional moral reason for complying with an 
established standard of how people are to be treated. In many situations the 
principle also aff ects the substantive conclusions that can properly be reached, 
bearing on whether diff erences in ultimate treatment are warranted and, if 
so, on the methods for determining how choices among individuals are to be 
made. [And s]omewhat less directly, the principle also aff ects how justifi cations 
of unequal treatment should proceed and what should be done in instances 
of uncertainty over whether people are relevantly alike or unalike.”). But see 
Peter Westen, To Lure the Tarantula from Its Hole: A Response, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 
1186 (1983).
63. See generally Darryl Brown, Th ird Party Harms in Criminal Law, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 
1383 (2004). Importantly, we recognize that many aspects of the criminal jus-
tice system have a disparate—and profoundly troubling—impact on family life 
in minority communities. See, e.g., Braman, supra intro., n. 20, at 1–11 (providing 
an ethnography of eff ects of incarceration on family and community life in the 
District of Columbia); Dorothy E. Roberts, Criminal Justice and Black Families: 
Th e Collateral Damage of Over-Enforcement, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1005 (2001); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Th e Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African 
American Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1271 (2004). We also recognize that 
our current sentencing regime has particularly harsh consequences for incarce-
rated mothers and their children. See, e.g., Raeder, supra chap. 1, n. 117, at 678–99. 
Rather than use the criminal justice system to confer benefi ts just on members of 
favored groups such as traditional nuclear families, however, we believe a better 
response would be more sanity with respect to drug law enforcement, less harsh 
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sentencing policies, expanded use of the coercion or duress doctrines, and 
greater use of alternatives to incarceration. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Are Shaming 
Punishments Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the 
Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2157 (2001) [hereinafter Markel, 
Shaming Punishments]; Dan Markel, Wrong Turns on the Road to Alternative 
Sanctions: Refl ections on the Future of Shaming Punishments and Restorative Jus-
tice, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1385 (2007). Additionally, if we want to direct benefi ts to im-
prove family life, we believe it more appropriate to do so through the distributive-
justice institutions of social policy and not through criminal justice “benefi ts” 
that are indirect and potentially more costly along other dimensions.
64. Bentham, supra chap. 2, n. 52, at 338.
65. Id. at 340.
66. “Criminal families” exist well beyond the Godfather trilogy. For a good introduc-
tion to scholarship about criminal families, see Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian 
Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (1993).
67. United States v. Menyweather, 431 F.3d 692, 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J., 
dissenting).
68. United States v. Guy, 174 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the trial court 
acknowledged that incarcerating the defendant would impose hardship on her 
family but was averse to creating a situation “where a person could steal with 
relative impunity and not expect incarceration simply because they come from a 
large family, or have responsibilities for a large family”).
69. Cf. Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, The Family and the Law 368 (1965) (quoting 
Dwight Eisenhower, who, when considering clemency for Ethel Rosenberg’s es-
pionage conviction, noted that “if there would be any commuting of the woman’s 
sentence without the man’s then from here on the Soviets would simply recruit 
their spies from among women.”).
70. For example, do states with particularly vigorous parental discipline defenses 
have a higher rate of child abuse? In states that exempt family members from 
prosecutions for harboring fugitives, are prosecutors encountering signifi cant 
obstructive activity from family members?
71. Importantly, we do not rank the relative importance of these concerns. Nor do we 
argue that a benefi t must trigger a certain number of the relevant considerations 
to off end our normative framework.
•  Chapter 3. Applying the Framework to Family Ties 
Benefi ts
1. Th is refers to sentences to be served by an “irreplaceable caregiver” that are de-
layed until a point when the need for care is diminished or alternative means of 
care are secured.
2. Developments in the Law, supra chap. 1, n. 9, at 1577.
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 3. Id.
 4. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958).
 5. See, e.g., Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United 
States 544 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that spousal immunity “was never supported by 
any but specious reasons”); 8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2228 (arguing that 
spousal immunity is “the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible 
obstruction to truth in practice”); David Medine, Th e Adverse Testimony Privilege: 
Time to Dispose of a “Sentimental Relic,” 67 Or. L. Rev. 519 (1988).
 6. See 2 Stone & Taylor, supra chap. 1, n. 5, § 5.08.
 7. Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11, at 90. Most importantly, the spousal privilege disad-
vantages victims of domestic abuse, especially in a post-Crawford landscape. See 
generally Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41 (describing how Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36 (2004), makes it much more diffi  cult to prosecute domestic abusers).
 8. It is worth noting that there are often exceptions to the spousal privileges: they 
tend not to apply in cases involving spousal violence, child abuse, or neglect. 
Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11, at 91. But see Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 367–69 
(citing Ala. Code § 12-21-227; D.C. Code Ann. § 14-306; Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-23; 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 223, § 20; and Mo. Ann. Stat. § 546.260, which codi-
fy adverse testimony privileges without any exception for crimes committed by 
one spouse against the other—and Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-21; N.H. R. Evid. 504; 
N.C. Gen Stat, § 8-57(c); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-30; and W. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 57-3-4, which codify spousal-communications privileges without such an excep-
tion). Th ere are a lot of nuances to how the spousal privileges apply—and those 
details extend beyond our immediate concern here. For the specifi cs regarding 
how these privileges frustrate law enforcement in the domestic violence context, 
see Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41. Federal courts tend to create an exception for joint 
criminal enterprises. See Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11, at 91 (citing United States v. 
Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 730–31 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sims, 755 F.2d 1239, 
1243 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Broome, 732 F.2d 363, 365 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
Some states have followed suit. See State v. Witchey, 388 N.W.2d 893, 895–96 (S.D. 
1986); Wolf v. State, 674 S.W.2d 831, 841–42 (Tex. App. 1984). But see Johnson v. 
State, 451 So. 2d 1024, 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); State v. White, 480 A.2d 230, 
232 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). We endorse that exception because it speaks 
directly to our fourth consideration, namely, that the privileges risk creating more 
successful criminal activity.
 9. Need for Parent/Child Privilege, 22 Champion 10, 11 (Apr. 1998) (proposal by the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers for enactment of a statutory 
parent-child communication privilege by Congress and state legislatures).
10. 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983).
11. Id. at 1304 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)).
12. Id. (citing Susan Levine, Comment, Th e Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 
Fordham L. Rev. 771, 782–83 (1979)).
13. Jessica Perry, Note, Th e Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: An Argument for Quali-
fi ed Recognition, 37 Brandeis L.J. 97, 106 (1998/1999).
14. Id.
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15. Id.
16. In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1326.
17. Th e generally acknowledged purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to 
encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients 
and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the 
administration of justice.’” Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 
(1998) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); see also 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 68 cmt. c (2000) 
(“Th e rationale for the [attorney-client] privilege is that confi dentiality enhanc-
es the value of client-lawyer communications and hence the effi  cacy of legal 
services.”).
18. United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the 
parent-child privilege could be analogized to the marital privileges insofar as they 
both contribute to family “harmony”).
19. Another option some have pursued is to claim the privilege under the First 
Amendment. See In re Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 579, 1982 WL 597412, at 
*1 (D. Conn.) (recognizing a parent-child privilege under the Free Exercise Clause 
because of the Jewish law’s prohibition from having parents testify against their 
children); see also Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 
244, 248 (10th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the claim of a fi fteen-year-old Mormon who 
invoked the Free Exercise Clause to avoid testifying against his mother). But 
see Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802, 804 (2d Cir. 1971) (refusing to grant 
such a privilege because the court was skeptical of the genuinely religious ba-
sis of the claim despite claimant’s invocation of potential “divine punishment” 
and “ostracism from the Jewish Community”). Some have also suggested that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination should be held to pro-
tect people from being forced to testify against their family members. See, e.g., 
Margaret Carlson, Should a Mom Rat on Her Daughter?, Time, Feb. 23, 1998, at 25.
20. Courts routinely apply the criteria adumbrated by John H. Wigmore in his evi-
dence treatise. 8 Wigmore, supra chap.1, n. 2, § 2192. Th e “Wigmore Test” consid-
ers four factors: (1) the communication must originate in confi dence that it will 
not be disclosed; (2) this element of confi dentiality must be essential to the full 
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties; (3) the rela-
tion must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously 
fostered; and (4) the injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure 
must be greater than the benefi t thereby gained for the correct disposal of the 
litigation. Id.
21. All of these arguments appear in In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1144 (3d Cir. 
1997).
22. Developments in the Law, supra chap. 1, n. 9, at 1474.
23. For an eff ort to think through how we might furnish testimonial privileges to 
friends, see Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of 
Friendship, 1984 Duke L.J. 631, 643–54. Levinson argues that it might be a good 
idea if people could choose to give a limited number of “privilege tickets” to 
whomever they want—thereby, deciding for themselves where they most need 
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a relationship of trust. See id. at 654–62. Th e value of friendship and family in 
political and legal life is further explored in Ethan J. Leib, Th e Politics of 
Family and Friends in Aristotle and Montaigne, 31 Interpretation: J. Pol. Phil. 
165 (2004), and Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 631 (2007) 
[hereinafter Leib, Friendship], in which Leib argues that many areas of the law 
should confer upon the friend special status and consideration.
24. It is worth noting that at least one commentator would like a “qualifi ed” 
parent-child privilege that would apply only in criminal contexts rather than 
civil contexts because the “stress placed on the family bond would be greater 
where criminal punishment was at stake.” Perry, supra chap. 3, n. 13, at 114. In 
our view, precisely because much more tends to be at stake in the pursuit 
of criminal justice, the familial privileges are especially inappropriate in the 
criminal context.
25. “[I]t hath been resolved by the Justices that a wife cannot be produced either 
against or for her husband.” 1 E. Coke, A Commentarie upon Littleton 6b 
(1628); see also 8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2227.
26. See 8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2227.
27. See Developments in the Law, supra chap. 1, n. 9.
28. Logan, supra chap. 2, n. 31, at 347. See generally Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It a 
Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 1032 (1996). Th ere are exceptions, both at common law, and today in many 
jurisdictions, for crimes against spouses or others in the household. See Cassi-
dy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 361 n.170, 367 n.205 (citing Ak. R. Evid. 505(A); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4062; Cal. Evid. Code § 970; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-107; 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-84A; Haw. Rev. Stat § 626-1; Idaho Code Ann. § 19-
3002; Ky. R. Evid. 504; Md. Code Ann., Crts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-106; Mich. Comp. 
Laws Ann. § 600.2162; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-505; Nev. 
Rev. Stat. § 49.295; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-17; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-57; Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 2945.42; Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.255; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5913; Tex. R. 
Evid. 504(B); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-271.2; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 5.60.060 (1); W. 
Va. Code Ann. § 57-3-3; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-104); see also State v. Taylor, 642 
So. 2d 160, 166 (La. 1994) (creating an exception by judicial construction); Stubbs 
v. State, 441 So. 2d 1386 (Miss. 1983) (same); State v. Benson, 712 P.2d 252 (Utah 
1985) (same). Still, as Cassidy notes, a number of jurisdictions permit no such 
exception. Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 367–68 (citing Alabama, the District of 
Columbia, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Missouri).
29. See Cassidy, supra chap. 2, n. 41, at 352 (describing how Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004), makes it much more diffi  cult to prosecute domestic abusers).
30. 8 Wigmore, supra chap. 1, n. 2, § 2192. See generally United States v. Bryan, 339 
U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
31. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
32. We are indebted to Michael O’Hear for this point.
33. We are somewhat skeptical of the capacity for decision-rule doctrines in the law 
of evidence and crimes to infl uence most people’s primary conduct. See Paul 
H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science 
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Investigation, 24 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 173 (2004). But there might be pock-
ets in the population that are especially susceptible to these rules, such as the 
families involved in organized crime; these families are repeat players and can 
obtain counsel to guide their conduct.
34. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Th eory, 112 Yale L.J. 1307, 1333 (2003).
35. Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11, at 91.
36. Mary Coombs mentioned, in her comments upon an earlier version of this 
argument, that although we emphasize that the spousal privileges are family ties 
benefi ts, we disregard the reality that the state cannot take a neutral position in 
this context: if the state did not give the “innocent” spouse a testimonial privilege, 
the state’s prosecutors would have an extra tool (and an extra sharp one, at that) 
in coercing testimony from a defendant because the state could always leverage 
pressure against the innocent spouse. We think that there remain two neutral po-
sitions, neither of which the state adopts in its current solicitude for family status. 
Either the state could aff ord testimonial privileges to a wide circle of persons that 
extend beyond the spousal context or it could aff ord no one such privileges. We 
prefer the latter approach because we see no reason to give criminals access to 
confessors, who may both help defendants evade capture and avoid confession to 
law enforcement. We do not see this preferred neutral policy as a burden on fam-
ily status because any defendant who trusts any intimate will give the prosecu-
tors a tool for coercion all the same. Most important for our purposes here is not 
neutrality as between defendant and state but neutrality as between defendants 
with family networks and those without.
37. Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-106(a) (West 2006); cf. Cal. Code Civ. Pro. 
1219(c) (West 2007) (sentencing victims of domestic violence guilty of contempt 
for counseling or community service).
38. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in 
Litigation: Its Eff ects and Social Desirability, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 597 (1989) (ques-
tioning the merits of the attorney-client privilege); see also Jeremy Bentham, Ra-
tionale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 473–75, 477, 
479 ( J. Bowring ed., 1842) (arguing that the attorney-client privilege serves to let 
the guilty go free).
39. See Chapter 1.
40. See Charles Daniels & Teresa Storch, Criminal Law, 14 N.M. L. Rev. 89, 105 (1984) 
(citing Wayne LaFave, Criminal Law 716 (4th ed. 2003)).
41. See State v. Mobbley, 650 P.2d 841, 843 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (Lopez, J., dissenting).
42. State v. C.H., 421 So. 2d 62, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
43. United States v. Hill, 279 F.3d 731, 737 n.17 (9th Cir. 2002).
44. Th e Florida court recognized the issue that “some immunized family members 
might render assistance to an off ender for reasons other than familial aff ection” 
but simply noted this did not render the statute “fatally overinclusive” under its 
constitutional analysis. C.H., 421 So. 2d at 65.
45. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
46. See, e.g., Th omas, supra chap. 2, n. 32, at 293 (describing the maltreatment of 
children from ancient Greece through twentieth-century America).
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47. See, e.g., Pleck, supra chap. 1, n. 67, at 6; Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Au-
tonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 Marq. L. Rev. 569, 572–81 (1992).
48. See Franklin Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 521, 
523–24 (1987) (using a hypothetical to suggest that if a stranger slapped a child, 
it would be considered assault and battery, but the matter would be treated very 
diff erently by the legal system if a mother slapped her own child).
49. See Th omas, supra chap. 2, n. 32, at 293 (noting “our reluctance to believe that 
parents—whom we expect to love and protect their off spring—could maltreat or 
abuse their own children, sometimes even fatally”). Th omas further notes that 
“[o]ur laws and legal systems have developed over hundreds of years around the 
notion that parents will love and protect.” Id.
50. See, e.g., Ira Lupu, Th e Separation of Powers and the Protection of Children, 61 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1317, 1324 (1994) (“[I]t is now clear that the psychological 
infl uences at play in family life are not limited to the positive sentiments of 
aff ection and concern.”). For example, the National Clearinghouse on Child Abuse 
and Neglect Information concluded that there were approximately one thousand 
four hundred child abuse and neglect fatalities in the United States in 2002, al-
though that number is in all likelihood too low because these cases are tradition-
ally underreported. See Admin. for Children & Families, Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., Child Maltreatment 51 (2002), available at http://www.acf.
hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm02/cm02.pdf.
51. See Pollard, supra chap. 1, n. 68, at 621–22.
52. Id. at 621.
53. Id. at 602–13.
54. See Marc Miller & Ronald Wright, Criminal Procedures: Prosecution 
and Adjudication, Cases, Statutes and Executive Materials 104 (3d ed. 
2007) (discussing studies and statistical evidence of eff ect of release on acquittal 
rates and sentences).
55. Raeder, A Primer, supra chap. 1, n. 152, at 8 (“Where are the children? Although 
it is estimated that nearly 20 percent of women are arrested in the presence of 
their children, relatively few police departments have developed protocols for 
child-sensitive arrest practices. Whether or not a woman had her child with her 
when she was arrested, jurisdictions vary widely about obligations of police and 
Child Services. Th us, although not typically thought of as a function of defense 
counsel, it is important to fi nd out whether the female defendant has minor 
children, and, if so, their location, because many of these women are not in in-
tact families. In other words, counsel should assume that many women will not 
have voluntarily revealed to the police that they have children or disclosed their 
whereabouts, given the realistic fear that their children may become involved in 
the foster care system, triggering the ASFA timeline leading to termination of 
family rights. Ascertaining that a woman’s children are safe will both let her focus 
on assisting in her defense, and ensure that she does not face child endanger-
ment charges if no one is at home or someone unreliable is watching the chil-
dren.”) (citation omitted); id. (encouraging lawyer to see if there “are any programs 
that will house both mother and child”). See also Clare M. Nolan, Cal. Res. 
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Bureau, Children of Arrested Parents: Strategies to Improve Their Safe-
ty and Wellbeing (2003), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/03/11/03-
011.pdf.
56. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
57. See, e.g., supra chap. 1 (discussing Johnson case at text accompanying 
note 123).
58. As previously urged by one of us (Markel), the competence criterion must be sat-
isfi ed at the time of the criminal off ense, the trial, and during the punishment 
to satisfy the moral requirement that punishment be intelligible to the off ender. 
Specifi cally, the off ender must have freely undertaken the criminal action and 
known (or reasonably should have known) that his conduct was unlawful at the 
time he committed the crime; at the time of adjudication, the off ender had to 
either freely and knowingly plead guilty or have the competence to assist in the 
preparation of his case for trial; and at the time at which the punishment is in-
fl icted, he had to be able to understand that he is being punished for his unlawful 
actions. See Markel, Against Mercy, supra chap. 2, n. 57, at 1445–46; see also Dan 
Markel, Executing Retributivism, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. ( forthcoming 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1263683 (addressing off ender competence in the 
context of punishment theory). Moreover, the sentence would need to be within 
the proper bandwidth of proportionality compared to the severity of the off ense 
and other off enders punished for a comparable off ense.
59. Reducing the sentence or relieving liability may be appropriate if the off ender 
had diminished capacity or if the crime was committed under duress because 
of a relationship with the primary off ender or because of a history of domestic 
violence within the relationship. Similarly, if there can be a causal connection 
drawn between the feature of a person that elicits someone’s compassion (i.e., 
the mother was stealing to feed her children) and the choice to commit the 
crime, then that too might be a reason for a legitimate departure. Or, if there is 
some other reason related to the merits of the case that warrants less punish-
ment: for example, the off ender has reduced the social cost of his wrongdoing by 
coming forward to the government. Absent these considerations, we can insist 
on a meaningful distinction between factors about someone’s background that, 
in the main, should not mitigate the sentence and factors surrounding someone’s 
criminal action with which an attractive vision of criminal justice is properly 
concerned. Markel, Against Mercy, supra chap. 2, n. 57, at 1466–67. Of course, all 
this assumes there are no justifi cations or excuses for the off ender either.
60. See Raeder, Gender and Sentencing, supra intro., n. 24, at 908–09; Raeder, Remember 
the Family, supra chap. 1, n. 106, at 251; Weinstein, supra chap. 1, n. 106, at 169.
61. See, e.g., Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family Relationships As a Collateral Conse-
quence of Parental Incarceration, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1671, 1680 (2003).
62. See generally Darryl Brown, Cost-Benefi t Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 
323, 343–48 (2003) [hereinafter Brown, Cost-Benefi t Analysis]; Darryl Brown, Th ird 
Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1383, 1407 (2002).
63. Cf. Paul Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullifi cation: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. Marshall L. 
Rev. 911, 919 (1997) (arguing that “[parental] training prevents more crime 
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than the deterrent eff ect of prison”). On the related claim that lengthy terms of 
incarceration are criminogenic and counterproductive, see Brown, Cost-Benefi t 
Analysis, supra chap. 3, n. 62, at 346.
64. See Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of 
Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 407, 
459 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Re-
quired? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoff s, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 711–16 (2005).
65. Of course, we also think there are a variety of noncarceral punishments that 
might be appropriate for many nonviolent crimes. One of us (Markel) has 
written on this earlier. See Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra chap. 2, n. 63.
66. To prevent the off ender from trying to delay sentencing indefi nitely, we might 
want to restrict the length of the deferral. Th us, if the crime occurs at T1, and the 
defender only has one child who is four years old, the defendant would be per-
mitted to defer sentencing for fourteen years. Th is limit would apply even if the 
defendant subsequently had more children after T1. During those fourteen years, 
the off ender would eff ectively be on probation, such that if the off ender violated 
other conditions of the delayed sentencing, the off ender would then go to prison. 
Th is does not eliminate the imposition of harms on children but it reduces, in 
part, the likelihood of such harm being realized.
67. See, e.g., Raeder, A Primer, supra chap. 1, n. 152, at 8–9. Indeed, Raeder herself typically 
centers her critique on the costs incarceration poses on nonviolent off enders.
68. See id. at 3–8.
69. A similar point may be made about the introduction of victim impact or defen-
dant impact evidence. For example, some jurisdictions limit who may off er state-
ments on behalf of victims or defendants to family members only. Although we 
are personally divided over the desirability of victim or defendant impact evi-
dence, we all agree that statutes or policies that permit only family members to 
off er statements are too narrowly crafted.
70. Raeder refers to these programs as options for mothers with children. See generally 
Raeder, Remember the Family, supra chap. 1, n. 106; Raeder, Gender and Sentencing, 
supra intro., n. 24.
71. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement 7300.4A(a), Visiting Regulations; 
see also Glaser, supra chap. 1, n. 136, at 362; Am. Correctional Ass’n, supra 
chap. 1, n. 136, at 542; Am. Prison Ass’n, supra chap. 1, n. 136, at 342; Comm’n on 
Accreditation for Corrections, supra chap. 1, n. 136, at 68; Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, Program Statement 5270.07, § 541.12(5), Inmate Rights and Re-
sponsibilities (1987).
72. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 585 (1984); Bell v. Wolfi sh, 441 U.S. 
520, 547–48 (1979); In re Dyer, 20 P.3d 907, 912 (Wash. 2001) ( fi nding that pris-
on authorities have wide discretion to administer an extended visitation policy 
because “[i]t is not in the best interest of the courts to involve themselves in 
the ‘day-to-day management of prisons, often squandering judicial resources 
with little off setting benefi t to anyone. Courts ought to aff ord appropriate defer-
ence and fl exibility to state offi  cials trying to manage a volatile environment.’” 
(quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995))).
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73. See Bureau of Prisons, Policy Statement 7300.4A(1).
74. Brenda McGowan & Karen Blumenthal, Why Punish the Children? 
A Study of Children of Women Prisoners 50–53 (1978); Genty, supra 
chap. 3, n. 61, at 1680.
75. McGowan & Blumenthal, supra chap. 3, n. 74, at 50–53; Genty, supra chap. 3, 
n. 61, at 1680.
76. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
77. Kelly Bedard & Eric Helland, Th e Location of Women’s Prisons and the Deterrence 
Eff ect of “Harder” Time, 24 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 147–49 (2004). Notably, Bedard 
and Helland are able to show that the “harder” time actually serves a deterrent 
eff ect; so what may look like a “tax” on families may in the end be an indirect way 
to keep the family together. Id. at 148–49. Th ey conclude: “[t]he evidence sug-
gests that an increase in average prison distance leads to a decrease in crime. A 
40-mile increase in the average distance to a female penitentiary reduces female 
violent crime, property crime and murder rates by 6.9, 2.3 and 13.3%, respectively.” 
Id. at 165.
   Th ese results are very provocative and suggest that a “family sensitive” loca-
tion policy may actually recommend having the state place women far away from 
their families as an indirect way to deter their participation in crime. Th e results 
of Bedard and Helland’s study suggest how empirical work could usefully illumi-
nate the relationship between family ties and criminal justice. Still, it is important 
to acknowledge that Bedard and Helland appreciate the externalities associated 
with using remote prison locations for their deterrent eff ect and do not ultimately 
endorse using “harder” time as a way to keep families together:
Th e evidence presented in this paper suggests remote prison locations and/
or restricted visitation as low cost crime deterrence mechanisms. However, 
our estimates do not quantify the welfare implications of this change. 
Increasing the distance to women’s prisons (or an outright ban on visitation) 
has clear externalities. Th ere is ample evidence that a mother’s incarceration 
has adverse eff ects on her children. It therefore seems quite likely, although 
not certain, that even more severe restrictions on maternal visitation would 
exacerbate an already bad situation for the children of female inmates. As 
such, the secondary eff ects therefore render the long-run general equilibrium 
eff ects of prison location on crime rates ambiguous.
Id. at 166 (citation omitted).
78. Th ese programs are particularly important because of the disproportionate 
harm that incarceration can visit upon mothers and their children. For 
example, women are more likely to face termination of parental rights if 
sent to prison than men, because women are more likely to have sole custody 
of their children and therefore not to have ready access to another suitable 
caregiver.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).
80. See, e.g., supra chap. 2, n. 70.
81. Cf., e.g., Bedard & Helland, supra chap. 3, n. 77, at 165–66.
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82. Elizabeth Scott and Amitai Aviram shared the reaction that average citizens 
may view certain family ties benefi ts as ways by which the state tries to induce 
compliance with the overall legal regime. Cf. Robinson & Darley, supra chap. 2, 
n. 15, at 497–99; Robinson, supra  chap. 2, n. 15. In other words, absent these ben-
efi ts and privileges, confi dence in the legitimacy of the criminal justice system 
would erode precipitously. In some such situations, prosecutors might end up 
exercising their discretion to decline exacting “full justice” because they would 
face the threat of jury nullifi cation. Th ese suggestions are provocative—as far as 
they go. But we think that the elimination of the unjustifi ed family ties benefi ts 
can be explained in a moral vocabulary (accuracy, equality, crime reduction) 
that would resonate with much of the population. Just as government has suc-
cessfully disturbed and altered social norms involving racism or sexism, so too 
could institutions of criminal justice shape social norms and not just uncritically 
refl ect them. In any event, it may turn out this concern about noncompliance is 
exaggerated; we need empirical work to study whether jurisdictions without fam-
ily ties benefi ts are suff ering from higher crime rates than those with them, and 
whether those jurisdictions that have either adopted or abandoned such benefi ts 
found any noticeable diff erences within their own jurisdiction.
83. For example, the punishment discounts given to parents, on the one hand, rup-
ture equality norms and, on the other hand, may work to reduce harms that 
young children may endure in the absence of a parent.
84. For instance, we are aware that families often help in the reintegration of off end-
ers into society, but we doubt that families would refuse to off er that help in the 
absence of family-specifi c privileges extended during the course of investigating, 
prosecuting, and punishing the predicate criminal activity.
• Part 2. Punishing Family Status
1. Justin Boggs, Parents of Slain Victorville Child Receive Long Prison Terms, Daily 
Press, Dec. 30, 2005. For examples of other recent cases where mothers have 
been prosecuted for failing to protect their children from harm infl icted by an-
other, see also Bill Scanlon, Mom Guilty in Baby’s Death, Rocky Mountain 
News, Dec. 22, 2007  (describing the case of Molly Midyette, whose ten-week-
old son died after beatings infl icted by his father); Steven Ellis, Court Upholds 
Murder Conviction for Failing to Protect Son, Metropolitan News-Enterprise, 
Mar. 12, 2008 (describing the case of Sylvia Torres Rolon, who was convicted 
of second degree murder after failing to protect her one-year-old child from a 
horrifi c night of abuse infl icted by her boyfriend).
2. We recognize that this group of burdens may fall into something of a diff erent 
category than parental responsibility laws or omissions liability, in the sense 
that a desire to enforce a certain vision of public morality might moti-
vate a state’s decision to utilize the power of the criminal law. We think it is 
important to recognize, however, that the state is promoting a certain vision 
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of family within both categories of burdens, in that it is essentially trying to 
foster an environment in which caregiving can fl ourish, and that we need to 
consider whether the use of the criminal law in these contexts in fact eff ec-
tively serves that goal. In addition, these two categories of burdens are linked 
in the sense that the existence of a certain family relationship is a prerequi-
site for imposing liability, and thus both categories warrant analysis under 
our framework.
3. We acknowledge that, in some instances, victims may feel that they, as well as 
defendants, have been harmed by family ties burdens.
4. Th ere are some exceptions—largely those associated with incest and obligations 
to pay parental support—that we discuss infra in Chapter 5.
5. We recognize this stands at odds with current constitutional doctrine that per-
mits promiscuous use of severe criminal sanctions. See generally Sherry F. Colb, 
Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is Th is Right Diff erent from All Other Rights?, 69 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 781 (1994); Douglas Husak, Th e Criminal Law As a Last Resort, 24 
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 207 (2004).
6. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); Linda K. Kerber, Women 
of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America 
138-55 (1980).
•  Chapter 4. An Overview of Family Status and 
Criminal Justice Burdens
1. Th at’s not to say that vicarious and omissions liability are only triggered in the 
familial context. Some states authorize vicarious liability prosecutions against 
corporations for the crimes of their employees and omissions liability usually 
encompasses various situations beyond failure to rescue a family member.
2. For those readers wondering, our view is that state statutes criminalizing polyg-
amy raise problems to those statutes prohibiting incest between consenting and 
competent adults. In the absence of a marital connection to a third person, X may 
marry Y. In states prohibiting polygamy, X may not marry Y on account of the prior 
relationship X entered into with Z.
3. In addition to creating criminal liability, family status is used in some jurisdictions 
as a basis for inferring a breach of trust that serves as an aggravating factor at 
sentencing. See, e.g., R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 740-41 (Can.) (“the off ence 
involved domestic violence and a breach of the trust inherent in a spousal relation-
ship. Th at aggravating factor must be taken into account in the sentencing”).
4 . See Diana Marrero & Shana Gruskin, Mom Arrested in Child’s Death; Police: Woman 
Ignored Danger by Leaving Daughter with Boyfriend, Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, 
June 21, 2002, at 1B. One of the fascinating aspects of this case is that the boy-
friend was eventually acquitted in the child’s death, so only the mother’s omission 
was punished. See Susannah Nesmith, 3 Years Later, Man Cleared in Baby’s Death, 
Miami Herald, Feb. 11, 2006, at B4.
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 5. Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 6.2 (4th ed. 2003); see also David Hyman, Res-
cue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 
653, 655 (2006) (“Th e common law approach is straightforward. Absent a limited 
number of specifi c exceptions, there is not duty to rescue, regardless of the ease 
of rescue and consequences of non-rescue.”)
 6. A very small number of states have adopted so-called “Good Samaritan” stat-
utes, imposing criminal liability in limited circumstances upon those who fail to 
rescue persons in emergency situations. See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519; R.I. 
Gen. Laws § 11-56-1 (1998).
 7. 308 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
 8. See State v. Walden 293 S.E.2d 780, 786 (1982) (denying “that parents have the 
legal duty to place themselves in danger of death or great bodily harm in com-
ing to the aid of their children”); Dressler, supra chap. 1, n. 44, at 114; Andrew 
Ashworth, Th e Scope of Criminal Liability for Omissions, 105 L.Q. Rev. 424 (1989) 
(discussing the requirement that the rescue must be an easy one).
 9. Larry Alexander, Criminal Liability for Omissions: An Inventory of Issues, in Crimi-
nal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part (S. Shute & A. Simester 
eds., 2002); see, e.g., R. v. Conde, (1867) 10 Cox Crim. 547, 549 (Cent. Crim. Ct.).
10. At common law, other status relationships could trigger a duty to rescue as well, 
such as the duty of a ship captain to the passengers. See generally LaFave, 1 Subst. 
Crim. L. § 6.2 (2007); State v. Mally, 366 P.2d 868 (Mont. 1961).
11. See Alexander, supra chap. 4, n. 9.
12. See, e.g., Muehe v. State, 646 N.E.2d 980 (Ind. 1995); see also Michelle S. Jacobs, 
Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under Failure to Protect 
Statutes, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 579, 586–87 (1998) (describing parents’ 
duties to their children).
13. See, e.g., State v. Schultz, 457 N.E.2d 336 (Ohio 1982) (upholding involuntary man-
slaughter conviction for mother who failed to protect her child during brutal 
beating by live-in boyfriend); Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. 1980) (upholding 
conviction of involuntary manslaughter for mother who failed to protect her son 
from repeated abuse by her live-in boyfriend).
14. See, e.g., People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206 (1907).
15. See State ex rel. Kuntz v. Mont. Th irteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 995 P.2d 951, 956 
(Mont. 2000).
16. See Alexander, supra chap. 4, n. 9.
17. Compare Leet v. State, 595 So. 2d 959, 963 (Fla. App. 1991) (holding that the 
live-in boyfriend of a child’s mother owed a legal duty to the child to prevent 
abuse by the mother after establishing a “family-like relationship”) with State v. 
Miranda, 878 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Conn. 2005) (overruling lower court’s conclusion 
that live-in boyfriend had duty to rescue his girlfriend’s child despite years of a 
“familial relationship with victim’s mother;” the problem of not using crisp legal 
categories is it will be too tempting to assign liability to “other members of the 
extended family, to longtime caregivers who are not related to either the par-
ent or victim, to regular babysitters, and to others with regular and extended 
relationships with the abusing parent and the abused victim”).
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18. E.g., Cornell v. State, 159 Fla. 687, 32 So. 2d 610 (1947) (conviction of grandmother 
for manslaughter by gross negligence for death of grandchild turned on facts in-
dependent of status).
19. Jill Smolowe, Parenting on Trial: A Couple Is Fined for a Son’s Crimes, Time, May 
20, 1996, at 50.
20. Id.; see also Pamela K. Graham, Note, Parental Responsibility Laws: Let the 
Punishment Fit the Crime, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1719, 1740-41 (2000).
21. See Leila Atassi, Parental-Responsibility Law Strikes a Chord: Maple Heights’ Stance 
Draws Broad Response, Clev. Plain Dealer, Apr. 30, 2006, at B1 (discussing 
widespread interest in a new parental responsibility law); see also Naomi Cahn, 
Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 399; Linda 
Chapin, Out of Control? Th e Uses and Abuses of Parental Liability Laws to Con-
trol Juvenile Delinquency in the United States, 37 Santa Clara L. Rev. 621 (1997); 
J. Herbie DiFonzo, Parental Responsibility for Juvenile Crime, 80 Or. L. Rev. 1 
(2001); Susan S. Kuo, A Little Privacy, Please: Should We Punish Parents for Teenage 
Sex?, 89 Ky. L.J. 135 (2000); Eve M. Brank et al., Parental Responsibility Statutes: 
An Organization and Policy Implications, 7 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 1 (2005); Tammy 
Th urman, Parental Responsibility Laws: Are Th ey the Answer to Juvenile Delin-
quency?, 5 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 99 (2003).
22. More often, however, parents are targets via other avenues for the misdeeds of 
their children: “statutory civil penalties for property damage caused by their 
children, eviction from public housing if criminal activity has occurred in their 
homes, and increased exposure to civil lawsuits fi led by victims of youth violence.” 
DiFonzo, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 3. A survey of the civil liability regimes around 
the country can be found in Brank et al., supra chap. 4, n. 21. For a discussion 
of these eff orts to impose tort liability on parents for the acts of their children, 
see Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, Th e Justice of Parental Accountability: Hypothetical 
Disinterested Citizens and Real Victims’ Voices in the Debate Over Expanded Paren-
tal Liability, 75 Temp. L. Rev. 375 (2002). See also Chapin, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 
629–638 ( focusing on criminal statutes).
23. See Jerry E. Tyler & Th omas W. Segady, Parental Liability Laws: Rationale, 
Th eory and Eff ectiveness, 37 Soc. Sci. J. 79, 79 (2000) (noting that the Massachu-
setts Stubborn Child Law of 1646 authorized the imposition of fi nes on parents 
whose children were caught stealing); see also Cahn, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 
405–06 (noting that “[s]tates have been enacting laws holding parents criminally 
liable for the delinquent acts of their children for almost a century,” primarily 
through the enactment of statutes making it a criminal off ense to contribute 
to the delinquency of a minor). Cahn adds that parents were frequently pros-
ecuted in juvenile courts under these laws during the fi rst half of the twentieth 
century. Id. at 406–07.
24. Leslie Joan Harris. An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws: Sending 
Messages. But What Kind and to Whom?, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 5, 6–7 (“Th is kind of 
law is more than one hundred years old, and lawmakers seem to ‘discover’ the 
idea of using parental responsibility laws to prevent teenage crime every couple 
of decades or so.”).
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25. Paul W. Schmidt, Note, Dangerous Children and the Regulated Family: Th e Shifting 
Focus of Parental Responsibility Laws, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 667, 675 n.62 (1998).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-3; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.577(1) (West 2003).
28. Id.; see also Brank et al., supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 9–10 (giving examples from Geor-
gia and Iowa).
29. N.Y. Penal Law § 260.10 (criminal liability for parent who “fails or refuses to ex-
ercise reasonable diligence” in controlling child).
30. See Act of June 21, 1995, No. 702, § 2, 1995 La. Acts 1854, 1855-56 (codifi ed 
at La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:92.2 (West Supp. 1997)) (“Improper supervision of 
a minor by parent or legal guardian”). See generally LaFave, 2 Subst. Crim. L. 
§ 13.4.
31. Schmidt, supra chap. 4, n. 25.
32. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.577(1).
33. See Maple Heights Parental Responsibility Ordinance No. 648.20; No. 698.02 (pro-
viding for sentence of 180 days in prison).
34. Maple Heights v. Ephraim, No. 90237, slip op. at 7, (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2008).
35. See Silverton, Oregon Criminal Code § 9.24, available at http://www.codepublish-
ing.com/OR/silverton/silver09.html#9.24 (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
36. See Leila Atassi, Parents to Pay for Youths’ Crimes, Clev. Plain Dealer, Apr. 19, 
2006, at B1 (quoting Mayor Hector).
37. See Idaho Code § 32-1301 (authorizing counties and cities to establish ordinanc-
es based on failure to supervise a child). Th e Idaho legislature authorized strict 
liability but permitted affi  rmative defenses based on certain factors: whether 
the parent was the victim of the juvenile misdeed; whether the parent report-
ed the misconduct; and whether the parent took reasonable precautions to 
supervise the child.
38. We have seen some estimates in the literature suggesting that in the last 
decade there were about seventeen states with criminal parental responsibility 
laws. But these numbers are misleading because some of the statutes cited are 
just general “contributing to the delinquency of a minor” statutes, which apply to 
all adults, not just parents or legal guardians.
39. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.577; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:92.2. Louisiana subjects 
parents to up to six months’ imprisonment for permitting an unlicensed minor 
driver to drive a vehicle if the minor ends up involved in an accident that resulted 
in death or serious bodily injury to another person. Th e statute also makes it 
a crime for a parent, “through criminal negligence,” to permit “the minor to as-
sociate with a person known by the parent” to be a gang member, a convicted 
felon, or a drug dealer or user. A parent convicted under this particular provision 
faces up to thirty days in a jail and a $250 fi ne. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:92.2 
(defi ning the crime of the improper supervision of a minor by a parent or 
legal guardian). Th e statute allows a parent to escape liability under these 
latter provisions if the parent sought assistance from various agencies in 
modifying the child’s behavior or if the parent referred “the child to appropriate 
treatment or corrective facilities.” Id.
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40. See, e.g., Corpus Christi, Tex., Code § 33-48 (1985) (parental duties include “[k]eeping 
illegal drugs and illegal fi rearms out of the home; [p]roviding reasonable supervi-
sion of the minor child; and [ f]orbidding the minor from keeping stolen property, 
or illegally possessing fi rearms or illegal drugs” (subsection letters omitted)); Elgin, 
Ill., Mun. Code tit. 10, ch. 10.66 (1995) (punishing parents who “willfully, know-
ingly or recklessly permit any minor” to possess “illegal drugs or drug parapher-
nalia,” or “commit an act tending to break the peace,” violate curfew, or “engage in 
street gang related criminal activity”); see also Peter Applebome, Parents Face Con-
sequences As Children’s Misdeeds Rise, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1996, at A1 (observing 
proliferation of “dozens” of ordinances in towns near Chicago in “last two years”).
41. E.g., Salt Lake City, Utah, Code §§ 11.60.010-.060 (1995); St. Clair Shores, Mich., 
Code of Ordinances § 20.565.
42. See Schmidt, supra chap. 4, n. 25, at 682 n.102 (1998) (providing examples).
43. See State v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38 (N.H. 1979); Doe v. Trenton, 362 A.2d 1200, 1203 
(N.J. 1976).
44. See Akers, 400 A.2d at 39.
45. Trenton, 362 A.2d at 1203.
46. Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993).
47. See Cal. Penal Code § 272 (1988 amendment). Th e amendment was enacted in 
response to the perception that California was in the throes of a “gang crisis.” See 
Williams, 853 P.2d at 510.
48. Id. at 509. Th e privacy challenge was dropped over the course of the litigation and 
not ruled upon by the California Supreme Court.
49. See id. at 511. Th e Court rather summarily rejected the overbreadth challenge. 
See id. at 516–17.
50. See id. at 513.
51. See Harris, supra chap. 4, n. 24, at 17 (“Anecdotal evidence shows these laws are 
almost never enforced and soon fall out of favor, only to be rediscovered in a few 
years. Th e next section of this Article reports on an empirical study of the en-
forcement of parental responsibility laws in Oregon that supports the anecdotal 
evidence.”). Harris’ study of Oregon shows that about one-third of the munici-
palities participating in the survey had parental responsibility laws, but they were 
rarely, if ever, enforced. Id. at 22–23.
52. See Schmidt, supra chap. 4, n. 25, at 684 (citing as example Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.
577(3)-(4)).
53. Jeff  Jacoby, Hypocrisy on Adult Consent, Boston Globe, Aug. 28, 2005, at C11 
(quoting sentencing judge).
54. Id. See also Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005).
55. See Courtney Cahill, Same Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics 
of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest 
Taboo, 99 N.W.U. L. Rev. 1543, 1546 (2005) (“[T]he very term ‘incest’ is a powerful 
way to provoke an almost visceral disgust toward any relationship to which it is 
compared.”).
56. People v. Baker, 69 Cal. 2d 44, 49 (1968); State v. Scion Barefoot, 31 S.C.L. 209, 
228–29 (S.C. App. 1845) (stating that at English common law, incest did not void 
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a marriage but made it voidable); Graham Hughes, Th e Crime of Incest, 55 J. Crim. 
L. Criminology & Police Sci. 322, 323–25 (1964).
57. According to one recent survey, adult consensual consanguineous pairings are 
not prohibited in Rhode Island, Ohio, and New Jersey. Note, Inbred Obscurity: 
Improving Incest Laws in the Shadow of the “Sexual Family,” 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2464, 
2469–70 (2006) (discussing the three American jurisdictions) [hereinafter Note, 
Inbred Obscurity].
58. States can also prohibit marriage between various pairings of relatives through 
their domestic relations statutes, even if they do not attach criminal penalties 
to the relationship. See Margaret Mahoney, A Legal Defi nition of the Stepfam-
ily: Th e Example of Incest Regulation, 8 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 21, 27 (1993) (noting “the 
ban on incestuous relationships is enforced under two types of state regulations”: 
fi rst, the civil laws denying recognition to marriages between certain relatives, 
and second, the criminal statutes that “punish attempted marriages, as well as 
sexual activity outside of marriage”). We focus here on the criminal statutes.
59. 41 Am. Jur. 2d Incest § 11 n.2 (providing citations). Th e defendant’s awareness 
relates to his knowledge of the relationship, not his knowledge of the law that 
punishes incest.
60. Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2465 (“Th e criminal incest laws 
in the vast majority of states apply to [consensual] incest as well by making the 
crime distinct from the crime of rape.”).
61. See Brett McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 337 (2004) 
(compiling the various state laws on incest). Ohio only targets parental fi gures 
for criminal liability for incest, and New Jersey does not penalize the parties 
to incest when both are 18 or older. Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, 
at 2469 nn.38–39.
62. Id. at 349.
63. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 670 NW.2d 802, 813 (Neb. App. 2003) (discussing 
Nebraska statute).
64. See McDonnell, supra chap. 4, n. 61 (compiling the various state laws on incest).
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Elise Soukup, After Gay Marriage, Polygamy Activism Rises, Newsweek, Mar. 
20, 2006, at 52.
68. See 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bigamy § 1. Interestingly, some states don’t require X to actu-
ally marry Y in order to be guilty of bigamy; extramarital cohabitation suffi  ces to 
trigger liability. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy 
and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 308 n.158 (2004). 
Some states also punish the single person who knowingly marries the spouse of 
another person. See 11 Am. Jur. 2d Bigamy § at §1-3. Th is type of legislation is not 
a family ties burden as we defi ne it because the state is not treating defendant X 
any diff erently on account of X’s family status or connection; rather, it’s because 
of X’s would-be spouse’s prior family connection. Th at’s not to say such legislation 
does not raise its own problems, but we are focused on those statutes that place 
burdens on persons because of their familial status.
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69. We use bigamy to refer to the criminal laws prohibiting the practice of polygamy, 
or taking on more than one spouse, regardless of gender. For a collection of biga-
my statutes, see Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68, at 290 n.51.
70. See, e.g., Kirk Johnson & Gretel C. Kovach, Daughter of Sect Leader Gets Additional 
Protection, N.Y. Times, June 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/us/
04polygamy.html (discussing conviction of FLDS sect leader, Warren Jeff s).
71. Jonathan Turley, Of Lust and the Law, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 2004, at B1.
72. Th is qualifi cation is important because if anti-fornication laws exist in a given 
jurisdiction then adultery is not really a family ties burden but a redundancy—as-
suming that fornication is sexual relations between non-married partners and 
that adultery is defi ned as sexual relations between a married person and anoth-
er person who is not the spouse. For our particular purpose, we are focused on 
adultery laws that operate in jurisdictions in which fornication (defi ned as sexual 
relations outside marriage) is not prohibited. To the extent that jurisdictions im-
pinge on all consensual sexual relations outside marriage between mature indi-
viduals, there is no specifi c family ties burden, but it goes without saying that our 
liberal commitments would trigger hostility to such laws, which persist in various 
forms in ten states and the District of Columbia. See Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68, 
at 290 n.49 (collecting statutes).
73. Adultery laws also occasionally raise issues like those discussed supra chap. 4, 
n. 68 because some jurisdictions retain laws punishing an unmarried person from 
engaging in sexual relations with a married person. Our analysis is restricted to 
those laws punishing only those married persons engaged in extramarital sex.
74. See Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68, at 299 n.107 (citing study reporting that 35 percent 
of American married men and 20 percent of American married women have 
adulterous sex).
75. See id. at 290 n.49 (collecting the statutes of twenty-three states plus the District 
of Columbia that continue to criminalize adultery).
76. Lynn D. Wardle, Parental Infi delity and the “No-Harm” Rule in Custody Litigation, 
52 Cath. Univ. L. Rev. 81, 95 n.57 (2002) (“According to the Washington Post/
Kaiser/Harvard Survey Project in 1998, eighty-eight percent of Americans 
believe that adultery is immoral, while only eleven percent fi nd it morally 
acceptable.”).
77. See Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68, at 290, n. 49.
78. See John F. Kelly, Virginia Adultery Case Roils Divorce Industry: Conviction Draws 
Attention to Little Used Law, Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 2003, at B1, B8; John F. Kelly, 
Va. Man Challenges State’s Adultery Law; ACLU Joins Appeal, Cites Privacy Issue, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 2004, at B8.
79. See Melissa Ash Haggard, Adultery: A Comparison of Military Law and State 
Law and the Controversy Th is Causes Under Our Constitution and Criminal 
Justice System, 37 Brandeis L.J. 469, 469–70, 476–77 (1998); James M. Winner, 
Beds with Sheets but No Covers: Th e Right to Privacy and the Military’s Regulation of 
Adultery, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1073, 1073–74 (1998).
80. See generally C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters but Should Marriage? Adultery, 
Fraternization, and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA Women’s L.J. 177 (1999); 
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Military Gets New Rules on Adultery: It’s Still a Crime, but Not All Cases Will Be 
Prosecuted, Chi. Trib., July 29, 1998, available at 1998 WL 2880547.
81. See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Military Leaders Worry Privately About Impact: Some 
Troops Off ended by Double Standard, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1998, at A10, available 
at 1998 WL16556190.
82. Cf. Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: Th e Injuries Infl icted by “Unenforced” 
Sodomy Laws, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 103 (2000) (arguing that even unenforced 
laws are not harmless because they create a criminal class).
83. Outside of Massachusetts and Connecticut, same-sex marriage is illegal in the 
United States, and thus adultery laws probably apply as a class only against those 
who are married, i.e., heterosexuals. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans 
in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1. In light of the recent 
events surrounding Proposition 8 in California, the status of same-sex marriage is 
still unresolved in that state, most especially for the 18,000 same-sex couples who 
were legally married before the passage of Proposition 8. Bob Egelko, Anti-gay 
Marriage Group Steps Up for Prop. 8, S.F. Chron., Nov. 11, 2008, at B-2.
84. Press Release, Offi  ce of the Governor, State of Alaska, Parent Sentenced for 
Failure to Pay Child Support (Feb. 9, 1999), available at http://csed.state.ak.us./
PressReleases/fi sher.html.
85. Id.
86. Obviously, the failure to pay the government one’s tax liabilities is criminal. But 
private parties cannot generally trigger the criminal justice system to enforce 
debts outside the child support context.
87. See Posting of Nate Oman to Concurring Opinions, Debt, Status and Fatherhood, 
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/05/ (May 25, 2007, 12:34 EST); see 
also Ronald K. Henry, Child Support at a Crossroads: When the Real World Intrudes 
upon Academics and Advocates, 33 Fam. L.Q. 235, 240 (1999) (stating that “the col-
lection tactics practiced for child support debt are tolerated for no other form of 
debt in American society”).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000).
89. Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act, Pub. L. No. 105-187, 112 Stat. 618 (1998).
90. Scott Sussman & Corey Mather, Center on Fathers, Families, and Public 
Policy, Criminal Statutes for Non-Payment of Child Support by State 1 
(2003), www.cff pp.org/publications/pdfs/crimstat.pdf. States have also tried a 
number of other measures to enforce child support orders, from garnishing wag-
es to suspending drivers’ licenses to booting cars. See Solangel Maldonado, Dead-
beat or Deadbroke: Redefi ning Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
991, 1000 (2006) (describing various eff orts); see also Jennifer Goulah, Comment, 
Th e Cart Before the Horse: Michigan Jumps the Gun in Jailing Deadbeat Dads, 83 U. 
Det. Mercy L. Rev. 479, 486 (2006) (describing how some states post “wanted” 
posters of deadbeat dads and others send birthday cards, reminding parents of 
their child’s birthday and urging them to pay).
91. See generally Ann Britton, America’s Best Kept Secret: An Adult Child’s Duty to Sup-
port Aged Parents, 26 Cal. W. L. Rev. 351, 351–52 (1990); Shannon Frank Edelstone, 
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Filial Responsibility: Can the Legal Duty to Support Our Parents Be Eff ectively En-
forced, 36 Fam. L.Q. 501 (2002); Katie Wise, Caring for Our Parents in an Aging 
World: Sharing Public and Private Responsibility for the Elderly, 5 J. Legis. & Pub. 
Pol’y 563 (2002); Andrea Rickles-Jordan, Filial Responsibility: A Survey Across 
Time and Oceans, 9 Marq. Elder’s Advisor 183 (2007); Matthew Pakula, A Fed-
eral Filial Responsibility Statute: A Uniform Tool to Help Combat the Wave of Indi-
gent Elderly, 39 Fam. L.Q. 859, 860 (2005); Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility 
Statutes: Legal and Policy Considerations, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 709, 710 (2001).
92. See Cal. Penal Code § 270c (1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-4 (2007); Ind. 
Code Ann. § 35-46-1-7 (2004); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 530.050 (2007) (Kentucky); 
Md. Code, Fam. Law §§ 13-101, 13-102, 13-103 (2006); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 273, 
§ 20 (2000); Mont. Code Ann. § 40- 6-301 (2007); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-326.1 
(2005); Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.21 (2003); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 15-10- 1 (2006); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 202, 203 (2006); Va. Code Ann. § 20- 88 (2007). See generally 
Rickles-Jordan, supra chap. 4, n. 91.
93. See Terrance A. Kline, A Rational Role for Filial Responsibility Laws in Modern So-
ciety?, 26 Fam. L.Q. 195, 196 (1992) (noting that “no state appears to enforce” fi lial 
responsibility laws).
94. See Cal. Penal Code § 270c (2008).
95. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 273, § 20 (2007).
• Chapter 5. A Framework for Analyzing Family Ties 
Burdens
1. Cf. John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice 10-15 (rev. ed. 1999).
2. Cf. e.g., R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 740-41 (Can.) (discussing the breach of 
trust associated with violence against one’s spouse as an aggravating factor in 
determining culpability).
3. But cf. Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: Th e Uneasy Case for Prosecut-
ing Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 807 (2006) (discussing results of a study 
showing that in practice, parents who lose children because of their negligent con-
duct are often treated more leniently than unrelated caregivers who cause death).
4. As we discuss in the next Chapter, one can design policies to accommodate these 
concerns in several ways.
5. See Fletcher, supra chap. 2, n. 9, at 3 (1993).
6. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of Self, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 
959 (1992).
7. See Regan, supra intro., n. 24; Regan, supra chap. 2, n. 11.
8. See Hills, Constitutional Rights, supra chap. 2, n. 14, at 147.
9. Of course, in cases in which family ties burdens are liability-creating statutes on 
the basis of status—such as bigamy, incest, or nonpayment of child support—these 
family burdens are creating a new class of criminals: persons without family status
notes to chapters 4–5
Dan Markel-Endnotes.indd   199 2/26/09   7:29:54 PM
200
 engaged in this conduct would not be criminals. But this kind of criminogen-
esis is diff erent from the way in which some of the family ties benefi ts created 
incentives to perpetrate misconduct that would be punishable regardless of the 
defendant’s family status.
   Th ere is also a plausible story to tell in which family ties burdens increase sys-
tematic inaccuracy in the criminal justice system. Because proving the elements 
of these crimes will often turn family members against one another, it may be 
harder to achieve truth-telling by relevant players, increasing judicial error rates. 
Yet this is not the sort of inaccuracy we generally had in mind in the fi rst Part of 
the book; we weren’t talking about systemic inaccuracy there but inaccuracy in 
individual cases.
10. See generally Markel, Against Mercy, supra chap. 2, n. 57.
11. On heteronormativity, see, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal 
Tax Policy, 101 W. Va. L. Rev. 129 (1998).
12. See generally Laura T. Kessler, Transgressive Caregiving, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 
(2005).
13. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Th eorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and De-
sire, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 181, 183–84 (2001); Symposium, Th e Structures of Care 
Work, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1389 (2001); Martha T. McCluskey, Caring for Workers, 
55 Me. L. Rev. 313 (2003); cf. Sasha Roseneil, Why We Should Care About Friends: An 
Argument for Queering the Care Imaginary in Social Policy, 3 Soc. Pol’y & Soc’y 409, 
411 (2004); Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 Wis. Women’s L.J. 57 (2002).
14. Cf. Larry Alexander, Consent, Punishment, and Proportionality, 15 Phil. & 
Pub. Affairs 178 (1986) (analyzing a “consensual theory of punishment” that 
“substitute[s] consent for moral desert as the justifi cation for imposing punish-
ment on specifi c individuals”).
15. Cf. Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms 24 (2000) (discussing how an actor’s 
willingness to bear certain costs or consequences can be a way of “establishing or 
preserving one’s reputation”).
16. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983) (“As a rule, one has no 
duty [under tort law] to come to the aid of another.”); 3 Fowler V. Harper 
et al., The Law of Torts § 18.6 (2d ed. 1986); Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 
§ 6.2 (4th ed. 2003).
17. Th e metaphor here reaches a bit too far since admittedly we don’t live life as 
single adults whom the state is otherwise and implicitly always watching close-
ly, ready to step in at any point as part of its own duty to rescue or support. 
Nonetheless, with every marriage or choice to parent, the actors are explicitly 
or implicitly stating their intention to care and support the other person in the 
relationship.
18. For disturbing counter-examples, consider the allegations made against 
Warren Jeff s, who was charged in a scheme of forcing young girls into marriages 
with older men, some of whom were closely related to the brides. See, e.g., John 
Dougherty, Polygamist Is Indicted in Assault of a Child, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, 
at A14; John Dougherty & Kirk Johnson, Sect Leader Is Convicted as an Accomplice 
to Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A18.
notes to chapter 5
Dan Markel-Endnotes.indd   200 2/26/09   7:29:55 PM
201
19. See generally Hendrik Hartog, Man and Wife in America: A History (2000) 
(charting changes in law and its eff ects on the American institution of marriage).
20. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 
Temp. L. Rev. 709, 777-800 (2002) (explaining why marriage might be viewed as 
compulsory).
21. See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, Th e Justice of Parental Accountability: Hypotheti-
cal Disinterested Citizens and Real Victims’ Voices in the Debate over Expanded 
Parental Liability, 75 Temple L. Rev. 375, 415 (2002) (“Parents, generally speaking, 
have made a choice to parent... Th is choice, in most cases, represents voluntary 
action....”).
22. Some have argued that women have little freedom to reject society’s expecta-
tions that they will choose to mother. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Family 
Bonds: Adoption, Infertility and the New World of Child Production 
35 (1993) (“Women are taught from birth that their identities are inextricably 
linked with their capacity for pregnancy and childbirth and that this capac-
ity is inextricably linked with mothering.”); Robson, supra chap. 5, n. 20, at 814. 
Others may perceive a religious obligation to procreate and parent despite their 
desire to do otherwise.
23. See Ethan J. Leib, A Man’s Right to Choose (an Abortion?), 28 Legal Times 60 
(2005) [hereinafter Leib, Right to Choose]. Although it is undoubtedly true that 
most “deadbeat” fathers are not individuals who had children against their 
will—in the sense that they attempted to use birth control, had semen stolen 
from them in a sexual act without vaginal penetration, or were encouraged in 
sexual situations by partners who were dishonest about their fertility status—
it is still likely true that many fathers have support obligations to children that 
they affi  rmatively would have chosen not to have were the reproductive freedom 
choice solely within their discretion.
24. Michael M. O’Hear, Yes to Nondiscrimination, No to New Forms of Criminal 
Liability: A Response to Collins, Leib, and Markel, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1437 (2008)
25. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Do Families Need Special Rules of Criminal Law?, 88 B.U. L. 
Rev. 1426 (2008) [hereinafter Hills, Families].
26. 18 U.S.C. §1346.
27. We do not disagree with Professors Hills and O’Hear that even paradigmatic 
cases of choice or consent in relationships—like the parent-child and spouse-
spouse relationship—leave us with line drawing problems in some individual 
cases. Since we think of our analysis as primarily targeted at legislators design-
ing these types of liabilities, we think the arguments of Professors Hills and 
O’Hear trying to undermine the choice involved with being a parent are perfectly 
admissible to that audience. Still, we continue to think that, diffi  culties not-
withstanding, we can impute voluntariness to the parent-child relationship in 
a world where access to birth control, abortion, and adoption exist. Professor 
Hills may be right that there are implicit “normative goals that lead us so 
easily to infer that consent exists” in these relationships. See id. But that does not 
vitiate our understanding of them as voluntary nor does it undermine our 
attribution of meaning and value to that voluntariness, complicated though that 
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voluntariness may be. See generally Ethan J. Leib, Responsibility and Social/Political 
Choices About Choice, 25 Law & Phil. 453 (2006) [hereinafter Leib, Responsi-
bility]. Moreover, whatever problems there are with imputing voluntariness to 
parenthood, three of the seven burdens—adultery, bigamy, and duty to rescue—
are also implicated in the spousal context, where imputing voluntariness is 
generally less troublesome.
28. Th e age of the person matters as does the mental competence; we can imag-
ine excluding from criminal liability those whose competence was below a 
minimum standard.
29. We use the term covenants instead of contracts, because we do not think there 
has to be bilateral exchange or consideration to make the declaration of intent to 
care for another legally binding in this context.
30. One of us has written that an opt-out should be available to fathers before birth 
under certain circumstances. See Leib, Right to Choose, supra chap. 5, n. 23. But 
this is a very special case—and it presumes a lack of consent on the part of the 
father of ever entering the relationship of father-child. Obviously, diff erent con-
cerns are presented when an adult consents to care for a child—and then at-
tempts to withdraw such consent.
31. For a provocative discussion of what parents owe their children (which 
also explains why parents cannot opt out), see Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert 
E. Scott, Parents As Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401 (1995). One of us has also 
argued for a mandatory duty to rescue for friends within tort law. See Leib, 
Friendship, supra chap. 3, n. 23, at 685–87. Because of the liberty interests 
implicated by the criminal law, it does seem useful to have a registry for these 
purposes.
32. For more details on how one such registry could function, see, e.g., David L. 
Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, A Status Other than 
Marriage, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1347 (2001). Vermont and Hawaii already 
have “reciprocal benefi ciary” statutes that cover some of this territory. See Haw. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 572c-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2005); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1301–
06 (2002). To our mind, the state could create a legal registry that could easily 
be confi gured to signal who is in one’s circle of care and what obligations one has 
assumed.
33. See, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably 
Rescue in American Tort Law, 87 Tul. L. Rev. 1447, 1452-55 (2008). We may dis-
agree with the no-duty-to-rescue pattern for other reasons, but if we are to have 
it and its exceptions, as they are, the doctrine should at least be operationalized 
in a way that better promotes the underlying interests.
34. O’Hear, supra chap. 5, n. 24.
35. By rejecting unilateral voluntariness, it’s unclear whether Professor O’Hear would 
also forbid bilateral exchanges that conventionally create omissions liability, 
such as when X hires Y to be his private nurse. Th ere is also an irony here: O’Hear 
gives us a hard time for purportedly expanding criminal law liability, but it is 
his alternative model of “vulnerability and proximity” without a voluntariness 
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side-constraint that might very well expand liabilities even further than our 
model.
36. So, for example, when children grow up, there might not be a basis for uncritically 
extending these duties anymore, at least according to Professor Markel. But to 
Professors Collins and Leib, there are some situations in which the vulnerability 
persists, such as with incest. Yet, even in these cases, the voluntariness of the re-
lationship still plays a role too in assessing whether it makes sense to criminalize 
status-based obligations.
37. Given the tradeoff s involved, we are open-minded about a general duty to 
perform costless rescues. We recognize that such a law would violate our 
voluntariness requirement but we are less concerned about that prospect 
because a general duty to rescue would not use status-based characteristics 
to impose criminal liability, our principal concern in this book.
38. We put aside the standard cases in omissions liability in which X creates the peril 
to Y or X waves Z away from rescuing Y. But one standard case, that of contract, 
does warrant more emphasis. We were puzzled by Professor Hills’s suggestion 
that the criminal law of omissions treats families diff erently from contractually 
bound “providers of caregiving services.” Hills, Families, supra chap. 5, n. 25. Th is is 
not a correct statement of the law, as we discussed in Chapter 4. If someone hired 
a nurse or even a neighbor for the purpose of caregiving, that contract would in 
fact be a suffi  cient basis for criminal liability in many jurisdictions if that person 
failed to perform an easy rescue. In some sense, that person is no diff erent than X 
who waves Z away from rescuing Y.
39. We acknowledge Professor O’Hear’s concern that the opt-in registry discussed in 
the piece is unlikely to be widely used, especially among the lower socioeconomic 
strata of society. See O’Hear, supra chap. 5, n. 24. Th at, perhaps, shows a limit of 
the registry. But the fact that not all poor homosexual couples may enjoy the ex 
ante benefi t of a duty to rescue via a registry is not itself a reason to deny that 
benefi t to those poor homosexual couples who do (or, more importantly, their 
children). Th us, something like the registry is still necessary to avoid the facial 
discrimination and inequality that results without it. Moreover, we are somewhat 
puzzled at why the registry would not provide suffi  cient information to subscrib-
ing parties about their duties, as O’Hear laments. See id. Signing up is actually 
quite likely to force that information—and would furnish the state with the 
opportunity to instruct parties about their responsibilities.
40. Hills, supra chap. 5, n. 25.
41. See supra chap. 2; Markel, Collins & Leib, Family Ties, supra chap. 1, n. 161, at 
1187–88.
42. We should note that one can be a liberal about the criminal justice system—
meaning here, concerned with consent—but status oriented in other areas of the 
law, such as family or civil law. More importantly, to adopt a moral theory about 
obligation that is non-liberal in the context of family and other close relation-
ships does not decide the question about how the related legal system should be 
designed. When one takes to institutional design, the choice about how much 
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to build off  of voluntarism and how much to build off  of a relational obligation 
is very much contingent on context. See Leib, Responsibility, supra chap. 5, n. 27. 
For more on building a moral theory of obligation relationally rather than from 
consent, see Samuel Scheffl  er, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 Phil. & Pub. 
Affairs 189 (1997).
43. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 220 (rev. ed. 1999) (“Each person is to have an 
equal right to the most extensive system of equal basic liberty compatible with 
a similar system for all”); J.S. Mill, 21 Collected Works of John Stuart Mill 
262 ( J. M. Robson ed., 1963) (“[T]he burden of proof is supposed to be with those 
who are against liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition.... Th e a 
priori assumption is in favour of freedom.”).
44. Th e phrase “equally eff ective” is important. We acknowledge that the criminal law 
involves powers of norm expression; therefore, we must assess carefully whether 
non-criminal alternatives aff ecting social norms carry similar expressive force.
45. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth 
Amendment: ‘Proportionality’ Relative to What? 89 Minn. L. Rev. 571(2005); 
Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 Duke L.J. 
263 (2005); Youngjae Lee, Th e constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 
91 Va. L. Rev. 677 (2005).
46. Cf. generally Douglas Husak, Th e Criminal Law as a Last Resort, 24 Ox. J. Le-
gal Stud. 207 (2004); Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization 55 (2008); Nils 
Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 521, 
524 (2005).
47. If the burden was not imposed on individuals based on their family status, 
it is not a family ties burden in the sense we mean, even if the policy ends up 
substantially hurting those with families. We again refer the reader to our ear-
lier stated conviction that most problems that have a disparate impact on 
families are best regarded as problems that need to be addressed in the crimi-
nal justice system for all those concerned, regardless of whom they aff ect. So 
if one has a particular problem, for example, as we do, with the war on drugs 
and how it often leads to over-incarceration, the solution is not to have a band-
aid for families but rather to fi x the underlying policy of over-incarceration.
•  Chapter 6. Application of the Framework to 
Family Ties Burdens
1. Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (noting that 
“the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest.... And neither rights 
of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the 
general interest in [a] youth’s well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict 
the parent’s control.... [T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental 
freedom and authority in thing’s aff ecting the child’s welfare”).
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 2. See Sherry F. Colb, When Oral Sex Results in a Pregnancy: Can Men Ever Escape 
Paternity Obligations?, FindLaw, Mar. 9, 2005, http://writ.news.fi ndlaw.com/
colb/20050309.html.
 3. One’s response here hinges on whether one believes that a person who takes pre-
cautions against pregnancy still assumes the risk of being commandeered into 
parenting by the state and the other partner. It might be a remote but foreseeable 
risk; thus, the question then is whether it is just to impose this consequence on 
the person. Perhaps one should be able to insure against the risk though it raises 
moral hazard issues. Professor Collins is of the view that a man should be on the 
hook unless his sperm was eff ectively purloined through deception or coercion. 
Professors Leib and Markel think a man should not be commandeered into par-
enting obligations by the criminal law’s apparatus if he takes due care prior to 
and during sex: e.g., he discusses the issue with a partner in advance of sexual 
relations using reliable birth control methods, and the woman agrees then that if 
birth control fails, the man will not be responsible for more than his fair share of a 
post-conception abortion.
 4. June Carbone, Th e Legal Defi nition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family 
Identity, 65 La. L. Rev. 1295 (2005).
 5. Indeed, the child at issue in Jones, 308 F.2d at 307, resided with a family friend at 
the time of his death.
 6. See generally Laura Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 833 
(2007).
 7. In establishing the criteria to answering this question, legislators, prosecutors, or 
courts may want to consider a variety of factors including: co-residence between 
the defendant and the minor, whether the defendant provides fi nancial support 
to child, whether the defendant has formally terminated parental rights 
 or instead makes statements to the public or the government regarding the 
relationship for purposes such as taxes or other government benefi ts. On the 
features that generally trigger legal recognition of parenthood, see David D. 
Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and 
Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 125, 132–43 (2006).
 8. Th e other aspects of the omissions liability doctrine should attach: e.g., the res-
cue has to be one that is actually achievable and doesn’t pose undue risks to the 
rescuer.
 9. Cf. Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1311 (2006); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: Th e Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing 
Civil Marriage, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1161, 1164 (2006).
10. 75 Am. Jur 2D Trespass § 157 (2008).
11. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922).
12. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 
854-55 (1984).
13. See Hyman, supra chap. 4, n. 5.
14. We leave aside for now whether the age of majority for this purpose should be 
dropped from 18 to a lower age, such as 16.
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15. Th e problem with this rationale is it might be said about any norm of responsible 
behavior; there really is not a single unifi ed theoretical account that adequately 
explains what the boundaries of criminal law are. See Antony Duff , Th eories 
of Criminal Law, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Still, that most 
parents will comply is not a good reason not to have the law. Will the law “crowd” 
out otherwise trust-based conduct, as some have suggested?
  It is hard  to see how it would, even if there is some value in compliance 
outside the law. For discussion of the “crowding” thesis—and its rejection, see 
Ethan J. Leib, Friends As Fiduciaries, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 665 (2009) [hereinafter 
Leib, Friends As Fiduciaries]; Ethan J. Leib, Friendship As Relational Contract 
( forthcoming 2009); Frank Cross, Law and Trust, 93 Geo. L.J. 1457, 1545 (2005) 
(“Whatever the intuitive appeal of the claims that legalization undermines 
trust, they cannot be sustained once they are subjected to scrutiny and empirical 
testing.”).
16. On latitude to parenting, see Murray, supra chap. 1, n. 100.
17. Mississippi prohibits “[a]doption by couples of the same gender.” Miss. Stat. § 
93-17-3(2). Florida goes further and prohibits all “homosexuals” from adopting, 
whether coupled or not. See Fla. Stat. ch. 63.042(3). However, about half the 
states “now permit same-sex couples to raise children together through second-
parent adoptions or through entry into marriage or a marriage-like union.” David 
D. Meyer, supra chap. 6, n. 7, at 135.
18. Th at’s not to deny that ex ante Larry may feel denigrated on the basis of sexual 
orientation discrimination.
19. Of course, some opponents would rely on more attenuated causal theories of 
harm if children are entrusted to the care of homosexual couples or those in 
polyamorous unions. E.g., Press Release, Christian Inst., Blair’s Gay Adoption 
Plans Will Harm Children (May 7, 2002), http://www.christian.org.uk/pressre
leases/2002/may_7_2002.htm.
20. Th e fact that a mother is often charged in the failure to protect scenario is a 
powerful example of the “mother-blaming” phenomenon that aff ects not only 
our legal institutions, but also our cultural norms about parenting. As Profes-
sor Becker states, “[M]others are expected to be much better and more powerful 
parents than fathers, always putting their children’s needs above their own and 
protecting their children from all harm.” See Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing 
Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liabil-
ity for the Acts of Others, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 13, 15 (1995); see also Naomi 
Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemma of Criminalization, 49 
DePaul L. Rev. 817, 822 (2000) (arguing the criminal justice system treats mothers 
more harshly); Jane Swigart, The Myth of the Bad Mother: The Emotional 
Realities of Mothering 6 (1991) (“[W]e live in a society that simultaneously 
idealizes and devalues the mother.”).
21. See Murray, supra chap. 1, n. 100.
22. We are grateful to Professor Murray for alerting us to this point.
23. Cf. Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 375 (1996); Erik Eck-
holm, Older Children Abandoned Under Law for Babies, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 2008, 
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at A21 (showing parents abandoning children well past infancy when they are 
promised immunity from prosecution for neglect).
24. See Nancy S. Erickson, Battered Mothers of Battered Children: Using Our Knowledge 
of Battered Women to Defend Th em Against Charges of Failure to Act, in 1A Chil-
dren and Families: Abuse and Endangerment 197, 199 (Sandra Anderson-Garcia 
& Robert Batey eds., 1991) (“[B]ased on sheer numbers alone, one could predict 
that women will be prosecuted for this category of failure to act more frequently 
than men.”).
25. One commentator has argued that “society particularly expects that the mother 
will be the child’s protector” and that “[t]he mother is expected to suppress any 
individual needs or identity of her own in order to serve and protect the needs 
of her child.” Jacobs, supra chap. 4, n. 12, at 587; see also Becker, supra chap. 6, 
n. 20, at 15 (arguing that “[t]here is a profound tendency in our culture to blame 
mothers (not fathers) for all problems children face (and all problem children)”).
26. Naomi Cahn, Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of Criminaliza-
tion, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 817, 822 (2000).
27. See Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the 
Margins, 2 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 1, 3–4 (1995) (discussing domestic vio-
lence and child abuse as strong predictors of each other).
28. Cf. Nicholson v. Scopetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (disapproving of a city agen-
cy’s practice of removing children from a custodial parent based on a parental 
failure to prevent the child from witnessing domestic violence).
29. See Becker, supra chap. 6, n. 20, at 19 (noting that women are sometimes mur-
dered after leaving an abusive spouse).
30. See id.
31. See id. at 31–32 (urging the provision of stronger “safety nets” for women in 
abusive situations); see also Linda Gordon, Feminism and Social Control, in 
What is Feminism? 63, 69 ( Juliet Mitchell & Annie Oakley, eds., 1986) (“Good 
social policy could address the problem of wife beating in part by empowering 
women to leave abusive situations, enabling them to live in comfort and dignity 
without men.”).
32. Becker, supra chap. 6, n. 20, at 32. It is important to note that Becker also argues 
that “we must also change other parts of the social and legal system to make it 
easier for women to escape abusive households with their children.” Id.
33. See id. at 21 (arguing that the mother “is in a much better position than the child 
to prevent abuse and owes a duty of care to her children”).
34. As Mary Becker has written, “[T]he assumption should be that the adult who 
was not literally a hostage—not literally coerced at every available second—could 
have acted to end abuse,” at least by picking up the phone and calling 911. Becker, 
supra chap. 6, n. 20, at 55.
35. Th ere may be some cases in which the more passive parent is just as culpable 
as the actual abuser, by providing active encouragement or a weapon or 
the like.
36. See, e.g., Nina Callaway, Your Wedding Vows: Samples of Wedding Vow Wording, 
About.com, http://weddings.about.com/cs/bridesandgrooms/a/vowwording.htm 
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(traditional language wording includes “to have and to hold from this day for-
ward, for better or for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, to 
love and to cherish; from this day forward until death do us part.”) (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2008).
37. Cf. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.
38. See, e.g., People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 295, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907) (reversing man-
slaughter conviction of man who failed to aid his lover after she overdosed on 
morphine because he owed her no legal duty). Indeed, some states have recently 
recognized that limiting liability to formal legal relationships would be plainly un-
derinclusive. State v. Caton, 739 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“Whether 
a person stands in loco parentis is a factual question. Th e term does not signify 
a formal investiture....” (citation omitted)); Leet v. State, 595 So. 2d 959, 963 (Fla. 
App. 1991) (concluding that the live-in boyfriend of a child’s mother owed a legal 
duty to the child to prevent abuse by the mother after establishing a “family-like 
relationship” for an extended and indefi nite period). We believe all states need 
to move in this direction and have a proposed a clear mechanism by which they 
could do so.
39. Another reading, which we fi nd somewhat implausible, is that it exhibits special 
faith in the spouses of black persons that they are more motivated to undertake 
rescues without the threat of legal sanction for failure to do so. Cf. O’Hear, supra 
chap. 5, n. 24.
40. In light of the extent of discrimination against gay individuals in this country, 
we think it far too risky just to hope that courts in all states would extend the 
same protections and obligations to individuals in a homosexual relationship 
as they would to individuals in heterosexual relationships. As a point of com-
parison, states are split about whether to allow same sex partners to recover 
in tort for wrongful death or infl iction of emotional distress. See D. Kelly 
Weisberg & Susan Appleton, Modern Family Law: Cases and Materials 
404 (3d ed. 2006).
41. We note that some civil union laws, such as Vermont’s, off er same-sex couples 
the same panoply of rights and responsibilities that exist with heterosexual mar-
riages. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204 (2002). In such a situation, we think there 
is still a residual discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by denying the 
word marriage to such partnerships but that discrimination does not extend to 
our core area of concern, the criminal justice system, because the obligations run 
on the same tracks. Th at said, the discrimination persists against those involved 
in voluntary and committed polyamorous relationships or in non-sexual unions 
who nonetheless seek to enter covenants of care with each other. Cf. generally 
Leib, Friendship, supra chap. 3, n. 23; Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefi ts?, 106 
Mich. L. Rev. 189 (2007) (arguing that a failure to recognize friendship impedes 
the elimination of state supported gender role expectations).
42. By decoupling omissions liability and marriage, we do not run the risk of 
punishing what amounts to a purely private breach of contract through 
criminal law. Since there is no bilateral exchange or consideration with 
notes to chapter 6
Dan Markel-Endnotes.indd   208 2/26/09   7:30:04 PM
209
our omissions registry but only a declaration to the state with binding conse-
quences, the state may decide to punish those who make false claims to the 
state or those who lull the state’s agents into complacency vis-à-vis a particu-
lar person. Th e lulling notion, of course, applies only to those few situations in 
which the state already has reason to be mindful of the vulnerability of a 
particular person.
43. At least one of us has some sympathy with the idea that voluntary friendships 
can trigger substantial legal duties. See Leib, Friendship, supra chap. 3, n. 23; Leib, 
Friends As Fiduciaries, supra chap. 6, n. 15. Few of these envisioned duties for 
friendship are criminally punishable upon breach but, admittedly, some are. Leib’s 
approach to friendship—and his resistance to registries in that context—is, in some 
ways, inconsistent with the approach taken here. To the extent that the approaches 
diff er, Leib is willing to concede that the use of a registry for criminal law liability 
may be the better way to allocate friendship’s burdens. But the private, civil law 
is another story.
44. Brank et al., supra chap. 4, n. 21.
45. E.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 32-1301 (2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:92:2 (2004).
46. Brank et al., supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 3 (noting that “all of the states have some 
form of civil parental liability”); Chapin, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 633–34 (discussing 
compensation and deterrence rationales of civil liability statutes).
47. United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
48. See Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of 
Pinkerton, 57 Amer. Univ. L. Rev. 585 (2008).
49. See, e.g., Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from An Ever 
More Expanding Ever More Troubling Area, 1 Wm. & Mary Bill Rights J. 1, 7 
(1992) (criticizing Pinkerton).
50. Kreit, supra chap. 6, n. 48.
51. See Posting of Dan M. Filler to Concurring Opinions, Strict Liability for Parents, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/07/strict_liabilit.html ( July 
6, 2006) (stating that these proposals raise questions both about eff ectiveness 
and morality). Th ere apparently have been few recent empirical studies assessing 
the eff ectiveness of these laws. See Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States 
1994-1996, http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/pubs/reform/ch2_d.html (bemoaning the lack 
of data about whether these statutes are eff ective) (last visited Sept. 28, 2008); see 
also Chapin, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 653–54.
52. See Posting of Dan M. Filler, supra chap. 6, n. 51.
53. Harris, supra chap. 4, n. 24, at 5.
54. See Courtney L. Zolman, Comment, Parental Responsibility Acts: Medicine for Ail-
ing Families and Hope for the Future, 27 Cap. U. L. Rev. 217, 229 (1998) (citing state-
ment by Nia Keeling, a family outreach worker); see also Tyler & Segady, supra 
chap. 4, n. 23, at 80 (citing the statement “[s]how me a bad kid and I’ll show you 
a bad parent,” made at a city council meeting in Southfi eld, Michigan, that ulti-
mately authorized a parental responsibility ordinance).
55. See Chapin, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 624.
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56. For a discussion of whether poor parenting is in fact a substantial contributing 
factor to juvenile delinquency, see id. at 664–71.
57. See DiFonzo, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 44; see also Cahn, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 425–27 
(identifying other causes of juvenile delinquency, such as “defi ciencies in early 
childhood education, peer pressure, and inadequate job opportunities”); Amy 
L. Tomaszewski, Note, From Columbine to Kazaa: Parental Liability in a New 
World, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 573, 582–85 (discussing how factors like the media and 
biology might contribute to juvenile delinquency).
58. DiFonzo, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 47; see also Cahn, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 416 (suggest-
ing that some parents do such a poor job of parenting, such as engaging in physical 
abuse, that their children might reject their supervisory eff orts).
59. DiFonzo, supra chap. 4, n. 21, at 48. See also Eckholm, supra chap. 6, n. 23.
60. Id. DiFonzo also argues that jailing a parent deprives the youthful off ender and 
any siblings of a parental infl uence in the home; this criticism is less persuasive if 
the parenting at issue was truly inadequate or even affi  rmatively harmful.
61. Asymmetrical dependency refers to relationships where one person possesses 
substantial authority and responsibility over another person who is largely de-
pendent for his or her well-being on the authority-wielding person. Martha 
Fineman elaborates upon this notion. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The 
Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century 
Tragedies 8 (1995). Our vision of who stands in relationships of asymmetri-
cal dependency does not rest necessarily upon residency, but we recognize its 
general signifi cance.
62. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.3 (1992) (providing a sentencing 
enhancement for abusing a position of trust). Notice that use of sentencing enhance-
ments this way are fi ne under our framework: they are not family ties burdens be-
cause they apply to all positions of trust. More, they would usefully undercut one way 
in which this burden is actually used to benefi t intrafamilial sex abusers, as we sug-
gested in Part I. Leib discusses how this provision can be used to protect friendship 
as a caregiving relationship in Leib, Friendship, supra chap. 3, n. 23, at 690 n.324.
63. E.g., Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is 
Oedipus Free to Marry?, 18 Fam. L.Q. 257, 259 (1984). Th is may help explain why 
adopted children are sometimes excluded from such prohibitions.
64. See Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55, at 1569. Cahill cites a number of courts that refer-
enced these rationales in upholding incest laws. See, e.g., In re Tiff any Nicole M, 
571 N.W.2d at 878 (citing both the possibility of “genetic mutation” and the need 
“to protect children from the abuse of parental authority”); State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 
839, 843 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (same). McDonnell cites a related concern of prevent-
ing the family from becoming “oversexualized,” with family members viewing other 
members as potential sexual partners. McDonnell, supra chap. 4, n. 61, at 353.
65. See Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2464 n.10 (citing Benton v. State, 
461 S.E.2d 202, 205 (Ga. 1995) (Sears, J., concurring) (on point of reducing rivalry); 
id. at 2465 n.13 (citing Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of 
Kinship 479 (Rodney Needham ed., James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmer 
trans., 1969)).
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66. See McDonnell, supra chap. 4, n. 61, at 352 (describing how many incestuous 
relationships pose no genetic problems and suggesting that states could take a 
more narrow approach by allowing incestuous couples to marry but making it 
illegal for them to have children). McDonnell does not grapple with the question 
whether such a statute would be constitutional. Margaret Mahoney makes the 
point that the genetic issue also cannot justify those state statutes criminalizing 
relationships between stepparents and stepchildren. See Mahoney, supra chap. 4, 
n. 58, at 28.
67. See Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55 (discussing how disgust and revulsion drive much 
of incest regulation).
68. See Mahoney, supra chap. 4, n. 58, at 28 (describing how “community norms” and 
religious history serve as common rationales for incest legislation).
69. As we noted above, three states do not punish consensual adult sibling sexual 
conduct.
70. Professors Collins and Leib would add that persons who once had a relation of 
asymmetric dependence should be precluded from future relations not involv-
ing asymmetry. Professor Markel disagrees; in his view, genuine and mature con-
sent may plausibly exist even between adults who were once in a relationship of 
asymmetric dependence.
71. See Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2469–70 (detailing the confus-
ing pattern of incest laws).
72. In other contexts, Professor Markel suggests possibilities including registering 
the relationship with the government if it fi ts into a certain category of risk and 
requiring participants to the relationship to take a sex-education course. See infra 
chap. 6, n. 84. Th ese might be appropriate in this context as well.
73. Here we largely agree with the observation from Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 597 (2003), in which he noted that the reasoning 
of the Court’s majority opinion makes it diffi  cult to resist the conclusion we draw 
regarding consensual adult relations.
74. See Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, Th e Sex-Ed License, Redux, 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/the-sex-ed-lice.html 
(Feb. 19, 2008) (discussing shadow eff ects of incest, adultery, and polygamy laws); 
Kay L. Levine, Th e Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equal-
ity in the Statutory Rape Caseload, 55 Emory L.J. 691 (2006) (lamenting shadow 
eff ects on consensual activity in statutory rape context).
75. See Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55, at 1569. Cahill cites a number of courts that refer-
enced these rationales in upholding incest laws. See, e.g., In re Tiff any Nicole M, 
571 N.W.2d 872, 878 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (citing both the possibility of “genetic 
mutation” and the need “to protect children from the abuse of parental author-
ity”); State v. Kaiser, 663 P.2d 839. 843 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983) (same).
76. See Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57 (developing this argument).
77. See, e.g., State v. Th ompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990) (concluding that a high 
school principal who threatened to block a student’s graduation unless she 
consented to sexual intercourse could not be convicted of the crime of “sexual 
intercourse without consent”).
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78. We recognize that some proponents of incest laws may be sincerely motivat-
ed by religious views or other comprehensive moral views, but those views, in 
a liberal society sensitive to the rights of minorities, are not necessarily views 
that a liberal criminal justice system must abide by. We also recognize there 
is an important and complicated separate issue of whether any incestuous 
marriages should be permitted. Our focus here is on whether currently 
criminal conduct should be decriminalized or reformed, and we will restrict 
our discussion to that subject.
79. While a sentence enhancement may, to some, signal that one victim seems to 
be “worth more” than another victim, we think there is less reason to be worried 
about that message since an off ender in that context has voluntarily created the 
trust relationship, and the breach of it makes the underlying conduct plausbily 
more reprehensible from society’s perspective.
80. Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2468 n.31 (“Th e likelihood that off -
spring of very closely related partners (parent-child and siblings) will have a genetic 
disease is about 13%, which is much greater than the likelihood that two strangers, 
with no family history of the disease, will have a child with such defects, which is 
0.1%. Two less closely related partners, such as fi rst cousins, have a slightly greater 
than 3% chance of having a child with a genetic defect.”) (citations omitted).
81. Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra chap. 4, n. 57, at 2468.
82. As to how these concerns are addressed outside the criminal justice system, we 
are more ambivalent. We recognize that some might try to distinguish eugenics 
(which might be thought to perfect a given gene pool) from genetics-based fears 
about incest, which are trying to avoid harms to future humans, as opposed to 
perfecting them. Th e problem with this distinction is that it assumes a moral 
baseline of non-incestuous relationships; if a community had endorsed incestu-
ous relationships historically, then eff orts to ban such relationships would be 
viewed by that community as “eugenics” by virtue of the goal of trying to improve 
the general issue of the community.
83. Indeed, to the extent that incest laws produce sentencing discounts to sexually 
abusive family members, the incest regime is complicit in extending a family ties 
“benefi t” with no adequate justifi cation for under-punishing those who sexually 
abuse their dependents.
84. Professor Markel, for instance, holds the view that if someone aged fi fteen to 
eighteen invites and chooses consensual relations with another person aged fi f-
teen or higher, then that person should be able to engage in that relationship 
provided certain (admittedly diffi  cult) conditions are satisfi ed. For example, a 
state could have a policy by which sex education courses would be a prerequi-
site for sexual activity in the same way that driver education in some jurisdic-
tions is a prerequisite for permissible driving. On this view, all persons under 
eighteen wishing to have sex without fear of prosecution would have to secure 
a sex-education license, which they could get from a variety of possible private 
or public sources. See Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, Is Teen Sex Like 
Teen Driving? Th e Uneasy Case for the Sex-Ed License, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.
com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/is-teen-sex-lik.html (Feb. 15, 2008). Th e education 
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would foster awareness of pregnancy, birth control techniques, genetic risks, dis-
ease, and physical and psychological coercion. Additionally, even with such a sex-
education license, adult-minor or minor-minor sex (regardless of consanguinity) 
could be presumptively or categorically prohibited when there is a relationship 
of asymmetrical dependence or cohabitation or supervisorial relationship in 
school, work, or extracurricular activities. Last, in relationships where there is 
a substantial age diff erence, which raises suggestions of coercion, the relation-
ship’s sexual turn would have to be declared in advance to a regulatory agency 
(or designated authorities) to certify that these conditions have been satisfi ed. 
Prosecution for statutory rape would be threatened in the absence of compliance. 
See also Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, Sex with Minors, Sex Between 
Minors, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/sex-with-minors.
html (Feb. 7, 2008); Posting of Dan Markel to PrawfsBlawg, Marriage of Minors, 
Marriage Between Minors, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/
marriage-of-min.html (Feb. 8, 2008).
85. However, one could permit or require the fact fi nder to infer that coercion is 
present in certain circumstances: e.g., does one person serve in a caregiving or 
supervisorial role to the other? But that question would cut across family status 
bloodlines. For Markel, concerns about medical risks and pregnancy would be 
addressed through the use of a sex-ed license, which would help secure a safe 
harbor from prosecution.
86. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that the constitutionality of laws prohibiting adult incest were called 
into question by the Court’s decision in Lawrence); Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55, at 
1544 (describing statement by Senator Rick Santorum, who asserted that “If the 
Supreme Court says you have the right to consensual [gay] sex within your home, 
then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the 
right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to do anything.”); 
Cass Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of  Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and 
Marriage, 55 Sup. Ct. Rev. 27, 60–65 (2003) (discussing the implications of Law-
rence for incest laws). Th e same slippery slope concerns about incest were also 
raised by opponents to the legalization of interracial marriage. For a very inter-
esting discussion on that topic, see Cahill, supra chap. 4, n. 55, at 1554–57.
87. Bigamy is also increasingly on the agenda. See Jeff rey Michael Hayes, Polygamy 
Comes out of the Closet: Th e New Strategy of Polygamy Activists, 3 Stan. J. Civ-R. 
Civ-Liberties 99 (2007).
88. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra chap. 6, n. 86, at 62 (noting it cannot be said that 
incest “prohibitions run afoul of some emerging national awareness.”). One 
organization, however, is seeking to liberalize cousin marriage. See Cousin 
Couples, http://www.cousincouples.com (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
89. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra chap. 4, n. 61, at 352–53; Note, Inbred Obscurity, supra 
chap. 4, n. 57, at 2465–66.
90. See Christine McNiece Metteer, Some “Incest” is Harmless Incest: Determining 
the Fundamental Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affi  nity Without Resorting to 
State Incest Statutes, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 262 (2000); see also Bratt, supra 
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  chap. 6, n. 63. At least one state supreme court has agreed with this general 
proposition. See Israel v. Allen, 577 P.2d 762 (Colo. 1978) (striking down state 
statute prohibiting marriage between brother and sister related only by 
adoption as unconstitutional).
 91. Robson, supra chap. 5, n. 20, at 762.
 92. Id.
 93. Id. at 764.
 94. For some historical background on American bigamy laws, see generally 
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 
136 U.S. 1 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885); Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
 95. See Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 
16 Cornell J. L. Pub. Pol’y 101, 106 (2006) (“Th e full case has not been made 
for criminalization of polygamy, it has been assumed. Th e harms of polygamy have 
been assumed, as have the eff ects of criminalization. Th e accepted rationale is 
that polygamy will spring up wherever it is permitted, harming women, children, 
and the very foundations of free society.”). Sigman’s article and some others pro-
vide an exception to this pattern of neglect. See also Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists 
out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy 
Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 691, 
737–57 (2001); Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68; Maura I. Strassberg, Th e Challenge 
of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering Polyamory, 31 Cap. Univ. L. Rev. 439, 
439 (2003).
 96. See Hayes, supra chap. 6, n. 87, at 105.
 97. Th is was a particular problem with the community of the recently convicted 
Warren Jeff s, who married off  barely post-pubescent girls in his community 
and at the same time eff ectively banished teenage boys from the community 
to “make more girls available for marriage to the elders.” Julian Borger, Hellfi re 
and Sexual Coercion: Th e Dark Side of American Polygamist Sects, Guardian, 
June 30, 2005, at 15.
 98. See sources cited supra chap. 5, n. 18.
 99. See, e.g., Geoff rey Fattah, Bigamy Law Debated, Deseret News (Salt Lake City), 
Feb. 3, 2005, http://deseretnews.com/article/1,5143,600109729,00.html (debat-
ing the application of a bigamy law to a man with a “spiritual” third wife).
100. But see State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 732 (Utah 2006) (holding that the bigamy 
statute in Utah covers both state-sanctioned marriages and those that are not 
state sanctioned).
101. See, e.g., Feminist Majority Foundation, Utah: Plural Wife Is First Woman Charged 
in Polygamy Case, Feminist Daily News Wire (Oct. 16, 2002), http://feminist.
org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=7073.
102. Maura Strassberg, Th e Crime of Polygamy, 12 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 353, 
371–74 (2003).
103. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 151-55 (considering the various economic 
theories which may encourage polygamy).
104. See Emens, supra chap. 4, n. 68, at 315–17.
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105. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 152 n. 430;  see also Robert Wright, The Mor-
al Animal: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology 96–99 (1994).
106. We presume most people will not be comfortable with this solution. But we’re 
not convinced there is a problem of welfare exploitation to solve in the fi rst 
place; if there is, this is one possible conclusion among others.
107. Th e Koran actually instructs Muslim men not to take on more wives than they 
can aff ord to keep in equal comfort. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 158 n.485 
(citing The Qur’an: A New Translation 4:34 (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem trans., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2004)).
108. It’s important to note that the offi  cial Mormon institutions no longer support 
or encourage polygamy, but there are communities that are Mormon-inspired 
and continue these practices; it is largely on these off shoots that Professor 
Strassberg focuses. Strassberg, Crime of Polygamy, supra chap. 6, n. 102, at 354.
109. Strassberg, Th e Crime of Polygamy, supra chap. 6, n. 102, at 405–12.
110. Professor Strassberg has also emphasized the harm of polygamous com-
munities to liberal democracies on diff erent grounds. Drawing on a Hegelian 
perspective, for example, Strassberg indicated that polygamous marriage culti-
vates despotism or inhibits the development of liberal values such as equality 
among persons. See, e.g., Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance: 
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1501, 1537 (1997) 
(noting that monogamous marriage is “peculiarly suited to cultivate the freedom 
to pursue particular ends and the freedom of self-governance by rational ethical 
principles which must be characteristic of citizens of a free state”). In response, 
Professor Sigman persuasively notes that the social science literature does not 
“signifi cantly substantiate the theory that polygamy bars the development of 
romantic love within a private intimate sphere, that polygamy causes despotism, 
or that monogamy causes the development of the liberal state.” Sigman, supra 
chap. 6, n. 95, at 176 (examining various studies). From a theoretical perspective, 
moreover, we are puzzled why Professor Strassberg would be willing to tolerate 
the decriminalization of laws limiting polyfi delity involving mature individuals 
if these Hegelian concerns were paramount. See Strassberg, supra chap. 6, n. 102, 
at 429 (concluding that there is little evidence to justify bans on polyamory when 
it involves mature individuals). Additionally, our sense is that liberal regimes 
retain their credibility by reducing the instances in which they use the criminal 
law to interfere with the autonomous and consenting choices of the individu-
als involved. Taking a fi rm stand against polygamy requires liberal regimes to 
abandon their commitment to respect most forms of private ordering in the 
absence of obvious and substantial negative externalities.
111. E.g., United States v. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
112. Martha Ertman, Th e Story of Reynolds: Federal “Hell Hounds” Punishing Mormon 
Treason, in Family Law Stories 51 (Carol Sanger ed., 2007); Kerry Abrams, 
Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 Colum. 
L. Rev. 641 (2005).
113. Historical opposition to polygamy sometimes invoked explicitly racist 
rationales, for example, that polygamy was something that was “almost 
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exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people,” not something 
that was appropriate “among the northern and western nations of Europe.” 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); see also Francis Lieber, 
Th e Mormons: Shall Utah Be Admitted into the Union?, 5 Putnam’s Monthly 
225, 234 (1855).
114. It seems that much of the historical American animus against polygamy is 
rooted in religious discrimination against the Mormon faith tradition and its 
adherents. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, “Th ey Ain’t Whites, Th ey’re Mormons”: An 
Illustrated History of Polygamy as Race Treason, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1270023. Additionally, many Christians tra-
ditionally viewed polygamy with disdain and continue to do so today. Sigman, 
supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 142-43.
115. Sigman helpfully explains why polygamy may be more marginally abusive to 
women but also why these claims are suspect. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, 
at 172–73. She notes
(1) polygamy invites secrecy, undermining women’s ability to get help if 
needed; (2) the structure of polygamy suggests that the husband will not have 
suffi  cient time to devote to each wife or their children; (3) the treatment by 
other wives may be abusive; and (4) the types of people who voluntarily 
choose polygamy may be attracted to the uneven power dynamic.
  However, there is no evidence that polygamy per se creates abuse or 
neglect. Having sister wives can be a support network. Th e status of senior 
wives versus junior wives and the relationships among these women vary 
between cultures. In fact, by banding together, women sometimes wield 
more power to change their husband’s problematic behavior. Yet sometimes 
co-wives are perpetrators [of the abuse against women].
 Id.
116. Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex 
Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 1023, 1039 
(2005) (“What these historical details remind us is that gender inequality is a 
contingent, not a conceptual, feature of polygamy.”).
117. Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 161–63 (summarizing research explaining the 
rareness of polyandry).
118. See id. at 163–64 (“Rather than the gender biased monolith some have made it 
out to be, polygyny is a multi-faceted choice of family structure, rooted in the 
economic, sociological, cultural, and biological particulars of a given society.”); 
see also Remi Clignet & Joyce A. Sween, For a Revisionist Th eory of Human Po-
lygyny, 6 Signs 445 (1981) (demonstrating diversity of polygynous marriages).
119. E.g., Strassberg, supra chap. 6, n. 109, at 1589 (“[M]onogamous marriages in 
nineteenth-century America were based on the same patriarchal ideas about 
women’s nature and gender roles as polygamous Mormon marriages.”).
120. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 173 nn.595–96 (citing studies); see also 
Hayes, supra chap. 6, n. 87, at 107 n.47 (“If there are crimes being committed, 
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and underage child brides, that needs to be prosecuted... [But,] what’s the diff er-
ence between that and other lifestyles with children in them?” (citing Interview 
with Nancy Perkins, Reporter, Deseret Morning News (Apr. 12, 2006))).
121. See Hayes, supra chap. 6, n. 87, at 107 (quoting interview with a wife in 
polygamous relationship who reports that “[w]e are labeled as criminals and 
treated as criminals for the purpose of [Division of Child and Family Services] 
investigations”).
122. Cf. Janet Elliott et al., CPS Calls Sect Its Largest Case Ever, Houston Chron., Apr. 8, 
2008, at A1 (describing the adversarial custody hearings which would begin for 
each child found in a polygamous compound).
123. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 164.
124. See id. at 172.
125. See sources supra chap. 6, n. 9.
126. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Democratic Families: ‘Th e Logic of Congruence’ and 
Political Identity, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 145, 162 (2003).
127. Cf. Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the Su-
preme Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388 (1988) (describing similar options in context 
of distribution of death penalty based on race of the victim).
128. Actually, it is hard to say whether a rule that defaults to decriminalization of 
bigamy would be a penalty default rule or a market-mimicking rule. Although 
the overwhelming majority of Americans oppose polygamy, the pattern of non-
prosecution in some jurisdictions over the years suggests (weakly) that there’s 
not much support for enforcing polygamy bans. See Sigman, supra chap. 6, n. 95, at 
140–41 (noting lack of prosecutions over much of the last fi fty years and general 
apathy among Utah law enforcement to prosecute polygamists); see also Dirk 
Johnson, Polygamists Emerge from Secrecy, Seeking Not Just Peace but Respect, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1991, at A22 (“[I]n recent years, as state law enforcement 
offi  cials have adopted an unwritten policy of leaving them alone, polygamists 
have gone public.”).
129. Cf. Leah Sears Ward, A Case for Strengthening Marriage, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 
2006 at A17.
130. AEI Studies in Public Opinion, Attitudes About Homosexuality and Gay 
Marriage 51 ( July 6, 2004).
131. See Joanna Grossman, Punishing Adultery In Virginia: A Cheating Husband’s 
Guilty Plea Is a Reminder of the Continued Relevance of Adultery, FindLaw, Dec. 3, 
2003, http://writ.news.fi ndlaw.com/grossman/20031216.html.
132. Indeed, many states have a multitude of civil law mechanisms that they use 
to signal disapproval of adultery and encourage monogamy. In North Carolina, 
for example, spousal support laws are used to send very powerful messages: if 
a judge fi nds that the “supporting spouse” engaged in act of “illicit sexual be-
havior,” the judge must award alimony to the dependent spouse. On the other 
hand, if the dependent spouse engaged in sexual misconduct, the judge cannot 
award alimony, no matter how destitute the dependent spouse may be. See N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 50-16.3A. North Carolina, along with a few other states, also re-
tains the torts of seduction and alienation of aff ections, providing an avenue for 
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the wronged spouse to obtain recompense through tort law. We take no 
position in this paper on the merits of these mechanisms; we simply note 
they are available.
133. Some have argued that the United States military actually has an implicitly 
gendered approach to prosecuting adultery within courts martial. See Hopkins, 
supra chap. 4, n. 80. Because none of us has suffi  cient understanding of mili-
tary legal culture, we really can’t say what the military should do in its adultery 
regulations. Our general argument here would tend to suggest that the govern-
ment should not criminalize consensual adult sexual behavior. But because our 
framework enables the government to proff er compelling interests to overcome 
our presumption against family ties, we can’t be sure how to analyze military 
policy in this regard. Our instinct is to be suspicious, but we would defer to 
military law experts on this one.
134. See generally Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1758, 1778 
n.87, 1779 (2005) (suggesting that perhaps marriage one day could “mov[e] clos-
er to a system of default rules in which couples could structure their own lives,” 
for example by choosing to have “reliance or expectation damages” available for 
the breach of certain promises).
135. As with our approach to polygamy, it is hard to say whether decriminaliza-
tion of adultery works to create a penalty default rule or a market-mimicking 
default rule. It is a penalty default rule if we assume most people want their 
marriages to look more like “covenant marriages,” which require higher entry 
and exit costs. See generally Steven L. Nock, Laura Sanchez, Julia C. Wilson, & 
James D. Wright, Covenant Marriage Turns Five Years Old, 10 Mich. J. Gender & 
L. 169, 170–72 (2003) (describing the terms of covenant marriage and analyzing 
satisfaction rates of those who have chosen them). If couples want exclusivity, 
the law will force them to take active steps to communicate and discuss that 
preference. On the other hand, it may be possible to infer (based on patterns 
of non-prosecution for adultery and assuming prosecutorial responsiveness 
to majoritarian will) that most people don’t want to have prosecutors enforce 
these matters even if they view adultery laws in low regard. In that respect, the 
statute serves as a market-mimicking default rule. One fl ag of caution we want 
to raise is that if a jurisdiction adopted a default rule of decriminalization, it has 
to be aware of how default rules can be “sticky,” and how such stickiness might 
aff ect the prospect of law’s ability to aff ect behavior. For example, if we create a 
rule that defaults to allowing extramarital sex without any legal stigma, it might 
actually encourage that behavior even if the goal of the default rule is simply to 
encourage partners to have conversations and agreements about the scope of 
their relationship to each other. Of course, this result might occur if we simply 
decriminalized adultery without giving the opportunity for partners to secure 
promises of exclusivity through marital agreements. On “sticky” default rules, 
see generally Ronald J. Mann, Contracts—Only with Consent, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1873 (2004); Brett H. McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate 
Law, 60 SMU L. Rev. 383 (2007).
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136. We note that Professor Emens, after weighing various costs and benefi ts, ulti-
mately preferred simple decriminalization of adultery statutes, noting the pos-
sibility that these statutes might be unconstitutional after Lawrence. Emens, 
supra chap. 4, n. 68. On the particular issue of post-Lawrence constitutionality, 
our sense is that if adultery statutes are drafted to be more respectful of the autono-
mous choices of individuals opting into a regime of regulation to prevent the kinds 
of harms that might materialize both to betrayed spouses and to any children 
of such a marriage, then it is likely they would survive constitutional scrutiny. 
Nonetheless, we too prescind from “contractual criminal law regulation” but 
principally for reasons having to do with fairness and externalities.
137.  Th at said, if the sanctions were capped by a sentence of community service 
with no collateral consequences, it would dramatically reduce the concern of 
a socially costly punishment.
   We also note that there are some cases that have invalidated various con-
tracts made between spouses, but the agreements we are discussing here are 
antenuptials; those are usually enforced if both parties are informed by counsel 
and refl ect a basic fairness in exchange between the parties.
138. Th e family law implications of these proposals for property distribution or 
other issues are matters beyond the scope of our criminal law focus here. 
However, our liberty-respecting framework for polygamy raises important and 
interesting questions about the reach of family ties benefi ts, such as whether a 
person with several spouses should be entitled to spousal privileges with all of 
them, etc. 
139. Th e “outside” person (X) is (knowingly or unknowingly) intruding upon the 
marital space between Y and Z. Our analysis of what penalty should attach to 
X is contingent upon X’s marital status. If X is unmarried, no penalty should 
attach, in our view, assuming X is a competent and mature individual. If X is 
married, his situation should be contingent upon whether his marital contract 
calls for exclusivity.
140. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Th e Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 
505, 529-30 (2001) (stating that legislators have a great incentive to appeal to 
voters by both generating outcomes and taking symbolic stands).
141. See sources cited supra chap. 4, n. 90.
142. See id.
143. Cf. Markel, Shaming Punishments, supra chap. 2, n. 63 (discussing the use of 
alternative sanctions).
144. Maldonado, supra chap. 4, n. 90.
145. See, e.g., Weisberg & Appleton, supra chap. 6, n. 40, at 700–01 (describing 
various enforcement mechanisms).
146. David Chambers, Making Fathers Pay: The Enforcement of Child Sup-
port 84 (1979). Chambers studied enforcement eff orts in Michigan between 
1972 and 1975. See also Drew Swank, Th e National Child Non-Support Epidemic, 
2003 Mich. St. DCL L. Rev. 357, 375–78 (2003) (citing the author’s own studies 
for proposition that jailing was eff ective).
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147. See Swank, supra chap. 6, n. 146, at 378.
148. A woman has been jailed for failing to pay child support in at least one case. See 
David Stout, In Rare Role Reversal, Mother Is Jailed for a Failure to Pay, N.Y. Times, 
July 26, 1995, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE7D9113EF
935A15754C0A963958260.
149. It is critical to remember that in thinking about these burdens from an ex 
ante as opposed to an ex post perspective that we be especially mindful of how 
gender aff ects this particular context. Women can choose to have children or to 
choose another alternative (adoption/abortion), while men’s options are signifi -
cantly more limited in this regard. If the mother puts the child up for adoption, 
the father will not have to pay child support. But it  is diffi  cult for the man to 
contract out of his support obligations if the mother makes a unilateral decision 
to bring a fetus to term and raise the child herself. Perhaps that is as it should 
be—but it is relevant in policy design on subsidiary questions like the jailing of 
deadbeat dads.
150. An interesting complication arises in the context of blended families where chil-
dren may fi nd themselves raised by a number of diff erent primary caregivers. 
If a father and stepmother divorce, should the stepmother, assuming she is 
fi nancially able, be required to pay child support? We are uncertain—it might 
depend on whether there was a prenuptial agreement in some cases. But we all 
agree that the fairness of imposing criminal penalties on an individual in this 
position seems questionable, and thus the issues raised by blended families are 
another reason to favor non-criminal approaches.
151. Cf. Billingslea v. Texas, 780 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Cr. App. 1989) (holding that an adult 
child’s failure to seek medical care for ailing live-in parent does not constitute 
criminal negligence because there was no statutory duty to act).
152. Rickles-Jordan, supra chap. 4, n. 90, at 199 n.136.
• Coda
1. We discuss this matter briefl y in our Preface to Part II. In her reactions to a prior 
draft of Part I, Kate Bloch suggested to us that the privileges may be an eff ort to 
counterbalance the indirect harm and devastation the criminal justice system 
imposes on families. We were intrigued by such a suggestion but could fi nd 
little evidence that policymakers thought about the privileges this way—and even 
if they had, we still had some trouble with the logical nexuses. However, at the 
very least, this type of reasoning might support some sentencing discounts, since 
lengthy incarceration terms undoubtedly take a large toll on many families.
2. In a recent paper, Steve Sugarman has drawn attention to the ways some govern-
mental welfare policy areas have moved beyond defi ning the family in traditional 
(heteronormative and repronormative) terms. See Stephen D. Sugarman, What Is 
a Family? Confl icting Messages from Our Public Programs, 42 Fam. L. Q. 231 (2008). 
For the most part, the criminal law is still stuck in the 1950s in its distribution 
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of facial burdens and benefi ts to the institution of the family. We hope that 
changes—and soon.
3. For example, the city of Phoenix has a diversion program for domestic violence 
defendants, whereas the city of San Francisco excludes domestic violence defen-
dants from its diversion program. See. e.g., San Francisco Pretrial Diversion Project 
Guidelines, available at http://www.sfpretrial.com/eligibilitycriteria.html (exclud-
ing domestic violence off enders from a pretrial diversion program) (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2008); Domestic Violence Victim Information Center – FAQs, http://phoe-
nix.gov/VICTIMSDV/dvfaq.html (explaining Phoenix’s diversion program) (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2008).
4. See Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: Th e Law of Domestic Violence, 47 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 1841 (2006).
5. See id. at 1858.
6. See id. at 1859.
7. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: 
A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. Crim L. & Criminology 959, 959 
(Summer 2004).
8. See Colker, supra chap. coda, n. 4, at 1882–83.
notes to coda
Dan Markel-Endnotes.indd   221 2/26/09   7:30:18 PM























Adverse testimony privilege, 4
Alexander, Larry, 192n9, 192n11, 192n16, 
200n14
Anderson, Michelle, 164n65, 165n86, 
207n24
Andrews, Rhonda V. Magee, 193n22, 
201n21
Anthony, Susan B., 66, 133
Antigone, xii, 156–57ns16–17, 174n2
Appleton, Susan, ix, 208n40, 219n145
Arrest policies
children, women arrested in presence 
of, 186n55
and family ties benefits, 46–48
Asymmetrical dependence, 117, 121–22, 
126, 130, 144, 210n61, 211n70
Attorney-client privilege, 158n4, 183n17
B
Bail Reform Act (BRA), 12
Becker, Mary, 107, 200n13, 
206n20, 207n25, 207n29, 
207n32, 207n34
Bigamy
abusiveness of polygamous 
relationships, 216n115
adoption by polygamous unions, 
206n19
coercion, 129–30
criminalization of polygamy, 
190–91n2
decriminalization of polygamy, 
127–135, 217n128
defiance of liberal state, 




and family status, 70–71












Braman, Donald, 157n20, 
176n23, 180n63




Dan Markel-index.indd   223 2/26/09   9:41:49 PM
index224
C
Cahill, Courtney, 10, 195n55, 210n64, 
211n67, 211n75, 213n86
Cahn, Naomi, 106, 193n21, 193n23, 
206n20, 207n26, 210n57, 210n58
Calhoun, Cheshire, 216n116
California
Community Prison Mother Program, 
18, 56
parental responsibility statute, 68
Pregnant and Parenting Women’s 
Alternative Sentencing Program Act, 
18, 56
Carbone, June, 205n4
Caregivers, family ties benefits, 48–53. See 
also Voluntary caregiving
irreplaceable caregivers, 35, 181n1
Case, Mary Anne, 218n134
Cassidy, R. Michael, 177n41, 178n42, 
182n7, 182n8, 184n28, 184n29
Chambers, David, 143, 202n32, 219n146
Chapin, Linda, 193n21, 193n22, 209n46, 
209n51, 209n55
Child abuse and neglect
fatalities, statistics, 186n50
historical context, 26
and x-ray technology, 177n38
Children. See also Child abuse and 
neglect; Child support, 
non-payment of
incarceration of parents, 13, 167n103, 
167–68n106
Child support, non-payment of, 72
discrimination, 143–44







Child Support Recovery Act, 72
Coercion, 158n1
bigamy, 129–30
Coker, Donna, 164n64, 165n76, 165n77, 
178n42
Colb, Sherry, 191n5, 205n2
Colker, Ruth, 152–3, 221n4, 221n8
Collective criminal agreements, 44
Collins, Jennifer, 173n161, 176n30, 199n3, 
201n24, 203n36, 203n41, 205n3, 
211n70
Community Prison Mother Program 
(California), 18, 56
Confidentiality





Creon, xii, 156–57ns16–17, 174n2
Criminal justice burdens
and family status, xv–xvi, 63–73
Criminal justice system. See specific topic
Criminal responsibility
failure to rescue, 64
parental responsibility, 68
Criminal sanctions, generally, 96–97
Culpability, predicting, 187n59
D
Dan-Cohen, Meir, 175n10, 199n6
Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act, 72
Defendant-centered perspective, family 
ties burdens, 75–81
family life and values, burdens as 
devices for promoting, 77–78
family members as object of harm, 
76–77
goals beyond family promotion, 
burdens as devices, 78–79
punitive coercion, defendant as object 
of, 76
DiFonzo, J. Herbie, 193n21, 193n22, 
210n57, 210n58, 210n59, 210n60
Discipline





child support, non-payment of, 143–44
family ties burdens, 83–84, 97
incest, 125–26
parental duties to rescue children, 
105–08
parental responsibility laws, 117–18
parental support, non-payment of, 146
Dan Markel-index.indd   224 2/26/09   9:41:51 PM
index 225





Dressler, Joshua, 162n44, 162n45, 
192n8
Dubber, Markus Dirk, 176n27
Due Process Clause
parental responsibility laws, 68
E
Eckholm, Eric, 206n23, 210n59
Economics and bigamy, 130–31
Egelko, Bob, 198n83
Emens, Elizabeth, 139, 196n68, 197n69, 
197n72, 197n74, 197n77, 214n95, 
214n104, 219n136
Enos, Sandra, 157n21
Enron, 7, 156n15, 162n43
Epstein, Deborah, 177n40
Equality
and family ties benefits, 29–32
and moral rules, 179–80n62
Ertman, Martha, 215n112, 216n114
Ethic of care, 176n21
Evidentiary privilege, family ties benefits, 
3–6, 36–43
assessments of family privileges, 
36–38
criminal justice context, 42




Failure to rescue, omissions liability, xiii, 
59, 153
family ties burdens, 99–112
friends and relatives, obligations to 
rescue each other, 111–12, 209n43





parental duties to rescue children, 
99–108
siblings’ obligations to rescue each 
other, 111–12
spousal obligations to rescue each 
other, 108–11
Family life and values, 





child support, non-payment of, 72
and criminal justice burdens, xv–xvi, 
63–73
failure to rescue, 59, 63–65
function of caregiver, 59–62
generally, xv, 33
and incest, 63, 69–70
omissions liability, 59, 63–65, 83
overcoming through focus on 
voluntary caregiving, 90–95
parental responsibility laws, 66–69
parental support, non-payment of, 63, 
72–73
Family ties benefits. See also Family ties 
burdens
accuracy and justice, 27–29
“adequate provocation,” 10–11




death of inmate, family and, 19
“defense of discipline,” 46
and equality under law, 29–32
escape, families allowing, 
155–56ns6–12
evidentiary privilege, 3–6, 36–43
family ties burdens, in relation to, 
79–81
and friends, 183–84n23
fugitives, families harboring, 6–8
function of caregiver, 59–62
furlough policies, prisons, 17, 54
generally, 1, xii–xiii
grandparents, 7, 163n47
harboring fugitives, exemptions from 
prosecution, 43–45
and incentivizing criminal activity, 
xvi–xvii, 32
Dan Markel-index.indd   225 2/26/09   9:41:53 PM
index226
Family ties benefits. See also Family ties 
burdens (Cont.)
intrafamilial privileges, 5–6
manslaughter as mitigation, 10–11
normative framework, xvii–xviii, 21–34
parental discipline defenses, 9–10
patriarchy and power, 26–27
placement policies, prisons, 55
post-Booker sentencing, 14–15
pre-Booker sentencing, 13, 48
pretrial release, 12, 46–48
prison policies, 16–19, 53–56
same-sex partners, 174n2
scrutiny of, 32–34
and sentencing, 12–16, 48–53
sexual misconduct, 11
siblings, 161n37, 161n40
spousal privileges, 4–5, 182n7
state and family, relationship, 23–25
state practices, sentencing, 15–16
survey of, 3–19
violence within the family, 9–11, 27, 
45–46
visitation policies, prisons, 16–17, 54
Family ties burdens
adultery, 135–40
application of framework to, 99–148
bigamy, 127–35




discrimination, 83–84, 97, 105–08
examples, xviii
failure to rescue, omissions liability, 
99–112
family ties benefits, in relation to, 
79–81
framework for analyzing, 75–97






parental responsibility laws, 112–18





Fastow, Andy, 156n15, 162n43
Fastow, Lea, 156n15, 162n43
Federal Bureau of Prisons
death of inmate, family and, 19





Fifth Amendment, 8, 158n4, 183n19
Filler, Dan, 116, 209n51, 209n52
Fineman,  Martha, 176n18, 179n60, 
210n61
First Amendment, 8, 183n19
Fletcher, George P., 174n9, 
178n51, 199n5
Franke, Katherine, 200n13
Frase, Richard S., 169n120, 204n45
Free Exercise Law, 183n19
Friends
obligations to rescue each other, 
111–12, 209n43
testimonial privileges, 183–84n23
Fugitives, families harboring, 6–8, 43–45
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of the Later-Day Saints 
(FLDS), 129
Furlough policies, prisons, 17, 54
G





child support, non-payment of, 
143–44
family ties burdens, 84, 97
incest, 125–26
parental duties to rescue children, 
105–08
parental responsibility laws, 117–18
parental support, non-payment of, 146
Genetic defects, 123
Genty, Philip, 172n144, 187n61, 189n74, 
189n75
Gertner, Nancy, 167n106
Dan Markel-index.indd   226 2/26/09   9:41:54 PM
index 227
Goals beyond family promotion, burdens 
as devices, 78–79
“Good Samaritan” statutes, 192n6
Goodstein, Laurie, 198n83
Graham, Bradley, 193n20, 196n56, 
198n81
Grandparents






Harboring fugitives, 6–8, 43–45
Harris, Leslie Joan, 172n138, 193n24, 
195n51, 209n53
Hasday, Jill, 176n25, 178n45
Heteronormativity, 35, 47, 84, 125, 151, 
200n11, 220
Hills, Roderick M. Jr, ix, 88, 94, 175n14, 
199n8, 201n25, 201n27, 203n38, 
203n40
Homicide within the family, 46
Homosexuals. See also Same-sex 
partners
discrimination against, 208n40
Hopkins, C. Quince, 197n80, 218n133
Human trafficking, 87, 200n18
Husak, Douglas, 191n5, 204n46





crime and family ties benefits, 32
Incest, 63, 69–70
discrimination, 125–26














child support, non-payment of, 143–44
family ties burdens, 83–84
incest, 125–26
parental duties to rescue children, 
105–08
parental responsibility laws, 117–18
parental support, non-payment of, 146
Infidelity
as “adequate provocation” for 
manslaughter, 10–11
Inmates. See Prisons
Innocent third parties, impact of 
punishment on, 52, 55, 188n69
Intrafamilial privileges, 5–6




Jeffs, Warren, 197n70, 200n18, 214n97
Johnson, Dirk, 12, 14, 156n14, 162n43, 
166n96, 167n102, 171n132, 182n8, 
187n57, 196n63, 197n70, 200n18, 
217n128
Johnson, Kirk, 12, 14, 156n14, 162n43, 
166n96, 167n102, 171n132, 182n8, 
187n57, 196n63, 197n70, 200n18, 
217n128
Justice




Kaczynski, David, xi, xii, 6, 155n1, 155n3, 
161n37, 161n41
Kaczynski, Ted, xi, xii, 6
Katyal, Neal Kumar, 185n34




Kleinfeld, Judge, 32, 168n109, 181n67
Knauer, Nancy, 178n44, 200n11
Kovach, Gretel C., 197n70
Dan Markel-index.indd   227 2/26/09   9:41:56 PM
index228
Kreit, Alex, 116, 209n48, 209n50
Kuo, Susan, 193n21
L
Lee, Youngjae, ix, 155n7, 156n10, 156n12, 
192n17, 204n45, 208n38
Leib, Ethan, 173n161, 183–84n23, 
201n23, 201n24, 201–2n27, 202n30, 
202n31, 203n36, 203n41, 203–4n42, 
205n3, 206n15, 208n41, 209n43, 
210n62, 211n70
Leslie, Christopher R., 157n24, 193n24, 
198n82
Levine, Kay, 179n60, 182n12, 211n74
Levinson, Sanford, 183n23
Liability
failure to rescue, 59, 63–65, 99–112
parents’ liability for actions of children, 
66–67, 193ns22–23, 194–95ns38–40




and child support, non-payment of, 
140–41
and incest, 120–22
and parental responsibility laws, 113–14
and parental support, non-payment 
of, 145
Lieber, Francis, 216n113
Logan, Wayne, ix, 26–7, 39, 165n84, 
176n31, 177n32, 177n34, 177n38, 
177n39, 178n45, 178n46, 178n47, 
184n28
M
Madoff, Bernie, xi, 58
Mahoney, Margaret, 179n60, 196n58, 
211n66, 211n68




and family ties benefits, 10–11
Marital-communication privilege. See 




historical context, 27, 177n39
Markel, Dan, 168n112, 173n161, 179n57, 
179n58, 180–81n63, 187n58, 187n59, 
188n64, 188n65, 200n10, 201n24, 
203n36, 203n41, 205n3, 211n70, 
211n72, 211n74, 212–13n84, 214n85, 
219n143
McClain, Linda, 157n23, 176n17, 176n18, 
176n22
McDonnell, Brett, 196n61, 196n64, 





and child support, non-payment of, 
141–43
and incest, 122–25
parental duties to rescue children, 
104–05
and parental responsibility laws, 
114–17
and parental support, non-payment of, 
145–46
Metteer, Christine, 127, 213n90





child support, non-payment of, 141–43
incest, 122–25
parental duties to rescue children, 
104–05
parental responsibility laws, 114–17
parental support, non-payment of, 
145–46
Minority communities




grand jury testimony, 160n27
incest, 124–25
sexual relations between, 212–13n84
Model Penal Code
and family ties benefits, 8, 10–11
Monogamy, 129–39, 217n132
Dan Markel-index.indd   228 2/26/09   9:41:57 PM
index 229
Mother and Infants Nurturing Together 
(MINT), 18, 56
Murder. See Homicide; Sheinbein family
Murray, Melissa, ix, 106, 167n100, 
174n1, 206n16, 206n21, 206n22
N
Neglect, children. See Child abuse and 
neglect
“No-drop” policies, police, 27, 177
Nourse, Victoria, 165n82
O
O’Hear, Michael, ix, 88, 93–4, 184n32, 
201n24, 201n27, 202n34, 202n35, 
203n39, 208n39
Omissions liability. See Failure to rescue, 
omissions liability
Opt-in registry, xviii–xiv, 203n39
P
Parental discipline defenses, 9–10
Parental duties to rescue children 








voluntary caregiving and 
limits, 100–04








Parental support, non-payment of, 63, 
72–73
discrimination, 146








voluntary caregiving, generally, 88
Parents, liability for actions of children
civil liability, 193n22
criminal liability, 66–67, 193n23, 
194–95ns38–40





Placement policies, prisons, 18
Plato, 23
Pollard, Deanna, 46, 164n68, 164n69, 
164n71, 165n74, 186n51
Pollard, Jonathan, 46, 164n68, 164n69, 
164n71, 165n74, 186n51
Posner, Eric, 18, 200n15
Posner, Judge, 18, 200n15
Polygamy. See Bigamy
Power and patriarchy, 26–27
Pretrial release and family ties benefits, 
12, 46–48
Prison policies
and family ties benefits, 16–19, 53–56
substance abuse programs, 172n139
Prisons. See also Prison policies
death of inmate, family and, 19
distance, impact on decrease in crime, 
189n77
furlough policies, 17, 54
mother inmates and children of, 18, 56
nieces and nephews, prison visitations, 
172n142
placement of inmates within prison, 55
placement policies, 18
visitation policies, 16–17, 54
Proximity as basis for caregiving 
obligation, 93, 202n35
R
Raeder, Myrna, ix, 18, 52, 157n24, 167–
68n106, 169n117, 173n152, 173n155, 
173n157, 180n63, 186n55, 187n60, 
188n67, 188n70
Ramsey, Carolyn, 164n63, 214n94
Dan Markel-index.indd   229 2/26/09   9:41:58 PM
index230




Regan, Milton, 157n24, 158n6, 175n11, 
182n7, 182n8, 185n35, 199n7
Relatives’ obligations to rescue each other, 
111–12
Religious views
and incest laws, 212n78
Repronormativity, 84, 125, 151, 220n2
Roberts, Dorothy E., 176n29, 180n63
Robinson, Paul H., 175n15, 184n33, 
190n82
Robson, Ruthann, 127, 178n44, 201n20, 
201n22, 204n43, 214n91
Rosenblum, Nancy L., 217n126
Rosenbury, Laura, ix, 178n49, 179n56, 
205n6, 208n41
S
Sandel, Michael J., 175n12, 208n37
Sanger, Carol, 205n9, 206n23, 215n112
Same-sex partners, 90, 105–06, 203n39
adoption, 105–06, 206n17, 206n19
civil union laws, 208n41
evidentiary privileges, 22
family ties benefits, 174n2
marriage, illegal, 198n83
Scheffler, Samuel, 25, 175n13, 176n26, 
204n42
Scott, Elizabeth, ix, 155n1, 158n5, 164n63, 
190n82, 198n90, 202n31
Sentencing
discounts, family ties benefits, 
48–53




Sexual assault. See Rape
Sexual misconduct, 122
and family ties benefits, 11
“Shall arrest” policies, police, 27
Sheinbein family, xi–xii, 58, 
155–56ns6–12
Sheinbein, Samuel, xi, xii, 58, 155n7, 
156n8, 156n10, 156n11, 156n12, 
157n17
Siblings
family ties benefits, 161n37, 161n40
incest, 124–25
obligations to rescue each other, 
111–12
Siegel, Reva B., 177n37
Sigman, Shayna, 133, 214n95, 214n103, 
215n105, 215n107, 215n110, 216n114, 









Spousal abuse. See also Violence within 
the family
historical context, 26–27
Spousal obligations to rescue each other, 
108–11
Spousal privileges, 4–5. See also 
Evidentiary privilege, family ties 
benefits
exceptions, 182n7
immunity privilege, 4, 36
Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, 133, 168n116
State and family, relationship, 23–25
Stone, Deborah, 24, 158n5, 158n7, 159n15, 
176n19, 176n20, 182n6
Stout, David, 220n148
Strassberg, Maura, 131–2, 214n95, 




Sugarman, Stephen D., 220n2
Suk, Jeannie, ix, 164n66, 166n94, 
178n42
Sunstein, Cass, 188n64, 213n86, 213n88
Swigart, Jane, 206n20
T
Taylor, Charles, 3, 158n1, 158n5, 158n7, 
159n15, 165n77, 175n12, 182n6, 
184n28
Time-deferred sentencing, 35
Travis, Jeremy, 172n141, 173n1
Dan Markel-index.indd   230 2/26/09   9:41:59 PM
index 231
Tronto, Joan, 176n19
Tuerkheimer, Deborah, 152, 221n7
Turley, Jonathan, 197n71
U
United States Sentencing Commission 
(USSC)
and family ties benefits, 13–15, 
48–49




family life and values, burdens as 
devices for promoting, 77–78
Vicarious liability, xiii, 115
Violence within the family
failure to rescue, 59, 63–65, 99–112
and family status, 59








and child support, non-payment of, 
140–41
family status, overcoming, 90–95
and incest, 120–22
limits of, 100–04
opt-in registry, xviii–xix, 21, 92–93, 
102–05, 110–12, 146, 152, 202n31, 
203n39, 209n43
parental duties to rescue children, 
100–04
and parental responsibility laws, 113–14
and parental support, non-payment of, 
144–48







voluntary caregiving, 93, 202n35
W
Weinstein, Jack, 168n106, 187n60
Weisberg, D. Kelly, ix, 208n40, 219n145
Westen, Peter, 179n62, 180n62
Wigmore, John H., 38, 158n2, 158n8, 
182n5, 183n20, 184n25, 184n26, 
184n30
“Wigmore Test,” 183n20
Williams, Joan, 176n21, 195n46, 195n47, 
200n16
Wright, Ron, ix, 166n90, 167n106, 177n40, 
186n54, 215n105, 218n135
Z
Zelinsky, Edward A., 205n9
Zimring, Franklin, 186n48
Dan Markel-index.indd   231 2/26/09   9:42:00 PM
Dan Markel-index.indd   232 2/26/09   9:42:01 PM
